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Preface
This book answers questions you’ve probably never thought to ask—such as:
•

What do Ronald Reagan and Bobby Kennedy have in common? (They both participated in top-secret wargames.)

•

How many times was Pearl Harbor attacked by air on a Sunday morning? (At least
three times; first in 1932 by the U.S. Navy during a live wargame, then in October
1941 by the Imperial Japanese Navy during an operations planning wargame, and
1
finally on 7 December 1941 by “naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.”)

•

Which came first, civilization or wargaming? (A trick question: it appears that civilization and wargaming began at the same time and place.)

This preface answers three more-serious questions about this book: why you should
read it, why I wrote it, and how it was created.
Why Should You Read This Book?
If you are simply interested in reading something that is both entertaining and “time
well spent,” that’s a good enough reason to read this book. Along the way you will learn
about H. G. Wells’s least accurate (or, we hope, most premature) prediction. You will
meet military mavericks and learn the rest of the story on historical events you probably
think you already know.
If you are serving in the military and are looking to discharge your duties at a lower cost
in blood, time, and treasure, you should read this book. If you are a new private, a senior
general, or a political appointee, you will find in this book insights relevant at your level.
If you are a parent concerned about the level of violence in video games and the increasingly competitive world your children live in, this book is for you. I describe how parents can use wargaming to help their children develop their ability to think strategically
and compete effectively.
If you are a voter looking to have a better understanding of national defense, this book
shows you how many key decisions are made.
If your business is business, this book describes the increasingly widespread use of
wargame-like techniques in that world. At a time when businesses are competing with
not only companies down the street but also government-owned companies halfway
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around the world, businesspeople need every edge they can get. The techniques described in this book can provide an important one.
If you are interested in helping to build a more prosperous, peaceful world, you’ll find
in my conclusion an assertion that while wargames have long been used to make victory
more likely, they have the potential to help make peace more enduring as well.
Why Did I Write the Book?
I started this book for a utilitarian reason: in 1997, I needed a text for my Air Force Air
Command and Staff College elective on wargaming. I kept working on it for different
reasons. As I researched the history of wargaming, I became more and more convinced
that wargaming was an exceptionally powerful tool. Wargaming has had a huge impact,
for good and for ill, on the shape of the world in which we live today. Unfortunately, the
people who had a major impact on wargaming itself are unknown not only to the general
public but also, largely, to today’s military. This struck me as both unjust and dangerous.
I also observed that the art, science, and application of wargaming are not always passed
on to the next generation. History seems to show that, when used effectively, wargaming
provides a powerful advantage, while wargame amnesia contributes to higher casualties.
This led to another realization—that it would not be enough simply to tell the story of
wargaming. Even if the story convinced readers to wargame, gaming in itself would not
ensure success. It was clear from my research that wargaming had become global, that
our adversaries would almost inevitably be wargaming too. I needed to write a book to
help our side gain greater value from wargaming than that gained by our adversaries.
As I worked to complete the book, I developed a final motive. I became convinced that
wargames—or, more broadly, simulation gaming techniques—could be valuable tools
for other purposes. Wargame-like techniques could help us compete more effectively
economically, ultimately enabling us to afford a more effective defense. Ultimately,
wargames could also help develop strategists committed to, and strategies for, a more
peaceful and prosperous world.
How Was This Book Developed?
If success has a thousand fathers, this book should be very successful. I gave my first
2
talk on the history of wargaming at the Origins wargaming conference in 1990. I’ve
given an updated version of that talk several times every year since, at venues ranging
from the German War College to the Pentagon. I frequently picked up leads from my
listeners.
Further, from 1997 until 2005 I taught the wargaming elective at the Air Force’s Air
Command and Staff College. My fellow instructors, guest lecturers, and students
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provided many remarkable insights that have shaped my current thoughts on the potential of wargaming and on game techniques in general.
I have received the most valuable insight and encouragement, however, from participants at the wargaming community’s annual gathering, Connections. Since 1993 Connections has brought together academic and recreational wargame practitioners and
military people from every service, from across the United States and around the world.
Finally, my colleagues throughout the U.S. and allied militaries—especially Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, the Air Force Materiel Command, and the Air Force Research
Laboratory—have taught me much about wargaming and its applications.
So, while the acknowledgments section thanks many who helped over the decades, the
real list is much longer. This book is truly the work of the wargame community. Still,
any misquotes or misinterpretations are mine alone.
So, What’s Next?
The introduction starts with a description of a fairly recent wargame, one that shaped
the world we live in today. Next there is a quick “Wargaming 101” description of
wargaming, for a basic understanding of principles and vocabulary. It concludes with
my case for the systematic use of history.
Part 1, “The History of Wargaming,” takes up the bulk of the book and is its heart. It
traces the impact of wargames on history from the earliest civilizations to the time of
this writing. Along the way it introduces the men who have had impact on wargaming
and also wargames that, in turn, have influenced history.
Part 2 is the payoff—how to get the most value from wargaming. It explains why
wargaming is effective and how leaders, practitioners, and participants can increase
that effectiveness. Finally, it describes how people, from parents to presidents, can use
wargames to support their specific needs.
The conclusion begins with a brief look back and then asks, How do we want wargaming to evolve in the future? It then suggests a way wargaming could evolve, from a tool
to help win wars to one to help avoid war in the first place. The book closes with an
illustration of such a use of wargaming, to help achieve the highest form of victory—a
just and lasting peace.

matt caffrey
Dayton, Ohio
2017
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Notes
1. In addition, such an attack was described in several books written before 1941, including one by Billy
Mitchell.
2. Origins is an international gaming conference overseen by the Game Manufacturers Association.

Acknowledgments
No one who works on a book for twenty-five years can remember all who helped. It is
even more difficult in my case because I have received so much help from so many. Here
is a partial list.
First I want to thank Dave Ross. He was one of the first to help and reviewed final drafts
while visiting a new grandson. Mike Garrambone was also one of the first to help. As a
past president of the Military Operations Research Society he has helped a great many
wargame practitioners. Also, early on I was helped and inspired by the research and
writing skills of my fellow student of wargaming Dave Lee. Of course the standard for
wargame scholarship has been set and maintained by Dr. Peter P. Perla, author of The
Art of Wargaming. I also need to thank Al Nofi, James Dunnigan, and Mark Herman,
each a giant in the field of wargaming, for their patience with my simple questions.
Finally, the friendship and encouragement of Larry Bond have been invaluable over the
long haul.
A book on a subject as broad as wargaming could not be attempted without folks willing
to help in a host of areas:
U.S. commercial: Michael Peck and Rex Brynen
U.S. joint: Cdr. Phil Pournelle, Adam Frost, Martin Jerome, and Margaret McCown
U.S. Air Force: Col. Walter Ward Jr., Sam Bolen, John Harris, Mort Rolleston, and Dave
Newsom
U.S. Army: Col. Kevin Felix, James Lunsford, James Sterrett, Mike Dunn, Randall D.
Grigg, Paul Works, Robert Mihara, and Gregory “Greg” Andreozzi
U.S. Navy: Dean Robert “Barney” Rubel, Dr. Stephen Downes-Martin, Paul Vebber,
Chris Weuve, Thomas Culora, Hank Brightman, Peter Pellegrino, Douglas Ducharme,
James FitzSimonds, Craig Koerner, William Murray, Shawn Burns, and Don Marrin
U.S. Marine Corps: Dr. William Lademan, Col. Eric Walters, Col. Phillip Ridderhof,
William “Bill” Simpson, Greg Thiele, Don Chappell, Brendan McBreen, Paul Nichols,
Rodney Parker, Gregg Pickell, Tim Jackson, and T. X. Hammes
U.S. intelligence community: Daniel Flynn

x  the newport papers

United Kingdom: Maj. Tom Mouat, John Curry, Professor Philip Sabin, Graham
Longley-Brown, Colin Marston, Adrian Timberlake, Ian Mitchell, James King, Tony
Hopkin, and Paul Syms
Australia: Todd Mason
Canada: Brian Train
Of course a book has no impact until it is actually published. I want to thank my boss
Dr. Rick McClelland for helping me get my proposal to the Navy in shape. My thanks
to Tim Wilkie for organizing my informal outside readers who provided invaluable
feedback as my manuscript progressed. I have thanked many of my readers above.
Those I thank now are Maj. John DeLateur, Eddy Sterckx, Fred Cameron, Joseph Saur,
Joseph Miranda, Mike Robel, Dan Novak, and Mike Condray. My thanks also to my
two official outside readers, Dean Robert Rubel and Dr. William Lademan, for their
invaluable help in getting the manuscript ready enough for the Naval War College Press.
A special thanks to the Naval War College Press—Dr. Cary Lord, Robert Ayer, and my
editor, Pelham Boyer—for their patience and their skill taking the manuscript through
to publication.
Finally, my thanks to all who came up after my talks on wargaming and told me something I did not know.

List of Acronyms, Abbreviations, Terms, and Jargon

A

A2/AD

antiaccess / area denial

A5SW

Wargaming Division (Headquarters, U.S. Air Force)

AAM

air-to-air missile

AAN

Army After Next

AB

air base

ABACUS
		

Advanced BAttlefield CompUter Simulation (United
Kingdom)

ABCA
		

American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New
Zealand Armies Program

ABSG

Army Battle Simulation Group (Australia)

ACC

Air Combat Command

ACE

Advanced Concepts Event

ACES

Air Force Command Exercise System

ACSC

Air Command and Staff College

ACTS

Air Corps Tactical School

ADFWC

Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre

adjudication
		

Determination of the net effect of Blue and
Red actions during a wargame

AETC

Air Education and Training Command

AFAMS

Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation

AFB

Air Force Base

AFGSC

Air Force Global Strike Command

AFMC

Air Force Materiel Command

AFRL

Air Force Research Laboratory
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AFSAA

Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency

AFSPC

Air Force Space Command

AFWC

Air Force Wargaming Center

AFWI

Air Force Wargaming Institute

AH

Avalon Hill Games Inc.

AI

artificial intelligence

alt force
		

Alternative force, i.e., different from a baseline/
programmed force structure

AMC

Air Mobility Command

AMD

antimissile defense

AMSO

Army Models and Simulation Office

analysis
		

In wargame context, the effort to derive insights from
wargame outcomes through quantitative means

analytical wargame
		

Wargame designed and conducted in such a way to
maximize its contribution to a larger analytical effort

AOR

area of responsibility (often the theater of combat)

AOSI

Army Office Staff Instruction (Australia)

AP

airport

APS

Air and Space Power Symposium

ARGUS

Advanced Real-Time Gaming Universe Simulation

ARPA

Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASM

air-to-surface missile

assessment
		
ASW

Qualitative process of drawing lessons from wargame
outcomes. Distinct from adjudication
Army Simulation Wing (Australia)

attrition
		
		

Loss of personnel or equipment. Losses are typically
either permanent (death/sinking) or temporary
(sickness, wounds/breakdowns, battle damage)

attrition warfare
		

Style of warfare that focuses on gaining an advantage by
inflicting disproportional attrition of the adversary
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AWGC

Army War Gaming Centre (Australia)

AWL
		

Airborne Weapons Layer (developmental air-launched
layer of AMD)

B

BBS

Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation

BCTP

Battle Command Training Program

BDA
		

Battle Damage Assessment (estimate of physical
damage—not indirect effects)

BEF

British Expeditionary Force

BGWG

Battle Group Wargame

Blue team

Friendly forces

board wargame
		
		
		

Wargame conducted using a map (often mounted),
counters (typically cardboard), printed rules/tables,
manual random-number generators (dice), and a live
opponent (almost always)

BOGSAT
		

“Bunch of Guys Sitting around a Table,” i.e.,
adjudication through judgment

branch plan
		

Supplement to the main plan that is activated if
anticipated but not expected conditions are met

break points
		
		

Conditions (mainly casualties) that cause a unit to cease
its current function. Units on attack go over to the
defense, units on defense run

C

command and control

C2

C4ISR
		

command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CAA

Center for Army Analysis

CAD

Conflict Analysis Division

CADRE
		

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and
Education

CAMMS

Computer Assisted Map Maneuver System

CAPE

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD)
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CAS

close air support (a.k.a. joint counterland operations)

CASL

Center for Applied Strategic Learning

CAST

Command and Staff Training (United Kingdom)

CATT

Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (United Kingdom)

CCTT

Close Combat Tactical Trainer

CENTCOM

U.S. Central Command

CFACC

combined forces air component commander

CFC

combined forces commander

CFLCC

combined forces land component commander

CFMCC

combined forces maritime component commander

CFSOCC
		

combined forces special operations component 		
commander

CGSC

Command and General Staff College

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CJCS

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJTF

commander, joint task force

closed game
		

Wargame in which Blue and Red teams know only what
they would know under similar real-world conditions

CM

cruise missile

CNO

Chief of Naval Operations

COA

course of action (typically basic strategy options)

COA wargame
		
		
COCOM
combined
		
complexity

Relatively “quick and dirty” wargame conducted
to explore, typically, three COAs to clarify the likely
outcomes of each before a final strategy is selected
combatant commander
Force, operation, or commander with elements of
multiple countries
In wargame terms, the breadth of factors considered

computer wargame Wargame conducted using a computer. Adjudication
		
rules and random-number generation are programmed.
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CONARC

Continental Army Command

CONOPS

concept of operations

Control cell
		

Element of the White team that is in charge of the
wargame

COSS

Center for Operational and Strategic Studies (Soviet)

COTS

commercial-off-the-shelf

CPX

command-post exercise

CRES

Command Readiness Exercise System

CRT
		

D

Opponents are either directed by an artificialintelligence routine or live via network

Combat Results Table (used in stochastic determination
of outcomes)

CS21

“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”

CSE

Central Studies Establishment (Australia)

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCA

defensive counterair (the defense of friendly airspace)

DDWSA
		
DEAD

Deputy Director for Wargaming, Simulation and
Analysis
destruction of enemy air defenses

decision cycle
		

Process followed to make and implement a decision
during armed conflict

decision-support
wargame
		

Wargame designed and conducted in such a way as to
maximize relevance, accuracy, and timeliness of
insights provided to decision makers

design
		

Basic architecture of a wargame; typically reflects
decisions on type, scenario, complexity, granularity

design elegance
		

Extent to which game design maximizes accuracy while
minimizing difficulty of execution

deterministic
		

Method of adjudication that attempts to establish the
single most likely outcome and does not vary it
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DMSO

Defense Modeling and Simulation Office

DoD

Department of Defense

Dstl
		

E

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (United
Kingdom)

DVTE

Deployable Virtual Training Environment

DWG

Divisional Wargame (United Kingdom)

EADSIM

Extended Air Defense Simulation

EBO

effects-based operations

EBW

Entropy Based Warfare (game)

educational
wargame
		
		

Wargame designed and conducted in such a way as to
maximize effectiveness of the wargame as an aid to
education. Effectiveness depends on the optimum
trade-off between relevance, accuracy, and time needed

ENWGS

Enhanced Naval Wargame System

epoch year

Year in which the scenario of a wargame is set

EW
		
EWR

electronic warfare; Expeditionary Warrior (game)
[followed by two-digit year]
early-warning radar

exercise
		
		

Military maneuver or simulated wartime operation.
May or may not also be a wargame depending on the
presence of a Red team and adjudication of outcomes

experiment
		
		
		

Test under controlled conditions intended to prove or
disprove a hypothesis. Wargames are not experiments, as
they are not controlled—Blue and Red can choose
options that they decide best serve their interests

experimentation
		
		

Multifaceted program that explores options for
innovation. Wargaming can be one element of
experimentation

F

facilitator
		
		
		

Individual assigned to a team or cell to improve its
effectiveness. A facilitator may be an individual who is
an expert on the software the team/cell will use or an
individual to mentor the team lead
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FASOC
		

Future Air and Space Operating Concepts
(RAF wargame) [or with two-digit year]

FCC
		

functional combatant commander (joint functional
command, e.g., USTRANSCOM)

FFRDC

federally funded research and development corporation

FG
		

Futures Game (Aerospace Future Capabilities Wargame)
[or followed by two-digit year]

fidelity
		

Degree to which the modeling, simulation, and
wargaming reproduce the real world (see realism)

FOB

forward operating base

fog of war
		
		

Uncertainty about friendly, adversary, and
environmental conditions experienced by leaders in
armed conflict

friction
		

Propensity of unexpected delays to occur during armed
conflicts

G

game
		
game director

Multisided competition governed by preestablished
rules
Individual responsible for the execution of a wargame

game truth
		

Current actual situation within a wargame, as distinct
from the Blue or Red perception of it

GCC
		

geographic combatant command (joint theater
command, e.g., USCENTCOM)

GHQ

General Headquarters

GLOMO

Global Mobility Exercise

GLOMO/ACS

Global Mobility and Agile Combat Support Exercise

GO/FO

general officer / flag officer

granularity
		

H

Degree of detail at which the considered aspects of
warfare are depicted

grognard

Longtime wargamer

HALE

high-altitude, long-endurance
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hexes
		
		
		
HLA

Six-sided shapes (hexagons); both map/board and
computer wargames sometimes overlay the depicted
conflict area with a grid of hexes to make the calculation
of movement and ranges easier
high-level architecture

hot wash
		
		
		
		

Discussion by wargame participants on both insights
into warfighting and ideas for improving future
wargames; typically held with all participants at the end
of the wargame, though during larger wargames they are
sometimes held by individual teams daily

hybrid wargame
		
		

Wargame that uses multiple adjudication methods, e.g.,
stochastic for combat outcomes, expert panel for
diplomatic outcomes

I

IAP

international airport

IDA

Institute for Defense Analyses

IED

improvised explosive device

IPL
		

Integrated Priority List (list of needs compiled by GCCs
and FCCs through wargaming)

ISC
		
		
		

Integrated Security Construct (set of scenarios for
hypothetical future conflicts; among other uses ISC
must be used as the basis for the scenarios for each
service’s Title 10 wargames)

J

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ITEM

Integrated Theater Engagement Model

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JLASS

Joint Land Air Sea Simulation

JOA

joint operating area

joint
		

Force, operation, or commander with elements of
multiple services

JRTC

Joint Readiness Training Center

JSCP

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
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JSIMS

Joint Simulation System

JTASC

Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center

JTLS

Joint Theater Level Simulation

JWARS

Joint Warfare System

JWD

Joint Wargames Division

JWFC

Joint Warfighting Center

JWID

Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration

K

KORA/OA
		

Simulation Model for Officer Training at Corps
Level (Germany)

Kriegsspiel
		

German for “wargame.” Early wargames used around
the world were often called Kriegsspiels

L

laydown
		
LCWI

Actual location of forces, especially at the outset of a
game or move
LeMay Center Wargaming Institute

levels of war
		
		
		

Concept that divides all warfare into three levels:
strategic, operational, and tactical. In general a single
wargame can only depict one of these levels, as the time
required for both decision cycles and events varies by level

live wargame
		

Wargame that involves the actual maneuver of forces,
e.g., Red Flag

LVC
		
		
		
		

A live, virtual, and constructive wargame combines all
three methods of wargaming—e.g., brigade training at
the Army’s National Training Center involves two
battalions in live maneuver, a third battalion and forces
on flanks participating virtually

M

modeling and simulation

M&S

MAD
		
MAGTF
maneuver
		

Military Assessment of Disruptive Technologies
(Canada)
Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Movement of military forces, typically to gain an
advantage over an adversary
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maneuver (warfare) Style of warfare where the principal method used to
		
gain an advantage over the adversary is maneuver
manual wargame
MCMSMO
		

Any wargame not requiring the use of computers
Marine Corps Modeling and Simulation Management
Office

MCWAC

Marine Corps Wargaming and Analysis Center

MEB

Marine expeditionary brigade

MEF

Marine expeditionary force

miniatures
wargame

Type of wargame played on a 3-D model of terrain with
3-D representations of the engaged forces

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MoD

Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)

model
		
		

Static, scaled representation of reality; examples
include equations, scale maps, a small 3-D version of a
larger object

Monte Carlo
		
		

Method of adjudication that attempts to replicate the
range of outcomes plausible in the real world (see
stochastic)

morale
		

Willingness of a force to continue its assigned missions;
may or may not be addressed in a specific wargame

MORS
move 0
		
		
		

N

Military Operations Research Society
First move of some wargames, used to deploy forces
and otherwise prepare for the beginning of hostilities.
Move 0s can also familiarize participants with
procedures, software, and each other

MTM

McClintock Theater Model

MTR

military technical revolution

NASM

National Air and Space (Warfare) Model

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVMSMO

Navy Modeling and Simulation Management Office
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NCO

noncommissioned officer

NDU

National Defense University

NEWS

Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator

NMSG

NATO Modelling and Simulation Group

NSGC

National Strategic Gaming Center

NTC

National Training Center

NWC

Naval War College

NWGS

Naval Warfare Gaming System

OB

order of battle (the forces available)

objective

Purpose for which an activity is conducted

OCA

offensive counterair

OEF-A

Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan

OIF

Operation Iraqi Freedom

OKH

Supreme High Command of the Army (Germany)

OODA

observe, orient, decide, act

OPEC

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

open game
		

Game where everything is visible to all players. Chess
and checkers are open games

operational art
		
		

Military concept holding that the skillful
orchestration of forces can improve the outcome of
campaigns

O

OPFOR

opposition forces (also known as Red or enemy forces)

OPLAN

operations plan

OPR

officer of primary responsibility

OR

operations research

ORI

operational readiness inspection

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD/NA
		

Office of the Secretary of Defense / Net Assessment
Office
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outbrief
		
		

Formal presentation of wargame outcomes and initial
insights conducted at the conclusion of the wargame,
typically to the wargame’s sponsor

P

PACAF

Pacific Air Forces

participant

Anyone who works in a wargame, in any capacity

PED
		

processing, exploitation, and dissemination (bridge
between sensors and users)

PFE
		

Programmed Force Extended (future force if all
programs remain unaltered)

playability
		
		

Relative ease with which a wargame can be
conducted, a function of time to learn and convenience
and intuitiveness of execution

player
		
		

Person assigned to a team that makes decisions on the
employment of forces, typically a member of the Red or
Blue team (or other decision-making team, if used)

PME
policy game
		
		

Q
R

professional military education
Wargame played typically at the strategic level designed
not for insight into specific situations but for exploring
broad policies

pol-mil

political-military

PPBS

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

PSOM

Peace Support Operations Model

PSWG

Policy and Strategy Wargame

QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

QJMA

Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis

RAC

Research Analysis Corporation

RAF

Royal Air Force

RAND Corporation
		
		

Nonprofit research and analysis organization
originally formed by Douglas Aircraft to support the
Air Force, independent since 1948. Its name is a
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portmanteau of (rather than stands for) “research and
development,” or “R&D”

RARDE
		

Royal Armament Research and Development
Establishment

real time
		
		
		

A real-time wargame is one in which one minute of
game time takes one minute of actual time to elapse.
Sometimes any wargame that runs continually at
whatever relation to real time

realism
		

Degree to which a model, simulation, or wargame
matches the real-world entity of interest (see fidelity)

Red team
		
		

In military usage, adversary forces (see OPFOR); in
business usage, an exercise of playing devil’s advocate,
asking “What if?” and reviewing plans for gaps

RFI
		

In gaming, a formal request to Control for information
or clarification

RMA

revolution in military affairs

RMAS

Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst

road to war
		
		

Element of the scenario that describes how a situation
developed that would make the outbreak of hostilities
reasonably plausible to the players

role play
		
		

When a player is assigned to perform the functions of
a particular position, e.g., commander of Pacific Air
Forces, chief of an air operations center

S

RPA

remotely piloted aircraft

RSIOP

Red Single Integrated Operational Plan

S&T

Strategy & Tactics (magazine); science and technology

SACLANT

Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

SAGA

Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency

SAGD

Studies, Analysis and Gaming Division

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SAS

Strategic Analysis Simulation
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scale
		
		
		

Characteristics of games: time depicted by one turn, the
number of systems/people in one unit, the area
represented by one hex. Some wargames (most pol-mil
games) do not use a specific scale

scenario
		

“At start” situation of a wargame, including Blue and
Red orders of battle

SEAD

suppression of enemy air defenses

seminar wargame
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		

Wargame organized into either one seminar or a
seminar for each major team or player cell. Seminar
wargame moves usually consist of the players receiving
a move brief, discussing specified questions, issues,
and tasks, then sending their decisions to game control
or outbriefing to an umpire. Individuals participating in
seminar wargames may be appointed to role-play
specific positions, but all deliberations are conducted by
the entire cell. When a seminar wargame is organized as
a single seminar, developing Blue and Red moves as well
as adjudication is accomplished through a discussion of
the entire seminar

senior mentor
		
		

Typically a retired flag officer or equivalent with
experience relevant to a wargame’s objectives; provides
mentoring, insight, advice, and analysis

SF
showstopper
		
		
Simnet

Special Forces
Event that would likely cause the Blue or Red team
to want to adjust its move, e.g., casualties much heavier
or much lighter than expected
Simulation Network

SimoF
		

Simulation Model for Operational Command and
Control Exercises (Germany)

simulation
		

Model operated on over time, to a scale representation
of a real-world process

SIOP
SME
		

Single Integrated Operational Plan
subject-matter expert (on any team/cell, though most
often in adjudication)
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SOF

special operations forces

sortie

Single flight by a single aircraft

SPI

Simulations Publications Inc.

SSCW

Scientific Support in Crisis and War

SSG
		
SSM

surface-to-surface missile

STAG

Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group

stochastic
		
		

T

Strategic Studies Group (U.S. Navy); Strategic Studies
Group (Australian commercial game publisher)

Method of adjudication that attempts to replicate the
spectrum of outcomes plausible in the real world (see
Monte Carlo)

strategy

Basic idea for how a goal is to be obtained

TACAIR

tactical air

tactics

Methods of fighting effectively

TAM

Theater Analysis Model

TCRP

Tactical Command Readiness Program

technology game
		

Wargame designed not to gain insight into a specific
situation but to help explore technology options

TES

Tactical Engagement Simulator (United Kingdom)

TEWT

tactical exercise without troops

THAAD

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

TIB

Training Information Bulletin (series; Australia)

Title 10 wargame
		
		

Any of a series of wargames conducted by each of the
U.S. armed services addressing its duties under Title 10
of the U.S. Code to organize, train, and equip its forces

TPFDD
		

time-phased force and deployment data (the schedule of
when units and supplies will be deployed and to where)

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command

TSG

Technology Seminar Game
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turn-based
		
		
		

U

TWX

Theater War Exercise

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

UE

Unified Endeavor [or followed by two-digit year]

UN

United Nations

UQ

Unified Quest [or followed by two-digit year]

USA

U.S. Army

USAAF

U.S. Army Air Forces

USAF

U.S. Air Force

USAFE

U.S. Air Forces in Europe

USCENTCOM

[see CENTCOM]

USEUCOM

U.S. European Command

USJFCOM

U.S. Joint Forces Command

USMC

U.S. Marine Corps

USN

U.S. Navy

USPACOM

U.S. Pacific Command

USSOCOM

U.S. Special Operations Command

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Soviet Union)

USSTRATCOM

U.S. Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM

U.S. Transportation Command

V

vignette
		
		

W

Game in which Blue and Red can affect the progress of
the game only at discrete times, ideally at the same
interval as real-world decision cycles. Strategic and
operational wargames are typically turn based

war game
		
		

Mini-scenario, often used to jump ahead to game key
moments in less actual time than it would take to play
out the entire campaign
Application of game theory, typically by an operationsresearch professional, to gain insight into an armed
conflict
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WARCON
wargame
		
WARS

Wargame Construction Kit
Simulation game depicting armed conflict. Decisions
made by contending parties affect the future state
Warfare Analysis and Research System

White team
		
		

Players in a wargame responsible for control,
assessment, adjudication, playing roles of higher
headquarters, management, RFI response, and analysis

WISE
		

Wargame Infrastructure and Simulation
Environment (United Kingdom)

My thanks to Mr. William “Bill” Simpson, a civilian employee of the U.S. Marine
Corps, for contributing some of the above definitions and significantly improving
others.
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Introduction

The Road Not Taken
The line of armored vehicles snaked for miles through the streets of the city. The invasion had started well. Resistance along the border had been light, many enemy units
surrendering or simply melting away. Many of the soldiers had yet to fire their weapons
in anger.
Still, something was not right. Many had predicted that the invaders would be welcomed
as liberators, pelted by flowers and kisses from pretty girls, much like the liberation of
Paris. A few skeptics had predicted sullen crowds, resentful of any foreign troops in
their country. That had not happened either. The streets were empty—not a pretty girl,
not a resentful man, not a waving kid, not a stray dog in sight. It was enough to make
you nervous.
Meanwhile, a second group of soldiers crouched and waited. They could hear the sound
of the armored vehicles in the streets below but they were under strict orders not so
much as to look out a window. They had deployed more than twenty-four hours earlier
along the route their commanders had calculated the Americans would take through
the city—and the commanders had been right! Now the waiting was almost over. From
one end of the city to the other, young men checked their weapons one last time and
waited for a specific song to be played on the local radio station.
On the north side of town, an officer of the Saddam Fedayeen lay in a well-concealed
position. His job was to see the first American vehicle emerge from the northern edge of
the city. He was then to call a fellow officer standing by at the radio station. This second
officer would have the station personnel immediately play the song that would signal
soldiers hidden all along the American column to open fire.
The American soldiers in the lead vehicles were beginning to feel a bit better. It was
clear that they had left the most built-up part of the city. Soon they would be back into
the open desert. It was not good to drive tanks through cities. American tanks could
outrange any opponent, but in a city almost all fighting would be at short range. It
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would be like bringing a rifle to a fight in a phone booth—a knife would be more effective. Still, just a little bit farther, the lead tank commander thought to himself, and his
vehicle would be back in its element.
The first casualties were soldiers sitting on open hatches. From the city’s southern
entrance to its northern exit, the long convoy was ambushed all at once. Most of the
Fedayeen were armed with rifles and submachine guns, but some had rocket-propelled
grenades and other weapons capable of damaging or even destroying the “softer”
American vehicles. They also focused their firing as best they could on vehicles with extra antennae. They had been taught that these would probably be command vehicles and
that knocking them out would delay an American counterattack. Improvised explosive
devices stopped the lead vehicles, making it hard for those behind them to get out of the
city. Larger numbers of Fedayeen on the southern edge of the city slowed any American reinforcements. The Fedayeen believed the longer they could keep the Americans
stopped, strung out through the city in a thin line, the more Americans they would be
able to kill.
Suddenly the American soldiers found themselves in personal fights for survival,
without orders or direction. At first few even knew where to fire, as most of the Fedayeen had done a pretty good job of concealing their positions. But some had hidden
themselves poorly, and they were the first to receive return fire. Then, with the speed of
veterans, American soldiers—first in pairs, then in four-man fire teams, then squads,
then platoons—started attacking their ambushers. When a city block was cleared they
established small rear areas where the wounded could be brought and cared for in relative safety.
The American army’s headquarters in the theater, that of V Corps, was also quick to respond. The urban environment limited the use of artillery and airpower somewhat, but
ground forces not already committed started pushing into the city from the south on a
broad front, to surround and kill or capture the ambushers. They met some resistance at
the city’s edge, but they soon started rolling up the ambush.
Then, as suddenly as they had begun firing, the Fedayeen stopped. Their orders were
now to slip away to fight again another day.
Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, V Corps commander, stood listening to the casualty estimates. The dead and wounded were bad enough, but all the soldiers listed as missing . . .
Most would be prisoners of the enemy, an enemy with a track record of torturing prisoners for intelligence, then using them for propaganda purposes. Then there were the
destroyed and damaged vehicles, as well as the ammunition that had been expended or
destroyed. On top of all that was the loss of time. The strategy to achieve regime change
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required a fast dash to the capital. But it would take some time to reorganize after such
an attack.
“OK,” General Wallace announced to his staff, “I’m ending this wargame now. I think
we have established which plan of attack we will not be using. I want my G-3 [the staff
operations officer] along with the rest of our strategy team to bring me three new COAs
[courses of action] by 1600 this afternoon. I want the rest of you to reset the wargame so
we can run through the COA I pick starting at 0630 tomorrow morning.”
This battle never took place. But it might well have, but for a tool used by military establishments around the world—a tool called wargaming.
Strengths and Limitations
As this book will make clear, wargaming is literally as old as civilization. For the last
two hundred years, wargames have been preparing strategists, as well as strategies,
for specific battles. Modern wargaming has grown from the pastime of princes in one
medium-sized European country to a tool that supports decision makers, develops strategies, communicates, and entertains worldwide. Along the way wargames have shaped
the world in which we live, providing an edge, sometimes a decisive edge, to sides in
conflict that wargamed or that gamed more effectively than their opponents. Today
some wargames involve over six hundred participants and budgets in the millions, while
others run on your phone, for free.
Here is a demonstration of the power and the benefits of wargaming, as well as its limi1
tations. I first learned of this wargame from then–lieutenant general Wallace. At the
time, I was the professor of wargaming and campaign planning at the Air Force’s Air
Command and Staff College (ACSC). General Wallace had come to talk to our students
about his recent experiences in Iraq. We all remembered a statement—it was probably
the only one anybody remembered from the first phase of the Second Gulf War—that
was attributed to General Wallace. It had been widely reported that when our advance
slowed a little south of Baghdad General Wallace had said, “This was not the enemy we
wargamed against.”
At the time, ACSC had a nonattribution policy. To encourage our guests to speak
candidly, students (and faculty members) were not allowed to quote speakers without
their explicit permission. But General Wallace began his remarks, “Please quote me.” He
was furious at the press, not so much for getting the quote a little wrong, as it had, but
for taking what he did say so out of context as to turn a compliment into a criticism. He
wanted our help to get the word out on what he had really told the reporters, and he told
us what that was.
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General Wallace observed that we in the military all too often, when things go wrong,
point to an intelligence failure but when things go right are slow to give the intelligence
community the credit it deserves. To do his part to correct this tendency, General
Wallace had gone out of his way to praise the work of his intelligence folks. Before the
big wargame described above, those folks had identified a paramilitary force called
the “Saddam Fedayeen.” Intelligence had correctly estimated its size, level of training,
arms, and loyalty to Saddam—yes, they would fight. During his wargame, his team of
“Red players” had deployed the Saddam Fedayeen along what they guessed was the most
likely route of the U.S. advance—through southern Iraq’s cities. (In Iraq, most highways,
like those of the old U.S. highway system, run through the centers of cities and towns.)
As Red anticipated, the first COA devised by V Corps strategists called for a rapid advance along the shortest route to the capital Baghdad, straight through the cities along
the way.
When the wargame brought the “Red” plan and the “Blue” (V Corps) plan together, the
adjudicators determined that the most likely outcome would be the carnage described
above. Taking warning, General Wallace approved a new plan, one that bypassed all
Iraqi cities, by cutting across the desert to their west.
When the invasion actually took place, intelligence confirmed that large numbers of
Saddam Fedayeen were waiting to ambush our forces in the cities south of Baghdad. But
the United States, going around those cities instead of through them, suffered very few
casualties for the first several days. In fact, one of the only times we suffered heavy casualties was when a convoy took a wrong turn, entered a city, and finally gave the Saddam
Fedayeen someone to shoot at.
So why did General Wallace say, “This is not exactly the enemy we wargamed against”?
As the general later told the story, sometime between day fourteen and day sixteen of
the war Saddam figured out that we were not going to fight the way he had hoped we
would. He then contacted his Fedayeen commanders and told them to attack out from
the cities against the American lines of supply. General Wallace felt he could almost
hear the conversation:
Fedayeen commander: “But my men are equipped with short-range weapons; they have
not been trained to fight in the open country!”
Saddam: “What part of ‘attack out from the cities’ don’t you understand?”
General Wallace was particularly upset with the pundits, the talking heads, who described the new attacks as brilliant on Saddam’s part. Obviously, these “experts” had
said, Saddam had cunningly waited until our combat units had passed by before attacking their supply lines. But there was no “brilliant plan,” Wallace said. We had made his
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original plan ineffective, and he had come up with the best “plan B” he could. Still, the
Iraqis were now executing a new strategy, and in that sense they were no longer exactly
the enemy we had wargamed against.
I picked this wargame to open the book with because of how well it illustrates the
strengths and limitations of contemporary wargaming. The great strength of such
games should be self-evident: without this one there is no reason to believe V Corps
would have changed its plan. Scores of young Americans would have died, and our
entire campaign would have been slowed.
But this game also indicates some of wargaming’s current limitations. Obviously, the excellent job the intelligence community did in assessing the Saddam Fedayeen was a prerequisite for the game’s effectiveness. Just as obviously, there came a time when Saddam
decided his strategy was not working and changed it: How can intelligence anticipate
that or what “plan B” will be? The final limitation is hidden in plain sight: this wargame
covered only the first twenty-two days of the war. Those twenty-two days represented
a tiny fraction of our combat operations in Iraq; the casualties we suffered then were a
tiny fraction of all we were to suffer over years of fighting. Yet the members of General
Wallace’s staff were justly proud that they devised a wargame capable of looking as deep
as twenty-two days into the campaign. There were no techniques then available to help
them to look months ahead in the little time they had available.
The above is something of a microcosm of the rest of this book. I’ll describe wargames
throughout history and then propose conclusions that I hope you will judge to be
consistent with that history. I’ll then propose techniques that may help a spectrum of
individuals gain greater value from wargaming. Actually, this book is organized a little
bit like what I’ll call later on the “Caffrey Loop”; we start with the history of wargaming,
progress to some general theories, and then make some more-specific recommendations. While we will later discuss how that history informs how wargaming should be
defined, for now our working definition of “wargame” will be any multisided simulation
of armed conflict in which the decisions of the participants influence the outcomes. Up
next, a quick defense of the proposition that we can learn from history to begin with.
Applied History
It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know
for sure that just ain’t so.
MARK TWAIN

How do we know that what we know is so?
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If we lived during medieval times, the answer would probably have been “authority.” If
two positions were in disagreement, the correct one would be the one citing the higher
authority. So if a priest and a bishop differed, the bishop must be correct, all the way up
to the ultimate authority, the pope.
With the dawn of the modern age, the answer becomes “science.” Today the scientific
method is used to determine truth far beyond the bounds of the hard sciences. The
scientific method is an iterative process. A hypothesis is formed, and an experiment
is conducted; if the outcome is consistent with the hypothesis, the hypothesis gains
strength, and if not, scientists construct a new hypothesis that is consistent with all
known facts—at least, as of the last experiment. Hence, ideally, human understanding
advances as wrong hypotheses are replaced by less-wrong hypotheses.
The scientific method has served us well, providing the foundation for the engineering
and technological advances that allow us to live longer, more prosperous lives. There
is one problem with it: you cannot put Jupiter in a test tube. In other words, there are
certain areas of knowledge that do not lend themselves to experimentation. We cannot
create the solar system in a lab and then vary one element (such as the universal constant of gravitational attraction) and observe the result. There are several fields—such
as astronomy, meteorology, and, especially, the “softer” sciences, such as economics and
sociology—in which experiments are impossible or impractical. So how does science
advance in these fields?
Astronomers test their theories against observations. Meteorology got its start using
weather data that had been collected years earlier. Economists look for natural experiments, past economic occurrences where all the variables are the same as those in question—save one. In each case scientists use the scientific method of hypothesis testing,
but with observed data, not data generated for their exact purposes in a laboratory.
FIGURE 1

The Cycle, a.k.a. Strategy Cycle, Caffrey Loop, Innovation
Cycle

History
Theory

Doctrine
Plan
Execution

The next section of
the book provides the
“observed data” on
wargaming. I will then
propose a hypothesis
on wargaming. You
will not have to take
my word for any of my
assertions; you will be
able to compare those
assertions with the track
record of wargaming.
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In 1994 I envisioned a similar method, one designed to apply something like the scientific method to the design of military campaigns. The method—which is sometimes
called the “Caffrey Loop,” more often the “Strategy Cycle”—occurred to me during a
faculty meeting. The commandant of the Air Command and Staff College, Col. John
Warden at the time, had been given a mandate by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force to
shift the main focus of the school’s curriculum to planning joint air campaigns. The
question was asked: If we were to educate future air strategists, why were we still covering so much military, naval, and airpower history? I thought I knew why but felt I could
better express my thoughts on a whiteboard. As I spoke, I drew figure 1 for the first
time.
I started off by stating that history provided the air strategist an enormous tool kit of
examples. These examples included successes but also, perhaps even more importantly,
failures. The principal problem with using history as a tool for developing strategy is
that there is just so much of it. It may not be possible in a lifetime to learn all history, or
even just the airpower element of military history. Brevity, I argued, is the principal value of theory. Even the longest book on military theory is brief compared with the huge
scope of military history. Theorists have, between them, read, and typically lived, much
of the history of war. Just as a hypothesis needs to be checked against data, so theories of
war need to be checked against the history of warfare. When that is done and the theories have been validated or confirmed, they can be invaluable tools for strategists.
However, the principal shortcoming of theory is that individuals may adopt different
theories. Military organizations require the coordinated efforts of many individual
decision makers at different levels of command and, typically, geographic locations.
How can they work together as a team if they accept different theories? They can’t. That
is why military organizations develop and promulgate doctrine. At its simplest level,
doctrine is a collection of those theories an organization accepts as valid.
Still, because doctrine is intended for an entire organization, it must be kept general.
When military organizations address specific contingencies, they develop specific plans.
Of course, most contingencies never come to pass, and most military plans are never
executed. As the great American philosopher Yogi Berra said, “I’ve been through some
2
terrible things in my life, and some of which actually happened.” Sometimes events
similar to an anticipated contingency have occurred, and a little bit of new history is
made.
I conclude by cautioning that new history, however, needs to be viewed in the context of
all previous history. Too often, recent events have been either dismissed as anomalous or
thought to make all previous history irrelevant. Both extremes have at times contributed
to decisions that had tragic consequences.
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Finally, if this book is to serve as part of a cycle to improve wargaming, that cycle must
be completed by you the reader. Only you can take wargame history that occurs after
this book goes to press and consider it in the context of the previous history of wargaming. Then you will be in a position to replace my incorrect theories of wargaming with
your own less incorrect theories.

Notes		
1. General Wallace went on to receive his fourth
star and to command the Army Training
and Doctrine Command from 2005 until his
retirement in 2008.

2. Per The Yale Book of Quotations. Mark Twain
earlier made a similar point, though uncharacteristically he was less succinct.

PART ONE
The History of Wargaming

CHAPTER ONE

The Rise of Modern Wargaming
Prehistory to 1913

1

Wargames are as old as civilization—and perhaps older. In his informative and entertaining Public Broadcasting series Connections, James Burke argued that the first
2
invention, the one that enabled all later inventions, was the plow. It allowed agriculture,
and as agriculture permitted denser populations, the frequency of inventions increased,
due either to “connecting” with new applications or combining with other inventions to
create one that was greater than the sum of its parts.
First-Generation Wargames: Prehistory until 1810
I would argue that the first invention actually came long before the plow. Humans’
development of language allowed them to pass on skills, inventions, and beliefs to succeeding generations. This ability both made it more likely that advances would travel
from their places of origin and also permitted advances made in one generation to con3
nect with advances made in succeeding generations. While language leaves no direct
archaeological record, we can guess the time of its appearance through the appearance
of—of all things—toys. These miniature versions of adult tools and weapons were the
first models. They could serve no “serious” practical purpose, but they were “training aids,” enabling the first simulations of adult tasks to help each generation pass on
survival skills to the next. For thousands of years, all toys remained miniature versions
4
of adult tools.
In the Beginning: To 1660
When society itself became more sophisticated and more specialized, a new type of
“toy” emerged among the rulers: abstract strategy games—that is, the first generation
5
of wargames. It is not difficult to understand why. While a miniature bow could help
the son of a hunter learn to shoot, a very different type of toy was needed to help the
child of a chief, king, or pharaoh learn to outthink the child of the neighboring opposite
number. Cultures separated by thousands of miles and hundreds of years appear to have
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developed strategy games independently, as all felt the same necessity to prepare their
future rulers to outthink other cultures’ future rulers. Through abstract depictions of
warfare, such wargames did (and do) teach “down-board” thinking—that is, the ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s possible moves and the opponent’s possible
responses, an essential skill in the deadly game of war.
Hence, it would seem reasonable that early wargames date from the very birth of
civilization. Do they actually? It appears they may, but the evidence is slim. Most
historians fix the beginning of civilization to the birth of cities. One of the finalists for
the title of “first city” is Ur, in today’s Iraq. There, archaeologists have found an intact
6
abstract (first-generation) game in the ruins. As the site of Ur was inhabited prior to
3000 bc, this could mean that wargaming evolved at the same time as cities. However,
7
the specific stratum in which the game was found dates from “only” 600 bc. So the Ur
wargame was probably not created at the dawn of civilization, but early as it is, even it
may not be the first. A mural in the tombs at Beni Hasan, in Egypt, appears to depict
two men playing an abstract game. The tombs were built in roughly 2000 bc, and later
8
written records describe two Egyptian wargames—Senet and T’au. The earliest Chinese
9
wargame may even be older, the earliest estimate being 2300 bc. The game—its name
transliterated as Wei-chi, Wei-ch’i, and Weiqi—spread to Korea in the 400s ad; there it
was called Baduk. Sometime during the 600s, it spread to Japan, where it was called Igo
and Go. In all these nations wargaming appears to have been used only by the rulers.
One telling exception to the elite monopoly on gaming was ancient Greece. In her
whimsically titled article “Ancient Greek Board Games and How to Play Them,” Leslie
Kurke at the University of California at Berkeley makes a persuasive case that the
Greeks held the invention and use of games in high regard. In fact, she demonstrates
that the Greeks believed certain types of games prepared the young for their responsi10
bilities as citizens. It may also be argued that in the Olympic Games the Greeks developed the first “live” abstract wargames, emphasizing competitions in skills relevant to
military success without actually simulating warfare. With the eclipse of democracy in
the region, wargaming again became a pursuit of elites.
Among the spoils carried off by Rome following the conquest of Greece in 168 bc was
the wargame Petteia. Renamed Latrunculi (Rome renamed a lot of Greek stuff), the
game became popular with the Roman elite. Rome was also the first civilization from
which writings have survived that document training methods simulating warfare.
Contemporary writers gave training techniques much of the credit for the effectiveness
11
of Roman soldiers. Martin van Creveld dedicates a significant portion of a book to
the question whether gladiatorial contests should be considered the earliest instances
12
of what we call “live simulation wargames.” While the deaths of gladiators were real,
not simulated, Van Creveld points to evidence that specific gladiators survived many
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contests. Even more convincing, some games consciously attempted to re-create land,
and even naval, battles.
Roman officers carried Latrunculi to the frontiers of the empire. Centuries after the fall
of Rome, the Vikings too played an abstract game, Hnefatafl. While the earliest hard
evidence of Hnefatafl’s existence is from 925, oral tradition suggests that the game is
much older. In fact, some point to similarities with Petteia and suggest that the Viking
wargame may have evolved from the Roman. Whatever its origin, by 1100 Hnefatafl had
been carried by Viking raids and conquests across Europe.
Meanwhile, however, a second wargame was entering Europe. Developed in India
sometime around ad 550, this game, originally called Chaturang, was somewhat less
13
abstract than those just discussed. Chaturang, a four-player game with playing pieces
that clearly depicted elephants, cavalry, chariots, and infantry, soon spread to Persia, today’s Iran. Following the Arab conquest of Persia in 644, Chaturang spread throughout
areas that Muslims either controlled or traded with. Over time Chaturang evolved, its
originally realistic depiction of forces becoming very stylized, perhaps “due to Islamic
14
aniconism, discomfiture with depicting the human form.” It appears Chaturang first
entered Europe during the 800s and that by 1000 it had reached most of the continent.
Sometime during the 1400s Chaturang evolved into our current game of chess, which
in turn seems to have eclipsed Hnefatafl. But however the game changed, its players
15
remained the nobility.
The earliest unambiguous live simulation wargame too was reserved for Europe’s nobility. While most if not all abstract board wargames originated from outside, this new
game appears to have developed in medieval Europe. We’re speaking of tournaments
and jousts, and, as for so much else medieval, their origins are unclear. Like so many
other innovations we associate with the Middle Ages, they may actually have arisen
16
in the late Roman period. True, tournaments often resulted in injury, and sometimes
death, but unlike in gladiatorial contests, death was not a feature of the enterprise. In
fact, over the centuries progressively more-stringent rules made tournaments and jousts,
if not safe, at least less deadly. Medieval tournaments could be huge affairs. They began
to decline as noble knights began to give way to masses of longbowmen and infantry
armed with pikes. However, what truly killed tournaments and sent live simulation
wargaming into a several-hundred-year eclipse was the rise of firearms, since fights
with such weapons could not, with the technology of the day, avoid being deadly.
On the Brink: 1664–1810
The first generation of wargames, abstract strategy games, seems to have developed
independently in various civilizations as each evolved a specialized ruling class.
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Second-generation wargames—simulations of movement, attrition, and sometimes
logistics—emerged only in Europe, specifically in Prussia. Why? The answer is probably
a combination of opportunity and need.
The opportunity grew from Europe’s increasing emphasis on, first, quantification and
then the scientific method. Alfred Crosby in an insightful, readable book makes the case
that much of Europe’s “rise” in comparison with the other civilizations of the globe can
17
be traced to this quantification. The spread went beyond precision measurement and
18
double-entry bookkeeping to embrace the quantification of chance. This trend had
direct military impacts, from the rationalization (hence acceleration) of the process of
19
loading muskets to the building and besieging of fortifications.
The need was met by the first modern “models” with military utility, increasingly accurate maps and charts. The value of accurate maritime charts was obvious, if only for
finding again newly discovered territories to make them colonial conquests. On land,
Frederick the Great, king of Prussia 1740–86, was responsible for the first accurate ter20
rain maps commissioned specifically for military use. Later Napoleon would use such
maps, planning his campaigns phase by phase before he ever began operations.
The first military simulation occurred in late 1781, when a Mr. Clerk of Great Britain
21
developed a method of using model ships to gain tactical insights. He used his ships
to step through battles, analyzing the influence the disposition of the combatants, their
“geometry,” had on their combat power and vulnerability. Mr. Clerk’s simulations,
however, were not wargames, as it appears his work did not explicitly depict a thinking,
reacting enemy.
22

However, traditional wargames were also becoming less abstract. In 1664 the German
Christopher Weikhmann introduced a variant of chess he called “the Kings Game.”
While the expanded list of pieces reflected the composition of contemporary armies, the
23
game was still closer to chess than to later second-generation games. In 1780, Helwig,
master of pages at the court of Brunswick, introduced a game that used a playing board
of 1,666 squares, with squares of various colors representing different types of terrain.
A fixed fortification replaced the king, but most other features were similar to chess.
Several chess variants then appeared, collectively called “war chess.” The most notable
of these was developed in 1798 by the noted military writer and tactician Georg Vinturinus. His Neues Kriegsspiel (New Kriegsspiel) featured a board of 3,600 squares depicting
24
a section of the Franco-Belgian border. Helwig came closer still in 1803 to a modern
simulation wargame with a new edition in which he introduced several elements that
would later become features of modern simulation wargames. Examples included
artillery attacks from a distance and the effect on combat effectiveness of the relative
25
orientation of units.
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But for all these advancements, these were first-generation games, largely abstract and
still used as aids in educating sons of the nobility. Apparently, “need” had to join “opportunity” for modern wargaming to be born. One of the triggers for that need came
from the New World, where Benjamin Franklin had the audacity to say that all men
should play chess, as it would help them learn to think through ways to achieve their
26
interests. In Europe too, Voltaire encouraged the common people to play chess. The
nobility was scandalized. If mere commoners played chess, where could it lead?
Well . . . such thinking, among many other factors, led to the French Revolution and
27
28
then to Napoleon. Today we think of Napoleon as a great military genius. True, but
to ascribe his success simply to “genius” misses many contributing elements. Worse, it
offers no insight into how that success was achieved and how it was, in time, reversed.
Napoleon conquered most of Europe with a power base that had in the past enabled
French kings (some very able in their own rights) only to conquer, occasionally, a province. How did he do it?
Napoleon enjoyed three advantages over his royal predecessors. In addition to his
undeniable genius, he could draw on both a meritocracy and a willing population. The
French Revolution produced that meritocracy. Previously, only children of officers could
become officers; now, half of Napoleon’s marshals had once been private soldiers. His
adversaries still had to name lofty aristocrats to command whether competent or not.
With a willing population, Napoleon could call on every French “citizen” to defend the
29
revolution and his liberties. Napoleon’s adversaries could field only as many soldiers as
they could pay. Genius, meritocracy, and numbers: Prussia would invent modern simulation wargaming as a key element of its efforts to overcome these French advantages.
The growth of both warfare and democracy brought about by the French Revolution
seems also to have increased civilian use of strategy games. Chess became more widely
played, and as early as 1790 adaptations of earlier abstract wargames and also entirely
30
new games were published for the civilian market. The competition not of war but of
the marketplace would over the next century and a half push commercial wargames
toward modern simulation games.
Prussia’s Sixty-Year Monopoly, 1811–1871
Historians agree, a Prussian named Reisswitz invented modern
wargaming.
ALFRED H. HAUSRATH

In 1811, Baron Leopold von Reisswitz, the Prussian war councilor at Breslau, invented
31
a wargame that finally broke with the grid and alternating-move conventions of chess.
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This new-generation game could truly be called a “simulation,” modeling actual space
and time with a consistent scale. First, Reisswitz constructed a table with a 3-D model of
actual terrain. Then to represent units he prepared blocks, painted in regimental colors
and taking up space that matched the units’ actual frontages on the scale of the table.
Each side would give its orders to an umpire, who updated the terrain table, resolved
combat, and told each side only what it would actually know. To determine casualties,
umpires first consulted complex tables that indicated an envelope of likely attrition
based on range, terrain, and other factors. Exact losses were determined by dice rolls, to
account for the uncertainties of the battlefield.
The Birth of Second-Generation Wargaming: 1811–1827
This breakthrough wargame so impressed the princes of Prussia that they asked Baron
von Reisswitz to demonstrate it to their father, King Friedrich Wilhelm III. The baron
worked for a year turning his game into something fit to be shown a king. He replaced
his sand table with ceramic squares that could be arranged to depict a variety of battle32
fields. He then had built a beautiful cabinet for all the wargame components. The king
was greatly impressed and for many years thereafter used the wargame with his sons
and sometimes a few army officers. In 1820, Friedrich Wilhelm III brought the game
with him during a state visit to Saint Petersburg and the court of Tsar Alexander I. That
winter the future king of Prussia (as Friedrich Wilhelm IV) and the future tsar of the
Russian Empire (Alexander II) played Baron von Reisswitz’s game against each other.
Arguably, not since Gutenberg had one man made so many interlocking breakthroughs
at the same time. Yet some historians do not credit Herr von Reisswitz with initiating
modern wargaming. Why? For all its innovativeness, they reason, Reisswitz’s invention
was used for the same old purpose—educating princes in warfare.
But times were changing. To counter Napoleon’s advantage in numbers the crowned
heads of Europe increasingly attempted to mobilize nationalism. Now, instead of costly
mercenaries, an increasing number of young men joined royal armies willingly (more or
less) to defend their nations. Even after defeating Napoleon, the armies of most European powers continued to grow. This growth was motivated by dynastic rivalries and
made possible by the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Prussia soon found it had
too many soldiers if only the sons of officers were to command them. Even conservative Prussia began allowing the sons of mere bankers, industrialists, and government
officials to become officers.
One of these new officers was Lt. Georg von Reisswitz. He soon realized that he and his
fellow “outsiders” simply did not know as much about war as those who had been taught
it by their fathers. He believed his father’s game could help. In 1824 he adapted it so that
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instead of an expensive ceramic three-dimensional terrain table, a relatively inexpensive
paper topographic map could be used. He also eliminated regimental colors; instead,
blocks (of proportionate scale size) representing forces of one side were red, the other
side blue. The result was a cheaper, more convenient (you cannot roll up a sand table),
33
and more flexible game.
Later that year Lieutenant von Reisswitz demonstrated his innovation to the Prussian
army’s Chief of Staff, Gen. Karl von Müffling. After initial bored skepticism, General
von Müffling became excited. Finally he exclaimed, “It’s not a game at all, it’s training
for war. I shall recommend it enthusiastically to the whole army.” General von Müff
34
ling did indeed write an article strongly praising it; in fact, he ordered all garrisons to
conduct wargames. For this achievement the king awarded Lieutenant von Reisswitz
the Order of Saint John and promoted him to captain. This broader applicability is
why some historians credit the junior Reisswitz with perfecting the first truly modern
wargame. Still, there is at least one other contender. In 1819 Lt. Col. J. A. Messmer, an
engineer in the Dutch army, produced a topographic map–based game that found wide
use within his service. Hence his wargame was produced after Baron von Reisswitz’s but
35
before Lieutenant von Reisswitz created his map-based version.
But with Captain von Reisswitz’s promotion came a transfer out of Berlin, a move that
he saw as banishment. Also, General von Müffling’s order mandating the game’s use
did not make the new captain popular. Many of his fellow officers resented the time his
cumbersome wargame required. It did not help that as its inventor he was repeatedly
called on to umpire games that sometimes saw senior officers go down in defeat. He was
shunned and isolated, so intolerably that in 1827 Captain von Reisswitz took his own
36
life. His father died two years later, a broken man. The captain had been so unpopular in life that even junior officers who advocated the use of wargaming scrupulously
avoided using his name for decades, until games had become an established part of
the Prussian way of war. By then many of the young advocates were themselves senior
37
officers.
Wargaming Comes of Age: 1828–1871
So even in the early years support for wargaming was uneven. It was soon to grow
38
dramatically. As early as 1828 Lt. Helmuth von Moltke advocated the use of games.
39
He even founded a Kriegsspiel (wargame) society, in Magdeburg. In 1837 Moltke, now
a general, became Chief of Staff of the Prussian army and ordered increased wargam40
ing. Moltke overcame initial resistance by sensing what motivated his subordinates and
devising a strategy to make them want to wargame.
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Prussia was appealing to nationalism and broadening the pool of candidates to overcome France’s advantage in officer recruiting, but nullifying its superiority in the
average officer’s ability due to its meritocratic system was more problematic. Prussia’s
solution was to pair aristocrat commanders selected for their “quality of birth” with
41
chiefs of staff selected for their merit. There came to be two ways to become a general
officer in the Prussian army. First, your dad could be king or at least a member of the
high nobility. Second, you could be a trained staff officer chosen to serve as chief of staff
of a major formation. Hence, the only chance even members of the petty nobility, let
alone the commoners, had of attaining high rank was early selection to the staff-officer
corps. However, only graduates of the Prussian war college were eligible for that. Moltke
now required that each application to the college enclose a letter from the applicant’s
commander evaluating his performance as the senior umpire in a unit-wide wargame. It
worked.
Moltke saw to it that when the successful applicants became war college students, they
42
did a great deal more wargaming. It was already part of the curriculum; Moltke, however, added several innovations, collectively called the “staff ride.” Each year between
1858 and 1881 Moltke would personally take the entire student body of the war college,
43
and much of the General Staff, to one of Prussia’s actual invasion corridors. Moltke
would then describe the most likely first clash between invading and Prussian forces. He
would then ask each officer present for his plan of battle (starting with the most junior
and concluding with the most senior, to overcome the possible reluctance of junior officers to criticize a senior’s plan). The discussion would evolve until a consensus battle
plan emerged.
On the basis of that plan, they would then play a map-based game. Moltke named the
senior general present (aside from himself—he was always the senior umpire) to command the invading forces and the next-ranking general the Prussian forces. He continued thus until the officers were split into two equal teams. Why? Moltke believed that
if the plan being played could succeed against some of Prussia’s smartest strategists, it
would probably also succeed against any enemy’s. Also, with equal-sized teams more
officers could participate meaningfully. After the map-based wargame he would contact
the local garrison. (Remember, since this was all taking place in an actual invasion corridor, there was always a garrison.) He would direct its commander to march a few hundred soldiers (representing thousands) to where the plan called for. (Could this be the
origin of modern field exercises?) This was to test the marching times and other details
of the plan. When all this was done the gamed plan went on the shelf as the actual plan
for countering an invasion along that corridor. Over the decades the staff rides gradually grew in number of participants and the situations in the wargames changed from
44
individual avenues of invasion to entire fronts, such as the Russian or French front.
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Now, let us think about all this for a minute. Moltke started with an “off-site.” He then
brainstormed to reach a consensus plan, evaluated that resulting plan in a wargame
against a world-class adversary (his own officers), and finally tested the plan with a field
exercise. Here was the capstone of a well-thought-out effort that used wargames in an
overall plan intended to help Prussia win battles even if opposed by another Napoleon.
Applying many smart people and effective procedures, Prussia created plans worthy
of a genius, eliminating Napoleon’s final advantage. In doing so, Moltke had expanded
the application of wargaming from its task of millenniums, developing strategists, to
developing strategies for specific contingencies.
Still, it is important to understand that the mission of the Prussians’ war college was to
produce war planners. Wargaming was a key element in the training of staff officers, but
it was only one element. The war college curriculum also included the critical examination of military history, strategy, and logistics; the formulation and communication of
effective and clear plans; and the conduct of wargames. Wargames both developed the
students’ abilities as strategists and taught them how to conduct games in the standard
planning process. Knowing that all major units would have war college graduates as
their chiefs of staff, the high command started issuing orders describing what subordinate units were to accomplish—not how. These “mission orders” could be shorter, could
be issued more quickly, and encouraged greater speed and flexibility in execution. War
college graduates would then (time permitting) conduct their own wargames to help
determine how best to achieve their assigned objectives.
While the focus of Prussian wargaming remained at the battle level of war, as early as
1848 the world’s first strategic wargame was conducted, in Berlin, by Lt. Col. (later
general) Vogel von Falckenstein. The game depicted the entirety of a war—a war
45
between Prussia and Austria.
At this time, Prussia had a monopoly on second-generation simulation wargames, but
first-generation abstract games were becoming increasingly popular. The wars of the
French Republic and of Napoleon had produced more citizens who both needed to think
through how they would vote and had a greater interest in things military. While most
citizens now played recycled abstract games, their boards decorated with military images, a few published wargames edged closer to second-generation simulation types. For
example, The Peninsula, published in 1813, was played on a highly abstracted map of
46
Portugal.
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Wargaming Goes Global, 1866–1913
For nearly half a century, modern second-generation simulation wargaming remained
almost exclusively a Prussian technique. But Prussia made no effort to keep wargaming
secret; rules were published commercially, and wargaming was even demonstrated to
nations with which Prussia had good relations. The Swedish military adopted wargaming shortly after its creation. The Netherlands followed in 1836 and Austria in 1866.
Europe and Beyond: 1866–1905
The spread of wargaming accelerated after Moltke and Prussia won a series of wars,
mostly against opponents with larger forces and equivalent technology. Both inside
47
Germany and without, that success was credited in part to wargaming. Soon the rest
of the world started copying Prussia’s (now Germany’s) military methods—including
48
wargaming. The table lays it all out in brief.
DATE OF ADOPTION

NATION

1820s

Sweden

1836

Netherlands

1866

Austria-Hungary

1872/1883/1902/1905

United Kingdom

1873

Italy

1829/1874/1889

France

1820/1875/1905

Russia

Secondary diffusion: Japan, Turkey, Latin America
Note: Multiple dates indicate adoption occurring in phases. For example, slants may separate
years of “first advocated / officially adopted / date reemphasized.”

There were similarities and differences in the ways various countries adopted wargaming. The Prussian General Staff first tried to teach wargaming to the Austrian General
Staff, but the Austrians were not interested—one imagines they did not see how the
game could be used for gambling. After being defeated by Prussia they seem to have
reconsidered.
A young officer in England and another in France translated German manuals, advocated their adoption, and met initial opposition. However, in time both saw wargaming
institutionalized in their militaries.
As for England, Aldershot (named for the site of Britain’s first, and main, training
facility) was the first wargame officially issued by the British War Office. In 1883 the
British army’s commander in chief, the Duke of Cambridge, issued an official order on
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wargaming.49 Official acceptance was short-lived; following the Boer War (1899–1902)
the army dropped wargaming, on the grounds that it had not predicted, nor could have
(given the capabilities of the then-current generation of wargames), the decisiveness of
50
the psychological or economic aspects of that war. It is therefore more than a bit ironic
that England was to lead the world both in the application of gaming to naval affairs
and in the evolution of civilian first-generation abstract games into second-generation
simulation wargames. It was Capt. Philip Howard Colomb, RN, who developed the first
51
clearly second-generation naval wargame, The Duel, in 1879. The Royal Navy officially
adopted wargaming in 1878. Naval wargaming quickly spread to Russia, Italy, and
52
Austria.
In Italy’s case, not only was there no initial opposition to wargaming but Italy appears
53
to have been the first nation whose games reflected the impact of logistics. Of all the
European powers, Russia appears to have had the most difficulty getting wargaming to
stick. As mentioned earlier, in 1820 the imperial family played Reisswitz’s wargame, but
that occasion appears to have been a one-off. Only in 1875 did the Russian army order
the use of Lieutenant von Reisswitz’s version, but the order seems to have been ignored.
The Russian navy adopted wargaming from the British, but apparently as purely an educational tool. Still, during the 1902–1903 academic year the Russian naval war college
gamed the naval elements of a future war with Japan. The game’s Red team accurately
anticipated the Japanese strategy in the actual conflict, which was to begin the next
year, and that Japan would initiate hostilities with a surprise attack prior to a formal
declaration of war. The game’s adjudicators correctly assessed that such an attack would
be devastating. “Lessons learned” were compiled, but none were acted on—in 1904
54
the real Japanese would achieve the same results. On previous form, it is likely that
after Russia’s defeat a panel determined that one of Japan’s advantages had been that its
army wargamed while the Russians’ did not. If so, the panel would have recommended,
to whatever effect, that Russian forces do likewise in their planning and professional
55
development.
Soon wargames spread beyond Europe. Typically a non-European state would take on
the practices of its leading arms supplier. For instance, Japan acquired naval assistance
from Great Britain; in turn, the Japanese navy adopted English methods, including
naval wargaming. Japan’s army, however, accepted assistance from the German army;
accordingly it too adopted military wargaming, but with German methods.
Australia is an interesting case. As Australia gradually moved toward independence
from Great Britain it gradually began taking over a larger portion of its own defense.
Australian wargaming began with the birth of that transition. Australian wargaming
began in this context, and it started at officers’ clubs. Many Americans think of officers’
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clubs as like the place in the movie Top Gun where Tom Cruise’s character meets Kelly
McGillis’s. Early Australian clubs were just a bit different.
In the United States, “O’clubs” are basically membership-supported bars/restaurants on
military and naval bases. Australia’s early officers’ clubs were typically the first nationally owned military building in each Australian colony (as today’s Australian states then
were). Generally located in the colony’s (later state’s) capital, they were more like British
gentlemen’s clubs than American O’clubs. They not only served to socialize Australia’s
early part-time and volunteer officers but also provided professional development opportunities. The Naval & Military Club was formed in Melbourne in 1881; the United
Services Institution of Victoria quickly followed, meeting at the Naval & Military Club
premises. While records from this period are few, an 1893 recommendation by (then) Lt.
John Monash lists wargaming as one of the principal professional-development activi56
ties of the clubs.
Coming to America: 1776–1912
Like so much that is American, our wargaming is partly homegrown and partly imported from overseas. The U.S. Army was the first to consider wargaming and the U.S.
Navy the first to adopt it officially, but there was, remarkably, significant early interservice cooperation and even a nineteenth-century joint game.
U.S. Army. The first known informal use of wargaming within the Army occurred in
57
1867; most historians, however, credit Maj. (later colonel) W. R. Livermore of the Corps
of Engineers with bringing modern wargaming to America two decades later, when his
58
book The American Kriegsspiel (1883) was published. In it Livermore freely admitted
that he had started by simply translating German game rules. However, he had gone on
to compare the German attrition tables with actual statistics from the U.S. Civil War
and Prussia’s own wars in 1866 and 1870–71. He had found that the historical record
indicated higher casualties, and he adjusted his own tables accordingly. He also significantly streamlined the calculation of combat outcomes.
Despite this historical foundation and reduction of the time needed, wargaming did not
really catch on within the Army for a decade or more. There are four possible explanations, all or none of which may be correct. Some individuals (including your author)
blame the Army’s then Chief of Staff, Gen. William T. Sherman. In his 1869 address to
the graduating class at West Point he said, “I know that there exist many good men who
honestly believe that one may, by the aid of Modern science, sit in comfort and ease in
his office chair and with little blocks of wood and algebraic symbols, master the great
game of war. I think this an insidious and most dangerous mistake. . . . You must under59
stand men, without which your past knowledge were vain.” A reading of his full speech
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shows that his point was that the graduates should spend time with troops, to learn their
capabilities and limitations, and also study war, but it would have been easy to miss the
“and also study war” part. Given General Sherman’s stature and his office at the time,
his remarks could not have helped.
60

A second explanation was advanced by Maj. Farrand Sayre in an excellent 1911 book.
Major Sayre argued that even with its streamlined tables, (by then) Colonel Livermore’s
wargame was too hard to learn. Major Sayre pointed out most of the Army was then
spread across many small posts, with few officers assigned to each. The odds of even
one officer at a fort, say, being capable of learning Livermore’s game and then running
it for his comrades were not good. Sayre asserted wargame use had greatly expanded
when, in 1897, Capt. Eben Swift translated and modestly simplified Gen. Julius von
61
Verdy du Vernois’s book on Free Kriegsspiel (about which more presently). Third, it is
possible that the victorious Army of the Republic felt no need to improve its effectiveness, until its rather close-run victory over Spain in 1898 demonstrated some dangerous
shortcomings.
Finally, the whole bodies of Major Sayre’s and Captain Swift’s writings were very
persuasive and may well have had decisive influence on the adoption of wargaming.
62
Captain Swift published first and influenced Sayre. Of course, Swift would have had an
important impact on Army wargaming if all he did was translate General von Verdy du
Vernois’s book and get it published. However, he also wrote an article, “The Lyceum at
Fort Agawam,” which argued that without any new legislation or supplemental appropriation, wargaming could enable every Army post to produce “veterans of forty years
of peace time service [who can] take the field with the confidence of men who fought in
63
a hundred battles” (p. 277)—because in effect they would have.
Orders, a published 1905 lecture in which he advocated a standard format for Army
orders, appears to have been influential, inasmuch as its format is close to what is used
64
today. He also demonstrated through numerous historical examples the perils of unclear orders—pertinent here because in doing so he reinforced Major Sayre’s point that
a principal value of wargaming is experience in making and communicating decisions.
Swift continued to advance wargaming over a long and successful career. He was to be
commandant of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College and attain the
rank of major general.
Major Sayre’s contribution was his book, Map Maneuvers and Tactical Rides. In it he
asserts:
Map Maneuvers [i.e., the term used by the U.S. Army for constructive wargames until sometime
after 1962] can teach lessons in peacetime that cost far more to learn in time of war.
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It is not practical to conduct field maneuvers with the frequency officers need to be ready for command in war.
You can do things on a map that are too expensive or disagreeable to do during field maneuvers, for
example blow up bridges, burn towns, dig trenches across a farmer’s field.
They teach map reading and geography.
Perhaps most importantly it gives participants experience in making decisions.65

How much influence did his book have? One indication of the book’s popularity, hence
probable influence, was that it was printed in five editions. Major Sayre was also an effective advocate of “tactical exercises without troops,” which could be outdoor planning
exercises or live wargames, depending on how conducted. This practice has survived in
the U.S. Army into the twenty-first century under the same name, or TEWTs.
If it is difficult to say why Army wargaming began, it is also difficult to say where and
when. Certainly, one candidate for place of origin is the Army school today called the
66
Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The proto-CGSC was established in
1881. Some assert wargaming was an integral part of CGSC’s curriculum from the start,
while Peter Schifferle asserts that it was not used until 1893–94, when it was introduced
67
by Arthur L. Wagner and Eben Swift. In either case, it became one element of a shift
in the school’s overall method of teaching from rote memorization to what came to be
called the “application method.”
In this approach subjects were first taught in conventional lectures, then discussed in
relatively small groups (this alone was an innovation at the time), then individually
applied by each student in a map problem. In that problem he would draft orders to
respond to a described battlefield challenge (there was no Red countermove). Next, a
group of students would participate in a map exercise (again writing orders and again
no Red countermove), and finally a group of students would participate in a wargame
called a “map maneuver” (again writing orders but now against thinking, reacting opposition). By 1896 there were eighty such application events within the CGSC curriculum,
mostly map problems, map exercises, and map maneuvers. There were also some “tactical rides” (recalling Moltke’s “staff rides”); these included field problems, field exercises,
68
and possibly field maneuvers—that is, live wargames. This method of instruction
69
would remain the foundation of instruction at CGSC at least through World War II.
The first official use of wargames by the Army may have involved field maneuvers.
There seems to be no source that explicitly states the year the Army began conducting
field maneuvers. In a 1906 publication Major Swift commented on “maneuvers over the
70
last 17 years,” which would mean the Army was holding maneuvers in 1889. We know
71
for certain that they predate 1910, for in that year a regulation on maneuvers appeared.
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This regulation demonstrated a maturity of concept that suggests both the existence
and the sophistication of previous maneuvers. For example, the regulation calls for both
general and specific scenarios, the German practice. It fixes the place of maneuvers in
the Army’s training cycle: instruction, drill, exercise, then maneuvers. It provides guidance on minimizing cheating. Most impressively, it specifically states that if an umpire
determined that the conditions in the field would cause a unit to change its posture (i.e.,
from attack to defense, or from defense to withdrawal), the umpire had authority to tell
72
the unit to do so.
A final candidate for the place and date of the U.S. Army’s adoption of wargaming is
the Army War College, established at the turn of the twentieth century. The college was
73
created as a solution to failings uncovered during the Spanish-American War. Work
began over 1899 and 1900, and the Navy’s William McCarty Little worked to ensure
wargaming was included in its curriculum, which it has been ever since 1900.
Whichever date you pick, by the early 1900s wargaming was firmly established in the
Army. Then it became the Army’s turn to innovate: for instance, Farrand Sayre’s Map
Maneuvers advocates transparent overlays instead of blocks, so that a permanent record
of each move would be made. At about this time the Army also started to standardize
the format of the move forms (i.e., player decisions) given to the umpire. It devised a
74
format for the “operation order,” the father of the joint orders format still used today.
U.S. Navy. Just as one living legend may have been blocking wargaming in the Army,
another was advancing it in the Navy. William McCarty Little was one of those historical anomalies who shape the world far more than rank or title would suggest. McCarty
Little, though medically retired (he lost an eye in a shooting accident ashore) in the
middle of a promising naval career, went on to help found the Naval War College and
to father naval wargaming in America. For years he did so as a volunteer, receiving no
75
pay beyond his retirement stipend. Among his tasks in 1886 was to write and deliver
the earliest known lecture on wargaming given to a professional audience in the United
States. In it he drew on conversations with Major Livermore and the writings of Captain
76
Colomb, but many of its insights were his own. The next year he and Livermore con77
ducted the first joint Army-Navy wargame-driven field exercise. (The Army high com78
mand promptly forbade any future joint exercises.) In 1889 McCarty Little ran a game
at the Naval War College. Wargames have been conducted there every year since 1894.
McCarty Little’s selfless labors gradually paid off. As early as 1894 and 1896, wargames
79
influenced the Navy’s budget. In 1895, a game played a decisive role in convincing
80
Congress to fund the Cape Cod Canal. In 1913, Capt. (later admiral) William S. Sims
81
introduced wargaming to the fleet.
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While success was gradual, we can use a remarkable 1912 article in Proceedings to
82
declare wargaming’s victory. In it McCarty Little described concepts that are considered new today. For example, he argued wargaming had shaped and should shape
national policy; that wargames were the cure for peacetime “stovepipe” mentality; and
that wargaming could not only produce better plans but condition its practitioners to
83
think and react more quickly than their enemies, an important advantage. The clarity,
persuasiveness, and confidence of this visionary article clearly indicate that wargaming
84
had come to America—and like earlier immigrants, had become truly American.
McCarty Little served until 1915, and his work serves us still. He received little recognition during his lifetime, yet the techniques he brought to America have been further
developed and continue to enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces. Americans yet to be born will be more likely to come home from war alive and sound of limb
because of McCarty Little.
As for civilian wargaming in the United States, chess remained popular throughout this
period, and board games, some with war themes, became so just before and during the
85
American Civil War.
German Wargaming: 1872–1905
At least one German was not pleased by the wide adoption abroad of German wargaming and other practices. In a speech to the German legislature to mark his retirement in
1888, now–field marshal Moltke advised Germany to keep the peace. He cautioned the
legislators that other nations had largely caught up with Germany’s staff training and
86
procedures; hence, any future war would be far more costly.
But even if wargaming was spreading throughout the world, it was not standing still in
Germany. Three areas of innovation in processes and applications allowed Germany to
maintain something of a net lead in the field through the end of the century, arguably
until the end of World War II. Unfortunately (for Germany), not all of this evolution in
wargame procedures was in a forward direction.
The newly unified Germany’s first wargame innovation was to optimize gaming for
different levels of warfare. Though at least one such game (at strategic level) had been
conducted much earlier, it was not until the 1870s that Germany really began tailoring its wargaming processes to what we today would call the “strategic,” “operational,”
87
and “tactical” levels. The German army had a specific name for each. Its strategic
wargames were Strategische Kriegsspiele, depicting entire wars. They called their operational games Grosse Kriegsspiele—that is, large wargames. These games were designed to
play large battles (and later, thanks to their third innovation, below, entire campaigns).
The German army’s tactical games were Kleine Kriegsspiele, small wargames, focused on
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small-unit combat. Over time the procedures evolved to meet optimally the command
challenges at each level of warfare. In contrast, it appears that other militaries initially
conducted only operational-level wargames.
The combat experience Prussia/Germany gained during its wars of unification and with
France had a powerful influence on its wargaming. One of the first things its soldiers
learned was that though wargame units fight until wiped out, in real wars they do not
fight to the last man—something Sherman could have told them. In 1877 a captain from
Saxony (a small kingdom that had recently become a part of Germany) named Naumann
published rules to cover what today we would call “break points”—that is, the rules pro88
vided criteria for determining at what casualty level units would cease to function.
The third innovation came to be called “Free Kriegsspiel.” Between 1873 and 1876 a
series of books, the most influential of them by Verdy du Vernois, argued persuasively
90
for a radically different type of wargame. Wargames have always had their detractors,
principally owing to cumbersome, time-consuming adjudication rules. Verdy du Vernois and others thought they had a simple solution: to substitute the military judgment
of combat-experienced officers for many of these rules. This would result in games that
were faster, hence more popular, and thus more often played.
89

At first Free Kriegsspiel seemed to work well. At its best, the professional judgment of
combat veterans could produce more-accurate outcomes in less time. This in turn facilitated the gaming of larger formations over longer periods of time—approaching entire
campaigns. There were two problems, though. First, Germany’s veterans of 1871 gradually aged, retired, and died. Their replacements could not adjudicate with the same authority. The second problem is today called “command influence”: players who outrank
the umpires tend to value their own professional judgment over that of the umpires.
Nowhere was this problem more visible or more damaging at the time than in the
91
person of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Thinking himself a great military genius, Kaiser Wilhelm
never missed a staff ride. The rides still started on hills overlooking possible invasion
corridors. Just when Moltke would have asked the most junior officer for his opinion,
the kaiser would immediately announce the “perfect” battle plan. You can imagine
the liveliness of debate. Then during the actual game, the group didn’t split evenly;
everyone wanted to be on the kaiser’s team. The results were predictable. The kaiser’s
side always won; the result was Germany’s loss. Instead of trying to stop the travesty,
Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of Staff from 1891 to 1906, added an annual
Kaisermanöver—emperor’s maneuver—with staged movements and predetermined
92
outcomes. Might these easy, consistent victories not have served to decrease whatever
wariness the kaiser had about going to war?
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One element of wargaming that remained relatively unchanged (aside from the kaiser’s
pontificating) was regular staff rides. Given Germany’s friendly relations with Sweden
and Austria none went to the northern or southern borders; the rides rotated between
Germany’s eastern and western borders. During his tenure Schlieffen held two staff
rides a year. Each lasted ten to fourteen days and involved twenty-five to thirty-five staff
officers of all ranks. The rides kept their educational and planning purposes; they were
also seen as ways of ensuring that the staffs at each command level thoroughly under93
stood the plans.
It may be these staff rides that led to the return of live simulation wargames. You will
recall that firearms had killed tournaments, the danger of which could no longer be
kept to acceptable levels. During the mid-1700s Prussia began drilling its troops in large
formations, to get them into position more quickly on the battlefield than their adversaries. These “maneuvers” were much copied after the victories of Frederick the Great,
but they do not appear to have simulated the clash of opposing forces. A century later, as
we’ve seen, Prussian staff rides typically concluded by having local garrisons verify the
time estimates for key troop movements. In these ways staff rides produced the key to
live gaming despite the lethality of firearms—to use wargame adjudication techniques
to resolve “combat” between live units—that is, represented by real soldiers. All this suggests Prussia may have begun holding modern live wargames as early as the 1850s; the
94
earliest hard evidence, however, is a 1908 manual.
There was both continuity and change at the German War College. Training to enable
the students to conduct wargames upon graduation, typically as an integral part of their
planning processes, remained at the core of the curriculum. Now instruction culminated in the Abschlussreise, the final journey. Student performance during this days-long
wargame impacted graduation and future assignment.
The Birth of Second-Generation Civilian Wargames: 1890s–1913
While many of the citizens of what would be the Western democracies had played chess
since the time of Franklin and Voltaire, they had missed out on the second generation
95
of simulation wargames, initiated by Reisswitz. For over a century civilian abstract
first-generation games did not reach the level of true simulations of warfare. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the “technology transfer” that led to civilian wargaming started with a
couple of reservists, one British and one German.
Until that happened, a typical game would have a military-sounding name and military
illustrations on the box but have recycled game mechanics inside. The board used for
play was decorated with scenes but play consisted of counters moving along paths and
capturing each other as in chess, checkers, or Go. A few were a bit less abstract. Some
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used counters that looked like army or naval forces; examples were Polemes (published
in England in 1885, which used sets of six soldiers in colorful uniforms to represent
96
units) and Modern Naval Warfare (1891, also in England, with model ships). Other
published games contained fairly realistic maps for playing surfaces. Waterloo Campaign, published in the United States by Parker Brothers in 1895, was played on an
accurate depiction of the road net actually used; Kriegsspiel der Weltkrieg (Wargame of
97
the World War) in Germany in 1914 was played on a map of Europe. A few had both
models of combatants and playing surfaces that represented real terrain; one such was
Naval Maneuvers, published in England in 1890.
Still, all these used traditional abstract “game mechanics” to resolve moves. One
wargame during this period did introduce a feature that moved closer to modeling war
(not just ships). It appeared in 1906 in both France and England. The playing board was
rather abstract, but playing pieces were blank toward the opponent, simulating the fog
of war, and victory always went to the stronger piece—simplistic but still a step away
98
from chess and toward realism. It had several names, of which L’Attaque seems to have
sold best. Today the game is known as Stratego.
It appears that a motive was needed before wargames published for a civilian would become more realistic. Before civilians would buy a game that was serious about depicting
war accurately, at least some would have to want to study war seriously. Spenser Wilkinson helped to create such interest. In 1873, while on summer vacation in Germany while
attending college, he glanced through a pamphlet on the military balance of power and
was shocked to learn that Britain’s army was among Europe’s smallest. He began a campaign to get his peers to pay more attention to war. One of Wilkinson’s many initiatives
99
was organizing England’s first wargaming club. In 1900, presumably through Wilkin100
son’s efforts, a member of Parliament listed wargaming as a hobby. As a member of the
British Territorial Army, Wilkinson promoted wargaming within that body as well.
The German reservist’s contribution to civilian wargaming was more indirect. As in
England, the problem was that before civilians could be interested in complex simulation wargames, they needed to be motivated to study war itself; Hans Delbrück contrib101
uted to that motivation. His family had advised Prussian kings on matters of war for
generations. “It was vital that the King understood war, for it is on the outcomes of war
that the nation prospers or dies,” Delbrück said. “Now Germany is evolving toward a
democracy, the people are becoming the sovereign, and it is just as important that they
understand war.” To help them do so he became the foremost military historian of his
102
time. A prolific and influential author, he founded the first chair of military history
at a civilian university and edited the first defense-affairs journal aimed at a civilian
audience.
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Interestingly, both the first modern naval wargame intended for a civilian audience
and the first for land warfare were originally published in England. The first naval
game created for a civilian market was Lieutenant Chamberlains’s Game of Naval
Blockade in 1888, though arguably it should be considered an abstract first-generation
103
wargame rather than a true second-generation simulation game. The second naval
wargame for a civilian market, however, was clearly a second-generation simulation
game—Jane’s Naval War Game, named for its lead designer, the English writer and
miniatures-gaming enthusiast Frederick T. Jane. It was really two games in one. There
was a strategic wargame (which edged toward the third-generation category) and a
tactical/battle wargame. When it appeared in 1898, the tactical rules for naval engagement required very detailed ship profiles. But the rules gave data on only four ships, and
customers were soon clamoring for more. A supplement soon followed with the needed
profiles for all British ships. Still, playing wargames between British ships was less than
gripping; the next offering provided the needed data for the entire German navy. Immediately there was an uproar in the press, something like this: “The Germans are our
friends. How dare he imply our navies may someday fight!” A wiser Fred Jane responded with the first edition of All the World’s Warships. Thus, the entire Jane’s Information
Group, which under a succession of corporate owners has contributed so much to the
reference sections of libraries worldwide, as well as to the British balance of payments,
started with a wargame.
Fred Jane’s game was ahead of its time in many ways. It was developed by an inter104
national team that included naval officers from Britain, Russia, and Japan. In the
strategic game within it each side bought its forces from a menu of fortifications and
combatants—a bit beyond second-generation, force-on-force wargaming. Finally, Jane’s
wargame was apparently the first designed for a civilian marketplace that was adopted
105
by navies around the world. The movement of innovation from the civilian market to military applications was to become increasingly marked—but not for another
half-century.
The counterpart civilian game for land warfare was the product of the author H. G.
Wells. Many consider him the inventor of second-generation wargames for a civilian
audience, but this is debatable on several levels. First, Jane’s game, though on naval
warfare and used by both military and civilians, does predate Wells’s. Second, there is
evidence games with toy soldiers had been conducted in the United Kingdom decades
before. There were several small-print-run books of rules for ground-combat wargames
for civilians in England shortly after the turn of the twentieth century. Wells simply
106
wrote another such rulebook, but his, Little Wars (1913), was by far the best known.
Finally, as with the French board game that became Stratego, whether Wells’s game was
truly of the second-generation simulation type is debatable. For instance, casualties
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were produced by firing a spring-powered miniature cannon, and only by the cannon.
This was hardly an accurate depiction of contemporary reality.
Still, it is important not to underestimate the importance of Wells’s work. Little Wars
was actually written with pacifist intent. His set of rules, to be used with toy soldiers,
was designed to help civilians better understand how terrible war was. If the citizens
of democracies—and he predicted that more countries would over time become more
democratic—truly understood how terrible war was, they would ensure their govern107
ments would never again start them. H. G. Wells made many correct predictions in his
long career, but this one was, at best, premature.
It would be almost half a century before an unambiguously second-generation set of
ground-combat rules would be published for a civilian market; another Englishman
would be among the first to do so.
While both Jane’s and Wells’s works were fairly popular, the number of civilians playing second-generation simulation wargames would remain modest for many decades.
Rather complex rules deterred some, but the main problem was the cost of the metal
soldiers or ships. Only the affluent could afford full sets of such “miniatures.” Still, this
is not to say that early civilian simulation games had no impact. They had an impact
on one young British aristocrat, who enjoyed wargaming with miniatures well into his
108
adult years—Winston Churchill.
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CHAPTER TWO

Wargaming and the World Wars
1905–1945

Arguably the two most decisive wargames of all time were played in 1905. The outcomes
were broadly similar, but the reactions of the governments involved could not have been
more different.
Gaming the Great War, 1905–1918
In 1905, Count von Schlieffen conducted his last staff ride before his retirement.
Virtually all present were on the kaiser’s team (i.e., playing the Blue, or German, side);
two first lieutenants played the armies of Russia, France, Britain, and Belgium. In the
scenario, the bulk of German forces were deployed in the east. The lieutenants playing
the Russians advanced the same two armies that actually attacked nine years later. Both
armies followed their future routes.
Prewar Wargaming, 1905–1914
The officers playing the Russians made the same mistake the real Russian general would
later make. Following a German counterattack, the umpires assessed that the Germans
had destroyed the Russian force. (The location was roughly the same as that of Russia’s
real defeat nine years later—in the battle of Tannenberg.) The German side decided the
Russians were too badly hurt to conduct offensive operations for some time, so it used
its rail net to move the bulk of its army to the western front. In the meantime, French
forces had conveniently entered Belgium—conveniently in that Germany could now
attack westward without violating Belgian neutrality. The wargame concluded with
1
the destruction of the French army. Caught out of their fortifications, the French were
2
defeated so quickly that the British army was unable to come to their aid in force. The
kaiser, leading the Blue team, certainly must have been pleased.
It was after this wargame that Schlieffen repeatedly advocated from retirement the
plan that bears his name. It called for minimal defense in the east and a strong attack
through Belgium and the Netherlands immediately at the opening of hostilities. During
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the remaining years of peace Germany stopped alternating the staff rides between east
and west. Thus Schlieffen’s was the only plan developed. This would have strategic
3
consequences in 1914.
Also in 1905, Spenser Wilkinson urged the British to play a wargame examining the
consequences of a new war between Germany and France. They did, and their wargame
envisioned the German main effort as a thrust into neutral Belgium to force the
French to fight out of their border fortifications. Like the German wargame, the British wargame indicated the Germans would destroy the French army before the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) could intervene in strength.
Wilkinson and his colleagues were not nearly as pleased with that outcome as the
kaiser likely was. This wargame appears to have led to a host of actions, in no small part
because Wilkinson ensured that its results came up on the floor of Parliament. They
ranged from reworking mobilization and cross-Channel plans to informal staff talks
4
with the French. This British ground-power wargaming did not fully reverse wargaming’s decline in popularity after the Boer War (see chapter 1). Still, inasmuch as the Germans lost the critical first campaign of World War I in part because the BEF was in the
right place at the right time (delaying the Germans enough to create the conditions for
the “Miracle” of the Marne), the impact on world history of Britain’s partial resurrection
of military wargaming would be hard to exaggerate.
The professional British military also conducted wargames to anticipate the shape of a
potential future war. After becoming director of military operations at the British War
Office in 1910, Brigadier (later field marshal sir) Henry Hughes Wilson spent the winter
of 1910–11 conducting, with his staff, a “great strategical War Game” to indicate what
5
the great powers would do if war broke out.
In addition, the British used live naval and army wargames to help them discern the
most effective use of aircraft in warfare. During their 1913 Fleet Maneuvers a Red radioequipped seaplane was able to report valuable information on the location of enemy
forces. A year earlier the army had used aircraft in a reconnaissance role during autumn
maneuvers. The Blue commander soon discovered that his own aircraft could provide
him with the location, movement, and strength of enemy forces far deeper and faster
6
than his traditional means (horse cavalry).
During the decade before World War I, Germany enjoyed something of a wargaming
renaissance, thanks to another General von Moltke. This nephew of the “Great Moltke”
assumed the position of Chief of the German High General Staff in 1906. “Moltke the
Younger” has received much abuse over the years for “ruining” Schlieffen’s master plan.
While the wisdom of his execution can be debated, he clearly did much to improve plan7
ning and wargaming methods before the war. Moltke started by going to the kaiser, a
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childhood friend thanks to his famous uncle. Moltke privately told the emperor that his
personal strategizing during the staff rides was closing off rigorous debate; the kaiser
agreed to desist. Next, Moltke examined the wargames themselves. He discovered that
machine guns were not being depicted. He was told that insufficient data existed to
calculate their impact on attrition precisely; Moltke saw to it that data were acquired
from the Russo-Japanese War. He then asked why logistics were not included. Told that
wargames could not account for logistics, he pointed out that the Italian games had
8
included logistics for decades. Sure enough, the next major German wargame included
logistics.
Moltke used his now more objective and comprehensive methods in a wargame that
tested the Schlieffen Plan. The game indicated the two armies on the outside of the
“great wheel” (as the intended massive movement of the German right flank was
known) would run out of ammunition two days before the campaign ended. Moltke saw
to it that Germany organized the first two motorized units of any army, anywhere in the
9
world—two ammunition supply battalions.
When war came, the plan did not work as well as the Germans had hoped. Why? The
problem wasn’t Moltke’s efforts to make the wargames more authentically depict contemporary combat results. That produced positive effects: Germany was less surprised
by the nature of the early fighting, and its equipment and tactics were generally less
inappropriate than the allies’. What got the Germans into trouble was not what they
wargamed but what they failed to.
Their wargames did not address the diplomatic and political consequences of their actions. Spontaneous attempts by Belgian civilians to destroy their own railroads caught
the Germans by surprise; there were no such “units” in German wargames. Even more
seriously, they did not consider the diplomatic consequences of their invasion of Bel10
gium—which brought the British Empire into the war; that empire in turn eventually
brought in the United States, and the additional weight of U.S. forces ultimately defeated
Germany. The Germans’ wargames got most of the details right but failed to warn
that the most decisive consequences of their invasion of Belgium would not be purely
military.
One wargame that did not shape history but should have took place in Saint Petersburg,
11
one of the capitals of the Russian Empire, in April 1914. The generals who would command Russia’s two most modern armies in the event of war directed the Russian side.
Both armies advanced into East Prussia against little opposition. They found themselves
in an area of lakes, which made cooperation between them difficult. The German side
placed a thin screening force in front of the Russian army to the north and shifted the
bulk of its forces south. This augmented German force surrounded and destroyed the
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southern Russian army.12 The Russian players took note and after the wargame recommended a simple change to the war plan to prevent this situation from developing. The
armies’ bases were different distances from the border; they simply needed to start their
movements on different days, so as to reach the border at the same time and remain in
contact during the advance.
Just four months later the two Russian generals commanded the same two armies, the
13
real ones, and implemented what appears to have been exactly the same plan. Again,
both armies started moving on the same day and both made good initial progress.
Again they reached the area of lakes that mutually isolated them. As if on cue, the real
Germans placed a light screening force before Russia’s northern army and moved the
forces thus freed up to the right, where they surrounded and destroyed the southern
army—near the town of Tannenberg. It would be difficult to exaggerate the results.
While the cost in trained manpower and morale was significant, Russia’s most serious
loss was the equipment and weapons of one of its only two truly modern armies. Russia
never fully recovered.
In the United States, both services conducted wargames in the years immediately
preceding World War I. The Navy’s wargaming occurred at the Naval War College,
in Newport, Rhode Island. While a range of navies, including that of Japan, were cast
as the opposition in various games, Great Britain was usually the adversary. This did
not reflect any anticipation that Great Britain actually would be a future adversary but
simply that at the time Britain had the largest navy and so provided the most challeng14
ing adversary.
With the coming of war in Europe, the American people, hence the American press, began paying more attention to things military. Most reports dealt with fighting, but one
periodical, Scientific American, began devoting upward of 40 percent of its pages to the
technology of the new war. In December 1914 it ran a story on the technology of prepar15
ing military strategists for war. With words and pictures its article described wargaming at the Army War College—for us, a rare glimpse into the equipment, procedures,
and assumptions for the U.S. Army at the time. The article ended on a very positive
note: “To the layman, it might appear ridiculous to watch the seriousness and concentration of these student officers, poring over the map,” but they “strive their mightiest to
learn how to hold the enemy at bay.”
The next mention in the press of Army wargaming would not be as positive. In 1916 an
Army wargame at the still-new Army War College in Washington, DC, attracted some
unwanted presidential attention. The Army Staff was even newer, having been founded
in 1903. Both organizations were still very small. So when the Army Staff wanted to use
wargames to explore options should the United States become involved in the Great
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War, it turned to the Army War College for help. When these wargames were reported
in the press, President Woodrow Wilson was furious—in his eyes such planning vio16
lated the spirit of neutrality.
During the Great War, 1914–1918
Little has been discovered about wargaming during the war itself. It is not now possible to say whether records of wartime games were destroyed or have yet to be found or
few wargames took place. Given German prewar doctrine, which made wargaming an
integral part of the planning of any major operation, it seems likely the Central Powers in fact played many wargames during the war. It is harder to estimate the volume of
wargaming on the allied side, given the allies’ on-again, off-again interest in wargaming
and the low number of American army officers trained in it by 1918. Still, we do know of
one British and two German wargames, as well as a U.S. Army and an Australian army
instance.
During late December 1917 and January 1918, Sir Henry Wilson directed a wargame to
look ahead to Germany’s expected spring offensive, based on the current situation on
the western front. The wargame designers concluded that (owing to the defeat of Russia)
the Germans could soon conduct an offensive with a hundred divisions on the western
front; the game explored the likely consequences of a German offensive of that magnitude. It ended with the Entente’s front along the Somme River broken at the juncture of
the Anglo-French armies. It appeared that had play continued, the Channel ports, on
which the BEF depended for logistical support, might have been lost.
Sir Henry, now a full general and the British representative to the allied Supreme War
Council, made a number of recommendations to the BEF commander, Field Marshal
Douglas Haig, who dismissed them. On 21 March 1918 the Germans unleashed Operation Michel, the first attack of the Kaiserschlacht (kaiser battle), a series of offensives
intended to end the war that spring. It was aimed at precisely the point and in almost
the strength played in Wilson’s wargame. The real offensive stalled at roughly the point
17
the British wargame had ended.
We have records of that same offensive’s being wargamed by the Germans. Ironically,
records of these wargames survive because they ignored the political consequences of
the offensive. Germany’s defeat of Russia had freed up most of its forces on the eastern front, producing a “window of opportunity.” If it could transfer those forces and
launch an offensive before many Americans had reached the continent, it might yet win
the war. However, if the German army failed, Germany’s prospects were bleak. Hence
this “Peace Offensive” was quite possibly the most carefully planned, wargamed, and
prepared-for operation of the war. When it was executed, it achieved spectacular (by
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World War I standards) advances but did not reach any truly strategic objectives and
ultimately failed. What went wrong?
Hans Delbrück thought he knew. Writing in his defense journal during the war, he
criticized the General Staff, declaring that the wargames had roughly predicted the
ultimately indecisive, however impressive, outcomes that actually took place but that the
General Staff went ahead anyway. He claimed that if representatives of the Foreign
Office had been present at the wargames, they would have realized that Germany’s
initial advances would cause panic in allied capitals. If Germany had offered generous peace terms (like giving back, oh, most of Belgium) before the offensives had lost
momentum, Delbrück asserted, the offer would probably have been accepted. Now
18
Delbrück feared Germany was likely to receive far worse terms. He was right.
The other wartime German wargame we know of was conducted by the High Command as part of its planning/preparation cycle for an earlier spring offensive. The game
19
was conducted at the headquarters of the army group of Prince Rupert. It seems likely
that it was typical of German preparation for all major operations.
During the Great War the U.S. Army continued to educate and train officers at the
CGSC using its application method—capped with wargaming. The American Expeditionary Force set up a forward staff school at Langres, France. By war’s end it had gradu20
ated five hundred officers. Thanks to Major Sayre, the course had proportionately less
21
lecture and more application than at CGSC, and especially more fieldwork.
During World War I, Maj. Gen. John Monash commanded the Australian 3rd Division.
He conducted in Britain long field training events that culminated in a week deployed
in a purpose-built trench system. The facility was large enough to train brigade-sized
units. While the record is not clear on whether this specific event was a field exercise
(a one-sided simulation) or a field maneuver (a live wargame), or both, it likely was at
least in part a wargame. There is abundant evidence that throughout his entire career
General Monash used wargaming to train his subordinates and develop his own insights
22
on war.
The Great War also produced the beginnings of what would later be called operations
research. It began with Thomas Edison, who donated his time and that of his laboratory
to the war effort. What the military expected, and he delivered, was technical improvement. However, he also used his inventive mind to devise many ways to employ more
effectively both existing technology and his emerging improvements—what would be a
23
hallmark of operations research. Frederick William Lanchester may have had an even
greater long-term impact. Lanchester was a British engineer who wrote several articles
24
and a book on the impact of airpower on warfare. As part of his analysis he developed
the “Lanchester equations,” which have been widely cited as predictors of the relative
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rate of attrition of two forces.25 Almost a century later these equations are still at the
heart of many of the attrition models used in military second-generation wargames.
Civilian Wargaming, 1914–1918
The carnage, the miserable conditions, and the years of stalemate made World War I
deeply unpopular after the war; we often forget that its outbreak was greeted with widespread enthusiasm on all sides. Until that enthusiasm withered with growing casualty
counts, games on military subjects sold well in several Western countries. Some of
these were simple games decorated with military images or depicting military subjects.
For example, in one game a player would advance in rank over the course of a military
26
career using a mechanism similar to that of Chutes and Ladders. Others were firstgeneration abstract wargames in some ways similar to War Chess games created for the
military prior to 1811—that is, they used the basic constructs of chess but called their
pieces by more-contemporary names or superimposed square grids on maps of actual
battle areas. Of course, exceptions were the second-generation simulation wargames of
Wells and Jane, which continued to be played throughout the war years and beyond.
Interwar Gaming: Innovation Catalyst and Inhibitor, 1919–1939
After the Great War, each power continued to wargame. How each wargamed had a
profound influence on its readiness for World War II. These differences largely explain
the easy victories Germany enjoyed early in the war.
Germany
Wargaming was even more prominent in the German military after the Great War than
it had been before. There were many reasons for this, and most can be traced back to
27
Gen. Hans von Seeckt, who was (clandestinely) Germany’s first postwar chief of staff.
Because the Treaty of Versailles limited the size of Germany’s military, Seeckt could
keep only a small percentage of the officers available at the end of hostilities.
Of these he chose first of all to keep officers of the General Staff, the part of the officer
28
corps that had been trained how to conduct wargames while attending war college.
In the much smaller treaty army, many of these officers dropped several ranks. Now
commanding or assigned to much lower-level military units than in wartime, even to
companies, they adapted their wargame techniques to the echelons where they were respectively assigned. The result was a proliferation in types of wargames Germany used.
Second, Seeckt dedicated roughly 10 percent of the entirety of his small officer corps to
undertaking a process of doctrinal development, with wargaming at its core.
Seeckt’s officers took an extremely pragmatic and detailed look at the history of the
recent war. From their findings they were encouraged to derive a wide spectrum of
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theories about what would and would not work in future wars. These theories were then
rigorously compared back with the historical facts. Theories that appeared consistent
with the facts were then explored further, through traditional map-based wargames.
The most promising ideas were further refined through adjudicated field maneuvers
(live wargames). Even foreign maneuvers were studied for lessons that could be drawn
29
from them. Seeckt also used wargames to develop commanders and staffs and to test
the aptitude of individuals for command and staff duty. Under him, wargaming was a
big part of the life of the German officer, as a cadet, during service with units, and at the
30
war college.
In fact, one thing Seeckt did not change was the central role of wargaming in the curriculum of the German War College. Though it was not called the Kriegsakademie for
several years—to obey the letter (while flouting the intent) of the Treaty of Versailles—
little actually changed. Students still participated in roughly one wargame a week. Each
of the course’s three years ended with a staff ride / wargame that Moltke would have
found familiar. The graduation exercise of each class remained the Abschlussreise, the
final journey—an eight-to-fourteen-day wargame that included live wargame elements,
frequent command-post changes, and the simulated deaths of key leaders (to generate
friction and allow more students a crack at command).
Hans Delbrück may have had a hand in bringing about the most sophisticated wargaming of the interwar period. Delbrück testified before a government panel that poor
grand strategy had been the root cause of Germany’s defeat and that the General Staff’s
purely military analysis of war plans was a cause of the strategy’s failings. The General
Staff’s wargames could only show the attrition effects of the invasion of neutral Belgium
or declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. They could not suggest the political
effects of these actions or the subsequent military consequences of those effects. In 1927
the German government established strategic-level wargames—not at the “shadow” gen31
eral staff but at the Ministry of Defense. These wargames were truly comprehensive:
industrialists were brought in to advise on the speed of industrial mobilization; attachés
were brought back from their assigned countries to play those countries’ militaries realistically (in what may be the earliest conscious effort to play Red as the real adversary
would); and diplomats integrated actions with the military’s. Even journalists partici32
pated, commenting on likely world public opinion.
In addition to limiting the size of the German military, the Treaty of Versailles prohibited entire classes of weapons: combat aircraft, tanks, and submarines. How could Germany develop doctrine for forces it did not possess? First, it gained some understanding
of their capabilities by studying World War I, conducting exchanges with foreign
militaries, and observing foreign maneuvers. German officers then conducted map33
based wargames that involved units with equipment Germany did not possess. Finally,
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they examined the most promising concepts they had derived in field maneuvers (live
wargames) in which substitutes were used for forbidden equipment and forces that did
34
not physically exist. The Germans called one concept they so developed “Mobile Op35
erations”; the rest of the world would soon call it “Blitzkrieg.”
As important and impressive as was the German army’s use of wargaming to develop
doctrine for weapons and identify their important capabilities, more-humble games
may have had even more significant impact in World War II. Only a fraction of the
German army in that war was to comprise panzer (armor) formations; the bulk of the
German army used the same transport (horses) as its soldiers’ fathers had. Yet history
after history of World War II affirms the fighting effectiveness of the entire German
36
army. This effectiveness is often explained as the outcome of veteran German forces
fighting inexperienced (“green”) adversaries. Yet this high effectiveness was observable
from the beginning of World War II; were not German troops then as green as their
opponents? Part of the true explanation may be the breadth and depth of German army
wargaming. In an excellent 2012 article, Dr. Milan Vego describes a host of interwar
German wargame types optimized for each level of command and for a host of applica37
tions—including developing the tactical abilities of noncommissioned officers. Using
1930 technology the German army had found a way to create “virtual veterans” before
the first real battle was fought.
Germany’s wolf-pack doctrine for U-boats is an even clearer example of the power of its
38
interwar application of live and map-based wargames. Britain ended World War I with
the submarine threat substantially under control, and it correctly estimated technological advances during the interwar period would favor antisubmarine warfare. Britain
was accordingly almost unconcerned about the German submarine threat when World
War II began. Unfortunately for Britain, Germany’s submarine doctrine, which was
largely developed even before Germany acquired U-boats, allowed it to win the first
several rounds of the Battle of the Atlantic, sinking shipping far faster than the Allies
39
could build replacements.
Unfortunately for Germany, however, in its navy’s wargames the “British” continued
to follow then-current British doctrine and strategy even after Germany’s new tactics
would have compelled adaptations. As a result, in the real world the Germans did not
40
anticipate, and so were not prepared for, British countermoves. The surface German navy also used wargames to develop doctrine and plans and it too reaped early
41
benefits. Gaming may have contributed to the surface fleet’s showing—surprisingly
professional for so new a force—during the Norwegian campaign.
When German rearmament “went public,” so did German wargaming: the first largescale Luftwaffe game was played in November 1934 and large Wehrmacht games took
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place in 1935 and 1936.42 These live wargames continued to grow in size and sophistication up to the beginning of the war. While these field wargames did not play Red as
accurately as did political-military games (both sides typically followed the evolving
German doctrine), they were vital in both developing that doctrine and socializing it
43
throughout the German army.
Still, it can be argued that what might have been the most decisive wargames of the
interwar period were never played. When Hitler came to power in 1933 he quickly put
a stop to the strategic-level wargames: he would make the future strategic decisions for
Germany. However, the German military was allowed to continue gaming at the operational and tactical levels. During the war, Germany fought brilliantly at those levels yet
made poor decisions at the strategic level. Would continued political-military wargames
have influenced Hitler’s decisions?
Perhaps not. In 1938, Gen. Ludwig Beck, then chief of the German General Staff,
conducted a wargame of a German campaign against Czechoslovakia. While the game
indicated a German victory, it also suggested that the fight would critically weaken Ger44
many. Hitler ignored these findings, convinced that there would be no fight.
The United Kingdom
Germany’s World War II preeminence in armor is all the more remarkable because
at the end of World War I the United Kingdom had the world’s most potent armored
force. Britain also produced the interwar period’s most prominent armor theorists, J. F.
C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart. How did Britain then fall so far behind? Many factors
worked against the development of British armor, and wargaming was one of them.
England had abandoned map-based (constructive) wargames, and its field-type (live)
45
wargames did not reflect the tank’s true value. As for the Royal Navy, it continued to
wargame, but its exercises focused on fighting the battle of Jutland better the next time,
not developing the most effective doctrine to exploit emerging technologies or to coun46
ter emerging threats. As for civilian wargaming, for over a decade all things war were
47
so unpopular that even makers of toy soldiers struggled to stay in business. However,
by the mid-1930s interest had recovered to the point that the small British Model Soldier
Society was founded. The society included an even smaller model soldier–based simula48
tion wargame wing. By the late 1930s several British board games on war topics were
approaching the nature of true second-generation simulation wargames.
France and Poland
As was true of many of its aircraft designs of the period, France’s interwar games were
compromises between the demands of too many missions at once. Its field-maneuver
wargames were expected both to train its largely reserve army and to explore doctrinal
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innovation. However, the need to familiarize inexperienced troops with current doctrine with current equipment inhibited these games’ usefulness for transformation. As
a result, the games helped France prepare to fight World War I even better than it had
done before. Given how inappropriate French doctrine was to prove in 1940, it is dif49
ficult to imagine wargames dedicated to doctrinal development not helping.
Even French wargames that, in retrospect, got the outcome largely right got enough
things wrong to make them misleading. In 1938 a French army wargame postulated a
German mechanized offensive through the Ardennes. The White (control) team used
established norms to estimate the time Germany would need to reinforce the critical
Meuse River crossings around Sedan. In the game, this delay gave Blue (the French)
time to take some countermeasures. Though not a win for the French, the wargame’s
outcome was not sufficiently bad to get much attention from the French high command,
and only minor (and ultimately ineffective) actual additional defensive measures were
50
taken. It might have been bad enough had the game’s norms been right: in May 1940
the Wehrmacht delivered exactly the attack France had wargamed, but it had found
51
ways to speed up its advance. More importantly, Germany used airpower to suppress
the French defenders during the critical crossing of the Meuse River, instead (as the
game had assumed) of waiting until the bulk of German artillery arrived. With almost
none of the expected time to react, France suffered not the minor defeat it anticipated
but a disaster.
As for Poland, a French military mission had brought wargaming there in the early
1920s to become part of the Polish army’s course in military studies. The Poles soon
began using both map and field wargames to test and refine operations plans (i.e., the
map-based games) as well as assess the development of their military (field games).
Major wargames in 1928 and 1931—in fact most Polish wargames during the interwar
period—assumed that hostilities would occur against the Soviet Union, that Poland
52
would keep Germany neutral diplomatically.
The United States
The early-to-middle interwar period was the low point of U.S. Army wargaming.
53
Though little written record exists, all that is known is bad. For Army ground forces,
all too often wargames became scripted exercises or became smaller and less frequent.
The Army’s air forces conducted no wargames during most of this period. Still, by the
end of the interwar period, especially in the Army ground forces, wargames had largely
rebounded.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Wargaming. According to two U.S. Navy histories, wargaming in the Army largely atrophied during the interwar period. While I’m generally
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skeptical of one service’s criticism of another, this seems plausible, given the slow
promotions, meager budgets, and dispersed nature of the Army in those years. Still, the
reality was more complex and varied. To understand interwar Army wargaming you
54
need to understand the service’s goals and difficulties at the time.
As young officers would return from Vietnam a half-century later swearing “never
again,” so many junior officers, and some senior ones, returned from “the Great War”
promising the United States would never again send a half-trained force into the meat
55
grinder that the battlefield had become. The Army’s first choice of a way to avoid
another bloodbath was to keep itself large. But with no major war on the horizon the
American people were not willing to pay for a large standing Army. The politically
viable alternative, one that was to evolve fairly quickly and remain in place until the
buildup for World War II began—was an expandable Army. Elements that required a
long time to create, such as a body of educated strategists, were adequately funded even
in the depths of the Great Depression. Elements of the Army with a shorter “lead time,”
such as trained marksmen and units, were starved for funds.
Given the above, it would seem a safe guess that the two places where wargaming did
not decline were at the Army’s staff and war colleges. You’d be half-right. With the
return of peace, the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College resumed teaching
a decision-making technique that began with an assessment of the situation, progressed
56
to the formulation of potential courses of action, and concluded with a wargame. The
name of these games changed from “free Kriegsspiels” to “map maneuvers.” Also in
57
these years the faculty played Red more often; however, for their big wargame at the
end of their second and final year of instruction, the students continued to split into Red
and Blue teams. Blue would defend New England from invasion, while Red was free to
58
attack anywhere in the region. Finally, CGSC taught its students that after graduation
59
they should wargame all plans before they were finalized.
Nevertheless, some have argued that CGSC wargaming was not quite as effective as
that conducted at the same time in Germany. The reason given is that CGSC games
typically only covered the opening moves of a battle or campaign, while the Germans
60
played until one side was decisively defeated. Even this deficiency, however, became
less pronounced when in 1939 CGSC began a series of linked wargames, challenging
61
students to cope with operations of long duration. In any case, it would be difficult to
overstate the importance of CGSC’s interwar games. At a time when most Army officers
were stationed with regiment-sized units where command-post exercises (CPXs) were
scripted and field maneuvers were increasingly rare, at CGSC they had opportunities
to plan and wargame the operations of divisions, corps, and armies. Most of the senior
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U.S. Army commanders of World War II did not learn their craft solely under the fear62
ful tuition of the Axis; they were virtual veterans, thanks to CGSC.
Curiously, the Army’s war college did not exceed or even match the staff college in
wargaming. As a result of its proximity (at Fort McNair, inside the District of Columbia)
to the undersized Army General Staff, more and more of the curriculum was taken up
with large student working groups tasked to solve current problems. At the time this
was seen as a win/win/win innovation: the overworked Army Staff received some very
talented free labor, the students got to work on real issues, and their work produced real
63
benefits. But there were also opportunity costs. The Army War College was the only
institution for the study of operations at the army and theater levels. A few more hours
on planning and execution at such levels may have better prepared the Army for leader64
ship at the highest level in World War II.
Greater wargaming decline took place in the underfunded field forces. CPXs appear
to have suffered most. Prior to World War I, CPXs had been conducted as map maneuvers in which the members of a command post performed their normally assigned
roles. During the interwar period many CPXs devolved into timed scripts of inputs (i.e.,
scheduling when preplanned developments or intelligence would be made known to the
65
players). The same script would be used year after year. While command-post members got to practice their present functions, they did not learn how to make decisions
in the face of uncertainty (many memorized the scripts), nor did they learn how to outthink a thinking adversary.
For the type of live wargame the Army called “field maneuvers,” the glass was a little
over half-full. Prior to World War I units had typically ended their annual training
cycles with a field maneuver. Local units would be split into Blue and Red forces, and
umpires would assess the outcomes of their simulated battles. Even under the tight
budgets of the 1920s, units typically cut corners elsewhere to preserve the funds needed
for credible field maneuvers. However, as money became even scarcer during the Great
Depression, maneuvers tended to become less frequent, shorter, and smaller. Still, there
were exceptions: in 1935, at the height of the Great Depression, First Army conducted a
66
fourteen-day field maneuver involving two corps and elements of five divisions.
Late in the interwar period, the number and sophistication of Army map and field maneuvers, including coordinated wargames conducted by the Army and Navy together,
increased markedly. Even where it had never stopped, wargaming increased in sophistication. The 1939 linked wargames mentioned above are examples. The evidence of this
67
increase is plentiful, but I have found no record indicating why it took place. A plausible explanation is that the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Marshall, directed it. Like
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Moltke, Marshall had valued map wargaming since he was a junior officer. Marshall did
in fact direct the Army to undertake extremely ambitious field wargames.
Of these, the Louisiana Maneuvers are best remembered, because so many historians
have credited them with helping the Army “get its act together” for World War II, helping not only to assess the effectiveness of weapons and doctrines but also to identify
68
key leaders. While live play increased realism, especially in movement rates, it was
their umpires who determined combat outcomes. This was a problem. Such determinations were traditionally based on matching the game’s range of outcomes with that of
historical outcomes. Since, by then, most American equipment had been developed after
World War I, there were no historical data available. Hence, the wargame could be only
as accurate as the umpires’ guesses about their effectiveness.
There were some honest mistakes. The head of the tank-destroyer program approved
69
the adjudication guide for the effectiveness of tank destroyers. Later combat would
show that these guides overstated their lethality, but until then, many believed their
effectiveness had been “proved.” As a result, in the early North African battles tank70
destroyer units were employed far too aggressively—with tragic results for their crews.
71

Other flaws in adjudication may have been deliberate. Efforts were made before play
ever began to guarantee an outcome that would “prove” the ground officers’ position on
72
the employment of airpower. As a result, ground officers’ air concepts prevailed. Procedures were not changed until tragedies like the battle of Kasserine Pass demonstrated
73
the need.
Still, the Army continually worked to make the adjudication of field maneuvers as accurate as it could be. The Army published a new Umpire Manual on 17 February 1941;
it included updates on the adjudication of tank destroyers. The Army also published, on
21 August 1941, a supplement for umpires assigned to adjudicate aviation forces. In late
1941 the Army conducted field maneuvers in the Philippines. These wargames provided
valuable insights and training opportunities. In the beginning of December 1941 it was
planning expanded field maneuvers when the Army, and the United States, ran out of
74
time.
U.S. Army Aviation Wargaming. In many ways the Army’s air forces had less success
than the service as a whole with wargaming, either in convincing the larger Army to
wargame airpower more accurately or in wargaming internally.
In 1934 six Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) faculty members, including Maj. Claire
75
Chennault, were called to testify before a commission on the Army’s use of airpower.
They were originally told they would have to pay their own way, that the Army’s budget had insufficient funds for their travel. Testifying on Army field maneuvers (live
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wargames) at the hearings, Major Chennault stated that airpower had not been allowed
to attack enemy forces before, during, or after amphibious landings but only in close
support after trench lines had formed. The Army’s response to this criticism was that
the learning objective had been to practice trench warfare and if airpower were used
too soon, trench lines might not form. Chennault insisted that these wargames needed
to depict airpower more accurately precisely because airpower would prevent the World
War I trench systems from forming. If the Army did not learn through wargaming how
to fight a mobile style of future war it would have to learn at a far higher cost on actual
battlefields. When Major Chennault returned from testifying he was informed that his
76
orders to attend the Army’s Command and General Staff College had been canceled.
Not seeing a chance for advancement without attending CGSC, Chennault left the
service.
This was not an isolated incident. The faculty of ACTS participated in Army War College annual wargames starting in 1923, hoping to educate senior Army officers on the
77
best use of airpower. The results were uniformly disappointing. Despite the gradual
inclusion of air officers in the planning process, the Army War College restricted air
participation to the combat zone, prohibiting attacks against vulnerable enemy reararea targets. If the distorted depiction of airpower disgusted the ACTS participants, it
may have provided “negative training” for the Army’s future leaders.
Things were not perfect inside the Army’s air arm either. At Maxwell Field, Alabama,
ACTS was developing doctrine and educating the airpower leaders who would fight
World War II. On the surface, their teaching methods appear outstanding. Periodically
the students would apply what they learned by writing plans to attack real targets. The
faculty would then pick one of the plans, and the entire student body would climb into
aircraft and execute that plan. Not since Moltke’s staff rides had planning received such
fast real-world confirmation. There was just one problem: ACTS was simulating actual
missions, not wargaming them. The bombers always got through to Selma, Alabama;
there was no enemy resistance. How this caused doctrine to evolve, or more likely not to
78
evolve, can only be guessed.
There was one bright spot. In 1927 a young captain recognized the need for airmen to
understand how airpower fit into overall joint theater campaigns. On his own initiative
he developed an air/sea/land wargame that took maintenance, supply, and even airfield
construction into account. Student reaction to his wargame was mixed. The game was
rated relatively highly in graduation surveys, but immediately after execution it received
79
a lot of criticism for being slow and difficult to play. Unfortunately the wargame really
was complex and cumbersome; after the captain’s departure in 1931 no faculty member was willing to continue the program. How much impact could such a short-lived
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wargame have had? The captain’s name was George Kenney. Many historians believe
that General Kenney was the principal architect of Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s air, sea,
and land campaign in the Southwest Pacific Theater. How much impact, indeed?
Wargaming returned to ACTS in the mid-1930s, in the form of a naval air tactical
80
wargame. Though its origin is not indicated in the ACTS history of the period, a surviving photograph suggests that the game was acquired from the Naval War College.
U.S. Navy Wargaming. Clearly the wargaming success story of the interwar period is
that of the Navy. Both the fleet and the Marine Corps made impressive use of wargaming, with a positive impact that has seldom, if ever, been equaled. I cannot hope to capture the spirit of the Navy’s interwar wargaming half as well as did Adm. Isaac C. “Ike”
81
Kidd Jr. in a 1984 letter:
Study was directed to the preparation for war at sea and of the consummation of any such war in
swift and decisive fashion should war become necessary. The most penetrating examination of the
personalities most likely to be involved was taken very, very seriously. In other words, know your
enemy, the adage of today. Their analyses were entitled, “estimates of the situation.” Computer
modelling to predict outcomes was handled on one’s hands and knees moving miniature models
about on a large game room floor in reaction to rolls of recalcitrant dice. . . . Competition was at its
keenest. Poor judgements, bum guesses, inadequate preparation and incompetence were rewarded
appropriately. It was not an uncommon thing for some careers to change direction radically and
even for some to end, following the rigors of the gaming floor which quickly separated the sheep
from the goats and left no room for doubt as to which was which.

With the active support of Adm. William S. Sims, President of the Naval War College,
the U.S. Navy built upon the work of McCarty Little, continually refining his techniques.
82
Even before World War I, College wargames looked at a possible war with Japan. Initially, all the games assumed the American fleet would dash across the Pacific, fight and
win a big, climactic battle near Japan, and relieve the Philippines. However, as the Naval
War College refined its methods, the logistical constraints on such a rapid advance
became obvious. Soon the wargames also made clear the need for forward bases and
underway-resupply ships in such a campaign. As understanding increased, the time
83
thought needed for the advance grew from days to months to years.
However, not all was smooth sailing, and the Navy had to come up with innovative ways
to cope with gaps in its knowledge of the Japanese. All through this period, American
intelligence on the specific characteristics of Japanese weapons and training was atrocious. But instead of arguing over what it did not know, the Navy turned this handicap
into an advantage. How it did that shows keen insight into the natures of education and
of people.
Naval War College students always wanted to win the big “capstone” wargames at the
84
end of their school years. As students have always done, they asked those who had
graduated before them for advice—or, in the vernacular of the U.S. military, they looked
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for “gouge.” Graduates were happy to provide advice: “Try to engage the Japanese at
night, they are blind. Watch out for their torpedoes, though—they’re killers. Fortunately, though, their ships sink like rocks after the lightest battering.” However, when they
talked to someone who had graduated in a different year they might learn: “Avoid night
engagements—the Japanese are incredible, and their ships are so rugged they can really
close in and slug it out. At least you don’t have to worry about their tinker-toy torpedoes.” Slowly it dawned on the students—the faculty was giving the Japanese different
strengths and weaknesses in each wargame!
What were the students to do? Unable simply to learn Japanese strengths and weaknesses before the game, they had to play in such a way that they could learn them through
experience before any decisive game engagements took place. Once they felt they had
learned what those strengths and weaknesses were, they would develop a strategy to pit
American strengths against Japanese weaknesses, while protecting their weaknesses
from Japanese strengths. They would then force decisive engagements. In other words,
they were “learning how to learn.” The positive impact this had on the Navy’s performance during World War II would be difficult to exaggerate. Virtually every line officer
in the Navy had attended the Naval War College between the wars. Each during his year
85
in Newport would have played easily a dozen wargames.
All this was a breakthrough in itself, but the Navy’s wargamers did more. Sims, a proponent of naval airpower, ensured that the College’s wargames included an accurate depiction of the impact of airpower on naval tactics and operations. Through these games the
86
faculty and students worked out initial concepts for the naval employment of airpower.
Like Germany, the U.S. Navy also used live wargames—“Fleet Problems,” adjudicated
fleet maneuvers to test and refine concepts and ideas first developed through map
87
wargames. Battleship admirals commanded the Navy of this period, but the aviation
community was able to develop operational concepts and procedures that were ready
when, at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese took away the battleship option. The Navy was able
to use wargames to try out—cheaply, quickly, and insightfully—ideas in aviation and
even ship design. For example, the circular formation used during World War II by carrier task forces was first developed during an interwar game. Some of what was learned
in these wargames later drove the basic design philosophy of American carriers—maximizing the number of aircraft each carrier could carry and maximizing the sorties each
88
aircraft could fly. In at least one case what gamers learned resulted in changes in the
design of ships already under construction, when in an early wargame a carrier’s single
aircraft elevator became jammed. The wargame made clear the operational costs of
such an event. A carrier then under construction was modified to add a second elevator,
eliminating the potential for such a “single-point failure.” Wargames could also have
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more-systematic effects on design. For example, the design of the Brooklyn class of light
89
cruisers was validated through wargaming.
Largely through the efforts of Adm. Harris Laning, the Navy’s live wargames (Fleet
Problems) and constructive wargames (at the Naval War College) acted synergisti90
cally. Naval War College game rules were used to help improve the umpiring of the live
wargames, and live tests of air-attack accuracy and, probably, Fleet Problem logistical usage improved the Naval War College’s wargame rules. Also, both the College’s
wargames and the Fleet Problems seem to have helped not only develop the Navy’s
91
evolving doctrine but socialize the changes throughout the force.
As influential as the Fleet Problems were, it is something of a mystery why they did not
have a still greater impact. Fleet Problems twice adjudicated successful, surprise carrier
air raids on Oahu. The first, in 1932, occurred during a joint element of Fleet Problem
XIII. The air raid was conducted on a Sunday morning and achieved complete surprise.
The second air raid took place in 1938 and was part of Fleet Problem XIX, commanded
by Adm. Ernest J. King, then Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force. Yet on 7 December
1941 our defenses on Oahu required hours to become fully effective. Then there was the
finding of Fleet Problem XXI in 1940 that the Navy was inadequately trained to fight
a night surface engagement. During the “hot wash” (immediate) debriefing, Japanese
proficiency in this area was mentioned. That proficiency was to be demonstrated just
years later during the Navy’s lopsided defeats off Guadalcanal. (At least in this case we
have a clue about why action was not taken. During the previous year’s Fleet Problem
XX an experimental radar demonstrated great effectiveness in night actions. The Navy
assumed that this technological solution would reach the fleet before war came with
Japan.)
Finally, the 1924 Fleet Problem III / Grand Joint Exercise 2 indicated that suicide attacks could be very effective. When some participants expressed skepticism that suicide
attacks would really be launched, the commander of the Black (U.K.) Fleet, Vice Adm.
92
Newton A. McCully, expressed his strong conviction that they would be. Yet this tactic
did not become a standard part of Red play. In fact, after the war Fleet Adm. Chester
Nimitz would say that the interwar games had missed this (and only this) element of the
Pacific War.
U.S. Marine Corps Wargaming. While relatively little is known about Marine Corps
wargaming during the interwar years, a case can be made for its being the most important wargaming work done during this period. The Naval War College’s games had
shown the importance of seizing forward bases during any war with Japan. Yet World
War I had seemed to show that, against modern weapons, amphibious assaults were
problematic. So the Marines had to solve an enduring problem, and they had to do so
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despite one of their traditional handicaps—a very sparse budget. Wargaming was a vital
93
method. Through study, debate, constructive wargames, and live-wargame exercises
94
the Marines developed their doctrine of amphibious operations.
Why was this so important? The Marines set out to make an offensive against Japan
sustainable; that was important in and of itself, but what they actually did was develop
the key to Allied success in all theaters. D-day and victory in Europe would have been
impossible without the work done by the Marine Corps during the thirties on amphibi95
ous techniques—with almost no budget and all too little recognition (then or now).
Civilian Wargaming. The interwar period was a low point for civilian second-generation
wargaming in the United States. While the general antiwar mood was not as strong as
in Britain, during the 1930s economic hardships, uncertainty, and fear of joining the
unemployed discouraged investing in expensive miniatures.
However, there were three bright spots. First, as early as 1915, Norman Bel Geddes,
today best remembered as the designer of the Futurama for the 1939 New York World’s
Fair, conducted ground-combat miniatures wargames at, and later near, his Manhattan
96
apartment. Second, as early as 1929, the writer Fletcher Pratt began holding navalcombat miniatures wargames at his Manhattan apartment. In 1940, Pratt published a set
of rules for miniature naval wargames. The recovering economy, increased concern with
national defense, and the alleged accuracy of his system may have contributed to Pratt’s
97
success; this book outsold all previous civilian wargame rules by a wide margin.
Finally, in the late 1930s a handful of Americans joined the British Model Soldier
98
Society and began receiving its newsletter, the Bulletin. Though few in numbers, they
would provide most of the leadership for the post–World War II growth in American
miniatures wargaming.
The Soviet Union
Apparently the former tsarist officers who came over to the Red Army during Russia’s
civil war brought imperial Russia’s wargaming techniques with them. Soviet games,
however, seemed closer to Baron von Reisswitz’s methods than to those of Lieutenant von Reisswitz. Terrain models were common for even very large operations, and a
99
wargame typically comprised a single turn. The slow, detailed adjudication of these
wargames that was optimal for decision support was poorly suited to developing the
thinking skills of Soviet officers. Perhaps to fill this void, in 1924 the Red Army developed and distributed a variant on chess.
From 8 to 11 January 1941, senior leaders of the Red Army wargamed a German inva100
sion, testing a defensive campaign plan developed the previous summer. Gen. Georgy
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Zhukov later said the situation depicted in the wargame was very similar to the actual
invasion just a few months later. The results of the wargame were briefed to Stalin. His
“displeasure” at the depth of German advance in the game may help explain the premature counterattacks made during the actual invasion. Stalin did concede that one of
the reasons the Red Army did so poorly in the game was that the young general playing
the Germans had performed brilliantly. What was this general’s name? Georgy Zhukov.
Over and over during the “Great Patriotic War” Stalin would assign General Zhukov to
the most-endangered sectors, the most-difficult missions. Was this performance in this
101
wargame one of the origins of Stalin’s faith in him?
Japan
Wargaming was an integral part of the curricula of Japan’s army and naval academies
and war colleges during this entire period, and insights from these wargames were
102
applied throughout Japan’s armed forces. In August 1941 Japan’s Total War Research
103
Institute conducted a global political-military wargame. Paying close attention to the
politics of target, neutral, and friendly countries, this wargame (which did not include
an attack on Pearl Harbor) pointed to an Axis victory and may have encouraged Japanese entry into the war. After the decision for war, each service wargamed its planned
operations. These wargames projected relative attrition with greater precision but they
did not include political considerations.
Some historians have maintained that Japan’s wargaming of the attack on Pearl Harbor
104
demonstrates how wargaming should be done. Japan originally planned to sail its
carrier force from its normal base on Japan’s Inland Sea straight toward Pearl Harbor.
During the wargame, however, the Japanese officers playing the Americans used their
limited sea surveillance assets to search for a fleet coming from that direction and spotted the Japanese force well out to sea from Hawaii. The wargame’s umpires adjudicated
that this warning would allow the American side to ready its defenses almost fully. The
Japanese side still “won” (i.e., it sank slightly more ships than it lost), but it was a Pyrrhic victory, of a kind that Japan could ill afford at the beginning of a long war against
an industrially stronger nation. So the Japanese strategists went back to their planning
cell and came up with something new. This plan was wargamed too, with much better
results. Japan’s subsequent victory at Pearl Harbor seemed to validate its planning methods—including its wargaming.
Yet was Pearl Harbor a Japanese victory? Certainly it was a tactical victory, by the standard of attrition ratios. It was also clearly an operational victory; it put the U.S. Pacific
Fleet’s battleships out of action for months. Still, what were the strategic consequences
for Japan? Shortly after his great “victory” Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, who had conceived
and championed the attack, has been quoted as saying, “I fear all we have done is waken
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a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”105 The sense of purpose Pearl Harbor gave the American people far outweighed any temporary advantage it gave Japan.
How could Japan have missed this beforehand? Japanese naval wargaming did not take
political impact into account. Of course, we will never know whether, had the Japanese
rerun their political-military (pol-mil) wargame with the Pearl Harbor attack included,
the outcome would have been close to what actually happened. (Remember, the United
States mobilized for this war far faster than it had for the Great War.) Still, not wargaming the strategic pol-mil consequences of their attack meant the Japanese had no chance
of learning what such a game might have shown them.
Wargaming in World War II, 1939–1945
As in the years before World War II wargaming influenced, for good and ill, the development of each future combatant’s capabilities, so once the conflict began, wargames
influenced its course.
The Axis
Germany continued to wargame throughout World War II, using its games to cultivate
and help select commanders and staff members and (when time permitted) to develop
106
and test actual operational plans. Hitler gave his generals too little notice of his decision to invade Poland for them to conduct most of the wargames called for by their
107
doctrine; the invasions of the West and the Soviet Union, however, were both exten108
sively wargamed. Sometimes those games strongly influenced German decisions on
the conduct of the war.
For example, in 1940, wargames conducted by Gen. Erich von Manstein, then a relatively obscure chief of staff of an army group, indicated that an attack into the Low Countries through the Ardennes would be more effective than the current scheme, which was
to repeat the Schlieffen Plan—only better. Skepticism from headquarters was partially
overcome by a successful field wargame over similar terrain in Germany. Admittedly,
109
though, the real clincher was Hitler’s support. The result was a French defeat that was
far faster and more complete than would have otherwise been possible.
Wargames that indicated a plan could fail were taken seriously. One wargame of an
air campaign against Britain and a second of a cross-Channel invasion both indicated
there would be serious difficulties. When the actual Battle of Britain ran into problems
similar to those forecast by the Luftwaffe’s game, the worrisome outcome of the cross110
Channel invasion wargame was given even more weight.
Hence, a wargame indicating disaster ensuing from an attack on the Soviet Union
may have had some effect. Games of that invasion were conducted at several levels of
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command.111 Operation Otto, the highest-level wargame, was conducted over three ses112
sions during November and December 1940. At the end of the unprecedented third
session, the players had proceeded only through early November 1941. Yet no fourth
session was scheduled. One reason was that the wargame had already predicted the destruction of 240 of the three hundred Soviet divisions and a front line deep in the Soviet
Union. Surely the Soviets would not be able to recover. Ironically, in the actual campaign, by the “game date” on which Operation Otto ended, the Germans had advanced
about as far as the wargame had indicated and had actually destroyed more Soviet
divisions (248). However, the Soviets were not down to sixty divisions: they still had 220.
How could the wargame have been so wrong? The Soviets had mobilized entire new divisions after the beginning of hostilities. To make matters worse for Germany, just after
the period covered by the wargame the Soviets acquired an old ally—winter. German
forces were woefully unprepared for winter fighting. Would a fourth session of Opera113
tion Otto have prompted abandonment of the invasion, or at least better preparation?
The German general staff continued to conduct wargames as an integral part of the
114
operational planning throughout the war. To describe all of the efforts would require
a very lengthy work. The following is just a sample. Ironically, wargaming both improved the Germans’ preparations to meet the D-day invasion and hindered their actual
response. Early in 1944 the Germans conducted a wargame on an Allied invasion of
France, focusing on German logistical preparations. The exercise prompted logistical
improvements that increased the effectiveness of German resistance when the inva115
sion came. Later, German reconnaissance spotted some of the preparations being
made across the Channel from Normandy. The Germans concluded that the Allies were
preparing a feint, a secondary invasion intended to trick them into thinking Normandy
was the main attack and not Calais, as they believed. Still, they conducted a wargame of
an Allied landing at Normandy and concluded that a lodgment was probable. If the feint
were successful, the Germans considered, the Allies might decide to make the feint their
main effort, especially if Germany pushed the expected main effort, at the Pas de Calais,
into the sea. Germany therefore decided to reinforce Normandy, but could not weaken
the defense against the main attack expected in the Pas de Calais. The Wehrmacht
found three units from other sectors to reinforce Normandy. The regiment that made
Omaha Beach so bloody was one of those reinforcements.
Ironically, while that German wargame made D-day far more costly for the Allies,
another actually helped them. The Germans planned to conduct a second wargame
once all three of the units selected as reinforcements for Normandy were in place, to test
whether they now could defeat an invasion there. However, the local commanders were
concerned an invasion could be imminent. They did not want their units’ chiefs of staff
away at a wargame when it came. So when several days of bad weather were forecast,
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they decided to move the date of their wargame up, although only two-thirds of the reinforcements were in place. They moved the date of the wargame up to 6 June 1944, and
116
as feared, many key staff officers were away from their posts when the invasion came.
World War II’s first battle of the Ardennes (Germany’s 1940 breakthrough) and its third
battle of the Ardennes (the “Battle of the Bulge”) are far better known, but Germany’s
wargame of the “middle” battle of the Ardennes (i.e., the battle of the Hürtgen For117
est) may have been its most unusual. Early in the fall of 1944, the Fifth Panzer Army
conducted a wargame of an American attack on its assigned sector, the Ardennes. While
the game was going on, the Americans actually attacked. Instead of dismissing the
game, Field Marshal Model sent only the commanders of units that were in contact back
to their commands. He then directed that actual American movements be fed into the
game. When it was time to commit the reserve, Model called its commander over to the
wargame map, personally briefed him, and sent him on his way. The Allied offensive
was quickly stalled.
Wargaming was an integral part of Japanese planning procedures as well. It played a
118
vital role in the planning of Japan’s initial rapid conquests. In contrast, the Japanese
game prior to the battle of Midway (in which, for example, the opposing player actively
cooperated with Japanese plans—a worse fault even than “mirroring,” playing Red as
Blue would act) is usually cited as the epitome of how not to wargame. That impression
has endured, but two developments in historical research significantly change the narrative and the main lesson that incident should teach.
For decades we read in books, chapters, and articles the same story. During the game
American airpower sank two Japanese carriers. Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki, who was to
command the carrier force for the actual operation, unilaterally reversed the umpires.
With the carriers restored to the game, the Japanese side went on to capture Midway.
Just weeks later, the Americans sank the same two carriers, plus two more. This time
Admiral Ugaki could not reach into the “dead pile” and replace his ships.
119
First, new details seemed largely to exonerate Admiral Ugaki. Then in 2005, a book
was published that for the first time accurately examined the planning and execution of
120
the battle from the Japanese perspective. Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully’s Shattered Sword clearly shows that the fundamental flaw in the Japanese navy’s wargaming
was a failure to play Red (U.S. Navy forces) realistically. At the strategic/operational
level, an even greater flaw may have been the conduct of the game as a “rubber stamp”
121
for a decision already made. Even so, more-realistic (i.e., aggressive) Red play may
have helped. However, the clearest example of poor use of Red came in an operational/
122
tactical wargame conducted just prior to the operation. The Japanese officer assigned
to play the Americans put his naval forces northeast of the atoll, right where Adm.
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Raymond A. Spruance would put his carriers during the actual battle.123 Red inflicted
heavy casualties on Blue (Japan). But Red play was dismissed as uncharacteristic of the
124
timid Americans, and so this foresight did not affect Japanese plans.
Understanding the role of wargaming in the Japanese armed forces also helps us to
answer one of the biggest questions of the war: After the Japanese were hopelessly out125
numbered in 1944 and 1945, why did they keep fighting? When the Japanese ambassador to the United States and his staff returned to Japan after the outbreak of war, they
were taken to a secret location outside Tokyo. There they played the American side in a
rare Army/Navy wargame. In that game Japan lost the war. Now what? A new strategy
was produced: Japan could not win, but it could kill Americans. These Japanese leaders
believed that if they killed enough Americans, the United States would grow war-weary
and give Japan better terms. Hence, by this view, the Japanese strategy for the remainder
of the war: inflict the maximum cost on the Americans in time and blood. It was not
until after the dropping of the atomic bombs that Japan abandoned this strategy.
The Allies
It is beyond dispute that the Axis began World War II with superior wargame technique
and broader application. However, as they did in so many areas, the Allies first narrowed the gap and then in some aspects pulled ahead.
The United Kingdom. British wargaming ran the gamut from the birth of modern
operations-research wargaming to the rediscovery of very free Kriegsspiel. The British
126
coined the term “operations research” and institutionalized the practice of OR. Like
Edison’s during World War I, the work of the British operations researchers started with
requests for technical innovation and grew to strategic importance.
As the prospects for war and the threat of bombardment of its cities grew, Britain
turned to its scientific community. Sir Henry T. Tizard formed a committee to identify
technologies that could help. Radar was the committee’s first and in some ways most
important contribution; it then worked to identify how radar could be of maximum
benefit to the war effort. From there the scientists branched out to identify models to
help optimize a host of military decisions. For example, if your objective is to get the
most supplies through to England but you have only so much industrial capacity, should
you build merchant ships to replace those sunk or build destroyers to sink the submarines that attack your merchant ships? Patrick M. S. Blackett was particularly prominent
in establishing OR sections at the headquarters of Fighter, Antiaircraft, and Coastal
Commands, as well being one of the first to define the methodology of OR. When the
United States entered the war, it established similar OR sections throughout the armed
forces.
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As the war progressed and Germany implemented counters to OR-recommended actions, OR teams began exploring what a decade later would be called “game theory” in
an attempt to anticipate how their thinking adversary might react in given cases. Apparently ignorant of previous military wargaming, they independently reinvented a similar
127
field, but with an even more analytical, mathematical inclination.
The other extreme of British wargaming was occupied by Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law
Montgomery. From at least the time of the second battle of El Alamein, Montgomery
would “walk through” all his operations ahead of time, with his chief of intelligence
providing the German moves, his chief of operations the Allied moves, and his chief
of logistics keeping a running tally of the projected supply condition. “Monty” was the
umpire. This practice was even freer than Germany’s Free Kriegsspiel but seems to have
128
been effective.
Between these two extremes were wargames the British conducted to explore options
in the Battle of the Atlantic. A British wargame indicated, for instance, that if a hunterkiller group of antisubmarine warships could be formed, many more U-boats would be
sunk. At that time in the war, appropriate ships would have to be taken from the escorts
of convoys to the Soviet Union. The game indicated that by delaying the next convoy
to the USSR long enough to cut down the size of the U-boat fleet, more cargo would
get through to the Soviets overall. The findings of the wargame convinced Winston
Churchill, who authorized the temporary diversion. Actual outcomes were close to
129
those indicated by the wargame.
At its apex late in the war, British wargaming was successfully used to prioritize possible future German threats and develop counters to them. In 1942 the Royal Navy’s
Western Approaches Tactical Unit began using wargames to train ships’ captains in
how to fight German U-boats and survive. Soon, between classes the faculty began using the wargame to anticipate enemy tactics and develop more-effective friendly ones.
These wargames developed and tested tactics that were then taught to the next class.
Later in the war the unit started working to anticipate feasible enemy technology and
methods. These possible future capabilities were then used by Red in wargames. Those
determined to be both feasible (through analysis) and highly effective (in the wargame)
became priorities for the development of countermeasures. This allowed Britain to have
responses ready to construct or teach as soon as the forecast capabilities actually appeared. Hence, any new advantage the enemy achieved by some innovation would be far
130
briefer than had Britain waited until it appeared.
The Soviet Union. The Soviets continued to evolve a unique style of wargaming.131
Soviet games typically centered on terrain models. Using each side’s plans for the entire
mission, the umpires, using incredibly detailed and cumbersome procedures, would
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adjudicate the operation all at once, all the way to its conclusion. Only then would the
two teams be called back and walked through the operation, step by step. Essentially,
these were one-move wargames.
There is no mention of Soviet wargaming during the early war period. This may be
due to the haste with which the Soviets had to respond to German offensives, which
probably precluded their laborious wargames. The first reference to gaming comes from
132
the Soviet after-action report following the Stalingrad campaign. The report, which
listed wargaming as having been the seventh of the nine most important factors in their
success, undoubtedly secured the place of wargaming in the planning of subsequent
campaigns. In fact, the pattern of those offensives—many simultaneous initial actions, culminating over time, and followed by long pauses—seems consistent with their
wargaming methods.
The United States. While I’ve found no indications of Army Air Forces wargaming
during the conflict, the Army continued to use wargames to prepare its officers for
combat, and the Navy and Marine Corps continued their broad-application wargaming
throughout the war.
With the coming of mobilization and then war, the Army’s CGSC greatly increased
class sizes, cut the length of classes to nine weeks, and actually increased the proportion
of student time devoted to wargaming. (From the beginning of mobilization in 1940 to
the termination of these short courses in 1946, CGSC graduated three times as many
133
students as it had from its founding in the 1880s to 1940.) CGSC also initiated a New
Division course for the commanders of divisions being activated and their dozen most
senior staff members. This high-level course dedicated an even higher proportion of its
134
length to wargaming than did the staff course.
This makes it all the more surprising that I can find no reference to Army use of
135
wargames to plan and prepare for specific operations during World War II. After over
half a century of wargaming at CGSC, the Army War College, and to a lesser extent
throughout the Army, even during the lean interwar years and particularly in the
final prewar years, it would seem, as far as the record goes, that Army ground and air
forces did not wargame during World War II. It is possible that wargaming was such
an ingrained part of planning for combat it was simply not mentioned. It may also be
that wargaming was seen as an education and training tool, not suited to actual combat
operations. Or it may simply be that records do exist and I have yet to find them. In
contrast, there are many clear references to heavy use of wargaming by the Navy and
Marines throughout the war.
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The U.S. Navy was reaping a rich harvest from its years of interwar gaming. A few
months into the war, Admiral Nimitz sent two lieutenant commanders back to the Naval War College. Their mission was to see whether the College had ever, by chance, used
Japan’s actual strengths and weaknesses in its wargames. They found two years when
the gamed Japanese characteristics had closely matched the evaluations of current intelligence. The officers returned with the Blue doctrine and plans from those years.
The Marines also got to see how accurate their interwar games had been. Frankly, their
early landings such as Tarawa did not unfold as the prewar games had forecast. Their
inaccurate “lessons” had contributed to flawed doctrine and the development and pur136
chase of not quite the right equipment. But the wargames had been close. The Marines
learned that in war it is easier to fix something almost good enough than to come up
with a capability from scratch.
The Marines refined their wargame techniques quickly. After a few assaults they were
getting results so close to actual casualty counts and “island secure times” that one
Marine called it “eerie.” Then suddenly a preassault game was way off on both counts.
The Marines had adjudicated as before and used the same methods to estimate Japanese
strength. Why then was the wargame’s outcome so far from reality? What had gone
wrong with the Marines’ wargame was that the Japanese were gaming too. A joint game
(described above) had just prompted a new Japanese doctrine, and the Marine Red team,
137
unaware of that, had continued to follow the old one. Later Japan would produce a
still larger variance from the War Plan Orange wargames, using an innovation called
“Divine Wind,” or “Kamikaze.”
In addition to classical wargaming, new operations-research techniques, in part
inspired by the British and in part homegrown, supported each American service. Applying these techniques, civilian scientists and engineers added a range of quantitative
138
applications as diverse as antisubmarine warfare and strategic bombing. The war also
spurred the development of flight simulators and computational devices for purposes as
diverse as breaking codes and aiming artillery. The continuing requirement for computational machines during the beginning of the Cold War provided the seed money for
139
what would soon take off as the computer industry.
The defeat of the Axis powers ushered in an eclipse of wargaming. Obviously, the former Axis nations ceased wargaming. Within the United States, gaming dropped almost
as steeply. Only inside the Soviet Union did wargaming expand and become more rigorous. Few knew this at the time, and few would have cared. If the atomic bomb had made
war obsolete, was not wargaming also obsolete?

64   the

newport papers

Notes
1. Vego, “German War Gaming,” p. 113.
2. Hill, “Influence of War Gaming on the Schlieffen Plan.”
3. Why did the German General Staff stop
rotating the staff rides between the east and
the west after over a decade? The most likely
explanation is that it believed it had found its
basic strategy and was focused on perfecting
it. There is a more interesting possibility. General Staff officers who spot-checked Russian
and French maps of the period commented
favorably on the French maps but found gross
inaccuracies on Russian maps. Could the
General Staff have decided to wargame defending in the east (hence fight in Germany)
and taking the offensive in the west so that
maps of the invaded territory would be more
reliable?
4. For more detail on this key British wargame
see Wilson, Bomb and the Computer, pp.
28–32.
5. Wikipedia, s.v. “Field Marshal Sir Henry
Hughes Wilson,” en.wikipedia.org/.
6. Patrick Bishop, Wings: One Hundred Years
of British Aerial Warfare (London: Atlantic
Books, 2012), pp. 25–26.
7. Hill, “Influence of War Gaming on the Schlieffen Plan.”
8. I can almost hear Moltke asking his staff officers, “Are Italians smarter than we Germans?”
9. Hill, “Influence of War Gaming on the Schlieffen Plan.”
10. Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August
(New York: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 90–91.
11. The French thought they knew Germany’s
broad plan in the event of war: an immediate
offensive to defeat France before Russia could
fully mobilize. To defeat this strategy France
urged its Russian ally to focus on mobilizing
its two most modern armies and with them
invade East Prussia. This would help Russia,
as the Germans would be unready for such
an early offensive. Even more importantly,
it might help to keep France in the war, by
causing the Germans to divert forces from
the west. Russia agreed to the French strategy
and developed it into a detailed plan. The
wargame would test this new plan.
12. See Wilson, Bomb and the Computer, p. 33.
13. Vasily Zatsepin of Romania doubts this incident took place, having found documentary

evidence that one of the Russian generals was
still in command of a distant district after the
wargame was supposed to have taken place.
But it is possible that knowing he would
soon command the army, the general made a
special trip for the game.
14. The U.S. Naval War College’s website includes
a section on the College’s wargaming activities at various moments in history. There is
a picture of a United States–versus–United
Kingdom game in the 1905–1906 academic
year.
15. Scientific American, 5 December 1914, as
quoted on Eaglehorse.org, the website of
the 2nd Squadron / 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment, Baley Barracks–Bad Kissingen,
Germany.
16. Here is how Wikipedia describes the incident:
“During the presidency of Montgomery M.
Macomb in 1916, President Woodrow Wilson
accused students and staff of planning for
taking part in an offensive war, even though
the United States had not entered World War
I. Wilson was unconvinced by Macomb’s explanation that the college was concerned only
with the intellectual growth and professional
development of its students, and insisted that
the school curtail its activities in order to
ensure that the U.S. maintained its neutrality.”
17. Albert Nofi, e-mail, 21 November 2013. Dr.
Nofi is a respected author, researcher, and
wargame designer. Also see Keith Jeffery, Field
Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier
(Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), p.
213, for the game’s structure.
18. Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 349–50.
19. See Vego, “German War Gaming,” p. 114.
20. Muth, Command Culture, p. 11.
21. Dunn, e-mail.
22. Peter A. Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander (Carlton, VIC, Austral.: Melbourne
Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 166–67.
23. William F. Whitmore, “Edison and Operations
Research,” Journal of the Operations Research
Society of America (1953), p. 83.
24. Frederick William Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm (London:
Constable, 1916).
25. According to Dave Ross of AFRL, Lanchester
initially used the equations to estimate the attrition rates of aircraft engines to predict how

on wargaming  

many spares a squadron needed. Also, see a
briefing by Lt. Col. Lance A. Forbes, “Combat
Modeling: Lanchester’s Equation” (Air Command and Staff College, Montgomery, AL, 14
March 2002).
26. Lewin, War Games and Their History, p. 108.
27. For Seeckt’s role in the rebirth of the German
army see James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military
Reform (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
1992).
28. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett,
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1996), pp. 36, 313.
29. Murray and Millett suggest Germany may
have learned more from British armored
maneuvers than the British did. Ibid., p. 41.
30. See Hofmann, War Games.
31. After World War II General Manstein claimed
that these exercises had been initiated at his
suggestion. See F. J. McHugh, Fundamentals
of War Gaming (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1966).
32. Robert Michael Citino, The Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics: Germany Defends Itself against
Poland (New York: Greenwood, 1987), pp.
147–49.
33. For the most comprehensive and authoritative description of German wargaming uses
and methods during the interwar period see
Hofmann, War Games.
34. For example, motorcycles would be allowed
to drive through the lines of opposing forces
to carry the information that could have been
provided by observation aircraft.
35. For the best description of the overall process
and wargaming’s place in it see Robert M.
Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and
Training in the German Army, 1920–39 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).

65

Workshop: Military Experiments before the Second World War (Alexandria, VA: Center for
Naval Analyses, 2002). For the development of
wolf-pack doctrine, pp. 29–31.
39. The first interwar naval wargame to incorporate submarines took place in 1927; the
first submarine-doctrine manual appeared
in 1935—the year Germany launched its
first submarine after the Treaty of Versailles.
Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period, p. 237.
40. Ibid., p. 239.
41. The earliest reference I have found was 1927,
but the German navy appears to have used
wargaming during the entire interwar period.
See ibid., p. 238; and Citino, Evolution of
Blitzkrieg Tactics, p. 156.
42. Gebhard Aders, History of the German Night
Fighter Force 1917–1945 (London: Jane’s,
1979), p. 9.
43. See Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg.
44. Many sources allude to this incident. The
earliest I’ve found is Wilson, Bomb and the
Computer, p. 21.
45. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Liddell Hart
Memoirs (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1965),
vol. 1, pp. 252–54. Some historians claim the
British army’s Chief of Staff “asked” umpires
in a wargame to rule that the experimental armored force had failed, providing the pretext
to disband the force. Other historians argue
that the results of a challenging exercise were
honestly misinterpreted.
46. Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period, p. 249.
47. One company literally turned swords into
plowshares, replacing dioramas of soldiers
with dioramas of farms. Peterson, Playing at
the World.
48. The society’s newsletter reported regularly on
civilian wargaming. See ibid., p. 272.

36. Perhaps the most convincing case was made
by Col. Trevor Dupuy in his invaluable
Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History
to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the
Outcome of Battles, rev. ed. (n.p.: Hero Books,
1985).

49. France actually outspent Germany on military
forces during the interwar period—proof, if
any is needed, that money cannot overcome
faulty doctrine. Murray and Millett, Military
Innovation in the Interwar Period, p. 333.

37. Vego, “German War Gaming,” pp. 106–47.

51. The lead headquarters saved some time by
editing orders used in a German wargame of
the advance instead of drafting them from
scratch.

38. For more information on this and other
interwar examples of map and live wargames
as catalysts for transformation during the
interwar period see Brian McCue, Wotan’s

50. Nofi, e-mail, 21 November 2013.

66   the

newport papers

52. Citino, Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics, p. 135.
53. All I initially found on interwar Army wargaming was brief references in two articles
about interwar naval gaming.
54. Much of the information in this section comes
from Schifferle’s excellent America’s School for
War.
55. Or as Schifferle writes, they vowed never
again to pay “the bloody cost of amateurism in
combat” (ibid., p. 86).
56. Ibid., pp. 66, 98.
57. Ibid., pp. 108–109.
58. Ibid., p. 72.
59. Ibid., p. 63.
60. Muth, Command Culture, p. 117.
61. Ibid.
62. Schifferle, America’s School for War, p. 63.
63. Ibid., p. 24.
64. Muth, Command Culture, p. 121.
65. I remember an article years ago in which a
major described returning to a unit in which
he had served twelve years before as a captain
to find it using the same CPX script.
66. Schifferle, America’s School for War, p. 26.
67. On 3 July 2007 I spent half a day in the
archives at the Army War College Library
and barely scratched the surface of the postwargame reports available from this period.
68. Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ
Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Army, Center of Military History, 1991).
69. U.S. War Dept., Umpire Manual (Washington, DC: General Headquarters, 17 February
1942).
70. Martin Blumenson’s chapter on Kasserine (pp.
226–65) in Charles E. Heller and William A.
Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles, 1776–1965
(Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1986),
provides a good and concise, if somewhat
Army-centric, view of the battle. The lessons
the battle taught about tank destroyers are
summarized on page 263. Not everyone
believes their overestimation was an honest
mistake; see David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks
and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S.
Army, 1917–1945, Cornell Studies in Security
Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press,
2003), pp. 148–50. One of the major objectives
of Gen. Lesley J. McNair—Army General

Headquarters (GHQ) chief of staff and an
ordnance officer by career and training—in
the 1941 “Carolina Maneuvers” was “to see . . .
how we can crush a modern tank offensive.”
Indications are that he strongly influenced
the umpires’ combat tables. McNair ensured
that these GHQ-controlled maneuvers never
tested tank-versus-tank combat, instead
usually setting antitank units, with support,
in defense against unsupported tanks. The
woeful performance of the 37 mm antitank
gun in actual combat was somehow translated
to “Works great!” by the time GHQ released
its report on North Africa. It is fairly clear that
McNair stood in the way of antitank main
guns for U.S. tanks until his death in 1944. See
Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in
North Africa, 1942–1943, rev. ed. (New York:
Henry Holt, 2007).
71. Comments on the depiction of airpower
during the Louisiana Maneuvers are based
on research done by Mark Clodfelter while
he was on faculty, as a major, at the School of
Advanced Airpower Studies.
72. Warren A. Trest, Air Force Roles and Missions:
A History (Washington, DC: Air Force History
and Museums Program, 1998), p. 77.
73. In fairness, the air battle over Kasserine also
demonstrated the need for sufficient air-base
construction engineers to allow forward fields
to keep up with advancing ground forces.
74. Dr. James G. Roche (of the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock, Maryland), e-mail, 13
December 2004: “Beginning in June 1941, the
U.S. Army in the Philippines began exercises
with the objective of reaching the level of the
Louisiana maneuvers. In September 1941,
the Philippines Division held exercises which
demonstrated its lack of mobility. In October,
the 26th Cavalry held an exercise to deploy
and defend the beaches of Lingayen Gulf—
horses had a tough time after the approach
march providing the necessary mobility. In
November, the 1st Provisional Tank Group
repeated the exercise successfully. To begin in
December, plans were made for advanced exercises combining the different arms (armor,
infantry, and cavalry) and adding the new
Philippine Army units. Facilities were being
constructed when the war began.”
75. H. Dwight Griffin [Maj.] et al., Air Corps
Tactical School: The Untold Story (Maxwell
Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff
College, 1995), p. 7.

on wargaming  

67

76. Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter: Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault (New York: G. P.
Putnam, 1949), pp. 18–19.

89. John Prados, Pentagon Games: Wargames and
the American Military (New York: Harper &
Row, 1987), p. 4.

77. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps
Tactical School, 1920–1940 (Manhattan, KS:
MA/AH for Air Univ., Center for Air Force
History, 1992), pp. 22–23.

90. As mentioned above, between 1923 and 1940
the U.S. Navy conducted a remarkable series
of live wargames, Fleet Problems I through
XXI. Albert A. Nofi, To Train the Fleet for
War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010),
pp. 28, 341.

78. Various lectures at Air University have gone
into greater depth than any published source I
have found, but the bare bones of this method
are laid out in Griffin et al., Air Corps Tactical
School, p. 5.
79. During work on my master’s thesis on the
history of wargaming, I was unable to find
any information on gaming at the Air Corps
Tactical School. The above is based on conversations I had in the early 1990s with Peter
Faber (then a major) while we both worked
at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies.
Colonel Faber’s PhD thesis is on the Air Corps
Tactical School.
80. Jerome A. Ennels and Wesley Phillips Newton,
Wisdom of Eagles: A History of Maxwell Air
Force Base (Montgomery, AL: River City,
2002), p. 59.
81. “War Gaming, 1930s Style,” Naval War College
Review 42, no. 3 (Summer 1989), p. 51.
82. One hundred twenty-seven of the 136 strategiclevel wargames played at the Naval War
College during this period addressed war with
Japan. Murray and Millett, Military Innovation
in the Interwar Period, p. 355.
83. Michael Vlahos, “Wargaming, an Enforcer
of Strategic Realism: 1919–1942,” Naval War
College Review 39, no. 2 (March–April 1986),
pp. 7–22.
84. These games were taken very seriously during
a period when promotions were slow and
opportunities to stand out in combat nonexistent. See Admiral Kidd’s brief but vivid
description of Naval War College gaming at
this time above.
85. Nofi, e-mail, 13 December 2004.
86. See Perla, Art of Wargaming, p. 71, and Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period, pp. 192–93.

91. See Albert Nofi’s truly outstanding work on
the interwar naval fleet problems and their
impact, ibid.
92. Based in part on Nofi, e-mail, 21 November
2013, and in part on his To Train the Fleet for
War.
93. The Marines wargamed at least as early as
1924; Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An
Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p.
89. However, work on developing an amphibious doctrine shifted into high gear in 1933,
when the Commandant of Marine Corps
Schools discontinued all classes so faculty and
students could work on defining what was
needed for the capability; John H. Cushman,
“Maneuver from the Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (April 1993), p. 47.
94. Col. Eric Walters, USMC (Ret.), a longtime
wargame advocate and innovator, has found
a single contemporaneous reference stating
that during the development (1934–40) of
the Tentative Landing Operations Manual, the
floor of the old seminar building at Marine
Corps University (the same room he would
use for wargames in 1994) was laid out with
model fleets and islands. While his discovery
seems to confirm that Naval War College–
style wargaming was part of the development
process, it is also plausible, as Colonel Walters
points out in a 6 April 2014 e-mail, that the
layout was constructed purely for problem
visualization. For live wargame exercises,
Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period, pp. 74–76.
95. Cushman, “Maneuver from the Sea,” p. 47.
96. Peterson, Playing at the World, p. 276.

87. The best sources on the Navy’s interwar live
wargames are McCue, Wotan’s Workshop, and
Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period, p. 355.

97. Pratt claimed his rules system correctly
predicted the outcome of the naval battle with
Graf Spee. See Perla, Art of Wargaming, pp.
38–39.

88. Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period, pp. 400–403.

98. Peterson, Playing at the World, p. 271.

68   the

newport papers

99. See John F. Sloan et al., Soviet Style Wargames
(Washington, DC: Science Applications,
June 1986), for the nuts and bolts of Soviet
wargaming.
100. Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow
to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Center of Military
History, 1987), pp. 16–18. See Richard W.
Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Lawrence: Univ. Press
of Kansas, 2001), pp. 264–68.
101. The general had previously decisively defeated
the Japanese in a rather large border skirmish,
which may have helped even more in gaining
Stalin’s confidence.
102. Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period, p. 197.
103. Perla, Art of Wargaming, p. 45.
104. Prados, Pentagon Games, pp. 1–2.
105. While this quote is now often attributed to
Admiral Yamamoto, the earliest reference to
it I could find was its appearance on-screen at
the conclusion of the 1970 feature movie Tora!
Tora! Tora!
106. For selecting personnel, Hofmann, War
Games, pp. 74–75.
107. Still, according to Vego, “German War Gaming,” pp. 132–33, they did conduct two staff
rides, which proved very useful.
108. Hofmann, War Games, p. 15.
109. Dupuy, Genius for War, p. 266.
110. For the Sealion wargame see Wilson, Bomb
and the Computer, p. 38, and Hausrath,
Venture Simulation, p. 27. For the Luftwaffe’s
game see James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe:
Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940
(Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1997), p.
356; also Edward L. Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German
Aircraft Industry, 1919–39 (Lincoln: Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 243.
111. Again there are several accounts. The most
authoritative (if somewhat verbose) of them
comes from the U.S. Army program to learn
from the German army’s experiences during
World War II by commissioning a number of
papers from the German generals themselves:
One of them, Gen. Rudolf Hofmann’s 1952
War Games, cited above, was later developed
into his German Army War Games (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1983).
See pp. 38–44.

112. Barry A. Leach, German Strategy against
Russia, 1939–41 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1973), pp. 82, 105–107. Actually, Operation Otto encompassed all planning for an
attack on the Soviet Union. One or more wargames were conducted at each echelon—Supreme High Command of the Army (OKH),
army group, army, corps, division, etc.—so
there was no one Operation Otto game. The
one referred to was that conducted by OKH.
See Hofmann, War Games.
113. A second irony: the wargame was conducted
by Gen. Friedrich Paulus. Little more than
two years later, Field Marshal Paulus would
surrender the Sixth Army at Stalingrad—an
outcome far different from what his wargame
predicted. Leach, German Strategy against
Russia, p. 105.
114. For example, in Messerschmitts over Sicily:
Diary of a Luftwaffe Fighter Commander
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007),
Johannes Steinhoff tells of observing the defense of Sicily being gamed by the front commander. His implication is that the Germans
were continuing to plan as usual despite the
increasing hopelessness of the situation.
115. See World War II German Military Studies
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Europe, Historical Division, 1979), vol. 12, p. 50.
116. Many sources on D-day mention the Germans’ anticipation of a feint in Normandy
and their second wargame. The best known
is Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day, June 6,
1944 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959),
pp. 80–81; in 1962 a movie appeared, with
the same title. My most detailed source on
the second German game is Paul Carell, Invasion—They’re Coming: German Account of the
Allied Landings & the Eighty Days’ Battle for
France (Boston: Dutton, 1963), p. 13. However, I have been unable to recover my source
for the Germans’ first Normandy game and
would appreciate any leads.
117. Hausrath, Venture Simulation, p. 27.
118. J. K. Hjalmarson, “The Development of War
Games,” Canadian Army Journal (Winter
1961), p. 9.
119. This morality play is arguably the most-oftentold incident in the history of wargaming.
While the above is true, it makes the argument
against the admiral more “open and shut”
than was actually the case. Most authors fail to
mention that the American aircraft that sank
the carriers during the game were B-17s. In

on wargaming  

the actual battle the B-17 proved completely
ineffective (during the entire war in the Pacific B-17s sank only one enemy ship that was
under way), so in a narrow sense, Admiral
Ugaki was right. Still, Ugaki failed to address
the issue that the loss of his carriers in the
wargame should have brought up: What if the
Americans get in the first hit? Would we have
enough strength to win anyway?
120. Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of
Midway (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2005).

69

129. Based on discussion during the first Connections UK conference, King’s College London,
2–3 September 2013. For the Connections
conferences generally, see Connections
Wargaming Conference, connections
-wargaming.com.
130. This account is based principally on a lecture
given at Connections UK 2017 but also on
Ministry of Defence, Wargaming Handbook
(London: 2017), pp. 19–20.

122. Ibid., pp. 61, 67.

131. The most detailed description of Soviet
wargaming I have found was based on the
debriefing of two Afghan army colonels. See
Sloan et al., Soviet Style Wargames.

123. By one account this U.S. force consisted of
only cruisers; by another (Shattered Sword) it
included carriers.

132. “Did You Know?,” fifth item, Strategy &
Tactics (March 2004), p. 25.
133. Schifferle, America’s School for War, p. 155.

124. Nofi, e-mail, 21 November 2013.

134. Ibid., p. 158.

125. During a master’s course he taught for the
University of Alabama at Air University, Dr.
Ronald H. Spector went into detail on his long
quest to understand why the Japanese kept
fighting. It was this joint wargame (of which
he learned just after his Eagle against the
Sun, cited below, went to press) that enabled
him finally to understand. Several published
sources touch on it, such as Hausrath, Venture
Simulation, p. 32.

135. A colleague at the Army War College has seen
a reference to the Ninth Army gaming its
prospective operations after the breakout from
Normandy, but as of this writing I have not
found a citation.

121. Ibid., pp. 61, 67, 410.

126. For the birth of OR see any of the “Historical Perspectives” papers presented by Gene
Visco and Michael W. Garrambone at the
annual Military Operations Research Society
(MORS) Symposia over the last several years.
Of particular interest are papers to be found
at www.mors.org/meetings/combat_analyst/
ca_pres/Garrambone.pdf and at www.mors.org/
education_colloquium/EC2003/presentations/
Garrambone.pdf.
127. For example, a 1957 article by two prominent
OR practitioners seems to indicate unawareness of prior games used for war-plan development. Clayton J. Thomas and Walter L.
Deemer Jr., “The Role of Operational Gaming
in Operations Research,” Operational Research
(February 1957), pp. 1–27.
128. My source is a briefing given by Mr. Michael
Garrambone to the MORS Symposium at
Quantico Marine Corps Base, Quantico,
Virginia, in 2003. Mike is a senior operations
research analyst and a senior officer in MORS.
He is currently researching the history of
operations research.

136. For the best brief account of Tarawa and its
lessons see Ronald H. Spector, The Eagle
against the Sun (New York: Vintage Books,
1985), pp. 259–66.
137. From a briefing I acquired years ago but cannot now find.
138. U.K. Air Ministry, Operational Research in the
RAF ([London]: 1963), provides a comprehensive look at the application of OR techniques
within the Royal Air Force (RAF), but I have
found no analogous description for the U.S.
Army Air Forces (USAAF). Still, given the
close relations between the RAF and the
USAAF, the British book likely provides some
insight into the latter’s employment of OR.
Several books and chapters by MORS in the
United States cover this period. For example,
Wayne P. Hughes Jr., ed., Military Modeling
for Decision Making (Alexandria, VA: MORS,
1983, 1989, 1997), although focused on
OR, includes some material on historical
wargames.
139. This is commented on in a number of
histories of technology in general and of the
computer specifically. For perhaps the clearest
and most succinct see Ernest Volkman, Science Goes to War: The Search for the Ultimate
Weapon—from Greek Fire to Star Wars (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2002), pp. 216–17.

CHAPTER THREE

Wargaming in the Cold War
1946–1989/1991

The impetus and initiative for the rebirth of war gaming in the 1950s as
a research instrument rather than a training or planning aid, came from
the scientists and not the soldiers; with, it is fair to say, Britain in the lead,
followed closely by U.S.A. and Canada, and now certain other NATO
countries.
BRIGADIER M. R. J. HOPE THOMSON, DSO, OBE, MC

Wargaming in the years immediately following World War II has been described as an
1
“eclipse,” a “breakthrough,” and a “transition.” Like the proverbial blind men’s descriptions of the elephant, each characterization provides a correct but incomplete idea of
wargaming at the time. Together, though, they paint a fairly complete picture.
Eclipse, Breakthrough, Transition: The Late 1940s and the 1950s
It is indisputable that wargaming in the former Axis countries went into eclipse. Unlike
after World War I, when the small German army allowed under the Treaty of Versailles had a higher percentage of officers trained in wargaming than it had had before,
Germany had no post–World War II army. The victorious Allies blamed the German
General Staff, if not for contributing to the start of the war (though some of the Allies
did), at least for prolonging it (which it almost certainly did). When the German army
was reestablished in 1955 as an integral part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) it included few World War II–era officers with knowledge of wargaming. So
few were they that when the U.S. Air Force agreed to provide a faculty member for the
German War College, the school requested an officer with knowledge of wargaming, to
2
help restart that element of its curriculum. Japan too stopped wargaming for a time after World War II. Its new constitution actually outlawed armed forces, though Cold War
tensions led to the creation of the Japan Self-Defense Force in 1954. Even in the United
3
States wargaming virtually stopped in war colleges. With the U.S. Army’s budget and
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manpower dropping rapidly, it appears that wargaming was neglected, like many other
things.
Shortly after World War II, two wartime advances came together to shape the nature of
American and Western wargaming throughout the Cold War. Wartime work in code
breaking, radar, avionics, communications, electronic warfare, and flight simulation
had produced advances that would underlie the electronic computer. Also, unlike the
pioneering work of Edison and Lanchester during World War I, which was soon forgotten, the field of operations research, which had started in England on the eve of World
War II and spread to the United States and Canada during the war, soon developed into
an enduring discipline.
The latter was probably largely due to the fact that global tensions resulted in a continued need for the talents of OR professionals. Searching for ways into problems with
many variables, several OR folks working at different locations hit on wargaming
as a tool. With the emergence of computers, the OR specialists could conduct their
wargames without the many military or naval officers previously required. To many OR
professionals and some policy makers, these automated games, played without humans,
were a breakthrough.
In fact, calling the immediate post–World War II period a time of transition is an enormous understatement. In what seemed the blink of an eye the United States went from
bombing Berlin and shipping Lend-Lease arms and supplies to our “great Russian ally”
to flying supplies to Berlin in the face of a blockade orchestrated by the Soviets. Naval
War College gaming in the 1945/46 school year illustrated the speed of this change. The
curriculum included wargames against the now nonexistent Imperial Japanese Navy
(too little time to change it), yet by the 1946/47 school year the Soviet Union had already
4
become the hypothetical enemy. Yet more changes were coming to American and Western wargaming, changes that would fundamentally reshape the field.
A lasting legacy of the war was the mobilization of the scientific community of the
English-speaking world. The Manhattan Project is the most famous example, but the
radar work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and elsewhere, as well as
countless other projects on both sides of the Atlantic, had contributed greatly to Allied
success. Western militaries now found ways to hold on to a particularly helpful element
of that scientific mobilization—the new community of operations-research experts. The
OR community’s survival would in a surprisingly short time lead to the reinvention and
reemergence of wargaming. Initially, however, it would be a very different type.
A distinguished scholar has called the change in wargaming during the early postwar
period a transition from amateurs (i.e., military officers) to professionals (OR experts).
That is, instead of an Army combat engineer or a committee of Navy line officers on a
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war college faculty designing and conducting wargames, they would now be developed
and largely executed by OR specialists. But this amateur-versus-professional statement
is at best misleading. A more accurate description would be wargaming transitioning from military strategy professionals / mathematics amateurs to military strategy
amateurs / mathematics professionals. As the following pages will show, the net benefit
of this transition to the defense of the United States and its allied and associated nations
is not intuitively obvious. That the Soviet Union, its satellites, and its associated nations
continued to wargame much as they had prior to World War II is interesting in terms of
what might have been. Still, great advances were achieved, and the greatest came at the
end of this period when military and OR professionals worked together closely.
Our expectations of the future shape that future. The United States expected peace,
guaranteed by atomic weapons; the Soviets expected continued conflict, and they (at
least publicly) asserted that the effectiveness of atomic weapons was overstated. Because
of those divergent expectations, wargaming initially atrophied within the United States
and grew in the USSR. As with the space programs, the Soviets widened their lead in
wargaming because the United States was comparatively standing still. Unlike space
programs, Red play was virtually unknown outside the Soviet sphere, so the Soviet lead
did not spur the United States to action. Still, this unipolar wargaming world quickly
began to change.
The seeds of wargaming’s eventual recovery in the West were planted even before its
post–World War II eclipse. Techniques and technologies developed during the war years
would eventually support its recovery. Though it was not apparent at the time, the early
computers (developed to help break codes and target artillery) and early flight simulators (designed to teach pilots the use of instruments and instrument flying) would
eventually fundamentally change the world. The development of computers would also
aid in the recovery of wargaming. As early as 1955, a conference in Michigan concluded
that the computer could speed wargame adjudication—though only when psychosocial,
5
political, and economic factors could safely be ignored.
The Korean War
Very little is known about wargaming in preparation for, or during, the Korean War.
It appears likely the United States did no wargaming before the outbreak to explore a
6
North Korean invasion. Although operations research was resurrected for this new
war, the only history that mentions its efforts during Korea does not mention or imply
7
wargaming.
In the histories covering the communist side, however, there are several references,
direct or indirect, to wargaming. One report suggests that wargaming may in fact have
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been used extensively.8 Officers who had graduated from Soviet staff and war colleges
planned the initial invasion with Soviet assistance. The facts that, first, the Korean War
was planned during the heyday of post–World War II Soviet wargame development
and that, second, the initial assault had the signature, the “look and feel,” of Sovietwargame-designed attacks make a strong if circumstantial case for North Korean use of
Soviet-supported wargaming.
There are indications that wargames were used throughout the Chinese-dominated
phase of the Korean conflict. Many of China’s top generals, including Gen. Lin Biao,
commander of the Chinese “volunteers” who crossed the Yalu River, had attended
9
Soviet staff and war colleges. A standard account of the Chinese intervention seems
to describe in a brief passage Soviet-style wargames being used to plan the initial of10
fensive. Because the wargame indicated that the superior firepower of U.S. / United
Nations (UN) forces would defeat Chinese troops dug in across the narrowest part of
the Korean Peninsula, China developed (and used) a second plan, one that would lure
11
the enemy into a trap.
There is an even briefer reference to what appears to be a Soviet-style wargame used to
12
plan the final defeat of U.S./UN forces south of Seoul. This and the signature of many
of China’s offensives—complex and intensely effective initially but less coordinated with
time—also suggest Chinese use of Soviet-style wargames.
The U.S. Military
One legacy of World War II for the American armed forces was an increased emphasis
on joint planning and “warfighting.” While the individual services would continue to
dominate the Department of Defense until at least the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act (see below), the trend toward greater “jointness” began immediately after the war.
One indication, and catalyst, of that trend was the initiation of wargaming at the Joint
Staff level. The formal use of wargaming by the Joint Staff began in 1949 when the Army
13
Advanced Studies Group was transferred there. First called the Joint Advanced Studies
Group, it became the Joint War Games Agency in the late 1950s.
As for the actual recovery of wargaming, the Navy again led the way. As we have seen,
immediately after World War II, wargaming at the Naval War College dropped to about
10 percent of its prewar levels. However, as early as 1947 the College increased its use of
14
wargaming with the addition of a game-intensive logistics course. Then, in 1958, the
Naval War College’s computerized Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS) became
15
operational. While this early analog computer system was hailed as a breakthrough
at the time, later articles would admit that this first computerized wargame never
quite worked (aside from its big status screen). But the mere fact that the wargame was
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computerized lent an air of modernity to what was by then supposed to be an antiquated
16
procedure.
In 1958 an Assistant for Wargaming was established on the Navy Staff and given responsibility for computer simulations and studies conducted in Washington, primarily
17
in support of budget decisions concerning force sizing and technology. Also in 1958,
the Navy formalized the longtime organization of the work of the Naval War College’s
War Gaming Department: half the year the College provided wargames for its students,
18
the other half wargames for various elements of the fleet.
As for the U.S. Army, in 1947, Gen. Dwight D. “Ike” Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff
of the Army, established a wargaming capability at the headquarters level, the Army
19
Advanced Studies Group. When the group was transferred to the Joint Staff in 1949
the Army created the Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG) to support its own
Pentagon budget-development and other needs. Located nearby in Bethesda, Maryland,
the STAG possessed an unheard-of set of three computers, a staff of 150, and a budget
20
of $1,750,000 ($18,150,000 in 2017 dollars). Similar wargaming was conducted at Johns
Hopkins University by the Operations Research Office, an organization created by the
Army to perform functions similar to those of the U.S. Air Force’s RAND Corporation.
This operations-research-PhD-heavy body performed a host of studies for the Army,
including big OR-intensive wargames.
Unfortunately, if OR-heavy wargaming flourished in support of the Army’s Pentagon
headquarters, it appears few field units of any size wargamed during this period. One
possible reason was a lack of training in wargaming. The Army had closed its war college during World War II to make more officers available to command all the incoming
draftees. The school did not reopen immediately after the war: the Army was trying to
get all the services to agree to one joint war college. Facing strong opposition, especially from the Navy, it gave up and reestablished the Army War College in 1954. But
even then its curriculum did not contain the amount of wargaming of the final prewar
21
years.
Still, need drove the continuation of some wargaming. The post–World War II U.S.
Army conducted wargames for some of the same reasons as the post–World War I
German army had—with only a fraction of its former budget and manpower, wargaming was one of the few modes of training it could afford. A series of articles in a service quarterly, Military Review, offered advice on conducting effective map-based
22
wargames. Stung by its lack of preparedness in Korea (and enabled by higher budgets),
the Army expanded its field wargame maneuvers. Its cartoon adversaries, the “Aggressors,” did not duplicate Soviet tactics, but this was a start.

76   the

newport papers

The Army did realize it might have to fight the Soviets. To prepare, it started debriefing general officers of the last army to have done so—the World War II German army.
One of the things the Army learned from these generals was the value the Germans had
23
derived from wargaming. In 1954, just two years after the Army published its report on
German wargaming, the Army established a wargaming function within the Continental Army Command (CONARC). The Deputy Commanding General for Development
of CONARC strongly believed in the value of wargaming for both training and evaluat24
ing proposed changes. In fact, he recommended that all units conduct wargames, using
maps of the deployment area, before conducting any field exercise.
The Marines, for their part, continued after the war to conduct field maneuvers, landing
exercises, and command-post exercises. When these exercises included reacting Red opponents and adjudication of the interactions of Red and Blue, they were wargames; those
that followed scripts or fixed schedules were simulations. However, for over ten years
after the war, it appears, the Marines did not use map- or computer-based wargames.
In fact, a survey conducted in the mid-1950s indicated that few Marines knew these
types of wargame even existed. The Corps’s response to this finding included a Marine
25
Corps Gazette article outlining the current state of wargaming. In 1958 the Marines
established a Landing Force Wargame series at Quantico, Virginia. The games were
conducted by a small War Games Group of ten officers and four senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and used physical terrain models and rigid, manual adjudication
procedures; their purpose was to examine the impact of proposed weapons and tactics.
The group planned to expand its activities soon to include examining various Marine
26
operations plans. As it turned out, “soon” took a while.
Meanwhile, an office of Operations Analysis had been established at Headquarters, U.S.
Air Force. Nevertheless, the new service initially depended on the OR community for
27
all its wargame needs. After the war the Air Force facilitated the creation of RAND as
a way to retain its access to OR specialists. In 1948 RAND began experimenting with
“crisis” gaming. By 1954 it had launched a number of innovative wargaming projects.
That year, RAND began a computer model of the Cold War competition between the
United States and the USSR. Input from the Air War College and the State Department
prompted RAND to add political and economic factors. Accordingly, building on the
foundation of earlier German and Japanese work, in the 1950s American academics and
defense analysts developed what is today called “political-military” (or more succinctly,
“pol-mil”) wargaming. Though the depiction of these factors in a December 1954
wargame was viewed even at the time as crude, the potential value of including such
factors was recognized. To increase flexibility, RAND later turned to a Free Kriegsspiel
style of play and in so doing reinvented the German political-military (pol-mil)
wargame. Also, in 1954, RAND attempted to wargame an entire nuclear war; the next
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year it used an Air Warfare Model to accomplish a “net assessment” at the Air War Col28
lege. The prestige of OR at the time rubbed off on Air Force wargaming.
In the civilian arena, the wargaming picture during the 1950s was one of expansion in
academia, recreation, and even business. Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) and several individuals at RAND developed techniques
and explored applications for a class of wargame that if played well might not involve
war. Dr. Bloomfield was a particularly articulate advocate of these games’ educational
29
and even policy insight applications.
RAND was also a large part of the OR community’s other big wargame-related break30
through of the 1950s, game theory. Like those of pol-mil wargaming, the roots of game
theory extend decades earlier, but also like pol-mil wargaming, even more so, it was
not widely applied until the 1950s. Basically, game theory holds that if the payoffs of
various choices open to each of two individuals can be established, then the “rational”
choice of both sides can be established. The most famous example of game theory is the
“prisoner’s dilemma.” Game theory has been applied to economics, politics, and several
other fields. When game theory was applied to armed conflict, the result was called a
“war game.” This has led some in the OR community and the wider defense arena to call
wargames “war games” as well.
By the early 1950s, “miniatures”—tiny models of warships, planes, and vehicles and
figures of soldiers—had been used to play second-generation simulation wargames by
a small but slowly growing number of rich and upper-middle-class men for forty years.
By the late 1950s, the players were much more numerous and were from a much wider
socioeconomic range. Several trends contributed to this change. First, the postwar
era’s improving standard of living made collecting miniatures economically feasible
for a larger segment of the middle class. Second, the price of miniatures fell, and by an
amount that is even larger when adjusted for inflation. Third, a number of wargame rule
books were published, mostly in Britain. Finally, during 1957 Jack Scruby in California
started publishing War Game Digest. Scruby’s circulation was initially tiny—forty gamers in the United States, Canada, and England—but by creating an informal network the
Digest acted as a catalyst for further innovation and growth.
However, even more revolutionary changes were beginning. Even the Harvard Business
Review published an article on adapting wargaming techniques to developing busi31
ness strategy. In 1953 a young man named Charles Roberts started selling Tactics, a
map wargame he had designed, to civilians. Though similar to the wargames published
in England and elsewhere over the previous half-century, Tactics was enough of an
improvement to be considered by many to be the first second-generation print wargame
produced for the civilian market. By 1958 Roberts had sold two thousand copies and
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had come within thirty dollars of breaking even.32 Encouraged, in 1958 Roberts founded
33
Avalon Hill to sell war, economic, and sports simulation games to the general public.
34
In 1959 he saw a picture of a RAND wargame in Life magazine. The game’s map, he
saw, had a hexagonal grid; he immediately realized that the “hex” grid allowed more realistic movement than a chess-like square grid, while keeping movement simple. In the
coming decade he would design and publish wargames that were indisputably secondgeneration.
International
Military wargaming took different paths for each of the former belligerents. Germany’s
general staff and military were disbanded, so all military wargaming ceased. The same
was true for Japan. In the case of the United Kingdom and Canada, developments followed a similar course to those in the United States, with wartime OR experts leading
the move toward Cold War gaming. Initially, this gaming was for “research” only—that
is, exploration of doctrinal and technology choices, not the traditional uses of education
and operational-plan development.
The United Kingdom, most notably, conducted comprehensive lessons-learned exercises
that resulted in the creation of a set of analytical models that would prove invaluable
35
in assessing options at various levels of combat. The first postwar wargaming in the
United Kingdom for which there is hard evidence took place in 1956, the evidence being
the game’s publication that year as The British Army Tactical Wargames. This was a
map-based game, based on OR from 1944/45, meant to model a fighting NATO withdrawal in the face of a Warsaw Pact advance. It contained the first wargaming rules for
36
the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In 1958 the United Kingdom produced a tactical
ground-combat wargame; it used a 3-D map (i.e., a terrain table) with analog line-of37
sight determination (what was visible from where) using a graduated pole. Most British
wargames during this period were developed and executed at Fort Halstead, in Kent.
Fort Halstead is still home for much of the wargaming of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), but few documents survive from this period. There is only a
photo of eleven men and two women, captioned simply, “Founding Team June 1959,”
and a summary of a report on a corps-level wargame in which individual companies
38
were depicted on the 3-D map.
If the British were less than thorough in their data collection, the Soviets were obsessive. Even before the cessation of hostilities, they launched a massive effort to collect and
compile operational data from their part of World War II, the “Great Patriotic War,” to
increase the validity of their wargaming. Owing to Cold War secrecy, this effort was not
39
known in the West until the 1980s.
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On the civilian side, the growth of miniatures wargaming in the United Kingdom and
the Commonwealth paralleled, if not exceeded, that in the United States. The slow but
accelerating postwar recovery and the publication of several rule books fueled this
growth. War Game Digest had contributors and subscribers throughout the English40
speaking world.
The High Point and the Low Point: The 1960s
By the end of the decade of the fifties, then, wargaming was clearly on the rebound.
In the United States, the 1960s got off to a promising start; and wargaming was also
41
becoming even more international.
The United States
At home, the main source for hope was the new secretary of defense, Robert McNamara,
whose strategy was to merge successful management techniques he had brought from
42
General Motors with proven OR techniques. His goal: effective defense at a cost the
United States could sustain over the long haul. Problems would emerge during execution, but at its core, McNamara’s concept for approving and continuing defense initiatives was sound and elegantly simple: accomplish a life-cycle cost analysis to learn what
a proposal would really cost, and then use OR techniques and wargaming to estimate
military utility. Meanwhile, if noticed by few, civilian second-generation wargaming
growth accelerated.
In the joint realm, President John F. Kennedy was angered by what he perceived as a lack
of political sensitivity demonstrated by the military in planning for what became known
as the Bay of Pigs debacle. To address this concern, in 1961 Secretary McNamara ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to wargame all impacts of contemplated operations:
military, political, and economic. Political-military gaming had originated in Germany
during 1927 and (as we saw above) was reinvented by American academia during the
1950s. The Joint Staff, in turn, expanded the capabilities of its existing wargaming
activity, the Joint War Games Agency, to encompass this type of wargaming. With the
increased scope came a new name, the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA).
McNamara would use SAGA for the unbiased evaluation of options throughout his
43
tenure.
That same year the computerized adjudication engine CARMONETTE was first
44
used, to assist with comparing the military effectiveness of weapon systems. In 1962,
wargames and cost studies helped convince McNamara to support the creation of an
“airmobile division,” whereas indications of relatively low cost-effectiveness influenced
him to cancel the Skybolt air-to-surface missile system. The latter caused a storm of
protest from Britain, which had spent a substantial amount on the codevelopment of

80   the

newport papers

Skybolt. The United States was blindsided by this criticism; McNamara’s attrition-perdollar calculations had not even considered diplomatic repercussions.
The biggest wargame of the period was completed six months after the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Called the “Simulation of Total Atomic Global Exchange,” this early computerized wargame took three years to prepare and six months to play. According to reports,
45
the outcome confirmed that the United States could survive an atomic war. (But why
were there reports at all on what would normally be a highly secret wargame? This is
speculation, but we may have wanted the Soviets to know we believed we could endure
such a war.)
During the 1960s, the military began efforts to broaden wargaming beyond attrition.
President Kennedy’s criticism resulted in political-military wargaming not only by the
Joint Staff but at “professional military education” (PME) schools as well. In 1964 the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, renamed in 1972 the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, or DARPA) funded a game that would depict all the politi46
cal, psychological, and economic ramifications of an insurgency. (Such an effort might
have produced an entirely new generation of wargames, one capable of examining all
wars in a much more comprehensive way. But regrettably, and despite some interesting
work in this area, the defense planning community continued to use primarily attritionbased wargames.) That same year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a political-military
game, Sigma I-64, that examined U.S. strategy options for Vietnam. The exercise was
repeated as Sigma II-64, with even higher-level participation. The author Thomas Allen
47
implies that these games predicted an American defeat. However, review of the actual
48
declassified reports makes interpreting the outcomes not so simple. First, the strategy
they executed did not match what followed in the actual event. During Sigma II-64, for
example, the Blue side immediately attacked an expanded version of the Joint Staff’s list
of ninety-four targets and promptly mined North Vietnam’s ports. Second, each exercise
depicted only the first several months of U.S. involvement. Even if they had been able
to adjudicate the political consequences of American casualties, the wargames did not
cover sufficient time for those consequences to arise. As more and more information is
49
declassified, accounts of the Sigma games become more and more complete.
In the mid-1960s wargaming spread to what would become the National Defense University’s Industrial College of the Armed Forces, for which the Raytheon Corporation
developed a fully automated wargame. TEMPER (for Technological, Economic, Military, and Political Evaluation Routine) was judged a useful tool for applying the school’s
course material.
The innovation that undoubtedly would in time have the greatest impact on wargaming, and indeed on the progress of the human race, started in 1969 as a relatively small
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Advanced Research Projects Agency project. ARPANET linked a handful of universities
doing defense-related research. It would grow, a little, during the succeeding decades
50
and become better known as the Internet.
The 1960s also started well for naval wargaming, with a ringing endorsement from
51
Admiral Nimitz. “The war with Japan had been [enacted] in the game rooms here by
so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the
war was a surprise,” he said, “absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics.” Also,
the Naval War College soon began offering a course in wargaming. In 1964 the Navy
conducted the first “remote” wargame, with the players on board ship and adjudicators
52
in Newport, at the College. Also in 1964 the Navy upgraded its wargaming system,
53
NEWS, to the Warfare Analysis and Research System (WARS).
However, there were serious problems. WARS was so cumbersome that even many
members of the War Gaming Department had trouble using it. Even so, the Navy believed that maritime warfare was increasing in scope and complexity faster than it could
improve the capabilities of its wargames. Perhaps the problem was, in part, the growing
complexity of computers and the corresponding difficulty of using them. There was also
a trend in both Washington and Newport to keep the Red moves constant. Analysts and
students would see how their plans fared against Red, but Red would have no opportunity to react; that reduced the value of all such wargames, for as any student of war will
tell you, “The enemy gets a vote.” That is, the opponent always preempts or reacts to
your plans. Further, even this less-than-completely-effective wargaming occupied by the
end of the decade only twenty-nine days of the Naval War College’s yearly curriculum, a
54
fraction of the prewar level.
As for the Marines, as of 1964, they still had only one small wargame unit (now called
the War Game Division), and it had not expanded beyond its original mission of
examining the probable impacts of alternative weapons and tactics. It had not begun
to address operations plans, education, or training. The War Game Division’s games
were still adjudicated manually; twelve hours of combat could take six months to play.
Still, two articles published in the early sixties indicate that the Marines recognized the
55
increasing importance of games for Department of Defense budget decisions.
For its part, the Air Force during the 1960s made major advances in wargaming.
Working with the Joint Staff and RAND, the Air Force started to wargame the Stra56
tegic Air Command’s Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) against a Red SIOP.
The “RSIOP” was prepared by intelligence officers, who studied not only the Soviet
Union’s weapons but its strategies and tactics as well. The Air Force also wargamed the
defense of North America. The game it used, Big Stick, was demonstrated in 1961 at
the Air Command and Staff College, where in 1964 it became part of the school’s core
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curriculum. During the 1960s, Abt Associates delivered three wargames to the new Air
Force Academy. The first, Strategy and Force Evaluation, enabled the students to explore
various strategic-weapons force structures. The second was a pol-mil game, and its final
57
“deliverable” dealt with insurgency and counterinsurgency. Finally, in 1967, the Air
Force introduced the world’s first instrumented air weapons range, established at Eglin
Air Force Base (AFB) and used in weapon effectiveness testing. The full impact of this
innovation would become apparent in the next decade.
The Army’s wargaming too became more effective during the 1960s. In 1961, the
Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) replaced the Operations Research Office as the
Army’s RAND-like think tank. As the Army focused more on counterinsurgency, it
hired RAC to develop a squad-to-division-level wargame simulating the situation in
Vietnam. The result, TACSPIEL, used the classic design of Red and Blue in separate
rooms and White updating a “game truth” map in a third room. As reports reached
58
Washington of real-world developments in Vietnam, the game was updated. Early in
the 1960s the Army’s Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University began
work on HUTSPIEL, a manual game that explored a ground battle between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, including both the use of nuclear weapons and battlefield logistics.
59
When RAC took the project over in 1965 it computerized the adjudication. Though
RAC’s emphasis remained the conduct of big wargames in the Washington, DC, area,
60
we’ll see below that it had some success reaching down to the field-army level.
Wargaming was used by Army helicopter enthusiasts to develop the concept of an
airmobile division. In 1962, as mentioned above, wargaming was used to sell the idea to
61
McNamara, who in turn directed the Army to follow through with it quickly. When
the Army deployed its first airmobile division to Vietnam, it found, as the Marines had
62
earlier, that real combat was different from wargames. Also like the Marines, though,
the Army found that its initial concepts were close enough for field adaptation.
Throughout the sixties the operations-research community’s wargame support to the
63
Army’s Pentagon staffs remained strong. However, wargaming in the field atrophied.
One reason appears to have been a decline in the study of warfighting, and hence
wargaming, at the Army’s highest school, the Army War College. During the fifties and
sixties, revision after revision of the curriculum increased the hours spent on international studies and other academic subjects at the expense of material more directly
relevant to warfighting—such as wargaming. Ironically, a history of the school praises
64
the subjects added in this period but is mute on where the time was coming from.
Meanwhile, the Army Command and General Staff College was shifting time away
from warfighting and wargaming toward leadership, management, and communication,
although it never completely abandoned wargaming.
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The U.S. Army did continue to execute the type of live wargames it still referred to as
“field maneuvers,” or more often simply “maneuvers.” Techniques for such games continued to evolve during this decade, as evidenced by the publication of two new editions
65
of the Army’s field manual on conducting them—Maneuver Control, FM 105-5.
Wargaming was also used in direct support of our forces in Vietnam. Three wargames
were conducted between May and October 1966. In-country commanders were quoted
as calling the insights gained extremely useful. For example, one of the wargames followed an actual, and very effective, communist attack on an air base. The Americans
gamed a hypothetical future attack and implemented the insights gained, and then the
communists struck again—this time with much less success. The dramatic impact of all
three wargames on real-world “friendly casualties” indicated that wargaming could be
of great value in an “active theater.” Nevertheless, an article advocating wargaming for
planning down to the battalion level admitted that the Army would be hard-pressed to
find enough personnel in the entire service qualified to man wargame cells at even the
66
division level in Vietnam.
Apparently unbeknownst to commanders in Vietnam, however, some in the Army had
been working to make wargaming more “deployable.” In the late 1950s, Dick Zimmerman of the J Operations Research Office and others worked to develop “quick games”
that could be executed by small staffs as far down the chain of command as field armies.
In October 1963, Gene Visco, of RAC’s European field office, observed Operation
Big Lift, in which for the first time the United States flew forces to Europe to “marry
up with” prepositioned equipment and then engage in a live wargame. Using what
he observed and his experience with complex wargames he developed Schnellspiel, a
wargame that could be used at the brigade level, with the help of a single analyst. It was
Mr. Visco’s hope that Schnellspiel would replace the judgment of G-3s (staff operations
67
officers) as the source of adjudication in unit command-post exercises. Such “eyeball
adjudication” had worked well immediately after World War II, when most unit G-3s
were World War II combat veterans, but by even the early 1960s such men were becoming scarce.
On the civilian side, the 1960s saw continued growth of miniatures wargaming, and an
increasing number of wargame rule sets, for different historical periods and even air
warfare, were published in the United Kingdom and United States. These rules, and ever
68
more numerous newsletters, were immediately available on both sides of the Atlantic.
However, in the United States board or print wargames soon overtook miniatures in
numbers of participants. It is easy to see why. To start a miniatures-based wargame,
an individual needs to purchase miniatures and paint them; buy and read a rule book
appropriate to the era of the miniatures purchased; build a playing surface like a model
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railroad layout; often, buy and read a second book with descriptions of the battles of
69
the era; and then, finally, play. With a print/board wargame, an individual needs to
purchase the game, open the box, unfold the map or board, read the rules, and start
70
playing.
Charles Roberts’s Avalon Hill firm published roughly two new wargame titles per year.
Most broke new ground by depicting different eras (ancient to modern), levels (tactical to strategic), or regimes (air, sea, or land). Through the 1960s the only publisher
of print (board) wargames worldwide was Avalon Hill, even though in 1963 it almost
went bankrupt. It was taken over by its largest creditor, Monarch Printing, and under
the leadership of Monarch’s president, Eric Dot, Avalon Hill grew in sales from a few
thousand annually at the beginning of the decade to over a hundred thousand by the
decade’s end. Young American males purchased most of these wargames. They were, on
71
average, above the national norms in education and income.
In May 1964, Avalon Hill planted the seed of what would enable, or at least accelerate,
the breaking of its own monopoly on print wargames. In that month Avalon Hill pub72
lished the first issue of its house magazine, The General. Intended principally to boost
sales, by helping individuals find opponents, The General also ran users’ complaints
about current wargames (all by definition from “AH”) and suggestions for designing
better ones. Soon the magazine’s readers began feeling like a community with common
interests, and the black art of wargame design became less opaque. During the summer
of 1969 a shoestring wargame publisher began operations, in New York City: Simulations Publications Incorporated (later better known as SPI). The two young founders,
Jim Dunnigan and Redmond Simonsen, would have a huge impact during the 1970s and
73
beyond.
Seeds of even bigger changes, even less noticed at the time, were being planted near
Boston. In 1961 three friends at MIT’s Project Warrior (about which more below), Steve
“Slug” Russell, Martin “Shag” Graetz, and Wayne Wiitanen, began working on what is
widely considered the first computer-based second-generation simulation wargame for
civilian use. By February 1962 Spacewar was running on an MIT PDP-1 computer. A
two-player, real-time, tactical computer wargame depicting combat between two spaceships orbiting a common sun, Spacewar was never published, but it was given to other
74
universities and individuals.
Despite this significant growth of commercial wargaming, for a long time many in the
military wargaming community appear to have been unaware of its existence. As late
as the late 1980s, in the author’s experience, the few practitioners of military wargaming who were aware of commercial gaming were hostile to it. Several felt that the very
existence of commercial wargames hurt their own games’ credibility. For their part,
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the commercial wargame designers believed (usually correctly) they did not have the
clearances to learn from military wargamers. The wall between these two communities
would take a long time to fall.
But the wall began to develop cracks almost immediately. In the mid-1960s the first attempt at technology transfer from the fledgling civilian sector to the military was made.
Charles Roberts developed a wargame, Gametrain, specifically to teach infantry tactics,
a weakness for many of our troops starting their deployments to Vietnam. The military
faculty at the Army’s Infantry School accepted the product, but the civilians who con75
trolled the funds rejected it.
International
Wargames were used by militaries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In the West, the
United Kingdom and Canada continued to use OR-based wargaming for research
76
purposes. However, some in those nations were advocating the return of wargaming to
77
its traditional uses of education and the development of operations plans. Throughout
this period the United Kingdom continued to use manually adjudicated wargames with
3-D maps. How slow the adjudication was can be guessed—the surviving rule book is a
hundred pages long. It is therefore not surprising that as early as 1962 a report was published in the United Kingdom advocating the use of computers, at least to accomplish
78
the especially cumbersome line-of-sight calculations.
Elsewhere, there is some evidence of Australian wargaming during the 1960s. Wargam79
ing was defined in the 1965 edition of the Australians’ Armed Forces Dictionary. Years
later it was noted that what was then the Scientific Services Office had been “actively
80
engaged in wargames since 1969.”
But the largest impact was achieved in the East, by Soviet-style wargames. The Soviets
opened their service schools to the officers of satellite and other communist coun81
tries. Wargaming constituted a very significant part of their curriculum. The North
Vietnamese applied the methods they learned in the USSR with effective results. Using
Soviet methods, they wargamed each of their attacks against the South Vietnamese
and their allies, from firefights to major battles. Familiarity with the plans the Soviet
method produced allowed the communists to coordinate fairly complicated attacks
without radios: subordinate commanders remembered a plan’s timetable and executed it
by their wristwatches.
In the 1960s China was the one communist country not invited to send students to
Soviet war and staff schools. It had once been, but relations between the two communist
great powers had begun to fray in the late 1950s; by the early 1960s diplomatic relations
had been broken off. China’s domestic war and staff schools were initially able to fill
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some of the gap, but China’s leader, Mao Zedong, was wary of his army growing too
professional to control politically. Having underfunded China’s professional military
education institutions since taking power, Mao in 1966, the beginning of his Cultural
82
Revolution, shut down military education entirely. It is probable that China did not
return to its Korean War level of wargaming competence until the early 1990s.
Among civilians overseas, the 1960s witnessed a breakthrough in wargaming in the
83
United Kingdom and the beginnings of a global civilian wargaming market. In 1962,
Donald Featherstone, a World War II British army veteran and prolific author, released
84
War Games. It was a half-century after Wells’s Little Wars but just four years since
Charles Roberts published the first unambiguously second-generation board wargame,
Tactics II. Featherstone had now created the first clearly second-generation set of
wargame rules for miniatures. Gone were the spring-powered cannon, replaced with
probability tables and dice. His rules took the “figures” wargaming hobby in the United
Kingdom by storm, thanks in part to endorsements by respected military figures but
even more to the book’s clarity. Featherstone went on to write rule books for all regimes
of war (air, sea, land) and most periods of history.
It was also in 1962 that Featherstone began editing Wargamer’s Newsletter, one of the
first and most influential publications on “miniatures” (the American term) / “figures”
85
(British) wargaming. In its pages, through articles on wargame design and insightful
critiques, he helped develop a generation of miniatures wargame designers. As importantly, in a manner similar to what The General did for print wargaming, he helped
(primarily English-speaking) wargamers in the United Kingdom and throughout the
world realize they were part of a community.
Largely through the efforts of Don Featherstone, the United Kingdom pulled farther
ahead of the United States in miniatures wargaming. Print gaming never really caught
on in the United Kingdom. Both nations began exporting a substantial percentage of
their games, predominantly to other English-speaking countries, but a few brave souls
from a spectrum of non-English-speaking nations were starting to buy both types of
wargames by mail order.

Wargaming had made a comeback. By late in the decade, one author has estimated, fifteen to thirty thousand officers and scientists worked in wargaming in the United States
86
alone. However, at the decade’s end there was a modest backlash against wargaming and against operations research. McNamara, the Pentagon’s leading exponent of
wargaming, was gone. Many blamed, at least in part, the fact that the war in Vietnam
87
was not going well on his policies and the OR tools he had used to devise them.
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However, like Prussia’s loss to Napoleon, that poor performance would itself soon motivate advances in wargaming, the greatest since Prussia’s breakthroughs.
Learning from Vietnam: The 1970s
The seventies were very good for wargaming. Unbeknownst to the West, wargaming continued strong in the Soviet bloc, as it declined in China. In the United States,
wargaming started the decade weak. Very little was published on military wargaming in
the early 1970s, perhaps reflecting the antimilitary attitude of the times. Yet by decade’s
end the U.S. military would produce significant advances in wargaming. On the civilian
side, many consider the 1970s to be the golden age of innovation in U.S. print wargaming, while predominantly British miniatures wargaming continued to grow in popularity and more civilians who did not speak English as a first language began to wargame.
The United States
In the early 1970s, it appears, there was something of a downturn in the use of wargaming by the U.S. military. If so, the decline was short-lived. As before, the Navy led the
way, but this time it was soon overtaken by the Air Force.
Vietnam was not going well for the United States. Aside from all the other problems,
the American air-to-air kill ratio had dropped from spectacular in Korea to dismal (occasionally worse than one-to-one, seldom even as good as two-to-one). A study called
“Red Baron” concluded that we were teaching our pilots how to fly, but not how to fight.
If a pilot survived his first eight missions, “on-the-job training” would have taught him
88
to fight, and he would very likely survive his tour.
The Navy acted first, establishing its Top Gun school in 1969, formally (until 1996) the
89
Fighter Weapons School. The aggressor/instructor pilots flew small, nimble jets similar
to those flown by the Soviets. The aggressors also attempted to duplicate Soviet tactics.
It worked—the Navy saw a significant improvement in its kill ratios over Vietnam,
while the Air Forces’s ratio stayed virtually unchanged. Despite this proof of the success
of live wargames in enhancing the tactical effectiveness of Navy aviators, there was no
immediate increase in wargaming by the Navy’s other communities or for higher levels
of warfare. On the surface warfare side of the Navy, one officer, Joseph Saur, saw at the
90
time little evidence of real interest in wargaming.
However, in time the Navy’s use of wargaming did expand. In 1972, Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner became President of the Naval War College. Among his many initiatives
was to recast wargaming at the College from a few big exercises focusing on staff work
to many small exercises that enabled (i.e., required) each student to devise a strategy.
To facilitate this shift he supported the development of “tabletop” wargames, the first
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being the Sea Control Tactical Analysis Game (SEATAG). Soon the exercises shifted
91
from the wargaming center in Sims Hall to classrooms. In 1978, SEATAG was replaced
by NAVTAG, a hardware/software system with a hardware “footprint” so small (for
the time) and inexpensive (for the time) that the Navy could afford to put sets on board
individual combatants. NAVTAG was so user-friendly (again, for the time) that some
92
sailors started using it during their free time.
However, big, complex wargames were still being conducted in support of the fleet. In
1975, the Navy established its Tactical Command Readiness Program (TCRP), an ongo93
ing series of wargames played on board the actual surface combatants involved. By
then the difficult-to-use, insufficiently capable WARS adjudication software was being
replaced by the far more powerful Naval Warfare Gaming System (NWGS) software.
While not as user-friendly as hoped, it was clearly an improvement. These enhancements and the strong advocacy of wargaming by Adm. Ike Kidd, first as Chief of Naval
Material and then as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), increased the
fleet use of wargaming to sixty days a year by late in the decade. More important in the
long term, as SACLANT Admiral Kidd pushed to make his wargames more strategic
94
and more joint.
At decade’s end the Naval War College made two additional wargame initiatives. One
was an elective that used gaming to help develop and test new fleet tactics. The other—
the Global War Game—was an attempt to recapture the kind of invaluable insights
gained from the College’s gaming of War Plan Orange during the interwar years. Planning began in 1978, and the first exercise, three weeks long, was held in the summer of
1979. The fifty participants, mostly students who had yet to leave the College for their
next assignments, executed the opening days of a global war against the Soviet Union.
The adjudication methods were simple, Red play was rather amateurish, and Army and
Air Force actions had been scripted before the exercise began. Nevertheless, “Global”
offered a new and important perspective: other contemporary wargames had much
narrower foci in geography and duration. The perceived value of this broader approach
would lead first to Global’s growth in size and sophistication and then to insights that
95
may well have helped win the Cold War. But that is a story for the 1980s section.
As for the Air Force, its main wargame initiative of the 1970s was Red Flag. If the Air
Force took longer than the Navy to respond to adverse loss ratios over Vietnam, its
response was more comprehensive. In 1974 the Air Force established its own Fighter
Weapons School. The school was similar to the Navy’s Top Gun; air-to-ground tactics were also taught. Then in 1975, owing largely to the vigorous efforts of Richard
“Moody” Suter, then a major, the Air Force initiated the Red Flag series to improve the
fighting skills of all its combat pilots. Both the school and Red Flag used an electronic

on wargaming  

89

range like that at Eglin AFB to allow accurate adjudication and debriefing of engagements. Over time, the Air Force created in the Nevada desert an entire enemy “nation,”
complete with strategic targets guarded by simulated integrated air defenses. This
system included both aggressor squadrons that flew Soviet-like aircraft and employed
Soviet tactics (another initiative Moody Suter helped to make a reality) and a network of
96
Soviet-like radars and simulated surface-to-air missiles. All this also provided a realistic environment for trying out new equipment and tactics.
Actually, the environment was even more realistic than the general public would know
until November 2006. In July 1979, under a program code-named Constant Peg but
known to its pilots as the Red Eagles Squadron, the United States began flying “acquired” Soviet aircraft. The Pentagon architect of the program and its first commander,
97
Col. Gaillard R. Pack Jr., USAF, would over thirty years later write a book on it. Pilots
flying Red aircraft and using Red tactics and a simulated Red ground-control intercept system—it would be difficult to imagine a more realistic wargame or a more valid
means of testing tactics and equipment.
The seventies also saw the beginning of efforts to improve Air Force educational
wargaming. For years people inside the service (notably then–lieutenant colonel Dennis
Drew) and outside (most notably Congressman Ike Skelton) pushed for “more war in
the War College” and more rigor in PME generally. Indeed, some progress was made,
as individuals in each school’s wargaming department adapted games received from
98
the operational Air Force or elsewhere or built their own. The Clements commission
(see below) provided additional support. But someone with a comprehensive vision was
needed to lead the effort to implement these recommendations fully.
That vision became available in September 1979, when Col. Constantine “Dean” Pappas
returned to Maxwell AFB. His career up to that point had been a perhaps unique mix of
operational, technical, and educational assignments, including a tour during which he
enhanced wargaming at Maxwell’s Air Command and Staff College. He now joined the
99
faculty of the Air War College as chief of wargaming. He was originally tasked simply
to improve the school’s existing Theater Warfare Exercise. But by 15 October he not
only had developed a comprehensive plan (including the facilities, hardware, software,
and personnel needed to catch up with the other war colleges and services) but had
100
secured the permission of Air Training Command to seek funding for it. What he did
next is more properly a story for the eighties.
Finally, 1979 also saw the first effort by the Air Force to reach out to friendly air forces
by running wargames for their war and staff colleges. Individuals from Maxwell AFB
traveled to allied and friendly nations’ war and staff colleges and conducted games
identical or similar to one used at Air University. Although in 1979 only the Canadian
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Forces Staff College hosted such a wargame, the list would grow in the 1980s and
101
beyond.
The U.S. Army, largely to correct tactical deficiencies observed in Vietnam and to
prepare better for an anticipated Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack on NATO, worked to
increase wargaming in combat units. More user-friendly manual adjudication manuals
102
were published, and several procedures were computerized; however, owing to time
demands on unit staffs, games’ actual use remained below the levels Army leadership
preferred.
There were, however, some notable successes. In 1974, the Command and General Staff
103
College introduced its first two-sided, computer-aided wargame. Some successes were
104
local; in Hawaii, for instance, the 25th Division made extensive use of wargaming.
Others had broader impact. In 1975, two students at the Command and General Staff
College, Capts. Hilton “Stretch” Dunn and Steven Kempf, began developing ground
tactical wargame rules for miniatures. The resulting Dunn/Kempf game was adopted
first by the Army’s Staff College, in 1977. Years later Kempf, by then a colonel, recalled
that the initial objectives of the wargame had been to allow students to test the plans
they had been developing in the curriculum and also to serve as a visual aid. The Dunn/
Kempf wargame was used in a series of conferences exploring various tactical options
for countering a Soviet ground thrust in Europe. Following positive feedback from the
conferences, the Combined Arms Center assembled five hundred Dunn/Kempf kits
(rules, miniatures, terrain) and shipped them throughout the Army. While extent of
use varied with unit and over time, the game was widely played into the 1990s—in part
because, to play it, units built terrain tables of the locations to which they expected to
105
deploy in wartime.
In the late 1970s, the Army acted to strengthen wargaming for command-post exercises
and other unit training. To do so it developed the Computer Assisted Map Maneuver
System (CAMMS) and established mobile teams to set up wargames for field units.
For example, during the summer of 1977 a training team of the 75th Maneuver Area
Command visited the garrison of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Using molded
foam terrain boards to display the current battle situation and portable computers to
automate (hence speed up) adjudication, CAMMS allowed the regimental commander
and his staff, as well as his squadron commanders and their staffs, to practice making
the decisions they would make to defend the Fulda Gap from the invading forces of
the Warsaw Pact. Though the original version was almost as slow as manual adjudication and contained some adjudication elements that defied logic (“popping” smoke
camouflage did not decrease your odds of being hit), CAMMS was a start at bringing
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computer-assisted wargaming to the “pointy end of the spear.” With incremental im106
provements and faster processors, CAMMS continued in use well into the 1980s.
The “hollow force” of the mid-1970s may well have been the low point for Army field
maneuvers. With most units starved for training funds and less-qualified recruits
needing more time on fundamentals, such wargames were conducted less and less frequently. However, in the late 1970s, as budgets began to recover, the Army significantly
107
enhanced the number, speed, and accuracy of its live wargames. Electronic systems
such as SCOPES and REALTRAIN, and finally the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (to oversimplify, a military version of laser tag), progressively improved the
108
adjudication of Army live wargames. However, the real breakthrough would not come
until the 1980s.
Finally, in the late 1970s Col. Ray Macedonia began his long tenure as head of wargaming at the Army War College. In the coming decade he would do much to advance
wargaming throughout the college, the Army, and the American military.
The U.S. Marines continued during the 1970s their long practice of conducting live
“field exercise” wargames and constructive “analytical” wargames. Wargames were also
part of the curriculum of their staff college. As the 1970s progressed, Marines in the
field demonstrated initiative in bringing wargaming first to their units and then to the
Marine Corps as a service.
The War Games Branch, Studies and Requirements Division, Development Center, of
the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, in Quantico, Virginia, conducted several analytical wargames in the decade. For example, beginning in November
1972 it conducted a set of wargames called Atlas I and II, using the Landing Force War
Game method of manual adjudication. The scenario depicted a Marine amphibious unit
fighting a delaying action on the south shore of the Strait of Gibraltar, in Atlas I, until
it could be reinforced by a Marine amphibious brigade, in Atlas II. The objective was to
assess the Marines’ ability to assist in sea control by keeping key straits under friendly
109
control. The objectives of their live wargames in the 1970s seem to have been both to
train commanders, staffs, and troops and also to “prove again” that the Marines had
110
not become obsolete. Such exercises were conducted in both the European and Pacific
111
theaters. Several seem also to have had a secondary objective of building alliance
cohesion, the clearest example being Pegasus II, during which exercise forces conducted
112
a vigorous civil-action program. During the 1970s the Marines also conducted the
113
constructive manual wargame APRX as part of their staff college curriculum.
However, several individual Marines were working to extend wargaming even further.
Perhaps the Marines’ most successful champion of wargaming was Col. John C. Studt,
then commanding officer of the 3rd Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Brigade, Marine
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Corps Base Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. An enthusiast of civilian board wargames, Studt was
interested when the Army fielded a new family of manual games. During May and June
1977 Studt loaned several of his officers to the Army to help run one of them. These
officers were to learn how to use and run the games and to “borrow” as many game
components as possible.
The 3rd Marines subsequently adapted and modified various Army games and used
them frequently to control battalion, regimental, and brigade command-post exercises
through at least 1979. They built a regimental simulation center (roughly five years
before this became a standard Army practice) in an unused troop theater and assigned
Marines to run it as an “additional duty.” The “sim” center was one of the standard
stops for VIPs and was visited at least once by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The most successful of the wargames adapted from an Army predecessor (the Army’s
Pegasus, the Marines’ Pegasus II) was described—with its costs ($250) and benefits
114
(enormous)—in a 1980 Marine Corps Gazette article.
Colonel Studt’s next assignment was to Quantico, where he continued to champion
wargaming. In 1979 a similar facility was established (in a similar way) by the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa, and a project was initiated to create the Marines’ own family
115
of manual wargames.
The ’70s also saw increased joint wargaming within the PME schools. After the defeat
in Vietnam, the Clements Commission on Excellence in Education (led by William
Clements, deputy defense secretary) reviewed the curricula of all the service war colleges
and concluded that they all needed to “put more war in the War Colleges.” Its finding
116
would help advocates of more wargaming in all the services. Also, the growing nu117
merical advantage of the Warsaw Pact in Europe was starting to generate real concern.
That concern grew when the 1973 Arab-Israeli War demonstrated how fast and deadly
war had become. Before and during World War II, wargaming had helped the Germans
develop and execute the increased tempo of blitzkrieg. Some thought wargames could
help the American armed forces cope with still faster warfare.
The 1970s also saw the beginnings of cooperation between the wargaming efforts of the
services. Specifically, Col. Dean Pappas, USAF, and Col. Ray Macedonia, USA, developed the concept of joint, distributed wargaming. Originally called “Car-Max” (for the
bases where the Army and Air Force War Colleges are located, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, respectively) the idea quickly evolved
118
into the Joint Land Air Sea Simulation (JLASS) Exercise, which involves all the senior
119
war colleges, and about which see below.
If during the seventies one couldn’t yet speak of the “interagency” arenas as we can
now, the State Department was already moving toward political-military wargames and
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related computerized aids. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson was particularly
enthusiastic about a system called CASCON, developed by Professor Bloomfield. (By the
120
end of the decade, interest had faded.)
In the civilian world, the 1970s were the commercial high point for print (board)
wargames. While predictions that print wargames would make miniatures gaming
obsolete turned out to be incorrect (the popularity of miniatures actually grew gradually
121
throughout the decade), print wargame sales grew phenomenally. About a hundred
titles were published each year; most titles sold between ten and twenty thousand copies,
122
twice the average sales of books on the same subjects. This increase in sales was due to
several factors, but one remarkable individual and his organization had a disproportionate impact.
During the late 1960s, James Dunnigan found he could design and develop print
wargames faster than Avalon Hill was willing to publish them. Largely to get his
wargames into print sooner, he and Redmond Simonsen founded Simulations Publications Incorporated (better known as SPI, mentioned briefly above). They purchased
a low-circulation history magazine, Strategy & Tactics (S&T), and started including
a wargame in each issue. By this key strategy, bringing together amateur and professional historians (who both wrote and read the articles) with amateur and professional
wargamers (who designed and played the wargames), the magazine generally increased
123
the range and historical spectrum of subjects wargamed. Mr. Dunnigan served as
president, editor, and lead designer; Mr. Simonsen was vice president and art director.
A significant percentage of SPI’s innovative designs came from Dunnigan himself—easily the most prolific wargame designer to date in any medium, with well over 140 titles
to his credit. In part to cope with such volume (SPI would produce over four hundred
titles during the 1970s), Dunnigan and the S&T staff developed techniques and pro124
cedures for designing and developing wargames, even publishing a guide to them.
Similarly, Simonsen developed conventions for print wargame graphics; many are still
followed today, and some continue to influence computer game interfaces. Perhaps even
more importantly, SPI’s success demonstrated that the market could support more than
125
one publisher and so encouraged a number of others to enter the field. Still, during the
126
1970s SPI would publish more than half of all print wargames produced worldwide.
In 1975, the first national civilian wargaming convention, Origins, was held, and this
127
too stimulated the growth of the field. The presence of an increasing number of
publishers encouraged such innovations as wargaming the effects of morale, training,
surprise, and many other supposedly “intangible” factors. For its part, the military
wargaming community, largely uncompetitive, did not even attempt to depict such factors during the 1970s, the 1980s, or for the most part the 1990s either.
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Sales of print wargames rose steadily during the decade, exceeding two million units in
128
1979. However, by then two developments had already taken place that would cause
those sales to decline in the 1980s. First, in 1971 a tiny company published miniatures
rules (as the book Chainmail) for battles set in the medieval period. In 1974, a supplement to those rules, by Dave Arneson and one of the coauthors of Chainmail, Gary
Gygax, appeared; the supplement initially sold very slowly. In 1977 a young man named
129
Chris Crawford published the first computer wargame for the civilian market. However, few private individuals owned computers at that time, and his sales were modest.
Sales of both computers and computer-based wargames would increase significantly
during the coming decade, as would sales of a variant of that miniatures wargame
130
supplement—Dungeons & Dragons.
The wall between civilian and military wargaming, which showed cracks in the sixties,
developed more in the 1970s. In 1974 the U.S. Army became the first service to buy a
commercial-style wargame, the tactical ground combat simulation Firefight, by SPI.
Many at fairly high levels in the Army believed that soldiers needed to do more wargaming and hoped that a wargame as easy to learn and to play as civilian wargames would
get used more than the Army’s current ones. Though Firefight has been described as
only a modest success, the crack had been made.
In 1976 it got much larger when Colonel Macedonia invited James Dunnigan to help
131
him reintroduce wargaming at the Army War College. Dunnigan’s contributions,
including helping to design the McClintock Theater Model (discussed below), brought
him to the attention of the legendary head of the Net Assessment Office of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD/NA), Andrew “Andy” Marshall. In 1977 Marshall invited
Dunnigan to address the first-ever conference of military wargamers from across the
Department of Defense. Dunnigan used the conference, held at Leesburg, Virginia, to
demonstrate the effectiveness of historical wargames (pointing out, for instance, that
they are self-verifying—that is, if you can’t reproduce history, you’ve missed something).
Leesburg kicked off a decade of reform and expansion in military wargaming; Marshall
132
often asked, “Why can’t your models do what Dunnigan’s can?” When Dunnigan’s
huge commercial wargame The Next War came out in July 1978, the defense contractor BDM took notice and hired the game’s developer, Mark Herman. So began a chain
of events that would lead commercial wargaming techniques into the heart of the U.S.
133
defense establishment.
International
Influences from American and to a lesser extent British and Canadian wargaming
spread to Australia in the 1970s. In 1972, Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) J. C. Gray visited the
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United States and was impressed by our army’s growing use of wargames. His recommendation that the Australian army begin wargaming was adopted. A review of progress in 1977 confirmed its value, recognized that significant progress had been made,
and recommended additional wargames be secured from the United States and United
Kingdom.
Early in the eighties the Australian army published Training Information Bulletin 52
(TIB 52). The bulletin (to be discussed more broadly in the next section) noted, “Units
and formations . . . have been developing and employing wargames to achieve collective and individual training objectives for a number of years”; an appendix listed
wargames used by Australian forces. The appendix contained eleven titles, ranging from
individual-training games (one employing an armored corps) to team-played, logisticsheavy games. The list suggests that during the seventies Australia might have done
more wargaming, covering a wider spectrum of applications, than did the U.S. military.
Finally, in 1979, a small section was set up in the Central Studies Establishment (CSE) as
a center for expertise in wargaming. This section soon developed and conducted several
134
training games for the Australian army.
The early 1970s also saw the British beginning to use computers for some adjudication
135
tasks in procurement-support wargaming. Late in the decade the British upgraded
from their 1950s-vintage manual ground tactical game to an internally developed
136
hybrid game. Units were still represented by markers on a now 2-D (i.e., flat) map, but
137
a computer made line-of-sight and other calculations. It appears this both made adju138
dication significantly faster and permitted a modest reduction in staff.
Also in Britain, in 1973 a young scholar, aged twenty-six, joined the faculty of the Royal
Military College at Sandhurst as a lecturer in war studies. He quickly brought wargaming into the Sandhurst curriculum. In 1974 this scholar, Dr. Patrick “Paddy” Griffith,
raised awareness of wargaming within Britain by running for the Daily Telegraph a large
game that explored the chances of a German invasion in 1940. Several generals and
admirals who had actually commanded forces in 1940, British and German, participated. The game appeared in a novel by Richard Cox in 1974, and Griffith himself pub139
lished further details in 2009. By the end of the seventies he had founded Sandhurst’s
wargame. Well before the end of the century he would become Britain’s best-known
140
professional wargamer.
In 1975, the United Kingdom’s Divisional Wargame (DWG) first became operational.
The DWG supported analytical wargaming from the corps through division levels. Something of a technological marvel at the time, the DWG’s run speed of ten to
fifteen minutes of real time for each minute of game combat seems glacial by today’s
141
standards.

96   the

newport papers

In 1970, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the German War College requested that its next U.S. Air Force exchange instructor be knowledgeable about wargaming.
It appears that the end of World War II and the disbandment of the military had produced such a break from the Germans’ traditions of military education that they needed
the Americans (who had originally learned wargaming from them) to teach them how
142
to use wargaming again. By the mid-1970s the Luftwaffe department of the school was
using an aggregated one-aircraft-on-one-aircraft analytical model called AGATHA.
While this software was very cumbersome to use, it would wargame complex air operations. In 1979, the college’s army department adopted a modern graphical-interface
wargame called KORA/OA (Simulation Model for Officer Training at Corps Level, and
below). KORA/OA replaced an earlier text-only ground wargame used at the college.
KORA/OA was subsequently used throughout Germany for the training and education
143
of officers in fighting units at corps level and lower.
The 1970s saw China begin to rebuild its wargaming capabilities. The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 allowed military schools to reopen. However, basic education
had been so neglected that at first much of its military schools’ efforts went to rudi144
ments. When the Chinese military resumed teaching wargaming, it must have had
trouble finding instructors after a pause of roughly two decades. Finally, in a precursor
to a trend that would grow during the next decade, it appears American computerized
145
wargames were first used by China in 1975.
In the international civilian gaming arena, throughout the 1970s Don Featherstone
continued to publish wargame rules and to edit the Wargamer’s Newsletter. However, by
now there were several other Britons writing game rules, owing in part to his efforts in
the Wargamer’s Newsletter to develop new designers and in part to rising incomes and
falling costs of miniatures, which put wargaming within the reach of more of the Brit146
ish population. The most prolific and enduring of these new voices was Phil Barker.
Since the 1970s his Wargames Research Group has played a key role in developing more
realistic hobby miniatures rules for all time periods. Mr. Barker has also worked as a
147
consultant for the United Kingdom’s, and other nations’, defense establishments.
While the 1970s saw an increase in the number of both print and miniatures wargames
sold outside the United States and the United Kingdom, most were still published in those
two nations, the United States continuing to dominate print and the United Kingdom min148
iatures. The few small publishers who emerged in other countries captured only a tiny
149
share of the increasingly global market. With the coming of the 1980s, this would change.

Although the seventies were good for wargaming, the trend that would ultimately
have the biggest impact on military gaming was not initially about gaming at all.
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Vietnam-era company-grade officers began to enter positions of greater authority. Many
felt our fighting forces had been hamstrung by a failure of strategic vision and a lack of
basic campaign planning. As individuals and groups, many worked to ensure that the
services would be better prepared intellectually the next time. In the Air Force, Maj.
Moody Suter had already initiated the live wargame Red Flag, and others, like Lieu150
tenant Colonel Drew, pushed to put more “war” in the war colleges. In each service
folks like the Air Force’s Lieutenant Colonel Pappas and the Army’s Lieutenant Colonel
Macedonia thought they knew how to do that—more wargaming.
Promise and Performance: The 1980s
Things seemed to come together for wargaming in the eighties. All U.S. services, NATO,
and commercial wargamers made great progress. Though little known at a time, one
wargame may have brought the world to the edge of nuclear war, while another did
much to preserve the peace during the difficult period of transition at the end of the
Cold War.
U.S. Defense
In joint wargaming, the eighties also saw continuity and innovation. It appears that this
acceleration was due at least in part to the greater emphasis on all things joint resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In that year the Joint Staff’s Joint Analysis
151
Directorate was redesignated J8. It continued its low-profile but highly influential
wargames. However, joint gaming also spread into education, training, and theater
strategy development. In 1982 the National Defense University (NDU) had finally
152
initiated a wargaming center. The Warrior Preparation Center became operational in
153
Germany. Wargaming at the National Defense University rapidly expanded during the
1980s, thanks in no small degree to the support of the university’s president, Lt. Gen.
154
Richard D. Lawrence, USA. By mid-decade wargames supported the curricula of each
155
of the university’s colleges, including its Armed Forces Staff College.
In the 1980s the late-seventies vision of two wargame pioneers, the Air Force’s Colonel
Pappas and the Army’s Colonel Macedonia, of a joint wargame between service colleges
was finally realized by all services. JLASS had become an annual elective exercise for
students of the Air, Army, Naval, and National War Colleges. The 1987 iteration was
held at the Naval War College; sixty controllers were needed to adjudicate the moves of
just fifteen students, in part because the only way to depict the joint campaign was to
run each move simultaneously through three service wargame adjudication programs
and then manually integrate the outcomes into a theater picture. Even so, the controllers
managed to adjudicate two game days per calendar day, allowing participants to go from
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just the first four days of a campaign to the first eight. The scenario was also moved to
156
the Korean Peninsula, allowing better Navy and Marine play.
The 1980s also saw now-colonel Moody Suter’s last great innovation. As Red Flag had
allowed the United States to create virtual air-combat veterans, so he now crafted an environment that would create virtual joint-campaign veterans. He designed the Warrior
Preparation Center specifically to allow senior U.S. and NATO headquarters to practice
the execution of war plans without having to maneuver troops. Colonel Suter retired, in
July 1984, before his vision could become operational, but the momentum was irresistible. Live exercises, the traditional method of training battle staffs, were coming under
increasing scrutiny. Bills for exercise damage, environmental concerns, and vulnerability to Soviet monitoring all increased support for the center. While the U.S. Air Force
provided the real estate (in Einsiedlerhof, Germany) and the center’s first commander,
Col. John Vickery, the fourteen to fifteen million dollars needed to build the center and
the three million required each year to operate it came from both the Army and the Air
157
Force. The center conducted its first major exercise in 1984, and by 1989 it was hosting
158
mammoth exercises involving every major command element in NATO.
In April 1986, the Joint Warfare Center was activated at MacDill AFB, Florida, to
provide similar wargame support to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to
159
U.S.-based joint headquarters, especially the warfighting area commanders. By the
late 1980s, all area commanders in chief were using wargames. A 1989 study concluded
that U.S. Central Command was clearly ahead of the pack—a circumstance that would
turn out to be fortunate. In particular, the Gallant Knight series, designed to test
American plans to protect the Strait of Hormuz from a Soviet drive southward from
Afghanistan, revealed that there was not enough ramp space in the Arabian Peninsula
for all the aircraft the United States intended to deploy there. In addition, given how
little warning could be expected, it was vital that munitions be prepositioned in-theater.
Finally, to move fast our forces would have to be light, whereas the Soviets would be
attacking with tanks; to have a chance, our forces would need to defend in the rough
terrain north of the strait. To supply them with fuel effectively, we would need miles
of pipe. The wargame having indicated these needs long before the actual fighting that
was to come, the United States had the time to convince governments in the region to
build more ramp space, persuade Oman to accept U.S. prepositioned munitions, and
160
buy and preposition an enormous amount of pipe. As it would later turn out, we had
the invading power wrong, but we were right about the enablers of military success. The
additional ramp space would soon prove crucial, as would the prepositioned munitions
161
and pipe.
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The bigger budgets of the 1980s also led to an increase in the number and size of live
162
wargames, now usually referred to by the military as “exercises.” Indeed, though all
these exercises involved live troops, many did not include opposing forces and were
actually simulations of wartime tasks. The most commonly exercised task was deployment. In any case, these exercises provided excellent practice for what may well remain
163
the fastest and farthest large deployment in our history—Desert Shield.
In the mid-1980s the State Department showed some interest in computerized wargaming as well as related analytical aids, though it appears this resurgence was not sus164
tained. There was also at least one interagency wargame. In March 1982, a five-day
game was played to determine the government’s ability to survive and strike back after a
nuclear “decapitating strike.” The exercise was executed at several locations around the
nation, including the White House Situation Room. Though one of an annual series, it
was described as the largest such exercise in over two decades (which implies that there
165
was an even larger similar exercise sometime during the 1950s). While unusually
high-level folks participated (including a former secretary of state, a former Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] director, and two serving cabinet secretaries), what was unique
was the publicity given the exercise. Since the 1950s, J8, like its predecessor organizations, had closely guarded the names of all wargame participants; now it was announced
that President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George H. W. Bush, and the secretaries of
both state and defense observed the wargame and received the outbrief. Why was this
wargame not kept secret like all the rest? Apparently the reason was President Reagan’s
view that demonstrating “the ability to maintain the continuity of government is as
166
much a deterrent to attack as sophisticated weapons.”
Though few would have thought so at the time, the most important joint wargame
development—perhaps the most important wargame development, period—may have
been a 1983 DARPA initiative, Simnet (for Simulation Network). The idea of an Air
Force captain, Jack Thorpe, Simnet allowed flight and other simulators to be networked
167
so that they all appear to be in the same synthetic battle space. Like that other DARPA
innovation, what would become the Internet, Simnet got off to a slow start. Not many
simulators were capable of being networked, and not many people saw any point in doing that. By the decade’s end only the U.S. Army had a small pilot project, at Fort Knox,
Kentucky. Like the Internet, though, Simnet’s use would later explode, and its military
use would be dwarfed by commercial applications.
Finally, wargaming was used in the planning for Operation Just Cause, the invasion of
168
Panama in December 1989. Less than a year later, a lot more gaming would be applied
to support a much larger war.
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It was the Army, however, that made the most important advances of the early 1980s.
169
In 1980 it opened the National Training Center (NTC). This “Red Flag for ground
forces” employed an instrumented range, technology similar to laser tag, and a credible
aggressor force to produce the most realistic ground-combat environment up to that
170
time. More wargaming was also being done at home stations, thanks to an innovation
171
by III Corps. A decade before, the Army had sought to make wargames independent
of scarce computer hardware and (relatively) more user-friendly. In 1981, III Corps
simply established a wargaming center at the garrison of each maneuver unit. Wargaming skyrocketed when overworked commanders found that using the centers, setting up
wargames took less of their own time than other types of training.
Also in 1981, the Army established a War Gaming Department and built a Center for
Wargaming at the Army War College and named wargame pioneer and advocate Colo172
nel Macedonia as the new organization’s first chief. The concept was for it to function
like the Naval War College’s War Gaming Department, splitting its support roughly
evenly between the educational needs of the Army War College and the wargaming
173
needs of the operational Army. One of the first accomplishments of Colonel Macedonia’s organization was the creation of the McClintock Theater Model (MTM). After
years of improvements and periodic name changes, MTM remains as the core of many
174
of the theater-level models the Army uses today.
The Army was also working to modernize its decision-support wargames. Tests conducted from 1980 through 1982 determined that MTM was insufficiently joint (i.e., did
not adjudicate air and naval forces well enough) to be fully capable of teaching and planning joint theater campaigns. In 1983, the U.S. Readiness Command of the Army War
College and the Army Concepts Analysis Agency funded the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) project. The intent was to create a computerized “engine” for theater-level
games, to support the development of strategists, strategies, and doctrine. This work
was both less and more significant than it may immediately appear. On one hand, as
described above, the Army had been using computer adjudication of wargames for analytical support to the Army Staff since the 1950s. On the other hand, JTLS brought the
perceived credibility of computerized adjudication to applications worldwide. In 1985,
175
the further development of JTLS saw it transferred from an Army to a joint program.
As the decade progressed the Army continued to make important advances. In 1987 it
moved the gaming support of the service’s operational mission from the Army War Col176
lege to the Command and General Staff College. Now designated the Battle Command
Training Program (BCTP), it was to run computer-driven command-post wargames for
all U.S.-based divisions. This program was part of a more general emphasis on gaming to train higher-level battle staffs in the art of war. Wargaming was seen as a way to
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conduct such training, which, traditionally, had been neglected in peacetime as being
177
too hard to do. BCTP would just have time to exercise all the divisions that deployed
178
to Desert Shield/Storm.
Also in 1987, the Army extended the techniques and technology of the NTC to enhance the combat effectiveness of more forces. The high deserts of NTC’s home in Fort
Irwin, California, were most suitable for training heavy divisions—armor (tank and
mechanized) and infantry in fighting vehicles. Now the Army built the same type of
instrumented training environments in forests, swamps, and mock urban areas at Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas, creating the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). At JRTC the
Army’s light forces (airborne, airmobile, air assault, light infantry, and special forces)
began to receive training of the same quality as its heavy forces.
But even then, the Army was having increasing difficulty preserving the use of its
exercise areas. In some cases, restrictions were imposed to address environmental
concerns; in others, exercise areas were lost outright. As a possible solution, the Army
built a “technology demonstrator” called SIMNET-T at Fort Knox, tying a handful of
tank simulators into a virtual network like Simnet. These simulators had been used
mainly to teach procedures; now they showed users a virtual battlefield. Crews of all the
179
networked tanks could “see” each other and a virtual enemy. This small project was
very impressive.
Finally, in 1989 the Army used wargames to explore various courses of action during
the planning for Operation Just Cause. It used Janus adjudication software, at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, in New Mexico, to help train battalion and brigade com180
manders. This innovative “repurposing” of an existing wargame would be followed on
a much larger scale just a year later.
The U.S. Navy in 1981 enhanced its wargame process and technology. In that year the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) to
tackle the really hard problems facing the Navy. Resident at the Naval War College but
reporting directly to “the Chief,” the SSG typically executed three wargames each year
181
as an integral part of its work. It was in that year that the Navy completed the replacement of its wargaming system WARS by NWGS, which we mentioned above as in prog182
ress. Seven years later it upgraded its system again, to the Enhanced Naval Wargame
System, or ENWGS. Each upgrade roughly doubled computing power, yet as before, the
scope of naval gaming always seemed beyond the latest system. As in the fifties, faculty
filled the gap with innovation, common sense, and long hours. The strain stemmed
from increased gaming by the College and fleet use, but also from the Global War Game
183
series.
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We saw earlier that Global was an attempt to recapture the fruitfulness of wargaming
during the interwar years and that it began on a modest scale in 1979. But each succeeding year saw an increase in the game’s sophistication and size. Global 1982 saw
important “firsts”: attendance topped two hundred, play began long after the beginning
of hostilities (it used the end state of an NDU exercise, Globex 82, as the starting point),
and the Army and Air Force were full participants. Because Global started in the midst
of hostilities, participants were able to see deeper into the campaign than ever before,
and what they saw was that the West might win before “nukes” were used by either side.
In 1983, Global began before the conflict did but worked hard to move well into the
campaign. A panel to adjudicate economic/mobilization issues was formed, for the first
time. Again, it began to look as if NATO could prevent a quick Soviet victory; further,
the West’s greater economic strength could make a long-term victory likely. Still, it
could go only so deep into the campaign in the three weeks of play, not enough to explore cross-effects between theaters or economic mobilization fully.
Globals 1984 through 1988 featured a single scenario that continued from one summer (when each year’s game was played) to the next, allowing a total of nine weeks of
wargame execution. That much real time allowed the scenario to be adjudicated all the
way to war termination. (Global 1988 dealt with both war-termination and postwar
184
issues.)
By mid-decade, participation had increased to six hundred individuals from over a hundred government departments, agencies, military commands, educational and research
faculties, businesses, and industries, as well as civilian and military representatives of
185
the United Kingdom and Canada. It was becoming increasingly evident that a war
with the Soviets would likely be protracted and that in a protracted war the Soviets were
186
doomed. As Global attracted more of Washington’s power hitters, that perception became widespread, coloring not only Navy strategy but national strategy as well. Global
also increased the credibility of wargaming with Congress, and the Navy turned to it to
187
188
support budgets. In 1988 the Marines began gaming their budget initiatives as well.
From the start, Orville E. “Bud” Hay was Global’s guiding light. He personally developed the unprecedented multiyear series and recruited the high-profile participants.
Bud took over as the chief of the Naval War College’s War Gaming Department in 1985
and ran Global until his departure (for a Senior Executive Service position at U.S. Joint
Forces Command) in 1999.
Another key to Global’s success was its Red team. Red teams for many wargames are
pickup affairs organized a few days before and disbanded at the end. Global greatly
benefited from the personnel of the Navy Operations Intelligence Center (now Office
of Naval Intelligence) Detachment at the Naval War College as specialist Red players
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and “intel” controllers in all Globals and all department wargames. Its senior civilian, Dennis Callan, was critically involved in all phases of Global, and in fact of most
189
department games. Dennis trained “generations” of Red gamers.
Still, not all was well with U.S. naval wargaming. The final reports on successive Globals
were of uneven scope, seldom including a candid evaluation of a given year’s problems
190
with design, preparation, or execution. ENWGS frequently crashed, delaying adjudication by from a few minutes to several hours. When ENWGS did produce estimates of
the net effects of Red and Blue moves they sometimes included outcomes that defied
common sense and even physics. Hence, most Navy wargames used umpires to, at a
minimum, reality-check ENWGS, typically to conduct manual adjudication in parallel.
Tactical outcomes were often negotiated by opposing controllers (officers and civilians
who supervised enlisted console operators) in the large ENWGS room of Sims Hall,
higher matters by seniors in a booth overlooking it—much like a stock exchange. These
negotiations were sometimes heated. Wargames in which the umpires (adjudicators)
191
outnumbered the Blue and Red teams were not uncommon.
For the Marines, the 1980s began with wargaming mostly limited to live field exercises
and a small number of manual constructive games at Quantico for analytical or educational purposes. However, the decade saw a significant increase in the Marine Corps’s
use of wargaming, culminating with the creation of a dedicated wargame organization
with Corps-wide responsibilities.
In 1980, most Marine wargames were training-oriented, tactical-level undertakings,
though one series was built around an early “man in the loop” automated system—the
Tactical Warfare Simulation and Evaluation Analysis System, TWSEAS, which focused
on operational units. All wargaming done in and by the operating forces was by local
option, internal to those organizations, and not coordinated or integrated at the service
level. Another “thread” during this time was the work of the Concepts, Doctrine, and
Studies Activity, long since reorganized out of existence, that did “wargaming-like”
things but that properly belonged more in the “analysis” world. Finally, schools did
192
some internal, curriculum-related wargaming—or so they called it.
Early in the decade the Marines began awarding contracts for a set of manual constructive wargames that would provide artificial experience to commanders and staffs at each
echelon. Four games resulted, developed by the University of Central Florida under the
193
management of the Naval Training and Equipment Center in Orlando, Florida. They
were these:
•

TacWar (platoon/company level). TacWar used miniatures with 3-D terrain boards.
Neither side knew the location of enemy forces until contact was made.
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•

Steelthrust (battalion / Marine expeditionary unit level). Steelthrust was played on
enlarged topographic maps, with cardboard units.

•

Landing Force (regimental / Marine expeditionary brigade [MEB] level).

•

TWSEAS (MEB or Marine expeditionary force level).

TWSEAS was computer based and was run from vans that could be transported to
where the wargame was to be played. In time, TWSEAS would evolve into the Marine
194
Air/Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare System, which was still in use around 2015.
By late 1982 a prototype of TacWar was far enough along to use in the Marines’ Staff
NCO Academy and Basic School. Steelthrust began testing in December 1982. A fifth
wargame for the Marine Corps’s tool chest, Warfare, was developed by Ketron Inc. to
195
depict warfare at the Marine amphibious force level.
Not all Marines believed these new wargames represented a step forward. One, T. X.
Hammes, knew the earlier games well, having served as a secondary-duty wargaming
officer with the 3rd Marine Regiment in 1978 and the 3rd Marine Division in 1979. He
gained considerable experience with the new wargames, later using them as commanding officer of several units. Nevertheless, in 2014 he asserted that the new wargames
“cost roughly 1000 times more to purchase and a hundred times more to run” than the
196
earlier Marine Corps wargames. Overall, he believed despite all the money spent the
1980s initiative moved wargaming in the wrong direction.
Still, as the decade progressed the Marines deployed their new family of wargames, with
197
their different media to fit their different target audiences. Initially these wargames
198
were not used often, but by the late 1980s their use had increased significantly. Since
the games themselves changed little, if at all, it appears that this increase was due to the
establishment of wargaming centers that provided administrative support. With less
work needed on their part, more (already task-saturated) commanders were able to find
enough time to game.
In the late 1980s, wargaming would have a profound, if indirect, impact on the Marine
Corps and beyond. In 1989 John Schmitt wrote the Fleet Marine Force manual War
fighting, FMFM-1. It was the first of his highly influential “white books” on strategy,
campaigning, and operations—a series that covered all major elements of military
victory. Schmitt was an avid commercial wargamer, a player who took all wargaming
very seriously. In fact, in mid-decade he began a series of one-move “tactical problem”
199
wargames that ran in the Marine Corps Gazette well into the next decade.
In 1988, at the direction of Gen. Alfred M. “Al” Gray Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the War Gaming Division was expanded into the Marine Corps Wargaming
and Assessment Center. In addition to being larger, it now reported to the commanding
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general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, through its Deputy
Commander for Warfighting. Designated to support wargaming throughout the Marine
Corps, during its first two years the center prepared and sent Marines to participate in
joint and other-service wargames, planned and successfully budgeted for a program to
upgrade TWSEAS, built a course to train controllers for TacWar and Steelthrust, and
worked with the Marine Corps University to introduce wargaming into the formal
professional military education curriculum. Perhaps most importantly, it developed the
Commandant’s Wargame, an exercise specifically designed to prepare Marine general
officers for participation in joint and other-service wargames—and, incidentally, for a
200
war that was much closer than any suspected.
Finally, during the 1980s the Marines made good use of commercially available
wargames. Two articles in the Marine Corps Gazette recommended them as a means to
201
professional development. The Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center’s
plan to create a library of commercial wargames seems to have endorsed that asser202
tion. Wargame clubs were established at several Marine Corps installations, including
Camp Pendleton, California, and Camp Hansen, on Okinawa. Throughout the decade
individual Marine leaders used commercial wargames, sometimes right off the shelf,
sometimes extensively modifying them. For example, Steve Dethlefsen modified the
commercial wargame Advanced Squad Leader to teach and rehearse infantry tactics
203
with his Marines shortly before Desert Storm.
The Air Force, for its part, advanced its wargaming capabilities on several fronts. Its
big story of the 1980s was the nearly decadelong struggle to plan, fund, build, and run a
world-class wargaming facility at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. But as the 1980s began, the
Air Force’s emphasis was on more general encouragement of all airmen to think more
about warfighting. Called Project Warrior, the program included emphasis on wargam204
ing from the start. As Project Warrior focused on individual, voluntary professional
development, commercial wargames, being relatively accessible, were emphasized from
205
the beginning. The Air Force even purchased about a dozen commercial game titles
and sent them to base libraries, aircraft crew alert buildings, and other facilities Air
206
Force–wide. Project Warrior also funded the publication of print wargames designed
207
by Air Force officers and distributed throughout the service.
The year 1984 was a banner one for Air Force wargaming. In 1984 the Air Staff Direc208
tor of Operations was given oversight of all the service’s gaming. Also in 1984 the Air
Force established the Blue Flag series of exercises. As Red Flag gave individual fighter
pilots virtual combat experience, Blue Flag was meant to give air operation center staffs
that same head start toward becoming veteran campaigners. Finally, 1984 saw the first
exercises at the above-mentioned Warrior Preparation Center, an Air Force initiative
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to support its theater-level commanders and planners in Europe. It would soon be
conducting joint (that is, with members of other services) and then combined (with
members of friendly or allied, especially NATO, nations) exercises.
Still, the epic drama was at Maxwell AFB. Maxwell is home of Air University and all
the colleges (war, staff, and company grade) that provide professional military education throughout an officer’s career. Since the 1960s (as discussed above), individuals had
developed or adapted wargames for these schools’ curricula:
•

Air War College: Theater War Exercise (TWX) and, in cooperation with other war
colleges, JLASS

•

Air Command and Staff College: TWX, Fastick, Big Stick, and JPLAN

•

Squadron Officer School: TEMPO III and Balboa

209

Now work was under way to create one center for wargaming that would support all of
Air University and in time the whole service. After an incredibly quick start (see above),
Colonel Pappas’s team needed almost a decade to achieve even most of its vision. First, it
refined its definitions of the requirements. Though at first officially an Air War College
faculty member, right from the start Colonel Pappas looked beyond his college’s requirements, even beyond those of his parent command, Air University, to the wargaming
needs of the entire service. Indeed his team envisioned providing Air Force wargaming
support to the sister services and the joint community.
210

Having defined the needs, it developed a phased plan for meeting them. Phase I would
meet those of all of Air University’s schools. As each school focused on a different level
211
of warfare, the center would have to offer a different learning experience for each.
Given that jointness had not really caught on in the early 1980s, Phase II was prescient—
its objective was to allow Air University students to wargame jointly with students
attending other service schools. Finally, taking (like Red Flag) a Navy initiative and
building on it, Phase III was to support decision makers throughout the Air Force—not
just in the air equivalent of fleet exercises, as the Naval War College had been doing for
decades, but in everything from crisis action planning and doctrinal development to
212
building and defending the Air Force budget.
Colonel Pappas’s team now turned to what it would take to do all that. Going well
beyond software, it determined how large a facility would be needed to plan, build, and
execute the wargames; how much of what kind of hardware would be needed; and how
many of what types of people would be needed to make it all work. Because realistic
wargames need realistic opposing-force play, the team planned an embedded intelligence operation. The intelligence operation would have two elements: an embedded
detachment in an arrangement similar to that used by the Navy in Newport (see above)
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and a permanent Red team made up of a few active-duty members but mostly of special213
ly trained reservists, who would be called up shortly before each wargame execution.
So the center could continually improve the software, the team planned for programmers. To promote realism and relevance as well as increase credibility, it planned to have
folks with operational backgrounds run the operation. All told, the team calculated it
would need a 42,600-square-foot facility that would cost $3.5 million to build and $6.1
214
million to equip.
Envisioned as a mutually synergistic set of capabilities, all this was called the Command
Readiness Exercise System (CRES). Now came a four-year fight for funding. While Pappas originally hoped for funding in fiscal year 1982, the building and manpower were
not funded until 1983, and it would be 1984 before CRES itself would be.
Then came the campaign to build the promised capability. In 1983, the building
contractor defaulted. A conference was held for potential second-round bidders that
December, but the actual request for proposal for Phase I was not completed until
215
March 1984. A new firm was selected and awarded the contract the following December. Meanwhile, the CRES team learned it would have to take many of the manpoweraccounting “slots,” or billets, that the center would need to become operational from
existing Air University positions. As it turned out, most came from the wargaming
departments of Air University’s largest schools: the Air War College, the Air Command
and Staff College, and the Squadron Officer School. The transfer of these billets meant a
temporary reduction in Air University’s wargaming capabilities, as individuals would be
leaving functioning departments for an organization that was not yet operational. Not
surprisingly, filling those slots took longer than anticipated.
Now work on the building began, with a new interim contractor, and continued
throughout 1984. Construction was originally scheduled to be completed in July 1985,
but delay followed delay. As a result, no one moved in until 28 October 1985, and full
216
occupancy was not possible until 1986. But also in 1986, CRES secured not only all
the computer hardware needed for the facility but enough desktop units to put one in
each classroom of all of Air University’s major schools—unheard of in 1986. However,
problems were developing with the core software those computers were to use. The
contract called for it to be complete in March 1987. The contractor failed to meet that
date, and the software, when finally turned over to the Air Force, did not meet requirements. Nevertheless, by using other software, the CRES office was able to announce it
had achieved Phase I capabilities on schedule, on 8 September 1986, and Phase II ahead
217
of schedule, also in 1986. Despite all the above, as well as budget cuts (of course)—or
perhaps because of the skill and effort applied to cope—CRES won the Air Force Organizational Excellence Award in 1985.
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Mr. Andrew E. Bilinski, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Information
Systems Management, joined Lt. Gen. Thomas C. Richards, commander of Air Univer218
sity, to dedicate the Air Force Wargaming Center (AFWC). Addressing the gathered
dignitaries, Mr. Bilinski declared the twenty-one-million-dollar facility and computer
219
system operational. He declared, “[The Air Force Wargaming Center’s] mission is
simple yet profound, to prepare the current and future leaders of our nation[’]s aerospace forces to make the strategic and tactical decisions on the complex battlefields of
tomorrow which will lead to victory. . . . Wargaming adds a vital, extra dimension to the
220
student’s learning.”
221

Now, with a staff of roughly a hundred on board, it was time to deliver. As with the
222
Naval War College thirty years earlier, there were initial problems with software. In
fact, the 1988 official declaration that AFWC was fully operational appears to have been
premature. AFWC was soon “firing” its prime development contractor. According to
its technical director at the time, AFWC was clearly not satisfying its Phase II or III
223
objectives.
Despite the failure of the original software system, major successes came early. For
example, in 1987 the Joint Flag Officers Course was inaugurated at AFWC. To meet the
course’s objective, to “foster among flag officers a better understanding of the relationships of national goals and objectives, strategies, campaign planning, and force employment and how these relate to war at the operational level,” it was built around a major
wargame. By 1989, AFWC’s efforts to improve wargaming at the Air Force’s service
schools had begun to produce results. The first success was the GLOBEX (not to be
224
confused with NDU’s Globex) wargame, in support of the Air War College. AFWC
also expanded on earlier efforts to conduct U.S. Air Force wargames at the staff and
war colleges of friendly nations. Over time, a single game at the Canadian Forces Staff
College expanded to, first, the United Kingdom’s staff college and then Australian and
225
Dutch staff colleges.
Finally, in 1989, exactly ten years after the Navy’s first Global War Game, AFWC kicked
off a series of wargames that are considered collectively the father of “Title 10” wargaming (see chapter 4) within the Air Force, as Global would be in the Navy. The Air and
Space Power Symposium (APS) attracted senior leaders from beyond the Air Force: the
Defense Department, other government agencies, defense contractors, and educational
institutions such as Harvard and MIT. The APS was designed, developed, and executed
226
by AFWC.
The decade of the eighties was also successful for commercial wargames, but transi227
tional as well. Print game publishers saw their sales plummet. Peaking at 2.2 million
units in 1980, they had dropped to less than a million at mid-decade and half a million
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by the decade’s end. Print wargaming was losing two key elements of its customer base.
Increasing numbers of the younger consumers, who a decade earlier would have started
playing wargames in their preteens or teens, now were playing Dungeons & Dragons.
Many of their older customers, now with more money but less time, purchased the stillexpensive personal computers and played computer-based games.
As for Dungeons & Dragons, after a slow start in the mid-1970s the growth in its popularity in the late seventies and throughout the 1980s had been phenomenal. “D&D” had
founded a new type of gaming, “fantasy role playing.” Actually, the original cover of
Chainmail had been correct. D&D is actually a close tactical (i.e., depicting individuals,
not units) miniatures wargame, albeit one set in a fantasy world. With D&D’s success,
other close tactical wargames followed, at first also set in fantasy worlds but soon with
science fiction and even contemporary military themes. None achieved anything close
228
to the popularity of D&D.
After an even slower start (Spacewar had been programmed in the early 1960s),
computer-based consumer wargames began to grow during the 1980s in both titles
available and sales per title. Increasingly affordable personal computers allowed the
recreational software industry to take off, and with it computer-based games for home
use. These early home computers were still too expensive for many homes and too
limited in capacity to depict warfare with the sophistication of contemporary print or
miniatures wargames, but they were easier to learn (the computer did the adjudication,
not the user), were quicker to play, usually featured “limited intelligence” (you saw only
what your units could see), and perhaps most importantly, provided an opponent, the
computer. Pioneers such as Gary Grigsby (designer of USAAF) and Chris Crawford
(Balance of Power) were demonstrating through their work that impressive work was
possible even with the modest computers of the day.
In 1980, BDM, with Mark Herman as lead designer, created a computerized, classified
version of Herman’s 1978 commercial print wargame The Next War. Called Tac Eur, the
design benefited from the participation in the design team by Gen. William E. DePuy,
who had recently retired as the commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The work was done for Andy Marshall of OSD/NA fame and was
used for various Cold War analyses on the NATO / Warsaw Pact balance.
In 1982 Marshall decided to go directly to The Next War’s publisher, SPI, for a new
wargame, the Strategic Analysis Simulation (SAS). Despite a contract with a new company, the lead designer was again Mark Herman. SAS was used principally by SAGA, by
then J8 Political-Military Analysis Division (PMAD), and OSD/NA to look at strategic
nuclear issues, national missile defense, and competitive strategies against the Soviets.
SAS gained quick acceptance in the educational community and was used by NDU for
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its end-of-year Prudent Stride exercises in 1982 and 1983. The key innovation of this
manual simulation was the flexibility to explore the wide range of defense technology
issues. It was the first simulation to look at the impacts of stealth, space-based missile
defense, and antisatellite weapons on the global strategic balance.
In 1983 the success of SAS led OSD/NA to contract with a publisher that had hired most
of the staff of the now-defunct SPI, Victory Games, to develop the Theater Analysis
Model (TAM). Marshall was now dealing with a third company, but the lead designer
229
was again Mark Herman, who was now chief executive officer of Victory Games. Interestingly TAM was designed in parallel with a commercial title, Gulf Strike. TAM was
used through the 1980s on a variety of military planning exercises for J8 on such topics
as the Chiefs of Defense wargame series, where it was used to support NATO games; by
Adm. William Crowe (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for senior decision-making
exercises; and on a variety of war plans in exotic places. TAM was the first JCS model to
230
use cohesion as a measure of combat effectiveness.
The 1980s also saw the first examples of military wargames being adapted to the commercial market. The Air Force’s Capt. Gary “Mo” Morgan adapted his games, which
had been published by Project Warrior, for commercial publication by Avalon Hill as
Flight Leader and TAC AIR. The Army’s Capt. Bill Gibbs designed a wargame to train
his Ranger platoon in patrol planning and execution. He later cofounded a wargame
231
publishing house and published his design commercially as Ranger. The Navy’s Lt.
Larry Bond developed a wargame to help his subordinates and peers hone their skills in
fighting naval engagements. Later, when he was a civilian analyst at the Center for Naval
232
Analyses, he published his game as Harpoon.
Another development in American wargaming during this time, one that does not fit
neatly into any category, was the work of Col. Trevor Dupuy, USA (Ret.). He challenged
the use of Lanchester equations in military wargame adjudication, in favor of his own
Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis (QJMA). At the risk of oversimplification,
QJMA proposed to adjudicate future combat by comparing a tentative equation against
historical data (a lot of historical data) and adjusting until the equation produced
historical outcomes. While he pitched his process to the defense OR community and to
233
military wargamers, he also published it in the popular press. While his work received
a lot of interest (including internationally, see below), it was never incorporated into U.S.
234
military wargaming.
International
The 1980s saw the first unclassified reports on how the Soviets wargamed. This glimpse
was due in part to greater openness in the USSR. Articles that wanted to appear frank
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but actually revealed very little began to appear in the open Soviet press. The real meat
came from defectors from the Afghan army. Trained in Soviet wargaming methods,
235
these officers were only too happy to provide details.
Another source of insight into Soviet wargaming was Iraqi wargaming during the Iran/
Iraq War. The Iraqis used Soviet methods in their successful offensives late in the con236
flict. However, Soviet wargaming could not then adjudicate the strategic impacts of
airpower. So, in 1986 Iraq hired an American defense contractor to produce a computer
237
wargame.
In the long term, the most significant international wargaming development of the late
1980s was the Chinese acquisition of U.S. wargaming procedures. China apparently
possessed some American wargames as early as the mid-1970s, but it took advantage of
the good relations before the Tiananmen Square massacre to gain a rather comprehensive understanding of U.S. military gaming procedures. First, fairly high-level delegations visited numerous American wargaming facilities. Then, in 1987, China hosted in
Beijing the first Sino-American Seminar on Methodologies in Defense System Analysis.
Particularly interested in the work of Trevor Dupuy, the Chinese did more than borrow
American techniques: they quickly began to evolve a longer-term, more holistic ap238
proach to wargaming.
For many in the British defense wargaming community, the 1980s were the “Golden
Age”—both for the volume of wargaming and the number of innovations. For example,
Britain’s internally developed Divisional Wargame was played typically six times a
239
year, each game lasting a month. The U.S. adjudication software Janus was used in
wargames at the battle-group level.
Many of the most analytical wargames were conducted by the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment, at Fort Halstead. It was not uncommon for a
single analytical game to take a year: months of preparation, three months for game
play, and months more for analysis and report writing. It was a slow process, but since
Red was the Soviet Union, it was fast enough—the threat seemingly evolved at glacial
speeds. There was also a trend to use artificial intelligence (AI) software to play Red or
both sides. This saved manpower (hence money), increased the speed of execution, and
best of all, ensured that the same decisions would be made over and over again, eliminating that inconvenient human variability from the data. Again, against the Soviets,
240
who slavishly adhered to their doctrine, AI routines worked well enough.
Also during the 1980s, the British, long leaders in OR-heavy gaming for national analytical uses, began using games in innovative ways. In part through the efforts of Dr.
Griffith, gaming was incorporated into the curriculum of Britain’s Army Staff Col241
lege at Camberley. In 1988, the British replaced their hybrid map/computer tactical
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ground-combat wargame with the American Janus. As more British wargames came
to be completely adjudicated by software and their outcomes displayed on screens (one
large map was retained for situational awareness and team coordination), Dstl analysts
realized a lot of data were being generated. Dstl found it could run increasingly sophis242
ticated mathematical analyses with rather little additional effort. Most importantly,
Dstl began stationing operations-research and wargame personnel at British joint standing headquarters, signaling its commitment to gaming to support specific operational
243
plans.
Some fraction of the credit for this expanded gaming should likely go to Paddy Griffith,
the Sandhurst lecturer, historian, and wargame designer and advocate. In 1980 he
organized an international society, Wargame Developments, for the reform of wargaming. Members included military personnel, civil servants, educators, and both professional and amateur wargame designers. In 1981 (fully a dozen years before the founding
of Connections in the United States), Dr. Griffith helped inaugurate the Conference of Wargamers, dedicated to the advancement of wargaming. It has been held in
244
Northamptonshire each year since. Also in 1981, Griffith’s Forward into Battle was
245
published. This history of tactical land warfare introduced the concept of the “empty
battlefield” (greater troop dispersion in response to higher weapon lethality, producing
lower casualty rates per unit area). The book became very influential on both sides of
the Atlantic, increasing Griffith’s stature and the credibility of his advocacy of wargaming. In 1989 he left Sandhurst to become a full-time writer and wargame designer.
In Australia, the 1980s were particularly active for wargaming. The record is abundantly
clear on that fact; I have yet, however, to discover documents establishing a cause. It
was a time of shrinking budgets: Were wargames seen as objective (or effective) ways
of resolving what could be cut from defense with least harm? There may also have been
a nobler reason. Australia had fought alongside the United States during the Vietnam
conflict. Could its increase in wargaming, concurrent with that in the U.S. Army, have
been motivated by the same thing, the determination of Vietnam veterans to prepare
better for the next conflict?
Major progress occurred in 1980, when, as mentioned in the last section, the Australian
army published TIB 52. This publication encouraged wargaming by defining it, describing types of applications, and offering guidance on how to conduct effective games.
In 1981, another major step was taken, with the publication of the Australian army’s
first policy document on wargaming, Army Office Staff Instruction (AOSI) 33/81. It
directed the Australian army to take over from CSE the task of developing and conducting wargames. In response, that same year the Australian army’s Logistics Plans Group
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began to develop and conduct games. Its wargame cell was staffed by army reserve officers; initially, assistance was still needed from CSE.
AOSI 33/81 also directed a high level of standardization. Army wargames were to use
specific, externally provided scenarios and “be based on common organizational data,
planning data and adjudication rules.” AOSI 33/81 also announced that “training and
evaluation wargames are to be essentially manual so as to enhance their flexibility.”
Computer assistance was to be limited to facilitating adjudication, storing data, and
recording play for later analysis.
In accordance with AOSI 33/81, Headquarters Training Command issued “The Conduct
of War Games in Training Command” in December 1982. It reiterated the policies of
AOSI 33/81 and laid out how they would be applied to the various army schools and
training establishments. It updated the list of wargames in TIB 52 and added U.S. Army
and commercial wargames that could be requested from headquarters for introducing
246
wargaming to units.
By 1982 the Australian army’s wargame cell was reaching out to gaming organizations
in allied nations. For example, one of its wargames was based on a U.S. Marine Corps
wargame called JIFFY; several others had been originally developed by the Directorate
of Land Operations Research in Canada. In late 1982, the War Gaming Cell moved to
Victoria Barracks in Sydney. There in late 1983 it came under command of the Development Branch Field Forces Command, with an expanded staff that included a small
number of regular army officers.
In late 1983 the War Gaming Cell began work on a new game, based on one of its current games (Water Buffalo) but with a bigger map and computer-assisted adjudication.
Eventually called Cannon Row, this wargame, continually developed, would be kept in
use by the Australian army until well into the 1990s. It would in time be used also by
New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines.
The year 1984 was truly a watershed for Australian wargaming: it saw both the establishment of its first wargaming center and the issuance of new, expanded guidance.
Australia’s Army War Gaming Center (AWGC) was established to “concentrate [Australia’s] limited war-gaming resources” to provide “maximum benefit to all wargaming
247
activities in the Army.” AWGC was first commanded by Lt. Col. Harry Clarson, who
reported to the Australian army’s Training Command. AWGC was located in Sydney,
and it absorbed the War Gaming Cell.
AWGC immediately got to work, clarifying its role and conducting wargames. In a
working paper (known as WP84-21), AWGC clarified requirements for future Australian army wargames. These included practicing decision making at all levels; practicing
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staff procedures from company through corps headquarters; helping to develop, refine,
and test contingency plans; and examining force-structure alternatives. During its first
year AWGC supplied the Australian control element in the last ANZUS (Australia–New
Zealand–United States) wargame, Triad, which was held in New Zealand. This game
used a New Zealand–created variant, First Foray, of the U.S. Army game First Battle.
The new guidance came from AOSI 17/84, “War Gaming in the Australian Army,”
which replaced AOSI 33/81. The Australian army was to “make increased use of
war gaming” for appropriate applications. Those applications were training, both in
individual decision making and team procedures, and analysis, both for procurement
decisions and contingency planning. AOSI 17/84 also defined the responsibilities of the
Australian army organizations involved with wargaming. Both the Army Office and
the Field Forces Command were to provide guidance and arrange scientific support.
Logistics Command was to identify applications for wargaming and oversee execution.
248
Finally, Training Command was to develop improved games.
In 1985 AWGC began two wargames that would be its workhorses through the end
of the decade. The first, the Computerized Battle Simulator, or ComBatSim, was fully
computerized, was purchased from a U.S. company (Perceptonics), and was used to
train staffs throughout the Australian and New Zealand armies in wartime procedures.
The second, the above-mentioned Cannon Row, which used a computer for most adjudication and for data storage, was developed by AWGC. At decade’s end, Cannon Row
was transitioning from developing and testing software by using plans to developing,
refining, and testing the contingency plans themselves.
Finally, for individual nations, in 1980 the Canadian army (then the Canadian Forces
Mobile Command) adopted the U.S. Army Dunn/Kempf tactical miniatures-based
wargame. At the alliance level, the burning question for the eighties was: Did a NATO
wargame almost trigger the end of the world as we know it? Even after thirty years, the
answer is less than obvious. What is known is that on 2 November 1983 NATO began
a constructive wargame/command-post exercise. Among its objectives was to practice
procedures to be followed if a NATO / Warsaw Pact conflict ever escalated to nuclear
war. The wargame involved heads of government and a new, unique format of coded
communication. Before the end of the game, the real-world Soviets had readied their
nuclear forces and placed air units in East Germany and Poland on alert. When the
wargame ended, on 11 November, Soviet forces stood down. Western governments tried
to determine whether the Soviets had believed the wargame was a cover for preparations
for a real attack; and if they had, whether they had been alarmed enough to strike first;
or if not, whether their actions had been a ploy. Few outside the higher levels of government and the military even knew of the incident at the time. It has since become known
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as the “war scare of 1983” and as one of the three times the Cold War came closest to
249
becoming hot.
Perhaps it was a coincidence, but future big constructive NATO wargames were played
not at NATO headquarters but at the newly opened (1982) Warrior Preparation Cen250
ter. By the end of the decade, NATO was dramatically increasing its constructive
wargaming in an effort to reduce criticism arising from damage caused by its live
251
252
wargames. Other NATO exercises were conducted at the U.S. Naval War College.
In April 1988, DARPA began work on a Distributed Wargaming System for NATO.
By December it had successfully linked four corps headquarters and conducted a test
wargame with five hundred participants. By November 1989 it had scaled up enough to
make possible Allied Command Europe 89, a 1,500-participant exercise linking all the
253
major Central Region ground and land headquarters. At decade’s end, several NATO
254
nations were also showing an interest in DARPA’s Simnet initiative.
On the international civilian side, in the 1980s the United States continued to dominate
print wargaming and the United Kingdom the publication of miniatures rules, but the
“globalization” of commercial game publishing was beginning, in Australia. Thanks to
the (more or less) common language, Australia had always been a strong export market
for American print wargames. Now not only print wargame publishers, like Australian
Design Group and Panther Games, but also such computer-game developers as Strategic
Studies Group (SSG) began operations. Some SSG games, such as Carrier Wars (1986),
utilized multilevel (hierarchical) AI to game command and control, long before any
military computerized games could. Also in the 1980s, a small (but good) Canadian design, development, and publishing company was founded—Simulations Canada, which
quickly expanded from print to computer games. Also, a few print wargames were
published in Britain. Finally, Japanese-published print wargames enjoyed in mid-decade
255
relatively great, if brief, success.

The 1980s saw tremendous developments in the military and civilian spheres of
wargaming. How did each sphere influence and react to the momentous changes that
were about to occur? The next chapter answers this question. From the above, though,
it is clear the Cold War period had a great impact on wargaming and vice versa. Still,
wargaming had its greatest impact at the period’s end, not by better planning and
preparing for the Cold War “going hot” but in promoting international understanding
to increase the odds that the Cold War would end peacefully. Elements of the U.S. Joint
Staff and Soviet General Staff met together on five occasions, ultimately gaming the col256
lapse of the Soviet Union. Did these efforts make a peaceful outcome more likely?
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As the 1980s came to a close, both the United States and the USSR made highly publicized strides toward greater openness, including increased contact between the U.S. and
Soviet militaries. While the meetings between Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the
Soviet General Staff, and his counterpart Admiral Crowe were getting headlines, quieter
meetings were being arranged between their senior staffs. The goal was to increase
mutual confidence through familiarity with each other’s analytical methodologies,
including wargaming.
The first U.S./USSR staff meetings were held in the Pentagon, 10–13 December 1990.
The goal was to enhance strategic stability through better understandings of how the
other side analyzed (i.e., understood) strategic (nuclear) deterrence and regional stability (largely a function of conventional forces). The U.S. side was led by Maj. Gen. David
Robinson, director of J8, and Vincent “Vince” Roske Jr., his deputy for wargaming,
257
simulation, and analysis. The Soviet team was led by Lt. Gen. Sergey Bogdanov, chief of
the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies (COSS) of the General Staff. The sides
actually exchanged the equations they used to analyze strategic stability and deterrence.
Their next meetings, on how each side analyzed the conventional balance in Europe,
were held in Feldafing, West Germany, from 24 February to 1 March 1991. This was
258
during the air/ground phase of Desert Storm. The U.S. side was led by Mr. Roske and
Col. George Brock, USA, director of PMAD in J8. The Soviet side was led by Maj. Gen.
Professor Dr. Vsevolod Medvedev, the deputy chief of COSS. Representatives from
NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Technical Center (Dr. Ron Speight)
259
and the United Kingdom’s office of net assessments also played important roles.
Moscow was the venue of their third meeting, 2–8 June 1991. Teams were led by, for the
United States, Major General Robinson and Mr. Roske, and for the USSR by Generals
Bogdanov and Medvedev. It was very much a working meeting, with serious exchanges
of analyses of deterrence and strategic stability and their results. As analysts, the teams
together crunched the numbers on reducing nuclear warheads of both sides to roughly
1,500 while maintaining strategic stability.
Their final meeting prior to the culminating wargame was held 16–21 June 1991 in the
Schloss Elmau, a historic five-star hotel in the western part of a reunified Germany. The
senior American and Soviet leaders remained the same, but the focus shifted to the nuts
and bolts of wargame adjudication and preparation for the game.
In October 1991, at Monte Argentario, Italy, officers of the senior staffs of the armed
forces of the United States and the Soviet Union sat down to play a pol-mil game,
Elegant Voyager. To say the times were turbulent would be an enormous understatement: two months previously there had been an unsuccessful coup in the Soviet Union;
two months hence the Soviet Union would cease to exist. Rear Adm. Dennis Blair, Mr.
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Roske, and Colonel Brock led the American delegation; the Soviet team was again led by
Generals Bogdanov and Medvedev. Elegant Voyager was above all intended as a loosely
structured forum in which measures tending to create and maintain stability between
states (i.e., the players representing them) in a complex international environment could
260
be demonstrated and identified. The outcome of the wargame closely tracked with
later events.
While the decision to move forward with this sustained effort was made at the highest
levels, success in building the respect and trust needed actually to succeed depended
261
on a small team of individuals, and one in particular—Maj. Roy “R2” Rice. Writing
almost a quarter of a century later, Mr. Roske would recall,
Roy was singularly instrumental in making the US/USSR analysis meetings and game a success.
The Soviets immediately respected his analytic skill and enjoyed his energy and personality. To
say there was a challenge in “breaking the ice” and achieving the levels of trust needed to conduct
the game would be an understatement; more than anyone else on the American team, Roy was
the one person who delivered the needed personal connections that provided the basis for that
trust to develop. Something that important came down to the skills of one analyst to carry the
day. . . . [S]ometimes the success of even the best ideas under the most important circumstances
come down to the efforts of a few key people and one person can determine the outcome[;] . . . in
this case, that one person was Roy Rice, Lt. Col. USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.262

In the history of the world, empires have rarely broken up without a fight. Certainly,
the Soviet (and then ex-Soviet) leaders must have found the shocking events of the next
several years a little less shocking for having seen them before in a wargame. As Mr.
Roske would write, “Through the preparation and playing of the game, the Western and
Soviet staffs developed a trust in each other, a common understanding of the challenges
and were prepared to support the planning that would be needed to keep things under
control.” Wargaming and other analytical methods were developed to help nations fight
wars more effectively. In the early nineties it appears that by increasing transparency
and reducing uncertainty, perhaps they played a role in avoiding war altogether.
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239. Pearce, briefing to Connections UK 2014.
240. A. W. Timberlake, e-mail, 16 February 2015.
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TITLE

REMARKS

MANUFACTURER

First Battle

Divisional-level game, not terrain
dependent; U.S. / opposing force orders
of battle

U.S. Army

Dunn/Kempf

Battalion-level game, not terrain
dependent; U.S. / opposing force orders
of battle

U.S. Army

Tobruk

Tank battle in northern Africa 1942

Avalon Hill

Blitzkrieg

Lightning warfare in North Africa 1942

Avalon Hill

Anzio

The Allied offensive against the
Germans, Italy 1944

Avalon Hill

Spartan

Tactical warfare in the Hellenistic age,
500–100 BC

Simulations Publications Inc.

Legion

Tactical warfare in the Roman era, 100
BC–AD 700

Simulations Publications Inc.

commands on the best use of games; assist
commands in their development and conduct;
conduct wargame training; act as training advisor for wargaming; and act as the army point
of contact for technical aspects of wargaming.
249. Wikipedia has a concise description of this incident, but far and away the most informative
source is “The ABLE ARCHER 83 Sourcebook” on George Washington University’s
National Security Archives, nsarchive.gwu.edu/
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Scare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 2013), and three associated videos.
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1988 REFORGER exercise was estimated
at between forty and sixty million dollars.
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were first surprised, then outraged, that they
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had been deliberately bypassed, and there
was a frantic effort to come up with a Soviet
motorized rifle division to attack them. It was
also interesting that the various national plans
had never been “passed around” to the planning staff; at least one British officer, listening
to the Greeks describe their “standard deployments,” commented, “They’ve never told us
that!”
253. Goodman and Ropelewski, “NATO Plans
Simulation War Game,” p. 16.
254. Ibid.
255. Some were original Japanese designs, but
the majority were reprints of American
print wargames. For the early globalization of
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256. The following is based on Mr. Vincent “Vince”
Roske Jr. and Dr. Roy Rice, e-mails, February
2014.
257. The Joint Staff ’s J8 division was (and is)
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recalled, “The head of the British delegation
remarked on the last day of the meeting that
we analysts must return home and perform
vital analyses of the recent operations ‘before
the military and political leaders rationalize it
away.’”
259. Mr. Steve McCarthy and Mr. Geoff Hawkins
from the United Kingdom played particularly
significant analytical roles, enabling the mutual trust to grow. Rice, e-mail, 25 February
2014.
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260. As stated in the wargame’s terms-of-reference
document: “ELEGANT VOYAGER will be a
multi-move, two team politico-military game.
As a pure pol-mil game it will not involve the
quantitative assessment of military strength or
feature force-on-force engagements requiring
statistical gaming techniques. Instead, it will
be a scenario-driven path game, monitored
and structured by an independent management team.”
261. After reviewing a draft of this epilogue Dr.
Rice modestly insisted that I had given him

too much of the credit: “LTC John Shull and
CDR Don Jagoe were two exceptional Pol-Mil
officers working in COL Brock’s division who
played much more significant roles than I.”
Rice, e-mail, 25 February 2014.
262. The Soviet participants shared Roske’s high
regard for “R2.” When Major Rice’s selection
for promotion to lieutenant colonel was announced during the game, the Russian generals presented him with his new rank insignia,
silver leaves.

CHAPTER FOUR

Wargaming after the Cold War
1990s–10 September 2001

The 1990s saw an explosion in wargaming by the U.S. military and by other militaries
throughout the world. It was paralleled by an explosion in commercial computer games
(though only a fraction of them wargames), again both in the United States and around
1
the world. It is probably too soon to grasp all the impacts, for good and ill, of that
expansion.
War on Sand Table and Sand: The First Gulf War, 1990–1991
To a small degree, the Gulf War was a fight between Soviet and American wargaming methods. Wargames conducted by both sides, both before and during the conflict,
influenced the course of the war, and perhaps the following peace. Given the success
Iraq had had with Soviet-style wargaming, it would be reasonable to assume it used
such methods in planning its invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, the Iraqi invasion followed the
pattern of Soviet-gamed operations—a fast start that petered out, at the Saudi border.
It would take time for the cumbersome Soviet technique to game and plan the next
phase, an attack into Saudi Arabia (if one was intended), time the still-forming coalition
desperately needed. It is also likely that the Iraqis had continued to use the airpower
wargame that they had purchased from an American defense contractor during the
Iran-Iraq War. Could this explain why the Iraqi air force launched no big raids into
Saudi Arabia? That is, if they used that wargame at all, it likely would have told them
such attacks would be costly and futile.
The wargames that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had played over the previous decade had given the United States a priceless head start in preparing for the war.
The superb training received during live games such as Red Flag and those at the NTC
also contributed much to our success. In fact, planning for and wargaming an American response to an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began less than a year before Iraqi tanks
rolled across the border. The CENTCOM commander, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, had
become concerned by the possibility of such an invasion and on his own authority had
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initiated the deliberate planning process.2 Following the course-of-action wargames and
the drafting of a plan, CENTCOM initiated the equivalent of its 1980s wargame Gallant
Knight (chapter 3), a large game called Internal Look, postulating an Iraqi invasion of
first Kuwait, then Saudi Arabia. The participants noticed that some of their wargame
“injects” (scripted information released by controllers) were disconcertingly similar to
3
actual CNN reports they heard during breaks. During Internal Look, those playing the
roles of CENTCOM’s leaders initially decided to deploy only a token force, “to show resolve.” The Red team, controlling Iraq’s forces, decided to drive south immediately into
Saudi Arabia. The Blue, or U.S., team had trouble getting sufficient forces in-theater to
4
slow the Iraqi advance. When the actual invasion occurred, the CENTCOM staff, with
Internal Look still fresh in their minds, pushed hard for the fastest possible deployment
of U.S. forces.
Not long after General Schwarzkopf began planning for an Iraqi invasion and months
before Internal Look, the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group conducted
5
a wargame that proved remarkably prescient. It was conducted at the War Gaming
6
Department at the Naval War College (NWC), from 5 to 9 February 1990. Held just
three months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this game examined how a weakened Soviet Union might affect regional conflicts, specifically a conflict set in the Persian Gulf.
John Hanley, then the SSG deputy director, was the “brains” and principal driver of the
game. Jim FitzSimonds, SSG intelligence officer, was central in developing the scenario.
The fifty-three participants included members of the CNO SSG and representatives
from NWC, the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, CENTCOM,
NATO, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the CNO’s staff, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
The objectives of this game were to examine the likely American and Soviet strategies
in the region; identify factors that would likely limit U.S. military capabilities in the theater; assess the ability of U.S. and allied military forces to deter, to contain, and finally
to terminate hostilities on favorable terms; explore the need to influence positively the
USSR as it developed its own response to crisis and the ability of the United States to do
so; and study the joint and combined task force organizations and operations involved.
In this scenario, Iraq acted as an aggressor, with national objectives to improve its
political, economic, and military position. Given the number of real-world stakeholders
in such a conflict, the wargame used seven cells: Control, United States, Soviet Union,
Iraq, European Community / Japan / Turkey, Gulf Cooperation Council / Egypt / Iran,
and Assessment. The players’ moves were not scripted; Control used a prepared general
framework, to ensure that the game objectives were properly explored. Two models
were used for analysis of engagements, but overall adjudications of move outcomes were
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subjectively determined, relying on the professional experience and judgment of the
members of Control.
Over the course of seven moves this multisided wargame depicted a conflict that extended from October 1994 through January 1995. Events started when Iraq demanded
both a higher oil production quota from OPEC (the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries) and recognition of its claims of sovereignty over Bubiyan and
Warbah Islands. As global oil prices continued to decline, Iraq issued a series of everstronger demands and conducted military maneuvers. Then, on 1 January 1995, Iraq
invaded Kuwait and struck three Saudi airfields. The Iraqis used chemical weapons in
the assault. On the 4th, Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia and quickly established control of
its oil fields, but not before the Saudis had destroyed key infrastructure and withdrawn
their forces to Riyadh. During the seventh move, U.S. and allied forces responded to the
invasions.
Many of the major insights drawn from this wargame would soon be confirmed:
•

Soviet crisis behavior in the foreseeable future would probably not be as it had been
in the Cold War, but driven more by domestic concerns, including rebuilding the
economy.

•

The shift to a multipolar world would reduce the ability of the United States and the
Soviet Union to moderate the behavior of regional belligerents.

•

Maintaining the U.S. technological edge would be as important as ever.

•

The future alliance structures used by the United States deserved further review; ad
hoc alliances might be paramount yet more difficult to establish and maintain.

•

Deterrence remained a principal goal of the United States and its allies, and the presence of military forces was vital when diplomatic efforts failed.

•

While the United States sought termination of hostilities on terms favorable to its interests, the reality of regional power structures and military capabilities might force a
reevaluation of what is “favorable,” in order to avoid long-drawn-out hostilities.

This wargame also produced a number of tactical insights that were forewarnings of
some of the challenges that would soon be faced in the Gulf War.
In Washington on the morning of the actual Iraqi attack, Mark Herman, the designer
of the commercial wargame Gulf Strike and now an employee of the defense contractor
Booz Allen Hamilton, was approached by the Joint Staff and asked to produce a game
of the developing situation. He was under contract by lunch. He modified Gulf Strike
7
to produce a classified wargame—and play began by midafternoon! Before the end of
the month the Joint Staff was running a more traditional wargame, TacWar, which it
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continued to run as the situation evolved until March 1991.8 Early U.S. Department of
the Army wargaming of the evolving crisis was conducted by the Contingency Force
9
Analysis Center of the Center for Army Analysis.
On 10 August 1990, the private British organization CORDA independently decided
10
to use Gulf Strike as a rapid-analysis tool. As its information was completely unclassi11
fied, CORDA was able to publish its findings in a paper just one year later. It used the
game to explore the likely outcome of an immediate drive into Saudi Arabia by Iraqi
forces. During its first wargame it assumed that the supplies Iraqi forces would need to
sustain an offensive were stockpiled in the Baghdad area only; coalition airpower easily
starved any offensive before it could get under way. For the second game it was assumed
that supplies were also stockpiled around Basra. This time the Iraqis could supply more
of their forces—enough to give them a thin advantage over the few coalition ground
forces then in place. This presented the Iraqi side with a dilemma: the more time it took
to supply more of its units, the more coalition ground units moved to the border. After
six days of combat the outcome remained in doubt. Later, CORDA would create the
scenarios used to train British forces prior to deploying to the Persian Gulf.
During August, a joint planning cell led by Col. John Warden and built on the Air
Staff’s Checkmate office produced the Instant Thunder theater joint campaign plan and
then wargamed it. The game, which used software that did not adjudicate the impact of
hitting strategic targets—having been designed to model Cold War force-on-force attri12
tion campaigns—indicated that the plan would have virtually no effect. This misleading outcome may help to explain some of the opposition to the Instant Thunder plan.
After offensive air planning activity shifted to the theater, the Air Force Studies and
Analysis Agency (AFSAA) deployed forward a small cadre of analysts armed with a
brand-new wargame adjudication program, EADSIM (Extended Air Defense Simula13
tion). While EADSIM had zero ability to anticipate the theater effects of hitting any
particular enemy target, it did a great job of determining a pilot’s chance of reaching
that target alive. By modeling the enemy’s air-defense system, EADSIM was able to
indicate the impact of attacking any part of it. On 21 October, Lt. Col. Mike Carpenter and a four-man team arrived in Riyadh. While they called on both AFSAA and
Checkmate for what would soon be called “reachback support,” the principal lesson they
would learn from Desert Shield / Desert Storm was the importance of having analysts
14
in-theater with the warfighters to build trust and open communications.
In the theater, U.S. joint wargaming had already begun. General Schwarzkopf deployed Col. Gary Ware, USAF, his chief of modeling, simulation, and wargaming,
from CENTCOM’s Tampa, Florida, headquarters to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with a
small cadre of analysts. Colonel Ware’s detachment would accomplish small studies
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on the spot and “reach back” to the balance of his team, still in Tampa, for larger jobs.
By early September, Ware’s work was indicating that Saudi Arabia would soon be safe
15
but that substantially more force would be needed to go over to the offensive. His team
continued to be used extensively in the lead-up to Desert Storm.
For example, as the time for the coalition counterattack approached, an element of the
U.S. government pushed CENTCOM to occupy western Iraq with the 101st Air Assault
Division, to prevent mobile Scuds from getting close enough to launch against Israel.
CENTCOM quietly wargamed such an operation and passed back the forecast high ca16
sualty figures; the suggestion did not come up again. Given the subsequently revealed
“wrongness” of the attrition-based casualty projections for this conflict (and the success
of a somewhat similar operation in 2003, in the Second Gulf War), it is possible that this
17
may have been an opportunity lost.
Reachback was used to wargame the initial days of the air phase of Desert Storm as well.
Planners in the Joint/Combined Air Operations Center’s Strategy Cell, known locally as
18
the “Black Hole,” called back to Checkmate to wargame each new version of its plan.
Deployed British forces also used wargaming, both before and during the Gulf War.
Most of their gaming during the run-up to the counteroffensive centered on, first, the
breakthrough of the “Saddam Line,” and second, the mobile battle that was expected to
19
follow. The Saddam Line was a sophisticated obstacle belt along Iraq’s Saudi Arabian /
Kuwaiti border, constructed between August 1990 and January 1991. To help devise the
best way to breach that line, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) asked the
Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) at Fort Halstead,
in collaboration with Rex, Thompson & Partners Limited, for advice on how this might
best be achieved. RARDE developed and used a simple manual wargame depicting both
the obstacle belt and the covering Iraqi forces. Officially the Obstacle Modelling Project,
it was soon better known as “the Lego Game.” One of the developers raided his child’s
Lego set and used some of the blocks to represent the vehicles and engineering materi20
als. The name stuck. This manual wargame was designed, developed, and conducted
by a small team that included Paul Donovan (section head in CA3 Division, RARDE),
Paul Glover, Keith Jennings, Rick Atkinson, and David Gascoyne. Armored engineer officers and senior NCOs examined the use of engineer resources to breach this obstacle.
The aim was to develop and refine the concepts of operations and, in particular, to
identify how the new techniques and equipment might best be integrated. The results
were passed immediately to British engineers in the Gulf. Later, the game itself, which
had been further developed to serve as training and planning aid, was sent to the Gulf
as well. (Tragically, Lt. Col. Alec Wright of the Royal Engineers, the principal champion
21
of the wargame at the MoD, was killed while taking the game to the Gulf.) The soldiers
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who were to plan and execute the breaching of the Saddam Line wargamed their plan
22
over and over again to minimize the time needed for this operation.
While the “Lego Games” were in progress, the Battle Group Wargame (BGWG) team—
the CA4 Division of RARDE—looked at the main armored battle expected after the
23
break-in. It chose Janus as its principal adjudication tool, though it had received Janus
from the U.S. Army’s TRADOC Analysis Center just two years earlier and had limited
experience with it. Its choice resulted in a frantic data-input effort in the weeks leading
up to the gaming. Why? The United Kingdom had been using Janus to explore procurement alternatives and so had focused on ten to fifteen years in the future, with planned
or contemplated British systems facing systems the Soviets were expected to field by the
late 1990s. At first CA4 Division had no data for present-day Blue systems, let alone the
24
obsolete Red ones the Iraqis were using.
The Janus series was conducted in three distinct phases. The first phase began during
August 1990, self-started by the battle group’s wargame team; it looked at the composition of reaction forces to assist Jordan should the Iraqis seek to widen the conflict. The
second, tasked by MoD, examined the capability of a British armored brigade as part of
a U.S. Marine division. The third examined the tactical options available to the British
commander, Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith, and originated with his embedded scientific advisor, Hugh Richardson. By this time the turnaround time between tactical problem and
one-page report was down to twenty-four hours.
The main people using Janus were Gavin Jakins (acting section head), Dr. Diane Harmer, Alasdair “Fred” Hood, Ian Gardner, and Russ McWilliam. The key military players
of the wargame were Lt. Col. A. D. R. “Tony” Critien (battle-group wargame controller),
Maj. Steve Bowkett, Maj. Paddy Clarke, WO2 (Warrant Officer Class 2) Paul Leonard,
25
and Maj. Edward Trousdell (Ret.). The Janus gaming stopped twelve hours before the
start of the ground war. The insights the series generated influenced the formation and
tactics used during the British army’s drive into Kuwait. On a postwar visit to RARDE,
General Smith thanked the BGWG team for its assistance in developing his tactical
26
thinking.
U.S. Marine wargaming in support of Desert Storm comprised wargames held both at
Quantico and (presumably on the basis of Marine doctrine) in-theater. The Wargam27
ing Division conducted three games in direct support of Operation Desert Storm.
The first was the Policy and Strategy Wargame (PSWG) played in September 1990. The
Commandant, General Gray, convened a PSWG every six months for flag and general
officers, Marine and others. This PSWG examined the real-world crisis and explored
the military options for resolving it. The participants developed operational plans and
concepts of operations (CONOPS) and briefed them to General Gray. The CONOPS
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developed by the flag participants looked strikingly similar to those actually executed
during Desert Storm.
The second gamed and assessed a breaching CONOPS in support of Lt. Gen. Walter E.
Boomer, Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), who was preparing to penetrate the Iraqi lines defending Kuwait. Through the leadership and direction
of Maj. Gen. Matthew Caulfield, the Marine Corps Wargaming and Analysis Center
(MCWAC) gamed around the clock for about ten days in October. The game used
the Janus model with real-world Red and Blue “laydowns” (force positions) and Red
defensive structures. Lieutenant General Boomer’s original plan called for twenty-four
breaching lanes across a two-division front. He was very concerned about heavy casualties due to indirect fire (i.e., from distant artillery, called in and corrected by observers
in sight of the target).
The game ran through multiple iterations and interactions. No iteration of the original
plan produced a breach in the Iraqi defenses. When the lanes were reduced from twentyfour to twelve across the two-division front, there were several successful breaches.
MCWAC reported its results and recommended that Lieutenant General Boomer consider
reducing the number of lanes. Further, MCWAC, which had found that the indirect-fire
threat was greatly affected by Marine tactical air (TACAIR) support, recommended
that Marine TACAIR be concentrated to neutralize it. General Boomer did reduce the
number of breaching lanes, and he did employ Marine TACAIR to reduce the indirectfire threat.
A third wargame facilitated development of the amphibious plan for Desert Storm.
Another initiative of Major General Caulfield, this plan envisioned a deep thrust to
Basra to create a double envelopment of the Iraqi army. Col. Marty Steele was the “action officer”; MCWAC designed and executed the game. The resultant plan was briefed
to General Gray and then taken to CENTCOM for presentation to General Boomer and
Adm. Henry H. Mauz, commander of naval forces in the Gulf. The plan was considered
but not executed by General Schwarzkopf—who did, however, use the amphibious forces
to deceive the Iraqis about his actual plans. As coalition forces moved forward, they uncovered evidence of Iraqi wargaming; from the terrain modeled, it was clear the Iraqis
28
had been rehearsing to repel an amphibious invasion.
Back in Washington too, many were gaming the Gulf War. A few estimates of casualties
29
30
were extremely high; others were fairly accurate. Most wargames projected coalition
casualties (killed and wounded) totaling about thirty thousand, of which six thousand
would be American fatalities. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, decided to oppose the counteroffensive: in his political
judgment, the American people would not accept such high casualties.
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As the time to attack grew closer, individual Army units started to wargame their
31
own parts of the plan. Most U.S. Army and many coalition formations used the Joint
32
Theater Level Simulation to adjudicate their games. But at least one Army unit used
a commercial game. A soldier wrote to Frank Chadwick, president of Game Designers
Workshop, a print wargame design and publishing company, that his unit had been
using one of Chadwick’s games to practice its part of the operation until a sandstorm
had literally blown the game away. The writer naturally could not tell him how soon the
33
operation would be launched—but could he send a replacement game, very quickly? He
did.
Also in this period, the British assembled a small Scientific Support in Crisis and War
(SSCW) team of civilian operations research experts and deployed it to Saudi Arabia
34
with the British 1st Armoured Division. During the air/ground-maneuver phase of
the war it reached back to RARDE and other establishments in England. British commanders in the field would discuss their contemplated actions with the SSCW analysts,
who would explore them either directly in wargames or through consultation with the
35
United Kingdom and report the results back to the field. However, as the Iraqi army
collapsed the speed of the advance accelerated so greatly that SSCW’s process proved
36
unable to keep up.
Wargaming also helped American forces during execution, if indirectly. During the war,
37
pilots based in Turkey referred to northern Iraq as “The Range”; a number of soldiers
were caught on camera saying, “The NTC was much harder than this.”
However, computer wargames can mislead. Computerized games did not then include
code that would have units “involuntarily change their posture”—that is, stop attacking,
38
retreat, or melt away, as a result of casualties suffered and other factors. Therefore, a
number of wargames depicted Iraqi units fighting, and inflicting coalition casualties,
to the last man. The resulting expectation of high casualties resulted in C-130 transport
aircraft being configured for medical airlift, not for flying in the fuel that was actually needed. Because the U.S. military’s games had indicated the Iraqis would fight to
39
the last man, there was too little preparation for prisoners of war. These high casualty estimates may have also influenced the American decision to suspend offensive
operations after the liberation of Kuwait. While polling data showed that the American
people wanted Saddam Hussein removed, they also showed support for the war beginning to decline at thirty thousand casualties, a few thousand fewer than most wargames
40
projected just to liberate Kuwait.
Though we achieved in this war one of the most overwhelming military victories in
history, we did not achieve a proportionately positive state of peace. Why? It appears the
United States never wargamed all the way through to peace. The Marines had planned
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to conduct such a wargame, but military victory came too quickly. Even if it had been
conducted, it is doubtful that our attrition models would have anticipated the revolts
against Saddam. The impact of wargaming on the Gulf War was enormous, and mostly
positive. Yet coalition casualty indications were over twenty times too high. These indications had real political and military consequences. How would experience shape the
evolution of wargaming in the United States and around the world?
Continuity and Progress, 1991–2001
During the 1990s the U.S. military spent more money on wargaming than in all previ41
42
ous decades combined. Much of this increased investment produced excellent value.
Yet the central problems that had caused the high casualty predictions for the Gulf War
were often pronounced impossible to fix or were ignored. A RAND paper, The Base of
Sand Problem, captured the problem well: What was needed was a more comprehensive
adjudication of armed conflicts. More computing power without a more comprehensive
understanding of war would simply produce the wrong answer faster and with more43
persuasive graphics. Relatedly, an article in the Army quarterly Parameters, drawing
on strong historical precedents, argued that while the then-current interwar nature of
the international environment made wargaming more difficult, it also made gaming far
44
more important.
Undeniably, increased competition for limited defense dollars and the success of the
Navy’s Global War Game as an analytical and lobbying tool have led all the services to
conduct Global-like games—collectively called “Title 10” wargames, in reference to Title
10 of the U.S. Code, the legislative foundation of the armed forces. As we’ll see later,
Title 10 games such as the Air Force’s Global Engagement and the Army’s Army After
45
Next grew in influence.
At the opposite end of the strategic-to-tactical spectrum, the 1990s also saw DARPA’s
modest efforts to encourage wargaming by networking simulators into a virtual battle
46
space increase in size and sophistication. In case after case, traditional simulators,
individually effective for little more than learning emergency procedures and “switchology,” were integrated into networks and collectively transformed into devices allowing
the learning, testing, and rehearsal of tactics against thinking adversaries.
Joint
During the 1990s most money spent on improving wargaming was devoted to facilitating the computer adjudication of joint operations. Perhaps, in turn, the most important post–Desert Storm / post–Cold War development in joint wargaming was not a
new game or process but the increased rigor given to existing ones. For instance, for
decades the U.S. combatant commands had received, every two years or so, a classified
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document called the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP would (and
does) require specific commanders to build or, more usually, update plans to deal with
47
specific contingencies. However, many of these plans had long been little more than
transportation feasibility studies and their updates little more than “pencil whipped.” 48
Gaming was an integral part of the effort to lend rigor to that planning, especially in
CENTCOM. Seeing the impact that CENTCOM’s wargaming-assisted planning had on
the success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, all other combatant commands picked
up their own games.
Nevertheless, CENTCOM still seemed to lead the pack in quality and timeliness of
wargaming. With prescience equal to that of his predecessor Norman Schwarzkopf, in
the late 1990s the new CENTCOM commander, Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC, became
concerned about conditions in Iraq should Saddam Hussein fall from power for any
reason. On his own authority he directed the drafting of a “branch” plan to his JSCP49
required operations plan (OPLAN) 1003-98. This plan’s equivalent to Internal Look
was called Desert Crossing. Held in late April 1999, the wargame assumed a fourhundred-thousand-strong U.S. force and indicated many events that actually occurred
after Saddam’s overthrow. An after-action report provided clear insights that would
have been valuable in such a situation. Of course, to have had that value the report
50
would need to have been read. In the next chapter we will continue this story arc.
In 1990, the deputy secretary of defense created the Executive Council on Modeling and
51
Simulation to take a comprehensive look at wargaming. It saw a maze of adjudication
software—most of it for a single warfare domain (i.e., air, sea, or land), using different
52
data, and producing different answers to the same questions. Ground and naval surface forces had clearly played important roles during the final days of the Desert Storm
campaign, yet no game could fully depict such a joint operation.
As a first step to bring order to this perceived chaos, a permanent Defense Department–
level office was established: the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO), in
53
1991. A small office with four military and three civilian positions, in 1993 DMSO
established an information clearinghouse so that work would not be duplicated out of
54
ignorance. In 1999, this clearinghouse became the Modeling and Simulation Informa55
tion Analysis Center. Toward the decade’s end, and following successes with them by
56
several services, DMSO became interested in commercial wargames and simulations.
As an interim measure in that connection, the wargames each service was already using
for command-post exercises were collectively dubbed the Joint Training Confedera57
tion. DMSO then funded development of software that would allow these service
games to “talk to each other.” When an aircraft in the Air Force wargame dropped
58
a bomb, it would hit (or miss) its target in the Army’s wargame as well. The Joint
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Warfare System (JWARS) was to replace most service analytical models. A purely
constructive model (that is, no element of the wargame could be either live or virtual), it
would be capable of running much faster than real time. Its primary usefulness would
be in helping develop, compare, and select between operational courses of action, and
examining alternative force structures or weapon systems. At mid-decade JWARS was
scheduled to be completed in a few years: Block 1 in 1998, Block 2 in 1999, and Block 3
59
in 2000.
Each service was to fund programs to replace many one-service adjudication “engines”
with a smaller number of joint ones. The Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) would be
the largest, most capable, and most expensive of the new wargame engines. Designed
primarily to support command-post-type games, it would run in real time and allow
constructive, virtual, and live elements to be incorporated into one battle space. Technically, JSIMS would be a set of intercompatible models. Each service was to develop its
own “module,” in compliance with a “high-level architecture” (HLA). Essentially a set of
standards, HLA was supposed to help ensure that all the service modules would be able
to talk to each other when completed. JSIMS was to replace all service wargames adjudication software used for command-post exercises and would be used to help refine
selected courses of action and support the rehearsal of plans by joint and component
staffs. At mid-decade, it was expected that JSIMS would reach initial operating capacity
60
by 1999 and be at full operational capacity by 2003.
61

JSIMS was controversial almost from its inception. Part of the reason was a manyfold
62
increase in the price tag. It was originally funded at sixty-nine million dollars; by
decade’s end the total development price tag was approaching a billion dollars. This was
due both to additional organizations joining the program (and simply adding their budget requirements to the total) and to growth in the original costs. Similarly, there were
slippages in the schedule—again, some resulting from new work and some outright delay. There was also some pushback, because the Department of Defense (DoD) planned
to force the services to use JSIMS, by establishing a “no pay” date (i.e., no additional
funding allowed for “legacy” models) and a “no play” date (after which legacy models
could not be used). But the greatest source of dispute was the total price: a billion dollars
is enough money to attract attention even in Washington.
Despite the controversy and the “innovative” organizational structure (in which the
project office controlled almost no money), it looked for a time as if JSIMS might actually work. By mid-1999, JSIMS target dates had slipped to initial capability in April
2001 and full in December 2003, but a major test of JSIMS by the U.S. Atlantic Command suggested that this potentially important system was approaching operational
63
usefulness. However, later in 1999 the director of the Joint Staff’s J8 division, which
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had repeatedly heard statements of concern regarding both JSIMS’s management and
technical approach, called for an assessment of the project. Subsequently, in early 2000,
the deputy secretary of defense directed the restructuring of the program and a funda64
mental change in its technical approach.
Meanwhile, the joint community continued to use legacy wargames for a spectrum of
applications. For example, in 1997 the Joint National Testing Facility used the Advanced
Real-Time Gaming Universe Simulation (ARGUS) to examine the operational impact
of projected antimissile systems, even though ARGUS was supposed to be replaced by a
65
JSIMS member simulation, Wargame 2000.
Also during the 1990s, the Warrior Preparation Center continued to grow in importance, capability, and popularity. As the Soviet threat disappeared, with the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, and Europe became more ecologically conscious, it became first
more difficult, and then nearly impossible, to conduct large-scale field exercises. The
Warrior Preparation Center allowed generals to mass their forces wherever they wanted
66
across their synthetic battlefields at perhaps 1 percent of the cost of a live exercise.
Small wonder that, being able to host a maximum of ten exercises a year, it spent most of
the 1990s booked up eighteen months in advance.
Partly in response to the recognized importance of wargaming during the Gulf War,
the Joint Warfare Center was moved, reorganized, and expanded to become the Joint
Warfighting Center (JWFC). It also moved to historic Fort Monroe, Virginia. JWFC
was responsible for joint doctrine and lessons learned as well as wargaming. After
the move, the element specifically dedicated to wargaming was designated the Joint
Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) and moved out of Fort Monroe to
Suffolk, Virginia. The first major joint wargame conducted by JTASC, Unified Endeavor 95 (UE95), demonstrated the cost advantage of constructive wargames over live
iterations. A traditional live wargame with the same scenario and order of battle would
have cost roughly thirty-seven million dollars to conduct; JTASC executed UE95 for
67
$3.4 million. Other advantages included security from overhead observation and the
virtual elimination of environmental impacts, wear on military vehicles, and claims for
68
property damage. Still, there were significant disadvantages.
In addition, wargaming continued to play a role in joint professional military education. Each wargame was optimized for the educational objectives of the school using it.
The curriculum of the Armed Forces Staff College was designed to prepare midcareer
officers—lieutenant commanders (Navy and Coast Guard) and majors (all others)—for
assignments to joint staffs at the theater level. Its curriculum emphasized theater operations, and its capstone game placed the students in leadership positions in a theater
campaign. To increase wargaming’s contribution to the effectiveness of this curriculum,
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the Joint Staff funded a new wing for wargaming (and a library) at the Armed Forces
Staff College. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili,
69
dedicated the new wing. The curricula of the National Defense University’s National
War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, in contrast, are designed to
prepare more-senior officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels, commanders and captains—for positions at the national strategic level. Therefore, their capstone wargame,
the Crisis Decision Exercise, requires the student to cope with a crisis from the national
70
perspective.
Individual service war colleges continued to participate in JLASS (see chapter 3).
Throughout the nineties the exercise continued to evolve. Two examples:
•

In JLASS 96, eighty-seven students were called on to cope with three major contingencies, during an era when the American armed forces were focused on coping with
71
two nearly concurrent ones. This year also included expanded media play.

•

During JLASS 98, ninety-three students and almost as many controllers participated.
A key innovation was the inclusion of Red media, allowing participants to assess and
72
devise counters to Red information operations against the United States.

Some valuable joint innovations were not exactly wargames. As early as 1989, the Joint
Staff began conducting experiments to evaluate the operational utility of fast-evolving
commercial information technology. During the 1990s, these experiments were formalized into the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID). Each year the Joint
Staff would create a wargame-like exercise and invite commercial vendors to demonstrate in it how their technologies could enhance joint command and control. As many
of the projects were in the prototype or beta stage, they were not fully games, with Red
trying to negate the new technologies. Still, JWID identified so many low-cost, highbenefit, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies that by 1995 Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom were participating, and by the late 1990s so were
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey. Signal magazine would even call
73
JWID “the ultimate war game.” But it was not technically a wargame at all, and such
imprecision would lead to confusion and controversy in a few years.
Late in the 1990s, the joint community and the services became convinced that
wargaming could be valuable for assessing doctrines and technology choices. Essentially, the conviction began to grow that before money was spent developing a new technol74
ogy, games could provide insight into its probable operational benefits.
The late 1990s also saw the first unclassified paper about what had been a largely
uncommented-on wargame operation, the Joint Staff’s Studies, Analysis and Gaming Division (SAGD, formerly SAGA). The paper, published by the National Defense
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University’s Institute for National and Strategic Studies, described SAGD’s work in
75
support of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). A greater-than-normal need for
transparency was the likely cause of this publicity. Some in the administration, Congress, and the public at large felt the “peace dividend”—that is, money that could be
cut from defense spending now that the Cold War had ended—should and could safely
be larger. However, many (including some of the same organizations and individuals)
were concerned that too-large cuts could lead to a return to the post–Vietnam War hollow force, leaving the United States vulnerable, especially if multiple conflicts or other
contingencies (disaster relief, peacekeeping) occurred simultaneously. To address the
tension between these concerns the fiscal year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act
initiated the Quadrennial (i.e., every four years) Defense Reviews. They would examine
every defense program, from force structure and infrastructure to modernization plans,
to ensure no more was being spent on defense than necessary. SAGD’s wargame was
intended to project the risk at various funding levels.
It was the high stakes inherent in such a wargame that called for such unprecedented
transparency, at least among the stakeholders within the Department of Defense. The
wargame process that SAGD developed was named Dynamic Commitment. Instead
of SAGD’s normal sequence of designing, developing (getting the needed data and
materials), and conducting a game, Dynamic Commitment comprised four events.
First, Dynamic Commitment was designed in a very open manner. On 5–6 December
1996 a game-design conference was held with eighty-five participants, mostly O-5 and
O-6s (lieutenant colonels and colonels, Navy commanders and captains) from across
DoD. On the basis of this exceptionally broad range of inputs, SAGD developed the
wargame. Two Blue teams would meet the same series of threats and contingencies, all
consistent with American historical experience since World War II. Actual execution
would include a host of other teams, each working to ensure an accurate outcome. On
14–17 January, SAGD hosted what it called a Scoping Game. In what was essentially a
“playtest” of the game’s design, two hundred people, mostly O-6s (colonels and Navy
captains), from across the defense establishment participated.
The third event, 19–20 February 1997, brought in over a hundred flag officers (generals
and admirals), including several deputy commanders of geographic commands. The
event was part outbrief on the playtest, part seminar wargame, and part opportunity
to collect very senior input on game design and execution. The final Dynamic Commitment event was held 20–22 March; over two hundred participants put together
everything that had been learned to date. The authors of the published paper were able
to report that Dynamic Commitment’s findings made a substantial contribution to the
QDR.
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In 1998, DMSO initiated a program of annual awards to enhance awareness of modeling
and simulation (M&S) throughout DoD and to recognize excellence, innovation, and
achievement in advancing the state of the art of M&S or in contributing to interoperability (ability of software to exchange data with other software) and reuse (ability to
76
run the same code or data in multiple efforts) in support of DoD M&S objectives.
As the decade came to a close, the recognition grew that the world was indeed being
transformed at an increasing rate and that just as the services were working to transform themselves over the long term, so the joint community had to find a way to look
and act far enough out to recognize the need for, and make, the necessary changes. This
was a bit of a problem, because, by design, joint combatant commanders (see chapter
6) are supposed to focus on accomplishing today’s and tomorrow’s missions; it is the services that are to look, plan, and budget for the long term. The solution was the creation
of a joint command that would act a little like a service—that is, look far enough into
the future to organize, train, and equip the joint headquarters that would be needed to
command the forces provided by the services. In October 1999, the U.S. Joint Forces
Command (USJFCOM) was established. By then it had already been assigned JWFC,
in part so the new command could conduct the “Title 10–like” games it would need to
77
anticipate joint needs.
U.S. Army
The demonstrated utility of wargaming during Desert Storm strengthened still further the acceptance of wargaming within the Army, though some criticism continued.
As we’ve seen, even before the Gulf War the Army had been working to improve its
wargames. After the conflict, on 15 February 1996, the Army Models and Simulation
Office (AMSO) was established. Reporting to the Army Chief of Staff through the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, AMSO was to monitor and coordinate wargaming activity across all Army uses, validating requirements and setting policy and
78
standards.
Since 1990 the Conflict Analysis Division (CAD) of the Center for Army Analysis
(CAA) had provided a political-military gaming capability to the Department of the
Army. Over nearly twenty years CAA would conduct over a hundred political-military
games, issues workshops, and seminars in support of headquarters, the combatant
commands, Army service component commands, and other sponsors. Gamers represented more than a hundred agencies and twenty countries. CAA’s political-military
capability was flexible and diverse with respect to the depth and range of issues it could
address, from strategy to planning to operations. A major strength of CAA’s events was
that they offered immediate insights to sponsors. Another was that CAA’s methodology
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represented for senior leaders a structured analytical tool for challenging and complex
79
problems that were not readily quantifiable.
On 1 January 1990 the Army Model Improvement and Study Management Agency was
established, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This body was chartered not only to identify
and implement improvements to Army wargaming but also to coordinate policy regard80
ing the service’s three broad purposes that in the 1990s most Army wargames served.
Education and Training. Wargaming made up a pivotal part of the curricula of the Ar81
my’s war and staff colleges. The opening in July 1994 of a new multimillion-dollar wargame facility at the Army War College was proof of the importance the Army placed on
82
this aspect of officer development. The Army also used wargames at all levels of command to generate input to command-post exercises. Games used included Corps Battle
Simulation, for use by corps and division headquarters, and Janus or Brigade/Battalion
83
Battle Simulation (BBS) for use by brigade and battalion staffs. The overall program
for training division commanders and their staffs was Warfighter. While the program,
of which the wargame was just one (but vital) element, did not claim to be as effective
as actual combat in creating veteran commanders and staffs, it has been estimated that
sixteen thousand battlefield casualties would be needed to achieve the same level of pro84
ficiency the old-fashioned way. So maybe Warfighter’s not quite as effective as actual
combat, but its “tuition” is certainly much lower!
Crews of Army vehicles, from tanks to attack helicopters, were increasingly trained on
a network of simulators called the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). The impacts
of fire support, combat engineering, and logistics were included. In 1994 it was predicted all Army combat simulators would be networked into CCTT by 2000. The results
85
proved mixed at best. By decade’s end, the Army was able to document undeniable, if
86
modest, performance improvements owing to its new virtual environment.
Anticipating, Testing, Evaluating, and Researching. The point here was to anticipate
87
the overall nature of land warfare in a specific theater at a specific time in the future.
Particular uses ranged from virtual prototyping (e.g., building a cockpit in a simulator
before you build it in a real aircraft) to discerning which technically feasible technology options would have the greatest positive impact on the battlefield. The largest, most
expensive, and most influential Army wargames in this category were the service’s Title
10 games, the Army After Next (AAN) series. These annual exercises were designed to
help the Army foresee how it would organize, train, and equip its forces in the future.
For example, wargamers would play several different plausible force structures in paral88
lel wargames against the same threats and see which did best.
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Each year’s AAN exercise was a little different. The first was conducted in 1997. Actually, the Army conducted two AAN wargames that year. A winter game, with a more
global, conventional view, began with Red taking out a number of U.S. satellites on
89
which the Army depends. The summer game focused more on unconventional operations and was set in and around Indonesia. Over three hundred Army officers participated in the summer game alone, alongside representatives of Great Britain, Canada,
90
Australia, and several U.S. non-DoD government agencies. After the events of 11
91
September 2001, this wargame would seem more than a little prescient.
Throughout the remainder of the decade AAN wargames reflected themes selected for
that year and were designed to provide insights relevant to stated objectives. In 1998, the
theme emphasized the operational level of future warfare. AAN 98’s objectives were to
look deeply into “asymmetric” threats, experimental force structures, domestic coun92
terterrorism, logistical implications, and technology “enablers.” Within AAN 98 there
was a separate, 120-participant wargame dedicated to conflict in space and how it could
93
affect surface operations. In 1999, AAN focused on the fusion of airpower and land
94
power. AAN 99 themes included strategic settings, force projection and sustainment,
urban and other complex terrains, hybrid forces, employment, homeland defense, coalition and joint issues, interdependence, and science and technology. Its objective was
95
simply to examine and expand understanding of each theme.
In 2000, the Army changed the name and the focus of its Title 10 wargame. It was now
called the Army Transformation Wargame, and its focus was to see how much difference the Army’s transformation initiatives might make in a campaign fifteen years
in the future. This change could be seen in the wargame’s themes and objectives. The
former were fewer and more specific:
•

Why an army?

•

Why this army (Objective Force)?

•

Insights for the Army in 2015.

The objectives were much more specific:
•

Visualize and define the strategic and operational environment.

•

Highlight the Army’s role in strategic responsiveness and “full-spectrum dominance.”

•

Demonstrate importance of achieving “overmatch.”96

The Army Transformation Wargame projected a plausible regional adversary’s technology and an economically supportable force size forward fifteen years. Two significantly
different future forces were postulated and played in separate games. The exercise’s Red
team developed a strategy it believed would be both effective and true to the adversary’s
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culture and doctrine. In brief, in 2000 Red sought to kill enough Americans to turn the
American people against the war. Each of the two Blue teams tried to employ its forces
to achieve their political leadership’s desired end state with the minimum cost in time,
lives, and treasure. After the exercise the Army analyzed the results to determine which
force attributes were the most helpful, so that research and development could be priori97
tized accordingly.
Deliberate and Crisis Planning. All branches of the U.S. military used one of two methods, similar but distinct, for creating war plans: “deliberate planning,” a two-year process used to update and occasionally create new standing (on-the-shelf) war plans; and
“crisis action planning,” which adapts standing plans or creates new plans to address
a breaking crisis. War plans probably constituted the most controversial area within
Army wargaming. Some emphasized granularity and rigor over speed of analysis, while
others traded precision for greater speed. Generally, common sense prevailed, and fast
adjudication techniques dominated crisis action planning, while more-time-intensive
and -granular efforts were the norm for deliberate planning. Wargaming became so integral to the Army decision-making process that several articles appeared on wargaming
98
techniques specific both to different phases of planning and to different branches.
The U.S. Army also explored contingencies that did not fit neatly into either category.
For example, more than two years prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, CAD
pointed to a need to be better prepared in the area of homeland defense / homeland
security. CAD engaged in a series of innovative workshops and political-military games,
sponsored by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, under the rubric
of the “Homeland Security Initiative.” Over the next eighteen months these games
helped define the Army’s roles and responsibilities in homeland security, promoted
communication on this critical issue within the Department of Defense and with the
interagency community, and led to the development of a series of “Defense Planning
Guidance Illustrative Planning Scenarios” dealing with homeland security. CAA itself
conducted a series of wargames and workshops in related critical missions for the Army,
from terrorism response to antiterrorism / force protection and critical-infrastructure
99
protection.
Still, Army improvements amounted mainly to supporting the development of the new
JSIMS family of joint games and also (see below) to working with civilian industry.
The Army’s element of the JSIMS toolbox was WARSIM 2000, a constructive model
that could interface with virtual and live exercises. It would communicate with JSIMS
100
and the other service/agency elements. WARSIM 2000 was to replace most if not all
of the Army’s models depicting warfare above the battalion level, such as Corps Battle
Simulation and Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation. Like the other elements of JSIMS,
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WARSIM 2000 was designed primarily for command-post exercises, as well as for ex101
ploring and rehearsing plans.
There were also some in the Army who advocated a far less costly way of improving
Army wargaming—using commercial games, either “as is” or modified. For example,
Lt. Col. Michael Robel demonstrated how a commercial game could be used to explore
the combat advantages and disadvantages of various battalion organizational configura102
103
tions. Others argued for such games in education and training.
U.S. Navy
During the 1990s the Navy continued to use a spectrum of wargames. It worked to complete its element of the JSIMS tool kit; JSIMS Maritime was designed to communicate
with JSIMS and other service/agency elements. It worked also on several other wargame
engines. For example, the Navy was also developing the Battle Force Tactical Trainer as
104
its element of the virtual battle space.
In 1995, the Navy Modeling and Simulation Management Office (NAVMSMO) was
established as the senior Navy wargaming activity. Located in Washington, DC,
NAVMSMO was to provide leadership and guidance for Navy modeling, simulation,
105
and wargaming, particularly in policy, strategy, investment, and procedures.
Also in 1995 the Chief of Naval Operations changed the emphasis of his Strategic
Studies Group from immediate problems toward the future operational and warfighting concepts generated by a given SSG in response to the CNO’s annual theme. In 1998
the SSG decided it could do so more effectively if it switched from its previous three
106
wargames a year to two.
On the strategic level, the service used a series of program objective memorandum
wargames to explore program/budget issues and the Navy RMA (revolution in military
107
affairs) War Game Series to look further into the future. The Navy’s RMA series was
interesting on many grounds: its unusual length, April 1995 through November 1996;
the participation of DoD’s Office of Net Assessment; and its structure with multiple
108
panels that fed findings into the main game.
The Navy continued its Global series, which did so much to help win the Cold War
and prompted the adoption of Title 10 gaming by the other services. However, with our
global conflict with the Soviet Union winding down, then ending (the Soviet Union
ceased to exist in December 1991), Global’s sponsors began looking for a new focus.
What was effectively the first post–Cold War Global exercise occurred in 1990, days
before the beginning of the Gulf War. The game reflected the strategic uncertainty of
the time, postulating three different directions in which the world might evolve after
the fall of communism. At the time there appeared to be some doubt about the utility
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of wargaming in so uncertain an environment, but looking back well over twenty years
109
later, its “guesses” appear amazingly prescient. During the early-to-middle 1990s,
Global typically explored the feasibility and effectiveness of U.S. power projection predominantly “from the sea,” in scenarios similar to those the United States had experienced during those years, in places like the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.
Nevertheless, some believed Global had lost its way, that it was being “kept going to
keep going.” Many players (see chapter 3) were “FOBs”—friends of Bud (Hay)—while an
increasing number were contractors, working to ensure that Global acknowledged the
utility to national defense of their proposed products. But on 24 July 1998, Vice Adm.
Arthur K. Cebrowski became President of the Naval War College, and for better and for
110
worse, Global found a niche.
111

Admiral Cebrowski had long been a proponent of “network-centric warfare.” Now, as
President, he directed that Global explore the potential of this type of warfare and the
practical requirements for implementing it. Admiral Cebrowski’s influence was first felt
in Global 1998, though there was only enough time to make modest adjustments to that
game. Global 1999, however, marked a fundamental shift, from hitting targets to achiev112
ing effects. Adjudicating such warfare is difficult for human umpires. Fortunately,
after a decade of investment, the software and hardware were now in place to support
113
this first truly network-centric Global. Still, Global 99’s designers also increased their
114
emphasis on depicting human factors.
Global 2000 explored ways to implement network-centric warfare. Held from 14 to 25
August at the Naval War College’s then brand-new McCarty Little Hall (see below),
Global 2000 attracted over six hundred participants, not counting War Gaming Department support staff. Set in 2010, it examined how increased data collection and sharing
of information might affect the actual conduct of naval operations. Global 2000 also
featured the first use of several new gaming devices, including the “Knowledge Wall,” a
large flat-panel display designed to summarize in one place all operational and logistical
115
information a commander needed.
Global 2001—which concluded just a month and a half before the 9/11 attacks—em116
phasized network-centric operations. Played from 16 to 27 July 2001, primarily at the
Naval War College, its 850 participants (not counting support staff) developed strategies
that were assessed with the help of ten computerized adjudication engines. Appropriate
to the network theme, some players participated from one of four “distributed” locations: the Pentagon, U.S. Space Command (in Colorado), and two Navy command ships
(one in the Atlantic, one in the Pacific). Even more than in 2000, a variety of innovative
117
information displays were evaluated.

on wargaming  

149

Perhaps the greatest benefit of this series of Global games was the opportunity to apply
the newest information technologies in a simulated wartime environment. Supporters saw a “cultural shift” over the course of these wargames, as repeat players became
more adept at using emerging technology. Some applied these new technologies and
techniques when they returned to the fleet. The most extreme and famous such case
was that after Global 2000 Rear Adm. Thomas E. Zelibor, commander of Carrier Group
3, directed that the Knowledge Wall be delivered to his flagship. The War Gaming
Department was very proud when the Knowledge Wall was used by the naval command
118
element of Operation Enduring Freedom—the liberation of Afghanistan.
Still, Global continued to have critics. Some felt it had become too large; total participation in Global 2001 substantially exceeded a thousand. Others felt Global was being
designed to demonstrate the correctness of a network-centric “ideology,” not to seek
answers. Finally, with more contractors participating than ever, there were those who
felt it had become too focused on technology, that it was coming too close to being a
sales opportunity that included a wargame.
In 1999, a new elective was offered at the Naval War College, the Mahan Group. It
was based on the innovative premise that wargames and other techniques useful to
real-world decision makers could also be effective for teaching. Largely owing to the
top-secret classification of its work and reports, few would learn of the existence of the
Mahan Group. In later years, however, other, less highly classified applications of its
119
technique would become fairly well-known, especially within the U.S. Navy.
Better known, though far less publicized than the Global, was the Navy’s continued
distributed gaming—perhaps the most valuable wargaming the Navy did during the
1990s. Now collectively called Battle Force In-Port Training, these games continued to
let leaders—from those of task forces to those of individual ships’ bridge teams—hone
120
their operational skills while their ships were in port, alongside a pier.
Also continued during the 1990s were the Navy’s live wargames, made famous by the
movie Top Gun. In 1996 the Navy’s real Top Gun course, the Fighter Weapons School,
was renamed the Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor program, merging the original
program with the Naval Strike course. The new course reported to the Navy’s Air Warfare Center and was taught at (and above) Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada. The new
school retained live wargaming and expanded its curriculum to cover all aspects of air
warfare (air-to-ground as well as air-to-air). It also began training controllers (the folks
121
who sit in the back of E-2 Hawkeyes, for instance) and aviators from friendly nations.
The Navy was also making increased use of COTS software for uses as diverse as education and sophisticated analysis. In the late 1990s, the Naval Academy issued the com122
mercial wargame Fleet Command to its midshipmen. An article in the prestigious U.S.
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Naval Institute Proceedings encouraged still greater use, listing advantages and draw123
backs and citing several examples of successful use. These included the exceptional
performance of a naval pilot candidate who had used a commercial flight simulator, the
demonstrated training value of a commercial submarine simulation for the Naval Submarine School and operational submarines, and the use of a modified version of Fleet
124
Command by the CNO SSG.
Finally, as a fitting conclusion to a century of achievement, on 28 September 1999 the
125
Naval War College dedicated its new nineteen-million-dollar wargaming facility. Most
appropriately, this latest attempt by the Navy to “push the envelope” is named for the
126
selfless individual who started it all—William McCarty Little.
U.S. Marine Corps
During the 1990s most of the original Marine Corps wargames were gradually overtaken by later innovations. For example, while as late as 1998–99 TacWar was still being
used extensively at the II MEF Wargaming Center in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in
127
2000 not a copy of it could be found in the extensive Marine installations on Okinawa.
The 1990s also saw an increase in the organizational sophistication and mission impact
of the Marines’ wargaming and a continuation of their long tradition of innovation.
In 1990, the Marine Corps Institute initiated a course, Tactical Fundamentals. Mandatory for lieutenants, the course used wargaming to develop their ability to make tactical
128
decisions quickly. In the early 1990s, Lt. Gen. Charles Krulak (later general), then
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in Quantico,
Virginia, initiated a series of initiatives and reorganizations to increase the effectiveness
129
of Marine Corps wargaming and bring it more in line with that of the other services.
These initiatives included the following:
•

Combining the Wargaming and Assessment Center’s Modeling and Simulation with
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Instruction Team. This gave the Marines the same
level of computer wargame–based training that the other services already had.

•

Activating the Marine Corps Modeling and Simulation Management Office
(MCMSMO). This office would both develop the Corps’s modeling-and-simulation
policy and represent it in the Defense Department M&S arena. (As you will recall,
DoD was spending a considerable amount of money on M&S during this period.)

•

Finally, renaming the Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center the
Wargaming Division, with a new charter to support Headquarters Marine Corps
(located primarily in the Pentagon), the Marine Corps Combat Development Center
(at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia), and all Marine expeditionary forces.
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The move of responsibility for computer-wargame adjudication to other organizations
accelerated an existing trend in the Wargaming Division toward human-adjudicated
games that emphasized decision making. One of the first products of this new focus was
a series of strategic-level, seminar-type games the Marine Corps Wargaming Division
130
hosted in mid-1993 to explore U.S. options in the Bosnian crisis.
One of the most successful results of this new approach was the Cultural Intelligence
Seminar Series, which started in 1994. Responding to a field commander’s questions
about how the cultures of various peoples affect their warfare and decision making,
the series focused on various hot spots, areas of potential employment, and sought to
supplement planning for them by exploiting the insights of nonmilitary experts relative
to social, economic, religious, and political realities “on the ground.” Cultural Intelligence Seminars on Somalia and Haiti provided commanders valuable information.
Years later, General Zinni said that the takeaways from the Somalia seminar allowed
him to evacuate the United Nations contingent from Somalia with a minimum of casualties on all sides.
In 1992 the Marines initiated an annual wargame designed both to give defense contractors a firsthand, though virtual, experience of Marine combat operations and to
131
expose the Marine Corps to emerging technologies that might be beneficial in combat.
In October 1995 General Krulak established the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory (now the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory). The Wargaming Division was
placed under the laboratory, first temporarily, then permanently, but it not only retained
its original mission but assumed that of wargaming support for the “Lab’s” innovation
and experimentation program. General Krulak also encouraged wargaming by individual Marines. He published a letter basically mandating that all Marines were to read
132
military history and theory as well as play wargames.
Also mid-decade, the Marines initiated two short-lived Title 10 wargames, Urban
133
Warrior and Joint Irregular Warrior. Urban Warrior grew out of a Marine-centered
series of games from the operational to tactical levels. After several years Urban Warrior
stopped; it had run out of new territory to explore, and real-world urban combat experience was making it redundant. Joint Irregular Warrior was held on an off-and-on basis.
The demand was not high, given, again, the real-world data coming in.
134

There were a number of important Wargaming Division initiatives in the late 1990s.
The Emerald Express program of small-wars conferences was inaugurated in 1999 to examine lessons learned and critical issues arising from Marine participation in such conflicts. These conferences focus on military, joint, interagency, nongovernmental-agency,
and private-voluntary-organization operations and relationships in humanitarian
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efforts, disaster relief, insurgencies, and peacekeeping operations. The Small Wars Center of Excellence at the Warfighting Laboratory was a direct result of Emerald Express.
The Wargaming Division continued its historical mission of innovative wargaming support to the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate with a variety of games and seminars,
including the American/British Non-Lethal Weapons Urban Wargaming Program, in
cooperation with the Ministry of Defence. Also, well before 9/11 the Biological Warfare
Wargaming Program examined the problems associated with the nation’s incidentresponse command structure and processes. It played an important role in the establishment of the Marine Corps’s Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force.
During the late 1990s the Marines continued their strong interest in exploiting the
force-development potential of commercial games. This commitment started at the
highest level, with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, then General Krulak, who
endorsed simulation technology in training as “innovative, challenging and fun” and
135
specifically approved several commercial titles for use on Marine Corps computers.
The officer in charge of MCMSMO argued for commercial wargames in training in
Navy Times: “Our junior Marines are computer literate—we are foolish if we don’t
136
capitalize on that skill and turn it into good training” by capitalizing on the fun factor.
The Marine Corps Gazette ran several favorable articles, including one that proposed
137
specific games to parallel the Commandant’s official reading list. Outlets such as the
138
Marine Corps Association bookstore began selling these and other titles.
The Marines’ most successful adaptation of a commercial wargame involved Doom,
a popular “first-person shooter” game. For less than two hundred dollars the Marines
produced a game that would have cost millions to develop from scratch. Exemplifying the proud Marine tradition of improvisation on a shoestring, Marine sergeant Dan
Snyder simply wrote a small program, a “patch” so that players, instead of fighting
monsters with science-fiction weapons, fought enemy combatants with weapons in the
Marine inventory. Lt. Scott Barnett secured the copyright permissions necessary to
allow any Marine (actually, anyone) anywhere to go to the Marine Corps website and
download the patch. Within less than a year, more patches were downloaded than there
were Marines.
It is easy to understand Marine Corps Doom’s popularity. Easy to learn and fun to
play, Marine Corps Doom provided valuable virtual training experience, some of
which could be gained in no other way. Networked so a four-man fire team could train
together, the game allowed Marines stuck on cramped amphibious assault vessels for
months at a time to maintain some level of tactical proficiency. Better still, the Marines
created virtual re-creations of the grounds and interiors of embassies considered highly
likely sites for hostage-rescue operations. They could even practice shoot/no-shoot
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decision making, by including synthetic embassy personnel in the game environment.139
The Marines purchased the rights to distribute internally at least one other commercial
140
computer wargame, TacOps, as well.
Meanwhile, the Wargaming Division at Quantico, Virginia, continued to host a spectrum of games needed to develop decision makers and evaluate planning decisions,
from the tactical level to the strategic. In 2000 the division assumed the responsibility
141
for Marine Title 10 gaming. This task included coordination of all Marine participation in joint and other-service Title 10 games, in addition to the resurrection of the
Marines’ own Title 10 gaming. The former began immediately, but the latter would be
delayed by the events of 9/11.
U.S. Air Force
Despite a rough start, in the 1990s the Air Force Wargaming Center hit its stride. In
February 1990 the Air Force terminated the AFWC’s software contractor for failure to
provide a fully functional product. Fallout was swift: substantial budget cuts to Phase
142
II, cancellation of Phase III, and closure of the Program Management Office. Yet
in 1991 alone, AFWC developed or improved ten major adjudication programs and
143
hosted forty-four computer-adjudicated games. AFWC was also playing an increasingly important role in the curricula of all the schools of Air University. The next year
was another important one for AFWC and Air Force wargaming. First, the Air Force
Command Exercise System (ACES) series of computer-assisted games came on line. Set
in a variety of theaters, the ACES series would be the mainstay of the service’s wargaming for over a decade. Also, the Air Force Wargaming Institute (AFWI, and see below)
hosted the second Air and Space Power Symposium.
After participating in the third Air and Space Power Symposium in 1994, the Air Force
Chief of Staff, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, decided to bring the event more in line with
the Title 10 wargames conducted by other services. When the Air Force held its first
official Title 10 game two years later, the event would have a new name. Also, General
Fogleman decided to rename AFWC the AFWI, in keeping with his policy of reserving
144
“Center” for very large organizations.
The 1990s also saw the activation of a second Air Force wargaming organization, the
Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation (AFAMS), in June 1996, in Orlando,
Florida. The location had been selected in the hope of achieving synergy with Army and
Navy facilities that had been in the Orlando area for years, and also with the modeling
and simulation department at the University of Central Florida. AFAMS was charged
with both improving Air Force models, simulations, and wargames and providing support to warfighters as excellent as what AFWI was providing to educators. Aside from
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fixing several long-standing deficiencies in existing wargame engines, AFAMS managed
the Air Force’s work in the Joint Simulation System programs and established an online
Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository, to reduce the chance of duplication of
145
effort.
In the early 1990s the Air Force finally caught up with the Navy in that it began conducting distributed wargames. In 1990, an investment of $2.5 million allowed Blue Flag
at Hurlburt Field, Florida, to conduct command-post-type wargames/exercises for Air
Force units worldwide. Simply by not having to bring commanders and their staffs to
Florida to participate in Blue Flags, the Air Force was able to save two million dollars
a year. Perhaps even more importantly, cutting out the time needed to travel left more
146
time to train.
By the late 1990s, the Air Force was catching up with the Army as well, in the use
of virtual battle space. Though Simnet, as we’ve seen, was the brainchild of an Air
Force officer, most of the initial investments were made by the Army. By decade’s end,
however, the Air Force had completed the Theater Aerospace Command and Control
Simulation Facility, a $27.5 million, 120-person structure that allowed more of the Air
Force to join the fight in the virtual world. Now an F-15 pilot at Nellis AFB, Nevada,
could fly “top cover” for an air-rescue helicopter piloted at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico,
while a command-and-control (C2) node in Tampa, Florida, notified a friendly airdefense battery at Fort Hood, Texas. For the participants, in their individual simulators,
all this would seem to be happening in the same space. The facility could also insert
not-yet-fielded weapon systems, helping the military develop in advance the most effective tactics for their employment and helping Congress assess whether their potential
147
positive impacts would be at least proportional to projected costs.
During the 1990s the Air Force also worked to complete its element of the JSIMS tool
kit. Called the National Air and Space (Warfare) Model (NASM), it was designed to
communicate with the other JSIMS service/agency elements. NASM was meant to
replace the Air Force’s 1970s-era interim wargame engine Air Warfare Simulator. In
addition to performing the missions expected of all models in the JSIMS family, NASM
was to be able to execute a hundred times faster than real time, thereby opening up the
possibility that it could be used to plan the entire air slice of joint theater campaigns as
148
well.
During the 1990s, of all the services, the Air Force seemed to be the most concerned
about what it perceived as a growing divergence between how future wars would be
fought and how they would be gamed. In 1993, the commandant of the Air Command
and Staff College, Colonel Warden (who had been the first architect of the Desert Storm
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joint campaign), had a great deal to say about shortcomings in wargames—essentially,
that they did not depict enemies as systems.
As one response to these concerns, in July 1993, the entire Air Force senior leadership
149
gathered for the first four-star Modeling and Simulation summit. As a result of the
summit, the Air Staff created a new directorate, HQ USAF/XOM, led by Brig. Gen.
Thomas R. Case. In January 1995, the directorate produced a pamphlet, New Vector for
Air Force Simulation, which was endorsed by a second four-star summit in June of that
150
year. But concerns about wargaming continued. For instance, in the mid-1990s, as a
reservist assigned to the Air Staff’s Checkmate division, I listened to a briefing by the
Air Force Director of Operations in which he outlined problems he saw in wargaming.
Even the Chief of Staff of the Air Force succinctly declared, in a 1996 speech, “Legacy
151
models are woefully inadequate.” In 1997, General Fogleman wrote to the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs,
These legacy models are most reliable when considering linear battle space, the forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA) and an employment strategy of attrition and annihilation.152 Models assessing
force on force engagements based upon force ratios and territory lost or gained lack the capability to
fully and accurately portray the significant effects of operations involving nonlinear battle spaces or
an asymmetric strategy directly attacking the enemy’s strategic and tactical centers of gravity.153

Also in 1997, Lt. Col. Steve McNamara, an Air Staff member and School of Advanced
Airpower Studies graduate, described in an article fallacies in how the then-dominant
Army and joint theater wargame software, TACWAR, depicted airpower. His conclusion: Quadrennial Defense Reviews and the operations (war) plans of what are now
“combatant commanders” were being distorted by TACWAR’s undervaluing of airpow154
er. Maj. Gen. (as he was then) David Deptula believed he knew the way to improve Air
Force wargaming—adjudicate not only attrition but also the full spectrum of physical
155
human-network effects.
Air University too worked to improve wargaming. In 1993 it began hosting an annual
156
series of conferences, called Connections. Originally the initiative of Colonel Warden,
the conference was later championed by the commander of Air University, Lt. Gen. Joseph Redden. The goal of the conference was to “push the envelope” of wargaming. The
strategy was to “connect” developers from different disciplines, services, and countries
157
so they could learn from each other. The conference immediately attracted leaders
158
from the military and commercial wings of the wargaming field. Over the decade, the
conference evolved, but the emphasis on advancing the art and science of designing and
159
developing games stayed constant. In 1994 Air University also expanded its participation in multiservice wargaming. In that year its School of Advanced Airpower Studies
began conducting the Theater Campaign Warfare game, in collaboration with other
160
services’ “advanced” schools.
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The mid-1990s were also when the Air Force began conducting Title 10 games, which,
as we’ve seen, General Fogleman decided late in 1994 to revive. In 1995 he said, “We
must put together our own Title 10 game to highlight modern air and space power to the
joint warfighting community.” While these games were to showcase airpower, General
Fogleman wanted them conducted on a “level playing field.” That is, he did not want the
wargames’ designers to fix outcomes in favor of airpower. Similarly, he recruited participants from the combatant commands, “to ensure Air Force Title 10 wargames were
truly purple [i.e., joint].” General Fogleman envisioned games in both the middle (ten to
twelve years in the future) and far (twenty to twenty-four years) terms. General Fogleman required a midrange game as he believed the Air Force had a relatively good idea
of the threats at that distance into the future. However, as ten to twelve years is actually
too short a time to create entirely new weapon systems, the midterm wargame would be
limited to exploring options for the employment of what was “in the pipeline.” To explore new weapon-system concepts he initiated a far-term game. Twenty to twenty-four
years, he believed, was far enough in the future to field new systems yet close enough to
the present to project fairly reasonable threats.
The midterm wargames were initiated first. Strategic Force 96, conducted at AFWI,
demonstrated that even with the weapons and systems projected to be available to the
Air Force in 2010, a resourceful enemy could minimize the impact of air attack and pro161
long a war. Global Engagement 97, also played at AFWI, started with a pregame event
to establish the strategic guidance that would shape the theater campaigns depicted in
the main exercise. Nearly three hundred individuals participated in the core exercise,
including three retired four-stars, one each from the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Each
played a theater commander in one of the three parallel exercises. Space played the biggest part to date in any Air Force wargame, and the role of information operations was
162
also increased.
In 1997 General Fogleman directed the establishment of a second Title 10 game—the
Aerospace Future Capabilities Wargame (usually referred to as the Futures Game, or
simply FG)—to understand better what force structure the Air Force as a whole should
possess twenty to twenty-four years into the future. It has also become a vehicle to
thrust uncomfortable issues onto the agendas of senior Air Force leaders, who have designed and used the FG series in various ways. The games generate final reports, usually
along with a Chief of Staff tasking memo for follow-on work to explore initial insights of
the game in a more focused, rigorous manner or to take specific actions.
The goal of the first FG, held in June 1998 with 250 participants, was to examine future
options for either penetrating an enemy’s defenses or standing off. It did so by exploring
the relative effectiveness of three force structures, the one the Air Force was planning to
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acquire and two different technology-enabled forces.163 Set in the Far East in 2018, this
first FG now appears remarkably prescient, in that it was the first wargame to alert the
164
Air Force to the possible future effectiveness of an adversary antiaccess strategy. The
Air Force would go on to conduct FGs in 1998, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011,
2013, and 2015—almost two decades. The FGs have typically featured participation
by the air forces of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, as well as other U.S.
services.
All FGs except those held in 2004, 2005, and 2007 followed the basic format of comparing the service’s actual planned future force structure (usually dubbed “Blue 1,” or the
“baseline” force) against an alternative structure (“Blue 2,” or the “alternative force”).
The structures were designed under the same fiscal constraints and addressed specific
challenges against the same adversaries in the same scenarios (closely based on actual
DoD planning scenarios, after the first few FGs). In other words, most FGs were really
two games in one: the baseline force versus Red and the alternative force versus an identical Red. The Air Force observed particularly whether the alternative force performed
more effectively than the baseline force and whether the “trade space” given up to “pay”
for additional or enhanced capabilities created any noteworthy risks. In most cases,
the FG effort involved about eighteen months of preparation for the “Capstone,” or the
game itself, comprising workshops and planning conferences to flesh out each game
objective, force structures, concept of operation, etc., in advance. In addition, for six
months following a Capstone the Air Force usually conducted postgame analysis work165
shops to scrutinize the results further and refine insights and observations.
Global Engagement 98, again held at Maxwell, had several objectives: to explore the
effectiveness of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force during the “halt” and “win” phases
of a no-plan scenario (that is, a conflict we were not expecting) and to look at “focused
logistics,” “agile combat support,” and airlift in a stressful scenario. Finally, the exercise
was to facilitate examining concepts from Joint Vision 2010 and from the information
operations and space communities. Again, three panels were formed, each headed by
a retired four-star from a different service, all contending in and against a common
166
scenario and Red strategy.
Global Engagement IV, in 1999, brought together 360 participants from all services and
167
the eleven unified commands. The scenarios, two major theater conflicts and four
humanitarian operations (all simultaneous), severely stressed the Air Force’s lift and
logistics capabilities. The first-time participation of British, Canadian, and Australian
coalition partners added an additional dimension to the decision making and also
168
brought some excellent capabilities to the force mix.
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Futures Game 99 was held at the Bolger Executive Leadership Center in Potomac,
Maryland, in June 1999 and was set in the Far East. This time the goal was to explore
various command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) alternatives to enable “stand-off” (i.e., from a defended coast).
To achieve this, FG99 fought two cost-neutral (equally expensive) force structures—the
one the Air Force was planning to buy by 2020, and a force with C4ISR systems that
enabled stand-off warfare—against a common Red. FG99 appears to have influenced a
later Air Force decision to increase funding for C4ISR and add “Global Vigilance” to the
169
Air Force vision—thus, “Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power.”
Global Engagement V was conducted in June 2000 in the Washington, DC, area and explored ways in which changes in force structure and employment concept could defeat
170
a “near-peer” competitor’s antiaccess strategy. The scenario, set in 2015, envisioned
an enemy using stand-off weapons, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles to contest U.S.
basing in the theater. Global Engagement V looked at concepts that could help defeat
such a strategy quickly, such as time-critical targeting, theater air and missile defense,
171
aerospace operations dislocation, forward support, and dispersal basing.
In addition to its “global” wargames, which embraced the Air Force’s overall capabilities, the service conducted a number of games for specific areas of interest. The Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) conducted games that (not surprisingly) focused
specifically on technology choices, far enough in the future to guide basic-research
investment. The first Technology Seminar Game (TSG) was a spin-off from Futures
Game 99. The general officer in charge of FG99, Maj. Gen. Norton Schwartz (later a full
general and Air Force Chief of Staff), briefed the game results to the AFRL Corporate
Board and asked that the research laboratory run a TSG. One reason for the request was
that some had questioned the ability of the Air Force actually to field some of the future
systems played in FG99 by the year of its scenario (the game’s “epoch year”), while some
asserted that other future systems were overly conservative—that is, postulating less
capability than could be fielded by then. General Schwartz asked AFRL to come up with
more-ambitious ideas but also to ensure all could be achieved by the epoch year of the
next Futures Game. The first TSG was held in 2000 and was called, oddly enough, TSG
172
2000.
Also in 2000, on 6 October at the Joint National Test Facility, at Schriever AFB, Colorado, the Air Force conducted Phase II of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
Organization’s Joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Wargame. One of its interesting
objectives was to test improved command-and-control interfaces, the need for which
173
was identified in the first phase of the game.
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On 22 January 2001, the Space Warfare Center, also at Schriever, began the first “Title
X–like” wargame designed specifically to examine the military utility of emerging space
systems and how projected Red forces could degrade them. Called Schriever 2001, this
four-day exercise, set in 2017, brought together 250 experts from around the nation. The
full report remains classified, but our dependence on commercial space systems and
the vulnerability of even military space systems to often “asymmetric” Red attacks were
174
acknowledged publicly.
Later that year, Futures Game 2001 was held, near Washington, DC. The goal was to
explore the effectiveness of two force structures (again programmed and alternative) in
relationship to the (then) recently published Joint Vision 2020. This time the scenario
depicted conflict in Southeast Asia. This FG triggered a dozen studies and several workshops and recommended changes to doctrine.
Nevertheless, and despite a decade of heavy investment and significant innovation, all
was not perfect in air wargaming. For example, in the spring of 1999 America again
sent its people into harm’s way, this time in the skies over Kosovo. Tactical games and
simulations—from virtual experience at Red Flag to analytical games that examined
individual missions—again gave the United States an important edge. However, the
American weakness in campaign-level/campaign-duration wargaming was made evident by the difficulty of adjudicating the types of human effects and system impacts that
were the main focus of NATO’s air campaign. In 2001 the commander of the College of
Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) at Air University, Col. Bobby
J. Wilkes (later a brigadier general), advocated the creation of a Red Flag–like exercise
175
at the operational level of war. Among his arguments was that periodic wargaming
would allow air strategists to develop more-effective plans faster. The need for such
quick thinking would be demonstrated sooner than most expected.
U.S. Civilian
176
The nineties were full of surprises for commercial gaming. Sales of print wargames
continued to decline, falling to two hundred thousand units a year by mid-decade. The
industry then stabilized, as desktop publishing allowed lower sales per title to be still
177
profitable. At the same time, the recreational software industry had exploded ($25
178
billion in global sales in 1997). However, wargaming’s share of those sales fell from 25
179
percent (when PCs were new) to about 10 percent in 2000. (Still, 10 percent of $25 billion . . . ) This loss of market share prompted changes in the way commercial wargames
were developed and marketed.

In the early 1990s, most big recreational software publishers included a few serious
wargames in their product lines, and several midsize companies (such as SSI, Talon Soft,
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and Australia’s Strategic Studies Group) focused entirely or primarily on wargames.
As higher production standards, principally graphics, drove up the cost of mainstream
titles, the big companies dropped all or most of their more modestly selling wargames,
and medium-sized game publishers found it harder and harder to get on store shelves.
By decade’s end new publishers had emerged, such as Matrix and HPS, who had found
they could thrive in the now “niche” wargame market by keeping overhead low and selling via the Internet and catalogs. Like the print wargame designers of the same period,
computer-game designers like Koger, Grigsby, and Tiller found that producing more
180
titles was the key to success.
Also in the 1990s, increasingly powerful computers enabled the early flight-simulation
programs to evolve into acceptable combat flight simulators. Some of these could be
networked to create a virtual battle space for civilians at roughly the same time that
181
the military was creating its own. (Guess which cost less per user!) The rapid expansion of the recreational software industry led some to predict that future advances
182
in simulation technology would come from the commercial side—not the military.
Most surprisingly, miniatures wargaming actually grew during this period, its propo183
nents calling its painted figures the ultimate “high-resolution graphics.” Commercial
wargaming also became global, many American titles selling well overseas and several
184
foreign titles selling well in the United States.
U.S. Civil/Military
Not surprisingly, in the 1990s, the U.S. defense establishment began to take an increasing interest in, and notice of, the commercial wargame industry. As early as 1992, a
Defense Science Board study stated, “The development of simulation technology is far
ahead of the military application of this technology”; it recommended, “DOD invest185
ment should leverage off commercial and entertainment developments of technology.”
That recommendation was acted on in 1999, when the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office initiated collaboration with Paramount and the Army provided forty-five
million dollars to the University of Southern California to establish an Institute for
186
Creative Technologies.
In the 1990s, Mark Herman continued to bridge the gap between defense and commercial wargaming. The lead designer of Booz Allen Hamilton’s next-generation wargame
Entropy Based Warfare (EBW), Mark picked the commercial computer-wargamedevelopment house Breakaway Games to do the programming, saving millions of
dollars and months of time and winding up with a more user-friendly user interface
to boot. A campaign model, EBW has been used in several hundred defense wargames
covering a wide range of war plans, future doctrine, advanced weapon systems, and the
like. The best known was the Army’s Title 10 futures game series (whose name, Army
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After Next, has morphed over time). According to the Joint Staff, EBW is the only model
that accurately represents information systems, information operations, C4ISR, and
situation awareness, along with their respective impacts on conflict. During the late
187
1990s EBW was used in a variety of classified war plans and planning exercises.
In the middle 1990s, Jim Dunnigan set up a website (strategypage.com) and LISTSERV
(milgames@yahoogroups.com) dedicated to military wargame professionals and every188
one who is serious about wargaming. The site has helped create a sense of community
and cross-service assistance among individuals of different services who often had not
even known that their counterparts existed. One of the first topics to come up there was
the “politics of wargaming” (senior leaders “deciding” the outcome first, then having a
wargame prove it). Previously, it seemed, most who had encountered this problem assumed that it never happened elsewhere. Some, irrationally, had blamed themselves. The
politics of wargaming is still with us, but at least now it is openly acknowledged as an
189
obstacle and so can be more readily confronted.
190

In the late 1990s each service academy began using commercial wargames too. The
Military Sciences Department at West Point used Steel Beasts by Shrapnel Games to
teach the principles of war. At Annapolis, third-year students were issued Fleet Command by Electronic Arts as part of the curriculum on naval tactics and strategy. The Air
Force Academy used an internally developed game but was testing several commercial
191
games, including a variant of StarCraft by Blizzard Entertainment.
Wargaming around the World, 1991–2001
With the collapse of the Soviet Union came an eclipse of the study of Soviet methods of
warfare by international students. However, as in the years after the German wars of unification, after the First Gulf War international militaries studied the military of the victor,
192
and as in the 1880s one of the things they studied was the victor’s use of wargaming.
Military. The Gulf War’s demonstration of the value of wargaming seems to have accelerated a trend among friends and potential foes. The growth of U.S.-sponsored international wargames may have contributed. For example, during the 1990s the U.S. Army’s
Center for Army Analysis explored coalition operations in numerous studies and games.
The games examined diverse functional areas in binational and multinational environments. Among the partners were the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany,
NATO, and the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies
Program (ABCA). CAA supported political-military games and workshops with the
Republic of Korea, the U.S. Eighth Army, U.S. Forces Korea, and the Combined Forces
Command from 1991 through 2003 on the most pressing Korean Peninsula security issues, ranging from arms control to North Korean nuclear ambitions. From 1996 to 1999,
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CAA conducted a series of workshops and games examining operational and medical
193
issues arising in NATO operations in nuclear, biological, and chemical environments.
U.S. Wargame Exports. By mid-decade Canada, France, Germany, and the United
194
Kingdom were using the American ground-combat wargame Janus. Within the
United Kingdom, UK Janus was used primarily by its Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory and education facilities. For applications for which other armies used Janus,
the British army employed a heavily modified U.S. system, ARTBASS (Army Reserve
Training BAttlefield Simulation System). Called by the British ABACUS (Advanced
195
BAttlefield CompUter Simulation system), it was run by Hughes, and later Raytheon.
The United States also exported wargaming through international participation in live
American games. For example, in 1997, German, Canadian, and Dutch forces participated in a live wargame called Roving Sands. This twenty-five-million-dollar exercise,
which took place around the Texas–New Mexico border, was designed to practice the C2
for and execution of integrated joint and combined air and missile defense. The allies
196
provided 2,500 of the twenty thousand participants.
In other cases U.S. wargames grew to become international. Even before the 1990s
the U.S. Seventh Air Force in Korea was conducting wargames. By the early 1990s its
wargames had grown so large that the local base community center had to be taken over
before and during each of the several wargames each year. In 1993 the Seventh Air Force
formally requested funds for a dedicated wargaming facility. That facility, the Korean Air
Simulation Center, opened in 1998. With the additional capacity came increased joint
197
(other U.S. services) and combined (other nations, specifically Korean) participation.
NATO. Greater use of computer wargames by our NATO allies seems to have been
initially triggered by the opening of the Warrior Preparation Center in Germany. As
part of the NATO CAX (computer-assisted exercise) project that began in 1991, a multinational working group was established to create standards that would allow various
national and service models to exchange information, thus enabling more-comprehensive
adjudication of conflicts than possible using isolated models. The group’s strategy was
to develop a protocol for a common interface program, much as the Internet allows
198
computers from different manufacturers to talk to each other. The British, French, and
Germans also developed wargaming capabilities independently.
The fall of 1999 witnessed several significant milestones in the internationalization of
U.S.-style wargaming. In November 1996, NATO’s Conference of National Armament
Directors established a temporary steering group on alliance wargaming. Its goal was
to improve NATO performance across the full spectrum of wargaming, cost-effectively.
The steering group produced a Modelling and Simulation Master Plan, approved by the
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North Atlantic Council in December 1998. In accordance with the plan, two permanent organizations were created. The first, the NATO Modelling and Simulation Group
(NMSG), was established in 1999; it consists of a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary,
and representatives from each NATO nation. The NMSG meets on an as-needed basis.
The second, the full-time Modelling and Simulation Coordination Office, opened in
199
the fall of 1999, in Paris. Also in October of 1999, an “International Modeling and
Simulation Week” was held in the Tidewater region of Virginia. Well attended by NATO
members (as a distributed flyer asserted), the conference demonstrated that wargaming
had indeed become increasingly international.
The United Kingdom. The United Kingdom was probably the fastest nation outside the
United States to upgrade its wargaming capabilities. Recalling the utility of the Scientific Support in Crisis and War team deployed forward during the Gulf War, it began
200
permanently assigning similar teams to all its “two-star” headquarters. As computer
advances provided ever more power for less money, Cold War–era software continued
201
to be upgraded. The United Kingdom also enhanced the wargames at its staff college,
developing a set of diverse games and applying various types to the segments of the curriculum where they were most effective. British staff college games soon covered topics
from leading peacekeeping forces to developing force structures under budgetary and
202
other constraints.
Still, as the decade progressed, many in the British defense wargaming community realized that the security situation was evolving away from its current modes of gaming. Its
models were slow to prepare and execute—not a problem against the lumbering Soviets,
but the emerging adversaries were much more nimble. For example, it took months
to create a new weapon with its software. That had been fine when the Soviets took a
decade to field, gradually, new systems. But in 1996 a Chechen commander captured
six SS-21 missiles and overnight turned them into improvised explosive devices—IEDs,
which were to be the main sources of casualties in Iraq. A real weapon had just been
created far faster than its representation could be generated in the United Kingdom’s
software. The AI routines the United Kingdom used to play Red were programmed to
follow Soviet doctrine, not the patterns of fighting demonstrated by new threats. Worst,
its wargames assumed fights between Red and Blue, but now fights were increasingly
203
among Red, Blue, Green, Lavender, and Plaid.
These realizations contributed to the decision by the United Kingdom to cease operation of the Divisional Wargame in 1997. Though considered, with some justice,
a technological marvel when it began operations in 1975, it no longer fit the defense
environment. The end of the Cold War had allowed old regional grievances to reemerge,
leading to conflicts that broke out with little warning. Inputting a new scenario in DWG
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still took three or four months. At a time when the British people were looking for a
peace dividend, DWG took over a million pounds a year to run, and that did not include
the twenty to thirty military personnel and ten or twelve technical personnel needed to
204
execute each wargame. Something much more flexible was needed. That same year
(1997), work began on the next generation of British analytical gaming—the Wargame
205
Infrastructure and Simulation Environment.
France. The French developed Carneade, an air- and land-combat game intended for
206
plan development and training from the regimental level up.
Germany. The most impressive advancements were made by the Germans. Germany
upgraded every part of its war college’s wargaming curriculum during the 1990s. In
1993, the college’s army department added a second game to its tool kit. It had been
using KORA/OA since the 1970s for units of corps size and smaller. Now it adopted a
second graphical-interface wargame, SimoF (Simulation Model for Operational Command and Control Exercises). SimoF focuses on operations at the corps level and higher
and depicts airpower more comprehensively than the earlier model. Both were produced
by IABG, a German company. In addition, in 1993 the college’s naval department converted from a manual wargame to the computerized game ITEM (Integrated Theater
Engagement Model). ITEM, developed by the NATO Consultation, Command and
Control Agency, simulated engagements up to task force size and very short campaigns
by naval task forces. Finally, in 1997, the college’s Luftwaffe department adopted a new
model with vastly improved ability to simulate air campaigns: ALICE (Air Land Inter207
action Combat Evaluation), from IABG.
The culmination of this decade of progress came in early 2000, when Germany dedicated a thirty-million-dollar (U.S.) Training and Exercise Center at its war college /
command and staff college—the Bundeswehr’s Führungsakademie. The largest military
construction project in western Germany since reunification, the center is large enough
to accommodate all five hundred of the college’s German students and a hundred
“international” students, including two Americans. It features over two hundred networked computers, newly developed adjudication software, and a multimedia-capable
auditorium. The center can also accommodate exercises by international (NATO) and
208
national (German) headquarters. It runs upgraded versions of existing service software, linked together when needed, using JOANA (Joint Operations Army–Navy–Air
Force) software, which also links with ADAMS, a strategic-mobility estimating routine.
The center’s sixteen-member staff conducts most exercises, though it is augmented by
209
up to sixty war-college faculty members for the largest events.
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Australia. Throughout the 1990s, Australia improved and expanded its wargaming.
In 1990 the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) was established by
bringing together several joint schools, some dating from as long ago as 1946. Located
on Royal Australian Air Force Base Williamtown in New South Wales, its mission was
(and is) joint/combined education and training for Australian forces, as well as doctrinal
development. While the ADFWC used constructive wargames from the start, over time
210
it diversified into live games as well.
In 1990 Australia acquired the U.S. Army’s Janus wargame-support software through
the ABCA relationship. Copies were installed at both the AWGC in Sydney and at the
Defence Science and Technology Organisation facility in Adelaide. Within six months
AWGC had used it to support an analytical wargame exploring the relative effectiveness
of four different sets of surveillance equipment to defend air bases against unconven211
tional attack. For almost twenty years Australia would improve and adapt its version
of Janus, called Janus(AS). During 1991 and through 1992, Australian wargamers focused on exploring the military utility of various mixes of wheeled and tracked vehicles
212
given a range of threats and weather conditions.
213

In 1993 AWGC was redesignated the Army Battle Simulation Group (ABSG). The
newly redesignated organization’s first major effort was to explore, using both Janus(AS)
and ComBatSim, options for Australian army employment of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Janus(AS) continued to be used for analytical wargaming, helping to explore options
for infantry-portable weapons in 1994 and for vehicle-mounted weapons in 1996.
Janus(AS)’s functions also expanded to include education and training. It was installed
at the Officers Advanced Course of each combat arm, starting with armor in 1993 and
concluding with artillery in 1996. Also in 1993, a two-day all-combat-arms wargame
was held at the armor school. In 1995 the game became the core of an all-arms course.
Between 1994 and 1996 Janus(AS) was used at both the Army Command and Staff College and Land Warfare Center.
Meanwhile, the applications of ComBatSim were also expanding, to support unit CPXs.
Starting as early as 1990 Australian and later New Zealand army battalions increasingly
used ComBatSim to determine outcomes of their annual CPXs. Active-duty battalions
would conduct their CPXs at home station; reserve units would travel to the ABSG.
The Australian military continued to look overseas for suitable wargames. The year
1993 saw the Australian military’s first known, widespread trial of a commercial game.
After very favorable reports from New Zealand’s simulation center, the commercial
computer wargame Operation Flashpoint was used by several elements of the Australian
defense forces. Feedback varied by unit and application, but several licenses were purchased, and official use continued for several years. Also in 1993, Australia conducted a
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trial of the U.S. military wargame software TACOPS, with a similar, though somewhat
214
less positive, outcome.
In 1995 Australia upgraded its ComBatSim software so that it could game a force of
brigade-plus size. This made ComBatSim able to support multinational procedural
training wargames. For example, it was used for Australian, Singaporean, and Malaysian participants in Kangaroo 95.
In 1997 Australia once again changed the name of its army’s wargame organization,
this time to the Army Simulation Wing (ASW). Also in 1997 the ADFWC expanded
215
its use of wargaming to include live maneuvers. In 1999 ASW moved from Sydney
216
to Puckapunyal, in the state of Victoria. At the same time, it was resubordinated to
the Land Warfare Development Centre. As the decade closed, Australia began opening
simulation centers at three of its army bases: Darwin, Brisbane, and Townsville. These
new centers expected to use Janus(AS) for just a few years—but that is a story for the
next decade.
China. Though information is fragmentary, it appears certain that China accelerated
the improvement of its wargaming during the 1990s. Just as poor U.S. air-combat performance over Vietnam led to the Red Baron study, which prompted Top Gun, Red Flag,
and the other improvements in live wargaming, so China’s alarm at the effectiveness
of U.S. forces in the Gulf War led it to study the American military and in turn create
217
equivalent wargaming capabilities. Chinese acquisition of U.S. methods and technology actually slowed with the cooling of relations after the Tiananmen Square massacre
but was not reversed. The United States classified its military’s games as “munitions,”
so that they could not be purchased by China, but China simply purchased wargames
published for the consumer market. Ironically, the latter had user interfaces far superior
218
to those of the military games China was not permitted to buy. Also, in the mid-1990s
Chinese defense researchers made a several-week-long visit to the United States, and
among their stops was the new wargame center at the Institute for Defense Analyses
219
(IDA). Very impressed, they vowed to build a similar center. By 1999 they had.
It appears the first sector of the Chinese defense establishment to embrace computerassisted wargaming was professional military education. By the 1990s China’s PME system had largely recovered from the Mao era. New games were introduced within PME,
such as Joint 99 and the Red Star System, but gaming does not appear to have extended
beyond the classroom. It was reported that “leaders don’t trust it, officers aren’t familiar
220
with it, and units don’t wish to use it.” One reason seems to have been the fragmented
nature of China’s wargaming effort. Each major military school and each military
221
region headquarters had its own gaming center. Early attempts to develop computer
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games domestically were disappointing: military people did not understand computers,
and computer programmers did not understand the military.
In 1997 one man started to change all that. In that year the Central Military Committee ordered Hu Xiaofeng (later a major general) transferred from the National
University of Defense Technology to the National Defense University, to take charge of
China’s computer-assisted wargaming. Hu was well qualified, having both impressive
222
military and technical/scientific credentials. By 1999 Hu had consolidated various game-development efforts into one organization, one system, with himself as lead
223
designer.
Sweden. Even neutral Sweden was initiating wargaming programs. In 1994, the Swedish Defense Wargaming Center became operational. Reporting directly to Sweden’s
Joint Forces Command, the center’s fifteen military and civilian personnel support the
Joint Forces Command’s exercise program as well as development of improved war224
gaming and planning technology.
International Trends in Wargaming
The 1990s saw Europe investing heavily in networked simulators, creating virtual battle
spaces. The United Kingdom led the way, beginning a virtual-battle-space facility in
1991. It awarded the final $450 million phase of the project in 1996. In 1996 the German
army took delivery of a similar facility. In 1997 the German navy opened a state-of-theart simulator for training surface-warfare officers, submariners, and pilots. Located at
Bremerhaven, this facility replaced an earlier training center at Wilhelmshaven that had
used off-the-shelf U.S. simulators. This new facility can also conduct single-platform
225
and small task-group wargames. It was reported in 1996 that Belgium, France, the
226
Netherlands, and Norway were planning to buy similar facilities in 1998. This interest
extended beyond NATO when Sweden purchased such a system for its Gripen multirole
227
combat aircraft.
The 1990s also saw the emergence of multinational live “peace games.” For example,
MARCOT 97 brought together maritime forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Chile to work out procedures for humanitarian opera228
tions. In some ways even more remarkable, the RUKUS 94 “peace game” brought
together the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia just three years after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Held at the U.S. Naval War College, the exercise helped
develop an understanding of how the former adversaries could most effectively work
229
together in peacekeeping and security operations.
The 1990s saw a proliferation of non-American print and computer wargame publishers
and development houses. First, the Japanese expanded from their strong base in arcade
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and arcade-like console video games into more-sophisticated computer wargames. Then
230
French publishers captured a significant slice of the global market share. By the end of
the decade what had been, with the exception of a few excellent but small Australian and
Canadian publishers, an American industry had become truly global. Even American
publishers were turning increasingly to development houses in places like Russia and
the Czech Republic. With the increase in personal computers globally, more and more
231
of the customers were overseas also. In the United Kingdom, Paddy Griffith continued to advocate wargaming and demonstrate its value. In 1997 he helped develop and
execute a TV series called Game of War. In each episode retired generals, historians, and
232
defense experts refought a historical battle.

Notes
1. It would be difficult if not impossible to establish exact numbers for total spending on commercial wargaming during the 1990s. Sales
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COUNTRY HQ

FOUNDED

REVENUE
(MILLIONS OF
DOLLARS)

1

Electronic Arts

USA

1982

2,482.2

2

Sony Comp Ent

Japan

1993

2,180.5

3

Nintendo

Japan

1933

2,128.5

4

Activision

USA

1979

864.1

5

Vivendi Universal

USA/France

2000

832.5

6

Take-Two

USA

1993

793.9

7

Atari/Infogrames

France

1983

761.9

8

Konami

Japan

1969

740.2

9

Microsoft Games
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1984

614.4

Sega

Japan

1952

563.6

10

Note: This table was briefed to the 2004 Connections conference at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Necessary corrections and updates
are that Sony is now Sony Interactive Entertainment, and that Nintendo was actually founded in 1889, as a publisher of playing
cards. By 2015, leading publishers were much more international, and sales were much higher; see “Revenue of the Largest Video
Game Publishers Worldwide 2015: Statistics,” Statista.com, as cited in Wikipedia.

CHAPTER FIVE

Post-9/11 Wargaming
2001–2011

The smart man learns from his mistakes. The wise man learns from the
mistakes of others.
PROVERB, VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED

“The world changed” on 11 September 2001, but not everything in the world changed.
In the world of wargaming, some things changed and others did not. It is still a little
risky to write so close to those events. Even today, over a decade and a half after the
attacks, we may not have fully grasped all the implications or identified all the trends
set in motion or deflected by the events of that awful day. We can, to the best of our
ability, report how these events initially influenced wargaming and how gaming in turn
initially shaped the nation’s response.
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom
The U.S. response to the attacks included the global war on terror, Operation Enduring
Freedom–Afghanistan (OEF-A), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It is too soon for
much to have been declassified or published on the wargaming support for these operations. Because the global war on terror is as much a political as it is a military struggle,
however, it is safe to bet that since 12 September 2001 the Joint Staff’s J8 division has
been diligently and discreetly wargaming U.S. strategy options. Given how quickly
OEF-A kicked off, it is unlikely there was time to do any wargaming in support of that
1
operation. Notwithstanding, it is almost certain that transportation-feasibility simulators/estimators and other modeling and simulation tools were used. Also, some Air
Force special forces units are known to have used networked simulators for rehearsing
2
missions.
The initial conventional phase of OIF, in contrast, was extensively wargamed, with
substantial positive effect. In the first games, Blue (the United States with its coalition
partners) advanced on Baghdad by the shortest, theoretically fastest route. Fortunately,
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our intelligence had discerned the strengths, locations, and doctrine of the “Saddam
Fedayeen.” The Red team (Saddam’s forces), as we saw in the introduction, deployed
most of the Saddam Fedayeen into the cities along that route. They were to wait until
leading Blue elements were leaving the city, then ambush the entire column at once with
short-range weapons. The wargame adjudicators, as we saw, indicated that the outcome
would not be pretty. However, in succeeding games Blue played the strategy of bypassing each city to the west, leaving the Fedayeen with no one to attack. The United States
used this strategy in the actual invasion, and it worked very well for almost two weeks,
until Saddam finally realized the United States was not going to play into his strength.
At that point, the Fedayeen moved outward from the cities against our lines of supply
and delivered attacks with which our logistics forces were neither trained nor equipped
to deal effectively. It was these attacks, as we saw, that led to Lieutenant General Wallace’s famous comment.
The senior commanders of OIF, speaking months after the operation, praised the
wargames both for the improvements they pointed to and helped validate and for the
3
growth in effectiveness of headquarters staffs they helped cultivate. It appears that
significant wargaming was also done by individual Army units. Jim Dunnigan tells of
a conversation he had with a young company commander who had just driven through
the Karbala Gap. “Boy, am I glad to get out of there,” the captain exclaimed. “Why?”
asked Jim. “Well,” the captain replied, “I’ve wargamed that particular scenario seven
4
times and got killed every time.”
So far, however, I have found no indication that wargaming was used either before or
during OIF to help develop political plans to transition Iraq to democracy. Leadership
seemed to have been unaware of the wargame conducted by the previous CENTCOM
commander, General Zinni (see previous chapter), that warned of many of the problems
actually encountered during the occupation. Still, however, it had become a standard
operating procedure among both our Army and Marine forces to game each tactical
5
operation before execution.
The United States: Continuity, Progress, and Doubt
More than twin towers fell on the morning of 9/11. While some wargaming programs
continued without apparent change, others were suspended. Some questioned whether
the big force-versus-force games were still relevant in a “post-9/11 world.” Still others
worked to make wargames more relevant to the new environment. The U.S. military
after all does not have a monopoly on wargaming within the U.S. government. For example, the National Intelligence Council, which comes under the Office of the Director
6
of National Intelligence, has conducted a “program” of games since 2006.
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Joint
Within the joint community, the senior wargaming element remained the Joint Staff’s
Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate, J8—the Deputy Director for
Wargaming, Simulation and Analysis (DDWSA) in particular. J8 still conducted polmil games, but its mission expanded greatly. DDWSA, as the Joint Staff focal point,
identified, budgeted for, acquired, and managed improvements to its gaming tools and
those of the joint community generally. DDWSA had three divisions: the Studies and
Analysis Management Division coordinates Joint Staff assessment; the Studies Analysis
and Gaming Division conducts the pol-mil wargames and supports a host of joint and
international games; and the Warfighting Analysis Division applies high-end models,
simulations, and other operations-research tools to defense issues. The Joint Staff’s Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Division, J7, was also involved in wargaming, through its support of exercises sponsored by either the chairman of the Joint Staff,
or by one of the regional combatant commanders.
U.S. Joint Forces Command was a major actor in the area of joint wargaming during
7
this period (it would not be deactivated until 4 August 2011). USJFCOM was already the
“transformation laboratory” of the U.S. military; much of its experimentation was done
through wargaming. JFCOM’s wargames were primarily supported by two subordinate
organizations: the Joint Warfighting Center, which managed the games, and the Joint
Warfare Analysis Center, which endeavors to improve their accuracy, particularly in the
8
area of systems effects. Most JFCOM wargames were conducted at the Joint Training,
Analysis, and Simulation Center, in Suffolk, Virginia. JFCOM was formally dissolved in
9
August 2011.
Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) was the first big Title 10–like wargame run by
JFCOM. MC02 was big in every way: cost ($250 million), personnel (13,500), and area
(twenty-five locations across the United States). It was also very complex, consisting of
twenty-three workshops and sixteen experiments over and above the main game, which
itself was adjudicated by a new “federation” of forty-two wargame engines and simulations. MC02 was also ambitious, in that it attempted to explore eleven joint-service concepts, twenty-seven joint initiatives, forty-six service initiatives, and twenty-two issues
10
from the regional combatant commands.
Unofficial sources have called MC02 a big success, but most of the publicity went to a
11
public exchange between JFCOM and one critic. The incident seems a bit humorous in
hindsight, but it illustrates an important point. Shortly after the exercise, a story broke
claiming that Millennium Challenge had been fixed. An e-mail from the chief of the
Red team, one Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), to a friend was cited as proof. The
e-mail complained that, at times, the Red team had been restrained inappropriately,
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allowing a Blue technology or concept to perform better than it would against a real
adversary. JFCOM’s initial response was that the e-mail must be a fake or at least taken
out of context. General Van Riper fired back with a second e-mail (this one got into the
press!) reaffirming the original report. JFCOM then replied that the general must be
confused about the difference between a wargame and an experiment, that Millennium
Challenge involved both, and that he had not been constrained during the game phases,
as such, but that “free play would have been inappropriate during carefully controlled
experiments.” General Van Riper insisted that he knew very well the difference between
a wargame and an experiment but that while Red play was conducted appropriately
during most of Millennium Challenge’s games and experiments, some of the events had
12
been conducted as experiments (including Red play) but had been called “wargames.”
The general argued that this was more than semantics, as a wargame was a more
rigorous test than an experiment. That is, calling an experiment a wargame gives the
13
outcome more credibility than it deserves.
Following MC02, JFCOM recognized the danger of the “politicizing” problem that the
Air Force had spotted a few years earlier: slanting a game to get the (leaders’) desired
result. Games set in the relatively near term were needed to “prototype” concepts that
could be implemented fairly soon, while wargames set in the more distant future were
needed to identify technologies and concepts that would require significant enabling
technology to be developed. Instead of establishing the alternating-game system adopted
by the Air Force, JFCOM’s director of joint experimentation, Maj. Gen. James Dubik,
USA, began cosponsoring the services’ near-term Title 10 games. These wargames
changed accordingly:
•

The Navy’s Global War Game became Unified Course.

•

The Marines’ Urban Warrior became Joint Urban Warrior.

•

The Army’s Transformation Wargame became Unified Quest.

•

The Air Force’s Global Engagement became Unified Engagement (UE).

Under General Dubik’s leadership, JFCOM’s Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9)
expanded the command’s capability in distributed wargaming, allowing more groups to
participate at a lower cost; acquired new software (Synthetic Environment for Analysis
and Simulation) to facilitate the adjudication of social, political, religious, and diplomatic aspects of a conflict; and initiated work to conduct a wargame jointly with the State
14
Department in 2005.
The increasing importance of JFCOM had not diminished the DoD-wide importance
of the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office. In fact, in April 2004 DMSO was
designated the lead standardization activity for wargaming within the Department

on wargaming  

183

of Defense. In 2006 DMSO was reorganized as the Defense Modeling and Simulation
15
Coordination Office. At the interservice level, however, success seems to have been
mixed. There are many reasons for this, the fundamental one being that the services
fight in different mediums and so emphasize different things in games. The Air Force
tends to use a “cue-ball” Earth (that is, with a blank or minimally detailed surface) and
to explore rapid, short engagements; the Navy needs underwater terrain (to constrain
submarine play authentically); and the Army needs to distinguish between, say, swamp
and marsh, and tends to play slower, longer engagements than the Air Force.
After years of schedule and budget difficulties, JSIMS appeared to be once again on the
rebound. However, in late 2002 the Pentagon decided to end the program. Although the
Joint Warfare System’s budget and schedule difficulties were (relatively, at least) tiny,
there was concern it too might soon be canceled. As it turned out, development and use
of JWARS continued to the end of the decade.
In 2001 the senior organization for joint educational wargaming was the National
Strategic Gaming Center (NSGC), under the Institute for National Strategic Studies
at the National Defense University. Located next to the National War College at Fort
McNair, in Washington, DC, NSGC designed, developed, and conducted strategic-level
games, exercises, and simulations to offer experiential learning to students attending all
National Defense University schools. In addition, NSGC
•

Worked closely with the Institute for National Strategic Studies on issues of national
security policy and strategy development and analysis

•

Provided state-of-the-art political-military simulations for the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands

•

Conducted, for congressional leadership, crisis-decision exercises designed to give
these senior government officials insight into the nuances and complexities of policy
making in the current global security environment, illuminate policy and organizational options, and improve dialogue between the executive and legislative branches
on critical national security issues

On behalf of the National Security Council, NSGC conducted a program of interagency
transformation, education, and after-action review for the strategic policy-making
community, including executive-branch departments and agencies, “the interagency,”
regional combatant commands, and the staffs of various nongovernmental and international organizations. Finally, NSGC also conducted extensive outreach to colleges,
16
universities, and other educational programs. Even the service Title 10 wargames were
17
becoming more integrated, pursuing common themes.
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U.S. Army
In the years between 9/11 and 2011, some elements of Army wargaming remained
unchanged while others evolved to meet the new threats or exploit new opportunities.
The Army Models and Simulation Office became the Battle Command, Simulation, and
Experimentation Directorate, but its mission remains today largely what it was in the
1990s; monitoring, coordinating, validating, and synchronizing the budgeting of Army
18
wargaming. The Army is increasingly relying on gaming in education and training, the
planning of operations at every level of war, and decision support for force development.
However, there was high-level recognition of problems in wargaming. These included
inadequate modeling of many of the Army’s mission areas, incomplete gaming infrastructure, and too much on-the-job learning for practitioners.
The Army continued its Title 10 wargames, significantly influenced by the events of
9/11 and the following wars and campaigns. First, Army leaders decided that since
projections of the far future (twenty to twenty-five years) do not change significantly in
a single year, they could skip far-future Title 10 games for a few years and focus more
on the near and middle terms. (It would be over a decade before such games were again
set in the far future.) They also tended to focus on unconventional or mixed threats, increasing the chances of generating insights useful in the ongoing wars. Still, each year’s
Army Title 10 wargame was different.
The Army Transformation Wargame was renamed Vigilant Warrior in 2002. Held at
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, home of the Army War College, Vigilant Warrior 2002
drew five hundred participants, including the Army Chief of Staff, the commander of
TRADOC, and other senior Army leaders. The scenario was very different from before
9/11. The participants had to devise a strategy for a very complicated situation involving,
possibly, enemy conventional forces, irregulars, and terrorists—in Army terminology,
a hybrid threat. The security of our homeland was also threatened. The lessons drawn
from the exercise, which gave much attention to how the Army contributed to homeland
19
security, reflected the changed world.
In 2003 the Army again changed the name of its Title 10 wargame. To mark the beginning of a JFCOM initiative to cosponsor service midterm games, the Army adopted
“Unified Quest.” Representatives of fourteen nations participated in this unclassified
game. Unified Quest 2003 (UQ03) was the first wargame cosponsored by JFCOM
with any service. It also produced a number of other firsts. It featured the first use of
emerging joint concepts in a service wargame and the first joint exploration of future
concepts. (As “equipping” forces is clearly a service function, alternative force structures
and system concepts are usually the province of service games.) Depicting a spectrum
of nearly simultaneous crises, Unified Quest 2003 was innovative also in that it explored
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both present options to improve interoperability and future concepts. UQ03 was also
the first of the Army’s Title 10 games to be preceded by several seminars and workshops.
The scope and number of these events before the “Capstone” would increase over the
20
years. Finally, UQ03 was distinctive for the breadth of high-ranking individuals attending the outbrief, the Senior Leader Seminar. In addition to the senior officer of the
sponsoring service, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the commander of the cohost,
JFCOM, leaders at the briefing included the deputy secretary of defense, the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Air Force.
Unified Quest 2004. UQ04 postulated an adversary who had lost most of his conventional capabilities yet continued fighting a protracted struggle with both conventional
and unconventional means. UQ04 was also unusually well documented; RAND prepared a 102-page report, with suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of Army Title
21
10 wargames. After two years of planning, preparation, and study and with the participation of eleven international partners, all the American services, most joint combatant
commands, and several government agencies, UQ04 produced nine insights, most with
22
relevance far beyond the U.S. Army.
Unified Quest 2005. UQ05 was set in 2015 and depicted a fictional Red using unconventional tactics. Blue players came from all U.S. services, joint commands, and
agencies; the United Kingdom, France, and Germany; and seven other friendly nations.
While again held primarily at the Army’s wargaming center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, members of the U.S. Joint Forces Command participated online from their
wargaming center in Suffolk, Virginia. During UQ05, the Army explored the impact
23
of conventional military operations on stability operations. The game was planned as
the first of what were to be two UQs looking farther into the future than most, seven to
nineteen years. That is not exactly what happened.
Unified Quest 2006. UQ06 was a mix of continuity and innovation. As often happens,
the game’s sponsor, in this case the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, called
for fresh, new ideas. The designers did not attempt to get these ideas from an established preparation process but from a radically changed one. Some things remained the
same; the focus was still on unconventional warfare, the conflict was set ten years in
the future, and, as in the previous year, the adversary was the fictional state of Redland
in southeastern Europe. The spectrum of service, joint, and international participation
also stayed about the same. What was very different was the scope and level of thinking before UQ06 started. In April 2006, the TRADOC commander (General Wallace)
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initiated a study, “The Art and Science of Operational-Level Command.” His guidance
to the study team, dated 5 February 2006, included the following:
• Put together a forum for professional discussion on the art and science of operational-level
command during UQ.
• Dialogue and argue over the points being raised regarding effects-based operations (EBO)
and other approaches.
• Focus on the key ideas and figure out how we can harness the power of several tough concepts
and make them one.
• Establish a framework within which to engage the participants regarding:
1. Understanding the nature and composition of systems that make up the adversary
2. Determination of the best way to influence those systems
3. Making early determination of the consequences of the success (or failure) of our influence to
mitigate the result if bad or take advantage of it if good.

All the above had to be done in such a way that commanders could at least understand
what was going on at multiple locations and echelons so as to be able to control the flow
of resources, missions, and commander’s intent in a way that led to a reasonably early
24
and favorable end state.
To comply with this guidance the UQ06 team conducted four seminars before the
capstone game. These would generate, develop, and record new ideas that could be
explored during game play. The first seminar was held with company commanders—a
frequent source of new ideas. The second consisted of midcareer battalion commanders. A month later the third seminar brought together brigade commanders, soldiers
considered prime candidates for a first star (i.e., likely future brigadier generals). The
final seminar was made up of division and corps commanders, some of the busiest men
25
(and women) in the Army. Even the UQ06 game itself was somewhat innovative. It was
again held at Carlisle Barracks, but its 250 participants included more representatives
26
from more U.S. government agencies than previously.
Unified Quest 2007. Relatively little was reported in the press on UQ07.27 A Washington Post article hinted why not, quoting a participant as saying the scenario had been a
28
Blue withdrawal from an “Iraq-like” nation and that it had not gone well for Blue. The
story’s implication was that the Army did not want the outcome known. The Army did
publish two unclassified documents on UQ07: a 104-page pamphlet and the standard
brief (in this case, eleven-page) executive report. But even the long pamphlet, with a lot
of information on process (UQ07 ran more pre- and postgame events than UQ06) and
general observations, did not mention the scenario or how the game turned out for Blue.
The far shorter executive report was actually more substantive. While it also covered
process, it also described both the scenario and listed a spectrum of insights, many with
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all-of-government, all-of-alliance relevance.29 UQ07 focused on winning a long war
by conducting a series of small games, set in the same conflict at different times over a
twelve-year period. Finally, UQ07 was the first Army Title 10 wargame to be cosponsored by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (along with JFCOM as
before).
Unified Quest 2008. A great deal was published on UQ08. Even the names of the nations in which UQ08 had been set were made public by the Army: three scenarios, set in,
respectively, Peru, the Philippines, and Nigeria, all in 2013. There had also been a 2025
scenario in Somalia. The theme was building partnership capacity—that is, working
with partners to enable them to defeat their terrorist threats without direct American
involvement. As one participant said, “If we have to have U.S. boots on the ground,
30
something has failed.” The Army’s executive report too provided much more information than the previous year, on the breadth of participation, structure, scenarios, and
insights.
Unified Quest 2009. UQ09 was even less reported on than UQ07 had been. My single
published source, an official information publication, describes a very methodical
31
thirteen-event process to gain clarity of issues of near-term concern to the Army. Fortunately, the Army once again produced a very substantive executive report, describing
the continuing broad range of participation, the extensive series of precapstone workshops and wargames, and insights produced. What was new was a shift from counterinsurgency to a balanced force coping with a host of threats, a precapstone game exploring
conflict nine-plus years in the future, and an exploration of special forces employment
in a predominantly conventional campaign.
Unified Quest 2010. Given the topic of UQ10—restructuring the U.S. Army to balance
risk across threats and time—it is hard to understand why coverage was only slightly
greater than UQ09’s. The best article, by a retired general officer, describes an innovative structure and lively debate and asserts that the resulting recommendations (not
described) were valuable. Interestingly, the article mentions a “smattering” of allied
32
participation and specific years of the Army’s budget. Again, the unclassified UQ10
executive report filled in the gaps, naming the “smattering” of allies involved (Australia,
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, and the United
Kingdom) and calling what appears to have been the capstone the “Army Future Game.”
In fact, the Army’s Title 10 program seemed to have shifted from a series of preparatory
events and a capstone game to a “campaign for learning” of which all Unified Quest
33
events were seen as parts.

188   the

newport papers

Unified Quest 2011. This shift became even more pronounced the following year.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the enormous amount of press coverage UQ11 received,
it is the hardest of the post-9/11 Army Title 10 wargames to gain a clear picture of. One
source of this difficulty is that so many events were involved. Since UQ03 introduced
precapstone events, most years had seen their number grow; UQ11 was a yearlong series
of such events, all of them called “Unified Quest.” Commentary, including two articles
written by the Army, tended to focus on one aspect and miss the overall effort. This, in
turn, was partly due to UQ11’s theme, homeland operations. An Army-produced video
on this element of UQ11 showed discussions among American military entities and
civilian agencies and Canadian military personnel of the constraints each faced when
34
operating within their respective homelands. All very businesslike, but some media
went nuts anyway, reporting that the Army was planning to intervene in (or cause)
bread riots. What seems to be the only article on the Capstone that describes its basic
flow paints a picture very similar to all services’ Title 10 games: participants working to devise an effective strategy for coping with a plausible future scenario given the
35
resources they expect to have in the year of the scenario.

During this period Army wargaming went much deeper into the organization than its
Chief of Staff’s Title 10 wargames did. The Army worked to make sure soldiers were
using exactly the right games for the challenges they confronted in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Lt. Gen. William Wallace, he of the famously misinterpreted quote about gaming,
became one of the leaders of that effort. Now commander of the Army Combined Arms
Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, General Wallace strove to ensure that each rotation of active-duty troops had the opportunity to fight in a virtual battle zone before it
deployed to the real thing.
He hoped to bring down the cost enough to make our deploying National Guard and
36
reserve soldiers “virtual veterans” also. In this connection the Army was (and is) pressing on with WARSIM, its part of the JSIMS set of wargames, even though JSIMS itself
has been canceled. Col. Kevin Dietrick (Project Manager, Constructive Simulations,
Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation) estimated that
after the expenditure of three hundred million dollars over the previous ten years, the
software was between 70 and 75 percent complete. Recasting WARSIM as the centerpiece of a new Army Constructive Training Federation, designers hoped to achieve a
ground-centric, but still joint, wargaming capability quicker and for far less money than
37
the original JSIMS.
In 2005, General Wallace received his fourth star and assumed command of TRADOC,
38
where he continued to advance the effectiveness of Army wargaming. Toward the end
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of the decade, innovativeness in Army wargaming resided less in big defense-contractor
adjudication programs like WARSIM than in adaptations of software originally created
for the civilian market. Finally, in 2009 the Center for Army Analysis closed its Conflict
Analysis Division. The division had provided a political-military gaming capability to
39
the Department of the Army for almost twenty years.
U.S. Navy
Over the years U.S. Navy wargaming had been blessed with a succession of individuals
who advanced the state of the art for the Navy and the nation. From William McCarty
Little to Orville “Bud” Hay, they had done great things. During the early twenty-first
century, naval wargaming was advanced by a leader who also did great things, mostly
through others—Robert C. “Barney” Rubel.
Much of Dean Rubel’s career had prepared him for success in wargaming. His activeduty naval service after commissioning in 1971 had been a mix of operational (flying
the A-7 Corsair II and F/A-18 Hornet), staff (in a combatant command, U.S. Southern
Command), and academic (on the faculty at the Naval War College, where he expanded
student wargaming) tours. As a student at the Spanish Naval War College he participated in its wargames.
When he returned to the Naval War College in 1998 as a captain, his personal mission
was to “fix wargaming.” Instead, in 1999 the Navy made him deputy dean of research.
Upon his retirement from active duty in 2001, he stayed on at the College as a civilian and was named director of the Research and Analysis Division of the College’s
War Gaming Department. In 2004 he became chairman of the department and began
“fixing” wargaming in earnest. One of his most fundamental changes was converting
its almost entirely military staff (whose members knew operations but seldom deeply
understood wargaming) to a mix of academic wargaming professionals and operators.
Together these two kinds of professionals produced games of effectiveness and accuracy
neither could have produced alone.
Also, faced with a new generation of adjudication software that was “not working,” he
more or less gave up on computer modeling and simulation, focusing on human-centric
adjudication—that is, by umpires. Gradually he and his faculty began to realize that
software, which was producing ever-more-fine-grained numeric outcomes, had been
inhibiting human interactions. With increased use of umpires came increased human
interaction—and the umpires were recording not only outcomes but those human interactions as well. Some started to suspect: Could these human dynamics be the richest
vein in which to mine for insights?
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Far too soon, in 2006, he was named the interim dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He did such a good job there leading the development of the Navy’s new
maritime strategy that he was made the dean officially in 2007. However, for wargaming
he became, like Gen. George C. Marshall during World War II, the enabler of success,
40
for over a decade. During this time the War Gaming Department remained the Navy’s
premier wargaming organization. Many of the department’s fifty wargames a year were
in support of the larger Navy, examining issues from the military use of space to counterinsurgency warfare.
The year 2001 would see the last of the Navy’s Title 10 wargame series, Global, for most
of the decade. Though Global was the first, as we have seen, and once the most influential of the service Title 10 games, Global 2001 was a poor fit for the challenges the Navy,
the United States, and much of the world faced on 12 September 2001. In any case, the
resources the Naval War College needed to support naval and national efforts in the
global war on terror left little to stage a thousand-participant (or more) forward-looking
wargame each year. The War Gaming Department explored many alternatives. It looked
at working with Joint Forces Command to share the costs and redesign Global 2002.
But as talks dragged on there was less and less time available to prepare for and hold a
Global in 2002. The War Gaming Department also proposed holding Global every other
year or reducing the number of participants to fit available resources. Briefed on the alternatives, the Navy’s Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. William J. Fallon, decided
41
to “just kill it.”
In the direct aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, representatives of the New York Fire and
Police Departments contacted the Naval War College’s War Gaming Department for
assistance. Having lost effectively their senior echelons in the attacks, both departments
wanted to educate new ones rapidly, via wargaming. The College ran a series of games
for both departments, both in Newport and in New York City, to train new leaders and
to help the departments improve their ability to plan for and respond to citywide emergencies. The success of this effort produced requests from other organizations, federal,
state, and local, for gaming support. The War Gaming Department established a small
cadre of civilian gamers who focused on homeland-security and -defense gaming. The
program continued for several years, but eventually the College had to refocus on its
primary responsibilities for the Navy.
Another line of wargaming established after the attacks concerned maritime homeland
security. Initially, a series of games was commissioned to assist the Navy and Coast
Guard in coordinating their homeland-security efforts. These games morphed into the
annual Maritime Homeland Defense and Security Games, originally for research. Out
of them emerged the Maritime Operational Threat Response conference-call procedure,
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which became national doctrine. The games were also pivotal in establishing close
working relationships with the Canadian and Mexican navies, as well as a number of
42
other government agencies from all three countries.
In 2003 the Navy tried Title 10 again, announcing that it would cohost the game with
JFCOM. In recognition of the change, Global was officially renamed Unified Course.
The first was held at the College during October 2003 but was called Unified Course
2004 (UC04). It focused on the campaign planning process. JFCOM created a website
(since disestablished), but most development and execution work for UC04 was accomplished by the Naval War College’s War Gaming Department and the game’s director,
Barney Rubel (then a professor). UC04 produced some very interesting “countercultural” insights, including the need for a global operational-level staff. But by now many
of the folks who knew how to conduct a Title 10 wargame had retired or moved on. Still
hoping to resurrect Global, in 2005 the War Gaming Department hired several addi43
tional faculty.
In 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Michael G. “Mike” Mullen, called for a
new maritime strategy and tasked the Naval War College with the supporting research.
The College carried out a nine-month program of conferences, consultations (in the
United States and around the world), and a six-week-long Strategic Foundations Game.
Conducted in one-week increments, the game featured senior policy players and a progressive challenge/response process. In the end the game produced the insight that became the heart of the new strategy’s logic: every nation, including the so-called rogues,
had a stake in the proper operation of the global system of commerce and security.
In 2007 the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps held a series of “Warfighter Talks.” These periodic discussions between senior operational leaders of both services focused primarily on force-employment issues of common interest. One of the upshots was the need
to rejuvenate wargaming in both services. Quickly a consensus grew: the best way to
do so was to bring back the Department of the Navy’s premier wargame—Global. The
War Gaming Department succeeded in resurrecting in principle the Global War Game
that year. Originally it planned to alternate between two very different types of Global.
In even-numbered years, Global would address how cooperation between the world’s
navies could most effectively enhance naval security and mitigate natural disasters. To
facilitate international participation, such Globals would be unclassified. In odd years,
the game would address emerging military threats. These Globals would be classified
and open only to closest allies.
The author was lucky enough to participate in both types of Global. Fifty-one navies
sent representatives to the international-cooperation Global, and very important issues
were put into context by the military-threats Global. However, Global’s rotation has
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been repeatedly thrown off, first to support the Quadrennial Defense Review, then to
help refine the AirSea Battle concept.
Perhaps because the Naval War College is home to both educational and decisionsupport gaming, some of its wargame electives have proved educationally effective while
also generating insights of value to decision makers. The first such “dual use” wargaming was by the College’s Advanced Research Program, an array of individual and collective directed-study courses that began with the Mahan Group, begun in 1999. There
were to be (and still are) several other such efforts, of which the Halsey Group was the
first to become relatively well known. Development work for “Halsey” started in 2001;
the students really got under way in 2003, when fifteen Navy and Air Force officers
signed up for a very unusual elective. Halsey students soon found themselves immersed
44
in all the details of high-end warfare in the western Pacific.
The educational objectives were to gain a better appreciation of the emerging realities
that would influence any conflict in the assigned theater and to improve the students’
ability to plan and execute military operations generally. However, unlike traditional
electives, Halsey and the other Advanced Research groups had the objective of producing insights useful to real-world American commanders in a given theater. Of course,
combatant commands (see chapter 6) focus on conflicts that may break out today. As a
result, they seldom look beyond two years into the future. The Halsey Group did look
into the future, far enough so combatant commanders would have time to act on their
insights, yet soon enough so that projections could be made with fairly high confidence.
The heart of the elective was a free-play wargame. With the guidance of two faculty
members, the students played all the roles of a traditional wargame: compiling and
checking the data and adjudication aids prior to play, devising and executing the Blue
strategy and that of Red, and conducting the adjudication. Halsey’s first game emphasized detail and transparency, concentrated on twelve hours of combat. This rigor
earned for Halsey the respect of actual operational planners; many of its sometimes
counterintuitive insights found their way into actual operations plans.
The Naval War College quickly decided to expand the effort. In 2004 the original
Halsey Group became Halsey Group Alfa, and a second elective was spun off, Halsey
Group Bravo. Initially, Halsey Bravo looked at sea basing. In 2006 it shifted to gaming
threats to American naval power in Southwest Asia. In 2005 yet another Halsey elective
was offered, Charlie. Halsey Charlie was later renamed the Gravely Group, in honor of
45
Vice Adm. Samuel L. Gravely Jr. However, its foci—ballistic-missile defense and undersea warfare—remained constant.
In 2007 the focus of the Mahan Group, the oldest of the directed research programs
(now known as the Mahan Scholars), shifted from general analysis of strategy in the Far
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East to nuclear deterrence and escalation. Partnering with U.S. Strategic Command, the
46
group has since cosponsored a yearly Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review.
Even after 9/11 the Navy continued to invest in its live wargames already made famous
by the 1986 movie Top Gun. In 2002, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center received
the first of fourteen F-16A/B Fighting Falcons from the Aerospace Maintenance and
Regeneration Center. These aircraft, originally intended for Pakistan, to which weapons
sales had been embargoed, joined previous “aggressor” aircraft, F/A-18A/B/C/D/E/F
Hornets and Super Hornets. Like their predecessors, they were painted in exotic
47
schemes.
Finally, the Navy Modeling and Simulation Management Office remained the senior
Navy wargaming activity. Located in Washington, DC, NAVMSMO was responsible for
the Navy’s Modeling and Simulation Information Service.
U.S. Marine Corps
During the decade following 9/11, U.S. Marine Corps wargaming continued to be
concentrated principally at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia. While Quantico’s
many schools continued to make innovative use of gaming, the core was still the Marine
Corps Wargaming Division. The best known of its initiatives was the return of the Ma48
rine Corps to Title 10 gaming. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the decision to
reinitiate a Marine Corps Title 10 wargame predated 9/11, and the Urban Warrior series
was close to what would be needed for a Title 10 game. However, the first such wargame
did not take place until Expeditionary Warrior 2003 (EW03). The Marine Corps and its
Wargaming Division were occupied with both the global pursuit of terrorists and the
fights, both conventional and irregular, in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Actually, several “mini-wargames” made up EW03, and the first occurred in November 2002. Unlike most other Title 10 wargames, which have planning and preparatory
events but one big “capstone” game, the Marines, ever innovators, designed EW03 as a
series of smaller games, each set in a different part of the world, extending over more
than a year. All, however—not surprisingly, given the then-current situation—explored
49
possible synergies between Marine and special operations forces.
Each Expeditionary Warrior game was sponsored by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. All were designed to study enduring problems of pressing concern with longterm policy and strategy ramifications. All brought participants from the joint (sisterservice or Joint Staff), combined (allied or coalition-partner), and interagency (other
U.S. government) arenas, as well as individuals from nongovernmental (typically aid)
organizations. However, they had slightly different emphases:
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EW03: USMC-USSOCOM operations, relationship/interoperability
EW04: USMC-USSOCOM operations, relationship/interoperability
EW05: distributed operations in the global war on terror
EW06: counterinsurgency and irregular warfare
EW07: campaign design and campaign planning
Expeditionary Warriors 2008 through 2010 examined the impacts of sea basing over
50
the course of a three-year campaign. Specifically, EW08 considered sea basing as a
broad concept, examined interoperability issues, and contributed to naval sea-basing
CONOPS development. EW09 examined counterinsurgency and foreign-internaldefense operations from a sea base. It too informed both Marine and joint/interagency
concept development in those areas. EW10 focused on how to operationalize the
sea base. Over the decade, the structure of EW evolved toward that of other Title 10
wargames, but the series continued to attract a broad spectrum of participants.
Though less well-known, a myriad of other games were executed by the Wargaming
Division in the first decade of the new millennium. We’ll look here at perhaps a third of
51
them. Their main impact came early in the decade. In January 2001 the Marine Corps
Wargaming Division conducted the Command and Control Wargame, in which the
Marine Corps and Navy explored alternative command relationships for Marine and
naval forces acting together. It demonstrated the value of a single commander so clearly
that on 19 September 2001 joint doctrine was changed accordingly and on 1 November
James Mattis, then a brigadier general (later, in the rank of general, Commander, U.S.
Central Command and today secretary of defense), was appointed the sole commander
of Task Force 58. This was the first time a Marine officer had been given command of
52
Navy forces.
Policy and Strategy Wargames. The PSWG series was the first of the research/exploration type conducted by the Marine Corps’s Wargaming Division. It was sponsored
53
directly by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The objectives were:
• To use wargaming to support general officers’ assessment of use of military force to protect
national interests.
• To generate increased awareness of national security issues and the strategic formulation
process.
• To strengthen regional expertise through area studies.
• To plan and operate more effectively.
• To demonstrate Marine Corps capabilities to other DoD agencies and the other services.
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Some of the PSWG wargames looked at Marine force deployment in the third world for
military operations other than war, nuclear proliferation (India, Pakistan), implementation of national policy in the Balkans, and the First Gulf War. Other PSWGs prepared
for and rehearsed Marine participation in the Global War Games.
Concept of Employment Wargames. The Wargaming Division has conducted a successful series that helps program managers refine or assess their concepts of employment.
Programs supported included next-generation night vision devices, the MV-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program, and the forward-deployed
advanced surgical suite.
Even as the global war on terror, as well as the only slightly more conventional wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, kept the Corps exceptionally busy, individual Marines still made
time to innovate with wargames so as to develop their ability to formulate effective
strategies quickly. In 2002 Lt. Col. Eric Walters (later a colonel) and Gy. Sgt. Paul Nichols worked together to adapt the commercial computer wargame Close Combat into a
tool for individual Marines. They asked the publisher to create a Marine Corps edition;
with Maj. Brendan B. McBreen they developed a workbook with scenarios and guidance
54
on deriving tactical lessons. In September 2004 a compact disc with a version of Close
Combat Marine and the first scenario from Major McBreen’s workbook were mailed out
in the Marine Corps Gazette. For a few months a scenario was included in each issue.
In 2006 the Marine Corps’s use of computer wargames to train individual Marines
became more technically advanced but also, in the opinion of several Marines, less
55
effective. In that year the Marines began to field the Deployable Virtual Training Environment, with three components: the hardware (thirty-two laptops per battalion), the
hardware and software to link them together (the Combined Arms Network), and the
actual game software, the Infantry Tool Kit. It was (and is) an impressive system, powerful, and initially very popular. Unfortunately, over time more contractors were added
and the software was locked (being proprietary), so leaders could not create scenarios to
fit their training objectives. Also, time on the system had to be scheduled beforehand.
Use declined.
On 24–25 June 2008, the final in a series of annual Marine Corps / defense-contractor
wargames took place at the Gray Research Center at Quantico. Both parties felt they had
derived significant benefit from the series, but the Marines were unable to navigate the
56
complicated legal paths they would have to in order to continue.
The post-9/11 period also saw the Marines’ first use of contemporary live wargaming
techniques. To be clear, the Marines had never stopped using techniques similar to
those used by the Army during the Louisiana Maneuvers. Also, their use of live-fire
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exercise areas such as their huge training area at Twentynine Palms, California, equals
or exceeds anything similar in the Army. But while the Navy implemented “dissimilar”
air-combat training (i.e., between aircraft of different types) as part of Top Gun, as the
Air Force did them one better with Red Flag, and as the Army pushed the live-wargaming
envelope yet again at the National Training Center, the Marines continued to use umpired field maneuvers. That changed when they built “Combat Town,” a replica Middle
Eastern village, complete with a mosque and covering two acres, at Twentynine Palms.
Combat Town had many immersive elements and a continually updated “IED Alley,”
but the greatest value of Combat Town resided in its role players, portraying innocent
bystanders, potential allies, or hardened terrorists. Marines had to sort out this “human
terrain” and prevail against a thinking, reacting adversary.
U.S. Air Force
In the first decade-plus of the twenty-first century, wargaming’s role in how the Air
Force prepares for and fights its part of a joint campaign increased in importance. The
high level of Air Staff involvement indicated the criticality of wargaming to the service.
At the time of 9/11, the executive agents for wargaming were the Director of Operations
(AF/XO) and the Director of Plans (AF/XP). Most of the detailed oversight and execution was handled by their subordinate divisions AF/XOXS (for Global Engagement, later
57
Unified Engagement) and AF/XPXC (for Futures Games). The Air Staff’s Modeling
and Simulation Division (AF/XIWM) was the Air Force “lead” in that area. Other elements of the Air Force’s modeling, simulation, and wargaming community contributed
via the New and Emerging Warfighter Capabilities Integrated Process Team, which
58
oversaw wargaming, experimentation, and analysis. In 2006, the Air Staff reorganized
so as to be more in line with joint (and Army) staffs. The Director of Operations became
AF/A5, while the Director of Plans became AF/A8. The executive agents for the Title 10
wargames became AF/X5XS for Unified Engagement and AF/X8XC for Futures Games.
The Modeling and Simulation Division became the Modeling and Simulation Policy
Division.
Even before 9/11, the Air Force had decided that conducting both its Title 10 wargames
every year was overly demanding of human resources (many planners and intelligence
specialists participated in both) and, given how often projections changed, probably
not necessary. The increased operations tempo following the attacks of 9/11 confirmed
the need to shift to alternating Title 10 wargames. From 2001 on, with few exceptions,
Global/Unified Engagement would be held on even years and Futures Game would take
place on odd years.

on wargaming  

197

Global/Unified Engagement still focused on the midterm security environment, ten or
twelve years into the future. The three FGs held from 2004 to 2007 retained the basic
FG format, but with differences for various reasons. There were similarities between
the two Air Force Title 10 game series (often many of the same players and sometimes
the same scenario) and also between successive games in each series (some scenarios
repeated several times), but each game was in many ways unique.
Global Engagement VI culminated with the November 2002 Capstone. Global Engagement VI set a 2015 Blue force against a robust asymmetric threat, to examine how
Blue might rapidly dominate a battle space and to identify conditions for transition to
59
sustained joint operations.
Futures Game 2004. FG04 started life as “FG03,” but owing in part to the high operations tempo within the Air Force at the time (the invasion of Iraq began on 20 March
2003), the game slipped into 2004. Using a Northeast Asia scenario, FG04 focused much
more on specific future technologies than on broad future force structures; looked only
at an alternative force, with no comparison with the planned baseline force; and was not
fiscally constrained. FG04 explored the potential applications and contributions of several future technologies: joint network-centric capabilities, unmanned vehicles, “persistent area dominance” munitions, and directed energy. FG04 also examined the relative
campaign impacts of airborne and space-based sensors. Products included master plans
for network-centric warfare, directed-energy weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles, as
well as follow-on experiments in network-centric warfare.
Global Engagement VII / Unified Engagement 2004. The Air Force teamed with
JFCOM in 2004 to conduct Global Engagement VII, changing its name officially to Uni60
fied Engagement 2004. In addition to greater joint involvement, it featured substantial
participation by the militaries of Australia, Britain, and Canada, whose national objectives, level of participation, and projected future capabilities were integrated into the exercise. The game pitted two Blue teams against two Red teams in a common scenario—a
61
failing state with weapons of mass destruction.
Futures Game 2005. FG05, conducted at the Dulles, Virginia, offices of Booz Allen
Hamilton, departed the farthest from the norm for Futures Games. FG05 was heavily
influenced by its unfortunate timing during deliberations on the Quadrennial Defense
Review. Air Force leadership decided it was not comfortable sharing potential alternative force structures (especially the envisioned “trade space”—i.e., what might be
forgone—to pay for them) while such trade space was being explored in the QDR discussions. Therefore, FG05 became a senior Air Force leadership conference, to talk through
62
future challenges, as opposed to a true wargame. FG05 was also by far the smallest FG,
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with roughly a hundred participants, including senior general officers from the United
States, Britain, and Australia as well as officials from the Department of Homeland
63
Security. FG05 had a very broad scope, embracing most future Air Force strategic
planning issues in the context of eight simultaneous contingencies postulated across a
spectrum of size, intensity, and type. Finally, FG05’s adjudication was less formal than
usual. Notwithstanding, FG05 identified various likely future capability shortfalls and
initiated several analyses of potential “mitigations.” These insights are representative of
some of the strengths of wargaming. Intelligence may be able to tell whether a potential
adversary will have a better aircraft in the future, but if a wargame indicates our future
systems cancel out that improvement, then we probably don’t have a problem. If the
wargame suggests, however, that we may in fact have a problem, the wargame may also
point to potential solutions. FG05 also provided insights into escalation management.
Unified Engagement 2006. The 2006 game’s capstone was held in Hawaii, to facilitate
participation by U.S. Pacific Command and its supporting Air Force component, Pacific
Air Forces. This implemented a strategy directed in 2005 by Gen. John Jumper, then the
Air Force Chief of Staff, to “take the wargame to the warfighter.” General Jumper’s goal
was to get the theater air forces to think farther into the future and the Air Staff gamers
to develop closer ties to the commands that would have to fight. To this end the Unified
Engagement team started partnership-building seminars with regional friends and
64
allies.
Futures Game 2007. The FG07 capstone was held 14–19 October 2007 at the Air Force
Wargaming Institute, Maxwell AFB. It was designed to explore the effectiveness of an
alternative force that would be technologically and fiscally feasible by the era of the
wargame, 2030. FG07 was unusual in depicting just one Blue force and in being de65
scribed with remarkable clarity and completeness in a published article. FG07 looked
for vulnerabilities in the areas of mobility, base defense, and counterinsurgency, and as
always, it explored potential future systems in the air, space, and cyber realms—C4ISR,
global strike, global mobility, and force protection—to see which concepts were worth a
closer look. The scenario, set in Southeast Asia, was very interesting, as it depicted challenges resulting from simultaneous conventional and unconventional threats.
Unified Engagement 2008. At the request of the then commander of United States Air
Forces in Europe (USAFE), Gen. Thomas Hobbins, UE08 switched theaters from the
Pacific, to focus on operational challenges central to the European theater. The UE08
series of planning conferences and workshops, as well as the October–November capstone game, took place at U.S. military facilities in Germany, and included significant
representation from not only USAFE but other European Command components as
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well. UE08 resulted in significant findings relative to missile defense and access/supply
66
into forward operating areas.
Futures Game 2009. FG07 had produced useful insights, but subsequent FGs, starting with FG09, returned to employing two Blue forces. The FG09 capstone, played at
Maxwell, explored whether an alternative force could more effectively conduct a major,
sustained, global irregular campaign and counter a peer competitor capable of disrupting the U.S. Air Force in the air, space, and cyberspace than could the actual planned
67
force. Participants included thirty-five active and retired general officers.
Unified Engagement 2010. UE10 returned to the Pacific theater. As UE08 had done
with Futures Game 2007, UE10 developed and shared its basic scenario elements
with FG09, continuing the tradition of synergy between the Air Force’s two Title 10
68
wargames.
Futures Game 2011. FG11 was held at Maxwell and explored whether an alternative
force could more effectively counter a regional nuclear-armed adversary and better
mitigate challenges to logistics in forward operating areas than could the actual planned
69
force.

During this period several Air Force major commands and centers conducted “Title
10–like” and other wargames. The Air Force Research Laboratory ran the Air Force
Technology Seminar Game for a few years. Designed to look sufficiently deep into the
future to guide research investment decisions, the first was held in 2000, as we’ve seen.
70
The second TSG (TSG II) was held in 2003. These games were designed to help sort out
which feasible future technologies offered warfighters the greatest relative advantages.
AFRL’s Headquarters Wargaming Branch (AFRL/XPPW) led the Technology Seminar
Games. AFRL/XPPW also supported Title 10 games across the defense community, by
projecting—as explained at the time by the branch’s separate website—what technologies would be available at the times depicted in each game. The wargaming branch has
subsequently been reorganized into the XPT Division.
Several of AFRL’s directorates worked to improve Air Force wargame software. One of
them, AFRL’s Information Directorate (AFRL/RI), worked
•

To make adjudication more comprehensive

•

To create the capability to deal with the adjudication of effects-based strategies
against asymmetric adversaries over long counterinsurgency campaigns through the
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development of third-generation wargaming (about which more in the second half of
this book)
•

To integrate wargaming with information systems to shorten the Air Force’s
decision-cycle time  71

Toward these ends, AFRL’s Information Directorate hosted Connections 2003 and
supported Connections 2004, which was held in Colorado Springs. The Information
Directorate continued to research the impact of doctrine, C2, unmanned-aerial-vehicle
“swarms,” and counterinsurgency warfare through 2011, under the leadership of Dave
Ross.
AFRL’s Human Effectiveness Directorate and Directed Energy Directorate were also active in improving Air Force wargaming. Starting in 2004, the Directed Energy Directorate conducted the Advanced Concepts Event (ACE), perhaps the first virtual wargame
anywhere set in the future. ACE leverages the hardware, software, and infrastructure
of Virtual Flag. In addition to aircraft currently in the inventory, virtual prototypes are
employed in a scaled-down virtual Red Flag. Insights on military utility, Red counters,
and best Blue employment can be acquired before one penny is spent on manufacturing. While Virtual Flag does not produce the stress of g forces on the trainees’ bodies, it
is superior to Red Flag in at least one way: peacetime safety restrictions are suspended
(you can’t really die in a simulator) so pilots can “fly” as close to the edge of the envelope
as they would in wartime. Virtual Flag also costs far less per pilot hour than Red Flag.
72
An ACE has been conducted most years since.
As it had before 9/11, the Air Force space community continued its Schriever series (see
chapter 4). The focus remained projected space capabilities, gaps, and requirements.
The Schriever capstone wargames were originally conducted at Nellis AFB’s Combined
Air and Space Operation Center North, more recently at the Space Warfare Center
at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. Like the Futures Game and Unified Endeavor,
Schriever games were major enterprises; they were objective driven, often used scenarios
similar to those of Title 10 games, and had epoch years in the future (typically ten to
73
fifteen years).
The Air Force’s final “Title 10–like” wargame serves both as preparation for Air Force
Title 10 games and as a useful exercise in its own right. During the fall of 2001, Headquarters, Air Force, Wargaming and Experimentation Division; Headquarters, Air Mobility Command; and the Air Mobility Warfare Center recognized their mutual interest
in bringing more realistic mobility and logistics assessment to Title 10 wargames. They
created the Global Mobility Exercise (GLOMO) initially as a precursor event for Global
Engagement VI. Held biennially since 2002 at McGuire Air Force Base (now part of
Joint Base McGuire, Dix, Lakehurst) in New Jersey, in partnership with Global/Unified
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Engagement, Global Mobility helps prepare both inputs for and participants of capstone
74
wargames and provides insights directly to the Air Force’s Air Mobility community.
The Air Force also conducted the Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment, specifically to
test innovations in command-and-control technology. More a simulation or experiment
than a true wargame, the 2004 iteration consisted of a number of “spirals,” mini-games
designed to address problems from the field and test solutions as quickly as possible—
75
even before the main exercise.
The Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation (see chapter 4) continued a field
operating agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, in the Pen76
tagon. Its mission remained coordinating the growing requirements for modeling and
simulation across the Air Force and working to fulfill them. During this period the Air
Force Wargaming Institute remained the principal source of educational wargaming in
77
the Air Force, as a division of CADRE (see chapter 4). While 9/11 did not fundamentally change AFWI or its mission, several technical and procedural innovations have
proved impressively congruent with post-9/11 needs. For example, AFWI has added
homeland defense to many exercises. Its manual wargames now have cells playing the
U.S. Northern Command (with major homeland-defense responsibilities) and “injects”
to stimulate thought about asymmetric threats and terrorism. This process continues
to mature, stressing improved “Phase IV” (transition to peace) planning. The wargames
are computer adjudicated, but homeland-defense discussions have been added. Behind
the scenes, AFWI’s greatest challenges have been updating models, databases, and game
materials to reflect the intent of the “modular army” (an initiative of the U.S. Army to
make its force structure more “tailorable” to the various challenges facing it in the early
2000s) or the “policy/decision environment” of the Homeland Security Department,
78
with no precedent and minimal guidance on which to base them.
Shortly after 9/11, AFWI worked with the Air Force Doctrine Center to explore homelanddefense issues through a vignette-focused wargame designed to highlight doctrinal issues. The structure for this game proved unique for AFWI, which traditionally designed
wargames that carry a thread from planning through execution to war termination. In
the homeland-defense vignettes, many more issues were addressed, by focusing on the
79
response to and repercussions of an isolated event within a finite period of time.
AFWI also improved its software. Accelerated Combat Timeline, an internally developed product, allows students (and, in time, operational planners) to examine their
campaign plans through to the desired end state in a feasible amount of time. The
Wargame Construction Kit, WARCON, is a program it developed with the Air Force
Research Laboratory, for which Dave Ross was the principal investigator. WARCON was
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designed to allow educational wargames to be modified and even created quickly—an
important attribute in a rapidly changing world.
In 2007 the AFWI parent organization, CADRE, merged with the Air Force Doctrine
Center to become the Doctrine Development and Education Center. In 2008 this center
was renamed in honor of Gen. Curtis LeMay, becoming the LeMay Center. Shortly
80
thereafter, AFWI was renamed the LeMay Center Wargaming Institute (LCWI).
Not all wargame projects at Air University were undertaken by AFWI/LCWI. In 2001,
Gary “Mo” Morgan of the Squadron Officer College attended Connections and observed the demonstration of Modern Air Power, a commercial theater-level air wargame
by Dr. John Tiller. Mo immediately saw the potential for his school, but it took until
2003, working through Dave Ross at AFRL, to arrange contract support and obtain Air
Education and Training Command funding. Finally a contract was let to adapt Modern
Air Power for military use. In 2004 the military version, Theater Airpower Visualization, was delivered and immediately became a core part of the Air and Space Basic
81
Course. In 2012 it became a core part of the Squadron Officer School curriculum.
Civilian
From the oldest to the newest media, sales of civilian wargames in the United States are
up. With the general rise in living standards, more Americans are finding miniatures
wargames affordable. When asked why computers have not taken a bite out of their
community, one miniatures wargame enthusiast replied, “Until we can really create
a holodeck, miniatures will be the ultimate high res[olution] graphics.” The ease of
creating new scenarios, no programming required, has also been cited as a reason for
the continued popularity of miniatures. Others point out that with miniatures, one gets
to make something tangible: a company of knights, a Napoleonic battalion, or a P-51
Mustang. With computers, whatever you “build” can be deleted in a keystroke; with
miniatures, after a game one still has a display case full of troops.
In 2003, print wargaming finally pulled out of its nearly two-decade decline and
achieved higher sales, even allowing for inflation. One reason was that desktoppublishing software now allows professional-looking games to be published profitably
even with very small print runs. The members of the largest cohort of print wargame
players, baby boomers, were entering their peak earning years and could afford to buy
more wargames. More titles were selling fewer copies each, but total sales were still up.
Ironically, the civilian computer wargame industry presents a mixed picture. “First-person
shooters” have become phenomenally popular. Part of their success is the increasing
numbers of virtual worlds where players can shoot it out with others from across the
country and around the world. However, this very success has made it difficult for the
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developers of operational and strategic wargames to find publishers. Developers have
responded in one or more of three basic ways. Some have selected the somewhat bizarre
course of creating operational and strategic games that look like and play (a little) like
first-person shooters. Called “real-time strategy games,” these titles run continually, like
a flight simulator or a close tactical wargame, but hundreds or thousands of times faster
than real time. Other developers of operational and strategic wargames are increasingly
selling directly to consumers across the Internet. Still others are actively seeking to sell
their operational or strategic wargames to governments.
Perhaps in the long term, even more important than the military’s discovery of commercial wargaming is academia’s application of wargaming techniques. Academic
gaming is not new; for example, Dr. Martin Campion, an early advocate of educational
wargaming and gaming in general, used print wargames to help teach history in the
1960s. However, it received little recognition until 2002, when Dr. Vernon L. Smith of
George Mason University won the Nobel Prize for economics for his founding of the
field of experimental economics. His methodology was similar to wargaming, in that
the strategies of contending sides were adjudicated and fed back to the participants. His
use of simulation gaming, both to develop insightful economists and to explore specific
82
economic strategies, paralleled the primary military applications of wargaming.
Civil/Military
In the years since 9/11, what had been a slow and uncertain trend in the U.S. military
of taking the recreational software industry more seriously has become almost an “in”
concept. Not only the military but civilian government agencies became increasingly
83
interested in commercial wargames. The author anticipated this “tipping point,” as the
commercial side of wargaming had always been willing to lead in the field of adjudication of human factors (after all, no lives depend on the correctness of their assumptions) and (to a lesser extent) of system effects that were often seen as a key to victory
in the global war on terror. Ironically, though, it seems to have been a recruiting tool
that finally captured the military’s attention. In little more than a year after its release,
America’s Army had over 1.5 million registered users. For less than the cost of a few TV
commercials, typically used by viewers as opportunities for snack breaks, the Army had
created a wargame that has young people of recruiting age spending hours in virtual
boot camps earning the right to play a first-person shooter in a scenario that imposes
strict Army fire discipline.
Also, the Institute for Creative Technologies in Marina del Rey, California, which the
Army helped create in the late 1990s, created two commercial-like wargames: Full
Spectrum Warrior, designed to teach squad coordination in infantry combat; and Full
Spectrum Command, to train light-infantry company commanders to lead in combat
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and in peacekeeping. Even the CIA was working with the institute on a wargame to help
84
its operatives understand how terrorist cells operate. The Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps continued to fund efforts to tailor commercial wargames to their needs. In at
least one case, that of TacOps, all three services were funding modifications to the same
85
commercial wargame.
Mark Herman continued to bridge the military and commercial communities. In the
early 2000s he was a vice president with Booz Allen Hamilton. He designed Cognitive
Warfare, an operational-level joint wargame adjudication engine to address the full
86
spectrum of conflict, with particular emphasis on the global war on terror. He had also
designed several innovative commercial print wargames—most notably We the People
87
(Avalon Hill, 1993), which introduced “card-driven” print wargames.
International Wargaming: Continuity and Change
The international wargaming community’s reaction to the events of 9/11 was broadly
similar to that of the U.S. military wargaming community, ranging from slight to
searches for new techniques and more-relevant capabilities. The U.S. military continued
to reach out to other militaries; simulations and wargames were important ways it did
so.
U.S.-Supported Gaming
The Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration continued and was arguably more
important than ever. Coalition members must talk among themselves; interoperability
of command-and-control equipment becomes imperative. As an extra complication, the
United States may be willing to share certain secrets with some long-term allies but not
with the coalition partner of the moment, yet all members need to communicate and
fight together. Little wonder then that JWID attracted not only our closest allies, like
Australia, New Zealand, and NATO allies Canada and Great Britain, as well as other
NATO allies, but other important partners as well, such as Japan, Korea, Singapore, and
Thailand. As in the past, JWID looked like a wargame, with a scenario and Blue forces,
but it was a demonstration: Red could not prevent candidate technologies from being
explored by implementing strategies that would bypass them. As mentioned above, this
88
is both a strength and a weakness of JWIDs.
The U.S. Army specifically continued to conduct wargames with international partners.
The Army conducted transformation/interoperability wargames with the British army
and workshops to support the ABCA planning process from 2001 through 2004. Noteworthy efforts were made in 2005 and 2006 with the German army on irregular-warfare
analysis and operations-research tools to support operational commanders. U.S. Army
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leaders believed they made significant contributions to improving partner capacity and
89
coalition interoperability.
NATO
Wargaming was being used at the highest levels of NATO to develop new concepts
and organizations. For example, on 23 January 2004, more than ninety NATO representatives from twenty-six nations met at the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center. They wargamed the employment of a proposed
twenty-thousand-strong NATO force in a scenario set in 2007. The importance placed
on such exercises can be inferred from the seniority of the leaders attending: four-star
flag and general officers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany,
90
and a three-star general from Canada.
United Kingdom. Well before the turn of the millennium the United Kingdom’s
Wargame Infrastructure and Simulation Environment (WISE) was fully operational.
Faster, more flexible, and less expensive to operate than Britain’s previous leading
analytical wargame software (Divisional Wargame), WISE was even able to begin supporting studies previously run on UK Janus, when that software was retired early in the
century. But had WISE evolved enough to stay relevant, given all the changes in warfare
following 9/11?
Of the many allies and partners who applied their wargaming capabilities to the emerging challenges of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the British may well have made the
single most important contribution. Shortly after British forces deployed to Afghanistan
the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory started receiving requests for new
wargames—some for training and planning for counterinsurgency operations, others
to support counterterrorism, and others for insights into peace-support operations. In
one of those “Aha!” moments for which the Brits have been famous since Newton’s apple
fell, they realized that all the requests were actually asking for the same thing: a way to
adjudicate quickly the results of operations in the human dimension. Second-generation
wargames adjudicated the military dimension of conflict; now what was needed was a
game to examine all dimensions of conflict within a society—what the author calls a
third-generation wargame.
Starting in 2004, Dstl began work on a true revolution in wargame-facilitation software,
the Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM, pronounced “Possum”). From the start it
was to be population-centric and scalable, a tool both sophisticated enough to be useful
and easy enough to use to be used. PSOM attempted not to replace human decision
making—indeed, PSOM-supported wargames had players for all major factions in the
conflict space—but simply to help discern the consequences of a series of decisions by
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independent actors. By 2007 the work was far enough along to share with the United
States, specifically the J8 elements of the Joint Staff. In 2008 Dstl initiated a rigorous
process of confirming the reasonableness of PSOM’s outcomes. By 2010 Dstl felt ready
to see whether PSOM could make a difference in an actual conflict.
During 2011, at the request of the International Security Assistance Force, volunteers
from Dstl’s PSOM-development team twice flew to Kabul, Afghanistan, then an active
war zone. In March they enabled over 150 military and civilian leaders of the coalition to wargame draft plans for the coming summer. In November, as part of a British/
American team, Dstl and PSOM supported the formulation and exploration of longterm campaign plans. The speed of PSOM’s evidence-based adjudication made it pos91
sible to look deeper into the future at a pivotal time in the war.
The senior British representative at the wargame, Col. (later brigadier general) Gary
Deakin, commented, “Use of the tool, and critically the supporting team of civilian staff
that made it work, enabled the planners to think at the strategic, operational and tactical
levels identifying and developing an understanding of the risks to the plan and how they
could be mitigated.” Three years later he would say, “This [PSOM] is the most effective
92
tool for wargaming at the highest levels I have experienced.”
Interestingly, these wargames were called not “wargames” but “conferences.” There was
a perception among the leaders that nongovernmental agencies would not participate
93
in a “wargame.” In this case the name choice may have been not only helpful but more
appropriate: after all, the objective was not to win in combat but to prevent combat from
starting.
While the United Kingdom’s PSOM was providing insights useful for developing
alliance-wide and “all of effort”–wide (that is, drawing in charities, businesses, UN
agencies, and all other groups that could influence outcomes for good or ill) strategy for
future months, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was designing, developing, and executing a
series of innovative wargames aimed at increasing the effectiveness of force structure
decades in the future.
Collaboration among the RAF’s Air Warfare Centre, Air Staff, and an exchange officer
from the U.S. Air Force, Col. Rand Miller, produced an “end-to-end process” for developing alternative-force options and anticipating their relative impacts. The process began with building a picture of the likely future defense environment. A host of sources
then developed concepts deemed likely to mitigate anticipated gaps or create opportunities. All were then rigorously reviewed for technical and fiscal feasibility. Surviving
concepts would be gamed in the envisioned future. The results would then be analyzed;
findings on relative military utility would be provided to decision makers, those on the
concepts themselves to the originators.
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By 2005 this process was sufficiently developed to be applied to a wargame for the first
time—the Future Air and Space Operating Concepts (FASOC) wargame. FASOC05’s
objective was to explore synergies between persistent airpower and precision effects
across a spectrum of contingencies. Set in 2020, FASOC05 attracted sixty-seven participants—a third from other British services. Even as a first effort, FASOC05 produced
five high-level recommendations and was a factor in a procurement action.
FASOC06 attracted German and French participation. Its objective was to examine
options for rapid global mobility, deployment and sustainment, C2, and engagement
capabilities. Set again in 2020, the scenario focused on countering terrorism. The sixtyeight participants, over half sister service or allied, presented their findings to the Chief
of Air Staff and twenty-two other flag and general officers. The four resulting recommendations included precision aerial delivery. FASOC07 explored the direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence, based primarily on surveillance and
reconnaissance. The scenario was still set in 2020, but international attendance shifted
to the United States and Australia. The fifty-seven participants again outbriefed the
Chief of Air Staff and, this time, twenty-six flag and general officers. The next FASOC
was more ambitious. The epoch year went to 2030, in which the game was to explore the
spectrum of “novel technologies” in which the RAF might invest and also to carry out
integrated air and space planning.
To allow time to meet these objectives fully, the wargame slipped to 2009. The RAF’s
project officers realized they had two challenges with FASOC09. First, exploring fully
the spectrum of potential RAF technologies would require an equally broad spectrum
of subject-matter experts. They would be difficult to assemble. Second, and more importantly, they realized the RAF’s investment decisions should be informed by allied,
especially American, decisions. Aside from avoiding redundancies, they would need
to discern possible future gaps that they might need to fill or opportunities to achieve
synergy. The next chapter will cover how both challenges were met through a single
94
initiative.
Dstl made many other advances during this period as well. It upgraded its wargames
the better to depict differences in perception and the impacts of command-and-control
capabilities. It also increased its use of old-fashioned paper-map wargames to facilitate
95
team coordination and integration. Finally, Dstl assigned Scientific Support in Crisis
96
and War teams to one-star headquarters.
Canada. In these years the Canadian Army Simulation Centre incorporated virtual
elements into its constructive wargames. The Canadians, however, were not only
wargaming with the United States and applying American methods but coming up with
innovative approaches of their own. For example, early in 2011 Defence Research and
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Development Canada conducted a two-part wargame, the Military Assessment of Disruptive Technologies (MAD). MAD I developed and vetted concepts deemed feasible ten
years in the future. Then, during MAD II, four small wargames explored the impacts
of those concepts. The Canadian military devised courses of action (COAs) against the
four contingencies using current Canadian systems; it then devised another set of options for the same contingencies with the capabilities from MAD I. Afterward, both sets
of COAs were gamed to conclusion, and the participants discussed the concepts’ likely
97
impact on future Canadian operations.
China
During the late 1990s China brought the development of domestic computer-assisted
wargaming under the leadership of an officer with impressive credentials in the military
and scientific spheres. By the early 2000s that officer, Hu Xiaofeng, was already producing results. Shortly after the turn of the century his laboratory located at China’s
National Defense University produced Sword Sharpener, a series of operational-level
wargames with computerized adjudication designed to improve the decision making of
operational-level military commanders. Hu’s next product, Absolute Victory, a computerized adjudication tool, incorporated military-political and economic elements. It was
followed by a multiplayer, networked, strategic-level wargame. In 2007 his laboratory
began work on a computerized wargame system that would link strategic and operational98
level decision makers.
As impressive as China’s technical progress had become, how it applied wargaming may
be even more impressive. Most of the world is adopting American wargaming methods,
99
but China seems to be changing our methods the better to fit its theory of war. As
a result, Chinese gaming methods may, in some areas, be superior to ours. Most U.S.
Department of Defense adjudication software started life as highly detailed one-on-one
or few-on-few attrition engines. With bigger and faster computers, the United States
has scaled these models up to depict theater-size conflicts. Still, it is difficult for most
American software to adjudicate more than a few days of war in a reasonable amount
of time. Chinese war theory begins with the calculation of the end state in China’s best
interest, then of the conditions that would bring about conflict termination on those
terms. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was preoccupied by measurements of the correlation of military force, China’s defense community believes that gaining or enhancing an
advantage in comprehensive national power is the center of national strategy. Accordingly, China has devoted itself to comprehensive games that can adjudicate the interplay
of all elements of national power right up to the achievement of favorable war termination—in other words, third-generation wargames. As one indication of this focus, China
has computerized the comparatively comprehensive methods of combat adjudication of
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the late Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, USA. Still, it also uses conventional American adjudica100
tion software, such as Janus, where it considers appropriate.
Australia
The new century saw another expansion of Australia’s wargame community with the
establishment of the Combat Training Centre. This new center primarily supported
command-post exercises and predeployment training. The new century also saw the
retirement of Australia’s domestically developed ComBatSim, in anticipation of converting to the Americans’ Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation. A delay until 2003 in
101
fielding BBS caused a total gap in software support to Australian army CPXs. At about
the same time, Janus(AS), the Australian version of the American Janus software, was
also to be replaced by a newer version. However, a pervasive flaw was discovered with
102
the latter, and Janus(AS) was retained for an additional decade. Janus(AS) was to be replaced by BBS at the Australian army’s simulation centers, but as the decade progressed
it became standard practice to use BBS for medium and large units and Janus(AS) for
small ones. Toward the end of the decade, first at Darwin and then increasingly at all
three centers, use of the commercial software Steel Beasts increased sharply, especially
for predeployment training.
In 2003 the Australian Department of Defence established the Australian Defence
Simulation Office as a single reference source for Australia’s proliferating modeling,
simulation, and wargaming activities. Over the next several years the office produced
103
a number of useful publications, including The Defence Guide to Simulation. Also in
2003, planning began for what would become a series of U.S./Australian live wargames
104
called Talisman Sabre.
In 2004 the American and Australian governments signed an agreement to create a
Joint Combined Training Centre, which would link training sites across Australia with
such sites in the United States. The agreement included a concept-validation event at the
105
Talisman Sabre (“Saber,” for the Americans) scheduled for 2007. Following that proofof-concept demonstration, Australia established a Joint Network for Experimentation,
Simulation and Training; it became operational in 2008. This network immediately
began enhancing Australia’s live wargames and in 2009 even allowed Australians to
participate in a U.S. Air Force Virtual Flag without physically leaving home. By roughly
the end of this period the Australian and American networks had been permanently
106
linked.
Talisman Sabre 2005, the first of these bilateral live wargames, which would become
biennial, took place 12–27 June 2005. It was conducted in Shoalwater Bay (in the Rockhampton area of Queensland), Townsville, and on the Coral Sea, with sixteen thousand
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American and Australian troops. During the exercise, U.S. Pacific Command and Australian Defence Force Joint Operations Command jointly executed more than twentyfive trips by LCACs (landing craft, air cushion) and more than 1,300 Australian S-70A
Blackhawk and MH-60S Knight Hawk landings and takeoffs.
The next Talisman Sabre, 10 June–25 July 2007, involved twenty-six thousand American and Australian troops. The area used also expanded, adding to Shoalwater Bay and
the Townsville Field Training Area the Bradshaw Field Training Area in northwestern
Northern Territory. The event also expanded the number of airfields used, to civilian airports at Sydney and Brisbane and Royal Australian Air Force Base Amberley. A
climactic moment was a joint amphibious landing of 2,500 personnel from six ships on
20 June 2007.
The next Talisman Sabre was conducted 6–25 July 2009. The increase in size was more
modest this time; there were ten thousand Australian land and naval personnel and
twenty thousand U.S. troops. This time the exercise was led by the United States and was
conducted primarily at Shoalwater Bay and the Townsville Field Training Area. It in107
volved various amphibious-assault and ship-defense exercises. Talisman Sabre 2011 was
conducted in July of that year and was led by Australian forces. It incorporated “combined
Special Forces operations, parachute drops, amphibious (marine) landings, land force
maneuvers, urban and air operations and the coordinated firing of live ammunition.”
Of course, not all Australian combined live wargames were conducted bilaterally with
the United States. For example, Pitch Black, conducted biennially since 2006, typically
drew forces from New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand (the United States and United
Kingdom have also participated in some years). While Pitch Black typically occurs in
the Northern Territory, primarily at Royal Australian Air Force Bases Darwin and
Tindal, in 2002 it was held on Australia’s east coast, and in several years additional air
bases have been opened.
These big live wargames were the most visible elements of Australia’s growing capabilities, but more important in the long term may have been its innovations in defense
planning. Between 2000 and 2004 Australia worked out most of the major elements of
an approach to defense planning that integrated anticipation of future threats, development of technical and procedural options for countering them, and wargaming to assess
108
the likely effectiveness of each.

Elsewhere, American-style gaming was indeed becoming more universal and more sophisticated. Ireland began using wargaming at its Military College Command and Staff
School. A 2002 exercise involving American and Polish forces employed both live and
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constructive simulation. Perhaps most interestingly, a Swedish company built a virtual
109
wargaming facility for the Norwegian army.
Global Civilian Wargaming
During this period there were several major developments in civilian wargaming. Sales of
miniatures and print and computer wargames continued to grow worldwide, in step with
a global trend toward higher prosperity, connectivity, and education. But the big news was
that for the first time more money was spent on recreational software in Asia than in the old
leader—North America. At the forefront of Asia’s growth was a phenomenal increase in online gaming in China. As of 2003 China had eighty million Internet users, fourteen million
of them playing online games. While most of that software came from South Korea, China’s
government declared that by 2023 China would be the world’s largest producer of recreational software. In 2003, little South Korea alone spent the equivalent of U.S.$3.9 billion on
110
recreational software, as compared with seven billion in the much larger United States.
The other major development was the political application of this technology—that is,
the creation of games designed to convince the user of the correctness of a particular
political agenda. These ranged from “Christian” video games to titles that, arguably, encouraged terrorism. The Lebanese branch of Hizbollah used an American game engine
to create a first-person shooter, Special Force, that not only depicts Israelis as terrorists
and war criminals but purports to “train” its users on how to attack Israelis without
committing acts of terrorism. Two titles developed by a Syrian textbook publisher, Under Ash and Under Siege, were specifically designed to inculcate anti-Israeli passions in
111
“the younger generation who no longer read newspapers but do play video games.”
Wargame design was also beginning to receive international recognition as an academically valid and effective discipline. In September 2003, King’s College London began offering a course on conflict simulation. Taught by Professor Philip Sabin of the Department of
War Studies, the course requires students to study both military and simulation material
and then produce a functioning wargame. Several student projects have been published
112
commercially. Several of Professor Sabin’s books, most notably Lost Battles and Simulat113
ing War, have made the case for the worldwide scholarly utility of wargaming.
October 2004 saw two wargaming milestones, the Serious Games Summit in Washington, DC, and the Exploiting Commercial Games for Military Use conference in The
114
Hague, Netherlands. The objective of the Serious Games Summit was to catalyze application of technology developed for recreation to serious military and civil purposes.
The conference brought together “applied gaming” providers and users from many different parts of the industry and many different parts of the world. While attending, your
author read a very positive page-one notice of the summit in the Washington Post and
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another, equally positive, in the Congressional Quarterly. The stature of these periodicals,
the location of the conference, and the breadth of its participation all reflected how inter115
est in the field was building. Other indications included the facts that the conference’s
six hundred slots sold out weeks in advance and that the government of Maryland made
a very visible effort at the conference to get serious-game providers to locate in that state.
There is little wonder why, as sales of recreational software topped seven billion dollars
in the United States the previous year, and American sales were less than half the global
market. When all revenue streams are accounted for—online gaming, game-specific
hardware, strategy guidebooks, etc.—computer gaming was then a twenty-billion-dollara-year global industry. By comparison, the previous year (2003) the U.S. military spent
116
just over four billion on models, simulators, and wargame software and hardware.
The Exploiting Commercial Games for Military Use conference in The Hague was
designed to allow all NATO members to “cross-tell” their experiences with adapting
commercial wargames. Progress in this area is particularly important to the new alliance members who could never afford to spend a billion dollars on a decadelong attempt
like JSIMS but could find three million dollars to modify a commercial wargame in two
years, as the U.S. Army did with America’s Army.
By 2011, the tenth anniversary of 9/11, it seemed that if we had not reached the end of the
global war on terror, we had at least reached the end of the beginning. The Serious Games
Summit similarly indicated that if the divide between the worlds of defense and civilian
wargaming had not closed, at least it had narrowed enough that the two communities
know, respect, and support each other. Finally, The Hague conference was simply one
more confirmation that wargaming, military and commercial, had indeed gone global.
Finally, near the end of this period Britain lost its unofficial dean of wargaming. Dr.
Patrick “Paddy” Griffith passed away on 25 June 2010. His contributions in history,
wargaming, and defense analysis would have been noteworthy even if his work in any
one of those fields had been all he accomplished. But in fact, he applied wargaming to
give him fresh perspective on history, applied history to envision fresh approaches to
contemporary defense analysis, and applied (unclassified) defense-analysis techniques
to improve civilian gaming. Yet his most important achievement may have been his
work, both organizationally and in print, to facilitate the achievements of others. His
117
influence will endure as long as free men must study war to remain free.

This is the conclusion of this chapter and, in a way, of the entire history section. The
next chapter offers a snapshot of wargaming “today” (late 2011 through early 2016) and
primarily looks forward.
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I chose 2011 as the final year of the section. Why 2011? Principally, 2011 was the twohundredth anniversary of what is considered by many the first modern simulation
wargame—that of Baron Leopold von Reisswitz. The two-hundred-year mark seems like
a good spot to pause and think about the journey. Also, 2011 was something of a turning
point. Early in 2011 the president of the United States, Barack Obama, made clear in a
speech before the Australian parliament that there would be an increased American focus on the Asia-Pacific region. In December 2011 the final U.S. combat troops left Iraq.
So, as we come to this somewhat arbitrary spot on the road and look back along the way
we came, what can we see to guide our steps on the road yet untraveled? Answering that
question is a goal of chapter 6. But first it will take a look at wargaming “today” and try
to anticipate likely future developments in the art, science, and practice of wargaming.
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CHAPTER SIX

Wargaming in Transition
2012–2016 and Beyond

Predictions are hard, especially about the future.
OFTEN ATTRIBUTED TO YOGI BERRA

I was originally going to call this chapter “Wargaming Today.” Then I remembered a
book I had seen in a used-book store in Normal, Illinois. The book was on the history of
Japan. It was organized into five sections, each with five chapters. The final section was
titled “Japan Today.” One of that section’s chapters was called “Formosa, Japan’s Tropical Paradise.” The book had been written in 1927—not quite “today.”
The problem with all books ending at “today” is that even on the way to the printers, the
material written stops being “today.” So instead I will provide some thoughts on where
wargaming may be going. As it is hard to know where you are going if you do not know
where you are, I’ll start by describing some (currently) recent developments and take
stock of where wargaming is at the time of writing (2016, with some updates into late
2017). Next, as we have seen that advances in wargaming have required motive and opportunity, I will examine first what factors may now motivate the evolution of wargaming and then examine factors that may make that evolution feasible. In the conclusion
of this chapter I will describe some of the wargaming developments I deem likely in the
near term. Finally, in the overall conclusion of this book I will propose some directions
in which we may want to nudge the evolution of wargaming.
A Snapshot of Contemporary Wargaming, 2012–2016
Before we begin, I need to confess that the picture I will paint will not be complete. The
closer to 2017 a development occurred, the more likely at least some of the information
will be classified, “close hold,” or both. As you saw in previous chapters, information
on some wargames was not in the public domain until decades after the fact. Also, very
recent developments, even in the commercial and academic fields, may simply not have
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been published yet. Finally, I’m sure I will miss some available information. That said,
let’s start with wargaming in the nation that in 2016 led the world in most of its aspects.
Wargaming in the United States
Any doubt that wargaming was in a period of transition during this period was eliminated by three memorandums from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (see appendix
E). The subject of the first was “The Defense Innovation Initiative.” Dated 15 November
2014 and signed by the secretary of defense, this two-page memo announced a broad
spectrum of initiatives to accelerate effective innovation throughout the U.S. defense
establishment. The third of six main points stated, “A reinvigorated wargaming effort
will develop and test alternative ways of achieving our strategic objectives and help us
think more clearly about the future security environment.”
The second memo was released 9 February 2015 and was signed by Robert Work, the
deputy secretary of defense. The subject was “Wargaming and Innovation,” and it began
by declaring that the department’s wargaming abilities had “atrophied.” It went on to
argue the importance of reversing that atrophy: wargaming could “potentially make
the difference between wise and unwise investment trajectories and make our forces
more successful in future conflicts.” The memo described several major initiatives and
outlined how they would be implemented. The initiatives included a four-star summit
on reinvigorating wargaming.
The third was released 8 May 2015, again signed by Deputy Secretary Work. The memo
began by describing the current critical period and by asserting that wargaming is an
important aid for making sound decisions and spurring effective innovation. Mr. Work
then described the purpose of the Wargaming Summit that he and the vice chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr., had cochaired on 23 April
2015, to align the wargaming “enterprise” more closely with DoD decision making. The
memo then laid out the resulting sets of tasks.
First, because you can’t determine what you need until you know what you have, the
third memo directed the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to create a wargaming repository to be populated
with game capacity, capability, and insights from across the enterprise. Gaps were to
be identified and mitigation options prioritized. Second, the Joint Staff and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense offices of Policy, CAPE, and Net Assessment would review
all findings and report findings as appropriate to senior leadership. Third, leaders from
the Joint Staff, Policy, CAPE, and OSD/NA were to serve as “quad chairs” of a Defense
Wargaming Alignment Group, to align wargaming with leadership’s priorities and
promote dissemination of game information. Fourth, Policy and CAPE would conduct
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wargames exploring capacity and capability options, as well as possible risks and solutions. Fifth, the wargaming quad chairs would develop a senior wargame series and
strive to make wargaming a standard element of the play-review process again. Secretary Work concluded with a list of other high-level meetings he was convening and a
pledge to stay engaged in wargaming improvement.
If we judge by this series of memos, calling this a period of “transition” may be too mild.
Earlier chapters of this book reported on service and combatant-command wargaming
but little that was truly U.S. defense wargaming. Grassroots bodies such as Connections
and the Military Operations Research Society tried to build a U.S. wargame community
but with small-scale success. These memos evoked a “wargaming enterprise” and initiated structures and processes to make it a reality.
A second “transition” in early 2015 was also more major than that mild word implies.
For the first time since its establishment during the presidency of Richard Nixon, the
Office of Net Assessment was not led by Andy Marshall. Andrew Marshall was ninetythree when he retired on 2 January 2015. Working directly for the secretary of defense,
Mr. Marshall and his small staff of about a dozen had a huge but hard-to-document
impact. He was called the second-most-powerful man in the Pentagon by many; most of
his writings are still classified. Perhaps the highest praise came from outside the United
States. In an interview with The Economist in 2012, Gen. Chen Zhou, author of several
Chinese defense white papers, recalled, “Our great hero was Andy Marshall in the
1
Pentagon. We translated every [unclassified?] word he wrote.”
Deputy Secretary Work reached out to the wargame community. He agreed to speak to
Connections 2015, at the National Defense University. Though in the event the talk was
given by his speechwriter, his expressed support contributed to an all-time Connections
participation record at 171 individuals physically attending (with others participating
online). He also encouraged MORS to hold a special wargame workshop. In the spring
of 2016 (15–18 March) Secretary Work called the first DoD Analytical Wargaming
Workshop. Called the “practitioners summit” by many, the event was led by OSD/CAPE
2
and hosted by the Army War College. That done, Mr. Work helped fund, and then addressed, a second MORS-run special wargame workshop. By paying for the registration
of American defense personnel and speaking (not necessarily in that order of importance) he encouraged a record turnout for a MORS special event: over 260 professionals
from six nations. As important was that the workshop produced a ninety-five-page final
3
report that could be used as a text for defense wargaming.
During this period OSD/CAPE also began using wargames internally. It started by
hiring Dr. Jon Compton. To communicate the contribution wargaming can make to
an organization with a long history of sophisticated operations research, Dr. Compton
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wrote a paper, “Analytical Wargame.” 4 He then founded CAPE’s wargaming team, the
Complex Problems Shop. His team provided wargame services throughout CAPE,
incorporating wargaming as one element of “soup to nuts” research programs. The
team and its process gained a lot of favorable recognition within OSD and some of the
5
combatant-command staffs.
The Joint Community. The wargaming office that arguably occupies the next-highest
position on the U.S. military’s organization chart is the Joint Staff’s Studies, Analysis
6
and Gaming Division. SAGD has evolved in recent years. While its dozen professionals (roughly three-quarters of them operations researchers, the rest political scientists)
continue to conduct highly classified and (often very) “close hold” pol-mil wargames,
they now conduct a spectrum of games, recently a few not classified at all.
The best known of their new types of wargames is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS) Strategic Seminar Series. Started in 2012 by the CJCS, Gen. Martin E.
Dempsey, these one-day games quickly produced insights that were briefed by General
Dempsey to the president. Held four times in 2012, these games bring together the
service chiefs and the combatant commanders to look at challenges that seem plausible
roughly five years into the future. In so doing these wargames close a “seam” in defense
wargaming. Services, headed by four-star generals or admirals, organize, train, and
equip their forces. Combatant commanders (COCOMs), also led (typically) by fourstar officers, employ the forces of all services (i.e., joint forces) in both war and military
operations other than war. As the research, development, acquisition, and fielding of
a new weapon system can take decades, the services attempt to anticipate threats and
opportunities decades into the future. But the combatant commands may have to go
to war tomorrow; they prefer to look no farther than two years out. These games are
conducted in a way with which Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery would have been
familiar, all participants discussing likely Red actions, likely Blue responses, and likely
7
net outcomes.
Since 2011 the Joint Staff has added a second wargame unit, the Joint Wargames Division (JWD) within the Joint Force Development Directorate (J7). The JWD runs the
“Chairman’s Joint Wargame,” Iron Crucible. Set in the near future (five or six years
hence) and using global scenarios that involve more than one combatant command,
Iron Crucible is designed to explore joint concepts and operational-level issues.
Iron Crucible 2014 was concerned with “global agility” and “flexible joint command
and control.” It was held 5–9 May at Joint Base Andrews, just outside Washington, DC.
There were 116 players and 127 control and support personnel. Thirty-four American
organizations participated; the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada sent observers. The Blue team included nine two-star officers or civilian equivalents, while in
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adjudication were two retired four-star and two retired three-star generals.8 Of course,
the findings went to the CJCS.
The Joint Staff also does a lot of ad hoc games, in response to “pop-up” queries. Some
meet needs of the Joint Staff itself and COCOMs, under J8’s “force structure, resources,
assessment” mandate, especially where computer models and analytical processes have
gaps to fill. Every four years SAGD and the other Joint Staff wargame elements put a
great deal of effort into supporting the Quadrennial Defense Review. Also, owing to its
long-standing expertise in running top-secret pol-mil wargames, it has been called on
also to do unclassified ones in support of “the interagency.” (In one recent development,
during the Pentagon’s renovation SAGD moved from its perennial basement home to
the “mezzanine.” Though still below the first floor, the new spaces are above, and no
longer look like, the basement.)
J8’s Warfighting Analysis Division conducts wargames too. This small office works with
high-end simulations in what are often called “analytical” games. Analytical wargames
are typically computer based and are often used for “sensitivity analysis”—that is,
change one element of Blue or Red strategy or equipment and then run the game over
and over again to see what difference it would likely make.
Looking back on the wargaming of the OSD and Joint Staff, we know relatively few of
the individuals who made a difference. Vincent Roske made a critical difference for
years. Maj. Roy “R2” Rice had an important impact at a critical time. Few others are
known beyond their community—but they know the difference they made.
It is a tough call as to which wargames are at the next higher level, as the U.S. military
has a dual organizational structure. Given their different concerns, as we saw above, the
services and the joint community have evolved very different wargames. Let’s look at the
services first. At the highest level are the Title 10 games (see chapter 4). Service chiefs
take very active roles in the planning, execution, and aftermaths of these wargames.
They typically attract between two and twelve hundred participants, principally from
the sponsoring service but all other services too, as well as other government agencies. A
few Title 10 wargames have been “United States only,” but close allies are often repre9
sented, less often a spectrum of friendly nations, and once as many as fifty-one. Each
service also conducts smaller wargames, below the Title 10 level. Such games may help
prepare for a Title 10 event, directly support the needs of the sponsoring organization,
or both. However, each service conducts these games in its own ways. Each service has
also continued to apply wargaming in the military education and training systems.
The joint community’s games emphasize evaluation and rehearsal of near-term plans,
as well as joint education and training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, their chairman, and
the Joint Staff provide guidance for these wargames. Most joint games are actually
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conducted by the combatant commanders. Within the U.S. military there are six geographic commands and three functional commands. The geographic commands are (at
the time of writing)
U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM),
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM),
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM),
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
Each is responsible for joint (multiservice) training and operations in its assigned geographic “area of responsibility.” The functional commands are
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM),
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
Each is responsible for performing a specific function globally. For example, USTRANSCOM provides strategic lift (via air, sea, or land) worldwide.
Two principal documents tell the COCOMs what wargames they are to conduct. The
first is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This classified document tells each combat10
ant command what contingencies it is to prepare to address. For each the COCOM
either updates an existing plan or creates a new one. Wargames are conducted at two
points in this process. First, after a small strategy cell develops (typically) three alternative strategies, courses of action, the team conducts a fast, informal wargame of each.
The outcome becomes the principal basis on which a single COA is recommended to the
combatant commander. The COA selected, and often modified, by the combatant commander is then developed by his or her (the commander of Northern Command, as this
is prepared for press, is Gen. Lori J. Robinson, USAF) own joint staff into a draft plan.
When the draft plan is fairly complete, a second, much larger wargame is conducted to
look for errors and gaps.
The second document is the annual plan for CJCS’s Exercise Program. This program
is the chairman’s principal vehicle for joint and multinational training. Many listed
exercises involve the militaries of friendly nations and are also tools for strengthening
international cooperation. A fraction of these exercises are also wargames. An exercise in the program preparing for a humanitarian mission is not a wargame: no armed
opposition is anticipated. When the required exercise prepares for an armed conflict,
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the COCOM “stands up” a Red cell to play likely adversary responses to Blue actions
and an adjudication cell to estimate the net effects of Blue and Red actions. In short,
the exercise becomes a wargame. In some cases the timing is such that the exercise can
contribute to a JSCP-required new or updated plan.
Some joint commands conduct wargames not called for by JSCP. For example, as we
have seen, USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with the Naval War College, conducts
DEGRE (Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review), an operational/strategic-level
game on escalation dynamics when approaching or crossing the nuclear threshold. Also,
USSOCOM, which has “organize, train, and equip” responsibilities similar to those of
a service, conducts a Title 10–like game, Shadow Warrior, annually. Shadow Warrior
2014’s capstone was held 26 October through 6 November, with participants from across
the U.S. government as well as international partners. The purpose was to explore
unconventional warfare (specifically, supporting insurgents) as a strategic policy
11
option.
Most COCOMs have a dedicated wargaming/exercise center. For example, the Warrior
Preparation Center supports U.S. European Command. U.S. Special Operations Com12
mand has the newest, most futuristic wargaming facility. U.S. Pacific Command has
13
two, the Pacific Warfighting Center in Hawaii and the Korean Air Simulation Center.
The chairman is also responsible for education and training in joint functions. Joint education is conducted through the Joint Flag Officers Course, National Defense University (specifically the Joint Forces Staff College), and service schools—wargaming plays a
role in all. The seniormost program is the Joint Flag Officers Course, which officers are
selected to attend on being chosen to receive second stars. They are selected on the basis
of whether they can be expected to command joint forces in the future. Many students
go on to become joint force commanders and members of the Joint Staff. Roughly half
of the two-week course is a wargame. The National Defense University is the senior
service school for all likely candidates for joint assignments. Many members of the Joint
Staff are NDU alumni. NDU’s Center for Applied Strategic Learning runs wargames for
NDU’s core curriculum and electives. The Joint Forces Staff College, the “phase two”
school for officers bound for joint jobs, offers a spectrum of courses, each designed to
prepare students for a different type of joint position. Operational-level games are key
elements of most of the courses. “Phase one” of joint training is received at the service
school, through core curricula and electives. The most prominent joint elective is still
JLASS (see chapters 3 and 4).
Even fewer names are known from wargaming in the combatant commands—only Col.
Gary Ware, USAF, and he because of the Gulf War. Due to the often-classified nature of
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their work they are seldom known beyond their circle of colleagues and the commanders who have come to rely on the insights they provide.
The Air Force. The Air Force has continued to conduct two “standing” Title 10
wargames, one set typically ten to twelve years in the future, the other typically twenty
to twenty-four. The Air Force Chief of Staff establishes each wargame and designates
a Deputy Chief of Staff as “executive agent,” who in turn designates a directorate and
a division for planning and execution. Headquarters, Air Force’s Directorate of Plans
and Requirements until recently conducted the Air Force’s “midterm” wargame, Unified Engagement, which we introduced and brought up through 2011 in chapter 5.
Since 2006 its location has alternated between Europe and the Pacific. This is done to
involve Air Force major commands directly that would have to fight and to secure joint
14
theater-warfighter participation and insights. In 2016 the Air Force’s midterm Title 10
wargame returned to its original name, Global Engagement.
During most of this period Headquarters, Air Force’s Directorate of Strategic Plans
and Programs was the executive agent for the other Air Force Title 10 wargame, the Air
Force Future Capabilities Wargame—Futures Game for short or FG for still shorter.
(See chapters 4 and 5 for the earlier FGs.) It is still set in the “far-term” future, twenty to
twenty-four years from the year conducted; for example, Futures Game 2015 was set in
2035.
Unified Engagement 2012’s capstone game was held 3–14 December 2012 at the Edelweiss Conference Center, Germany, after twenty pregame events extending over
eighteen months. More than 360 military and civilian representatives from the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, Denmark, and the
Netherlands participated. The nearly two years of effort gave its cyber warfare play
15
in particular scope and credibility beyond that of previous Unified Engagements.
Concepts explored included AirSea Battle, operational access, integrated air and missile
defense, and strategic capabilities. Perhaps most interesting were the implications of
16
having a single air commander support two combatant commanders.
In 2013 the Futures Game’s full name, which for a while had been reduced to those two
words, returned to something similar to its original, longer one, but most continued
to refer to it as “FG.” The capstone of what was properly Air Force Future Capabilities
17
Wargame 2013 was held at Maxwell AFB from 10 to 15 March. Its two hundred–plus
participants represented all U.S. services, the Department of Defense and Joint Staff, the
intelligence community, and our British, Australian, and Canadian allies. Objectives
included examination of basing, countering missiles, execution speed, and threats to
airpower. The scenario was set in 2032, in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility, and it involved coping with a Red antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.
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On 6 October 2014, as part of an overall headquarters reorganization, the two Air Force
Title 10 wargaming executive agents merged into one directorate, AF/A5/8. Thereafter both Air Force Title 10 games were executed by a single division, the Wargaming Division (A5SW). The future-force and operational-concepts strengths remained
mostly intact, but after Unified Engagement 2014 and Futures Game 2015, headquarters
wargaming would directly serve the new Air Force Strategy, Planning, and Programming Process and operate in close partnership with other Air Force wargaming centers.
The capstone of Air Force Future Capabilities Wargame 2015 was held during March
at Maxwell. The 230-plus participants again came from across the U.S. services and government as well as from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. The scenario was
very similar to that of FG13, with intelligence projections extended to 2035. As is the
norm for FGs, there were two cost-neutral Blue teams—that is, the alternative force had
fifteen potential future systems added and an equal cost in programmed forces subtracted. Objectives again were basing and missile defense, as well as long-range operations and autonomy.
With Global Engagement 2016, the Air Force’s midterm Title 10 wargame reverted to
its original name. Once again the actual game was the culmination of many preparatory events. The capstone, held 10–13 September at the Warrior Preparation Center in
Germany, had nearly three hundred participants from across the Air Force, the other
services, combatant commands, the intelligence community, Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, and several American defense-related organizations. They focused on
operational agility.
When the secretary of defense and deputy secretary issued the memorandums we
examined above, the Air Staff, partly in response, expanded its wargaming repertoire.
For example, A5SW designed, developed, and provided the capabilities to execute a
wargame campaign in support of an enterprise capability collaboration team on future
air superiority. The culminating wargame was held 25–29 January 2016 at LCWI. The
Plan Blue game series was another initiative, a recurring forum for senior Air Force
leaders to develop and refine strategies and concepts of operations. The focus of Plan
Blue 2016, closely supported by RAND Project Air Force, was on basing, antiaccess / area
denial, and escalation-risk management. Actually, there were two wargames: one for
O-6s (colonels) was held in April 2016, both to test the game play and generate insight;
the all-general/flag game was held 9–13 May.
Finally, A5SW demonstrated a capability to develop and execute a number of smaller,
highly focused “quick turn” wargame–type events that meet specific requirements.
These have been collectively dubbed the “Agile” series, in Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
lexicon.
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It is clear this was a time of transition and opportunity, both at and below the headquarters level. The Air Force itself is organized into “major commands.” Most have
functional responsibilities (Air Force Space Command, or AFSPC, is responsible for
space; Air Mobility Command is responsible for the air transport of forces and for aerial
refueling). A few have geographic responsibilities (e.g., Pacific Air Forces, or PACAF, is
responsible for the Pacific region). Most functional major commands conduct annual or
biennial wargames covering all areas of warfare but primarily anticipating future needs
and opportunities in respective missions or areas of responsibility. Here are thumbnail
descriptions of each.
The mission of Air Combat Command (ACC) is to provide Air Force component units
for U.S. Central Command, Southern Command, Northern Command, and Strategic
Command. Accordingly, ACC wargames are primarily for training. They also provide
expertise on combat air forces to both Air Force Title 10 games. ACC’s best-known live
wargame is Red Flag (see chapters 3–5), but it is just one of several “flag” wargames.
The next best known is Blue Flag, which trains participants to fight at the operational/
theater level.
The Air Education and Training Command recruits, trains, and educates airmen to
deliver airpower for America. The command’s wargame element is the LeMay Center
Wargaming Institute, whose mission is to provide wargame support to courses offered
by Air University, including the Air War College, Air Command and Staff College,
Squadron Officer College, Commanders’ Professional Development School, and the Air
Force Judge Advocate General’s School. LCWI also hosts the Air Force’s far-term Title
10 wargame and Air Force Space Command’s Schriever wargame, as well as supporting
games for allied nations.
LCWI undertook a transformational effort starting August 2013 aimed at delivering
the full spectrum of wargame content and technological capacity envisioned in LCWI’s
1983 charter. On the wargame front, the emphasis has been on exporting “tradecraft” to
operational clients in addition to educational wargames to PME schools. Recent successes include clients from PACAF, Global Strike Command, Eighteenth Air Force, and the
Air Force Research Laboratory. These events range from hosting games or tabletop exercises to “turnkey” operations involving game design, scenario development, technical
support, and postevent analysis. On the technology front, a major effort has been under
way to distribute wargaming tools via the Air Force’s unclassified network. A number
of clients already use LCWI’s wargaming “Gateway” to utilize these tools. Additionally,
LCWI is updating its classified wargaming network with the same suite of tools.
With the recent emphasis on wargaming by the former secretary of defense, the future
looks very bright. In April 2015, AFWI hosted a SecDef (secretary of defense) Defense
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Innovation Initiative, where a number of clients tested technologies and concepts that
could be strategic “game changers.” According to Col. Walter H. Ward Jr., LCWI’s director, speaking in 2015, “The creativity and imagination of American Airmen have always
been the engine of innovation, but the growth of wargaming tradecraft will bring those
ideas to life faster and change the equation of time in our favor where adversaries will
now be trying to adapt and keep pace with us . . . [which is] as it should be.”
LCWI’s tools include the SIMWAR engine, a discrete-event combat-simulation system.
It was designed to support the Air University schools in teaching combat doctrine. It
allows instructors to define scenarios that support specific educational goals. LCWI
is currently (2017) evaluating Joint Theater Level Simulation–Global Operations as a
replacement to SIMWAR.
The Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) develops and provides combat-ready
forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike. AFGSC’s wargame branch supports
wargames at the OSD, service, and major-command levels, ensuring the accurate depiction of nuclear or global-strike forces through all phases of conflict. In 2013, AFGSC
hosted and executed its first command wargame, Strategic Vigilance. Held biennially
for operational-level planning, its findings are briefed to the AFGSC senior staff and
entered into the DoD Wargame Repository for wide dissemination. A companion game
to Strategic Vigilance is USSTRATCOM’s Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review,
18
which considers strategic-level planning of nuclear and other national-level assets.
It is the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) that conducts the research, development,
testing, evaluation, acquisition management, and logistics support necessary to keep the
service’s weapon systems ready for war. Its wargame branch supports Air Force Title 10
wargames by ensuring that theater impacts of weapons are faithfully represented and
assessing the technical and cost plausibility of any depicted future system. AFMC also
leads the Agile Combat Support / Science and Technology Wargame / Alternate Force
Workshop (held every other year at LCWI), both in the preparation for the Futures
Game and for its own use.
The creation of the Agile Combat Support / Science and Technology Wargame /
Alternate Force Workshop required three organizations to join forces. In 2011 Simon
Kippin of the Royal Air Force was finding it difficult to assemble sufficient resources to
continue the RAF’s Future Air and Space Operating Concepts game (see chapter 5). At
the same time the author was trying to find sufficient resources to maintain a similar
game conducted by AFRL and initiate another to serve AFMC’s interests. Meeting at a
Futures Game preparatory event, we realized that by conducting the game together we
could achieve a “critical mass.”
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The first AFMC wargame was held in 2012 at Maxwell and drew fifty-two participants
from across the U.S. Air Force, the Royal Air Force, and the U.S. Navy. It explored
forty American and a dozen British concepts and tried new methods of adjudicating
the impact of “agile combat support.” The second AFMC game, held in 2014 also at
Maxwell, with eighty participants from all U.S. services as well as the air forces of the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, explored fifty-two American and nineteen
British concepts. Also, AFMC partnered with the Air Mobility Command to expand
its GLOMO workshop/wargame to depict more fully the challenges of deploying forces
into forward bases, especially in an A2/AD environment. In 2016 AFMC held the first,
groundbreaking Long Duration Logistics Wargame. Eighty participants over nine days
extended wargame play a full six months into the conflict, generating insights into the
logistical and infrastructure status of U.S. forces after six months of warfare. These
insights were of direct interest to AFMC and contributed to those produced by the Air
19
Force’s Global Engagement 2016.
The Air Force Reserve Command provides combat-ready units for active duty whenever
there are not enough trained units in the regular component of the Air Force to perform
a national-security mission. Individual reservists are often called up to meet the workload of large wargames, but there seems to be no command role in gaming.
The Air Force Space Command, as we’ve seen, is devoted to the development and operation of military space and cyberspace technologies. AFSPC’s wargame branch supports
Title 10 games by ensuring that Blue, Red, and Gray (neutral) play in the space and
cyber domains is authentic. AFSPC also leads the Schriever wargame (see chapters 4 and
5), both, again, in preparation for the midterm Title 10 game and to generate insights of
relevance across the U.S. space and cyber communities and specifically for AFSPC itself.
The Air Force Special Operations Command provides Air Force component units for the
U.S. Special Operations Command. Its wargame branch primarily supports USSOCOM
gaming and the two Air Force Title 10 wargames.
The wargame branch of the Air Mobility Command (AMC), whose mission we mentioned above, provides global air mobility through airlift and aerial refueling for all of
the U.S. armed forces. AMC supports both Air Force Title 10 games. It also conducts an
internal event, the Global Mobility Exercise (see chapter 5). In 2014 GLOMO was jointly
hosted by AMC and AFMC and its scope was expanded from examining strategic mobility to include basing at forces’ forward destinations. This more comprehensive look at
the challenges of deploying forward required the participation to increase from typically
fifty to seventy.
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The mission of Pacific Air Forces is to supply Air Force components for the U.S. Pacific
Command. PACAF’s wargaming primarily supports USPACOM gaming. However,
when Unified Endeavor is held in the Pacific, PACAF is heavily involved.
U.S. Air Forces in Europe provides Air Force units to the U.S. European Command, and its
gamers primarily support USEUCOM, except when Global Engagement is held in Europe.

The Air Force, of course, also uses games to educate and train. Educational wargames
are under the direction of the Air Education and Training Command and are predominantly run at the LeMay Center Wargaming Institute for Air University (see chapters
3–5), although the university’s schools sometimes create or contract for their own
games. Air Force wargames used for advanced training come under the Air Combat
Command: Red Flag, Blue Flag (chapters 3 and 4), and Virtual Flag (chapter 5). This
period also saw the final Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment, in 2012. (It was disestablished in 2013 with the closure of the Air Force Command and Control Integration
20
Center.) It is clear that from George Kenney (as a captain, later as a general) to Col.
Richard “Moody” Suter, to Col. Dean Pappas, and to Gary “Mo” Morgan (as a captain,
later lieutenant colonel), the Air Force has had a long history of wargame innovation.
The Navy. Perhaps more than any other service, the Navy has experienced transition
in wargaming in this period. During the summer of 2014, Dean Robert Rubel, who had
been, as we’ve seen, the enabler of wargaming success at the College for over a decade,
retired. While missed, he had built and nurtured a strong team who continued to innovate after his departure.
Naval wargaming as a whole, in fact, had achieved many successes. The U.S. Navy
entered this time of transition with a more appropriate menu of wargame activities than
any other American service. It continues to be conducted principally at the Naval War
College, by its War Gaming Department. It was perhaps the wargaming department
most ready for the transition toward conventional war against a roughly equal adversary, yet it continues to explore the types of highly asymmetric threats that have not
gone away.
The Navy’s resurrected Title 10 wargame, the Global War Game (sometimes now called
Navy Global), continues to explore whatever issues are most pressing to the Navy’s
senior uniformed officer, the Chief of Naval Operations. In all cases the CNO’s “executive agent” is, as it has been, the College’s War Gaming Department. As have all of them
since the first in 1979, Global continues to be held there. During Global 2012 over two
hundred participants explored command and control while commanding forces in
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multiple domains against a “net peer.”21 The game indicated that then-current C2 structures were inadequate for cross-domain operations at the operational level.
Global 2013 explored three options for commanding such operations better. Informed
by two pregame workshops that explored first hardware and then procedural options,
the seventy-two players split into three teams, each employing one of the options. For
example, one team played “Domain [surface, subsurface, etc.] Commanders,” another
“Cross-Domain Commanders.” Red play was a preplanned series of vignettes, all featuring high-stress A2/AD environments. Insights were reported to nineteen American and
22
international flag and general officers.
By 2014 there was a draft concept for command and control of cross-domain forces in
an A2/AD environment. The need was to explore and refine it. In early September over
eighty individuals from all U.S. services and those of Australia, Canada, Japan, and
the United Kingdom participated in Global 2014 at the Naval War College’s wargame
23
center. The results argued a need for commanders of not only cyber and space domains
but of logistics forces as well. Finally, the postgame analysis concluded, successful
24
implementation would require education, training, and practice. During 2015 and
2016, Global continued to explore challenges faced by our Pacific Fleet. Instead of single
large annual wargames they each comprised several smaller games, four in 2015 and
three in 2016. As all these games were run at the top-secret level, little information was
25
released.
Games are also conducted at the request of the Navy’s “communities”—surface, subsurface, and air. Many of these are run by the War Gaming Department, others by the
College’s Strategic and Operational Research Department or defense contractors, such
as the Center for Defense Analyses. The Naval War College has expanded its internal
wargames that both educate students and generate insights for decision makers (see the
previous chapter). These now include several Special Advanced Research Programs:
Halsey Alfa, which examines potential near-future air/sea warfare in the Pacific theater, is one of the seminars into which the original Halsey Group was subdivided (see
chapter 5). It still may be the most successful, with influence that may be second only to
Global’s. Halsey Bravo now focuses on potential near-future naval and air combat in the
U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The Gravely Group, led by Dr. William F.
“Will” Bundy, still concerns itself with ballistic missile defense and conflict avoidance,
as well as integration of air and missile defense. In 2013, Japanese students attending
the Naval War College joined the group. The Mahan Scholars seminar explores nuclear
deterrence and escalation; its work is classified top secret. Its faculty leader, Dr. Stephen
Downes-Martin, developed many innovative techniques for analyzing how decisions are
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made, by both players and adjudicators. Dr. Downes-Martin retired on 31 March 2015,
but his techniques are now applied across the Naval War College.
Wargaming also supports the Navy’s education and training missions, beyond the College. It is part of the curriculum at the Naval Academy, in Annapolis, Maryland, as well
as of the senior and intermediate courses at the Naval War College. A wargame, for example, is the capstone event of the core curriculum’s Joint Military Operations trimester. Wargaming also supports several elements of naval training. Best known are the live
wargame elements such as Top Gun, but ships’ crews often participate in games set in
what will soon be their deployment areas, from on board their ships, alongside the pier.
Finally, wargames, particularly at the Naval War College, continue to provide a benefit
that is often overlooked yet is important and likely to become more so in the coming
years—socialization. Naval War College wargames have fostered maritime cooperation
among the world’s navies, improved cooperation between the Navy and the Department
of Homeland Security, and helped raise cooperation between the American, Canadian,
and Mexican navies to a new level.
Looking forward, the War Gaming Department faculty foresees the need of and opportunity for still greater contributions from gaming. In the near term, the department
plans to focus more on the human decision-making process as was advocated by Profes26
sor Downes-Martin. Not neglecting technology, it is developing software that will
make communication among the players faster and easier and introducing really large
maps (twenty-four by forty-four feet, in one case).
Other needed changes are anticipated to take longer. The demands of joint accreditation have squeezed space for wargaming in the College’s curriculum. For reasons that
will be explained in chapter 10, that trend needs to be reversed. The College’s gamers
also feel the Navy needs to look deeper (in terms of game time) into campaigns; few
contemporary games now play more than a week of game time. The history of wargaming includes example after example of leaders misled by games that did not look deep
enough into a conflict. The Naval War College is the “motherhouse” of wargaming in
the U.S. military.
This period did see one Navy wargame effort terminated. Founded in 1981, the Chief
of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group (see chapters 3 and 4) used wargaming to
explore the Navy’s toughest challenges. Its eighteen to twenty-two members conducted
two wargames a year to explore future operational and warfighting concepts generated
27
in response to the CNO’s annual theme. The program was terminated in mid-2016.
Still continuing, however—as part of a program at the Naval Air Weapons Station
China Lake, California—is the Navy’s pioneering live wargame made famous by the
movie Top Gun (see chapters 3–5).
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From the father of American wargaming, William McCarty Little, to all those who
fought and refought War Plan Orange during the interwar years, to Dennis Callan,
Francis McHugh, Orville “Bud” Hay, Larry Bond, Robert “Barney” Rubel, and Stephen
Downes-Martin, the Navy too has produced generations of wargame innovators.
The Marine Corps. During this period the U.S. Marine Corps conducted wargames
from the fire-team level up. However, the bulk of its gaming continues to be conducted
at the Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia. The two major (but not exclusive) homes
of wargaming there are the Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory.
The Marine Corps University consists of two colleges, three courses, and several classes.
The application of wargaming within each part varies with its mission. The Marine
Corps War College prepares its students to assume senior leadership positions in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. The Marine Corps Command and Staff College
equips officers to serve as commanders and staff officers of combat units in joint, interagency, and coalition environments. The School of Advanced Warfighting attempts to
forge the next generation of Marine Corps strategists. The Expeditionary Warfare School
is the Marines’ school of combat leadership, where young Marine officers learn how to
“fight the force.” The School of MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) Logistics is
particularly important to the Marine Corps, which often needs ways to deliver logistical
support where it appears impossible.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory conducts wargaming through its Marine
28
Corps Wargaming Division. The division remains the only major gaming function in
the U.S. defense establishment not subordinate to a war or staff college. The mission of
the Wargaming Division continues to be to plan and execute the Marines’ Wargaming
Program and act as the service’s cognizant entity for gaming matters. Assigned tasks
(aside from those already discussed or that might be presumed) include supporting
experimentation and other combat development and assisting the Warfighting Laboratory in creating conditions that allow risk taking and reduce later real-world surprises in
ways that are difficult to reproduce in experimentation, exercises, or operations.
However, running the Marine Corps’s Title 10 wargame, Expeditionary Warrior, continues to be the division’s single largest task. The purpose of EW11 reflected the transition then ongoing. Instead of focusing on terrorism or unconventional conflict it was
to examine employment of Marine forces within a joint context in an access-challenged
environment. EW11’s themes also reflected this change; they were joint operational access and enhanced MAGTF operations.

on wargaming  

235

EW11 also “fed” EW12, which examined the joint and naval force’s ability to overcome
29
antiaccess/area-denial challenges. EW13 examined a very different situation. Instead
of examining how forces could best fight their way into a contested theater, it explored
the benefits and risks of having some Marine forces in theater before any crisis. EW13
looked at how a modest force could maintain awareness of the operational environment
and act early in a crisis, in a variety of ways. The game’s insights contributed to the
development of Expeditionary Force 21, the Marines’ capstone concept, one that would
30
guide their development of capabilities over the ten years following the wargame.
Expeditionary Warrior 2014 looked at how the Marines and the Navy might reorganize
the command and staff elements of their combat forces to increase their effectiveness in
peace and war. Specifically, EW14 depicted the employment of an integrated maritime
operations center so as to improve the effectiveness of a Navy/Marine force, as well as a
regionally focused Marine expeditionary brigade headquarters, with the expectation of
improving both peacetime engagement with friendly nations and crisis response with
those same nations. The Blue participants were divided into three cells of roughly thirtyfive, each organized around a different option for an integrated maritime operations
center and a regionally focused MEB headquarters. Each Blue cell then planned and
executed operations, all three against identical Reds and in identical scenarios. While
all Blue cells seemed to show that greater integration and closer cooperation had merit,
much work remained. EW14’s “quick-look report” advocated additional exercises and
experiments to help find the optimal level of integration and the modifications to doc31
trine, procedures, and regulation needed.
EW15 examined the impact of concepts, capacities, and capabilities bearing on the Marines’ ability to conduct, as part of a joint, combined task force, littoral operations in an
A2/AD situation. Its capstone took place 23–27 February 2015, the senior leader outbrief
32
that May. Finally, EW16, held 14–18 March 2016, continued to explore A2/AD in the
context of increased Russian aggression in the Baltics and a NATO response. This shift
from USPACOM to USEUCOM tested the Marine Corps’s ability to conduct expeditionary operations as part of a composite force in any clime and place.
During this time the Marines also initiated a Title 10–like wargame called Elegant Potential. Designed to explore potential conflicts from a whole-of-government, whole-ofresources-available (i.e., nongovernmental organizations) viewpoint, Elegant Potential
33
brought together leaders from a broad spectrum of organizations.
The training of Marine higher headquarters staffs and their commanders remains the
34
responsibility of the MAGTF Staff Training Program. The program serves all three
“numbered” Marine air-ground task forces—I MEF, II MEF, III MEF—as well as their
35
subordinate Marine amphibious brigades. For wargames these headquarters are often
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augmented by personnel from other services (making the games joint), officers from
allied and friendly countries (making them combined), and individuals from non-DoD
government agencies (and so interagency). The training is designed to be realistic and
challenging, largely by virtue of a tough, smart Red. The value of the training is further
enhanced in frank, detailed after-action reviews of the performance of the commanders
and their staffs. The Staff Training Program’s complement of active-duty and reserve
Marines (and six retired lieutenant generals who serve as mentors) is large enough to
run each of the Corps’s higher headquarters through the training roughly every twentyfour months.
The Marines have also been working to expand and modernize their modest live
wargaming. Among the options they are considering is an augmented-reality system
36
that superimposes images of threat forces on real terrain.
Command elements from MAGTFs to companies also used wargaming in operational
planning, with methods similar to those used by the geographic combatant commanders. Following the guidance of Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1, Marine Corps
Planning Process, unit leaders and their staffs conduct fast, (relatively) simple games on
each of their final three COAs and maybe a longer game of the nearly completed plan if
time permits.
During this period the Marines have continued their time-honored tradition of innovating on a shoestring. In April 2015, Paul Nichols, retired gunnery sergeant and project
officer with PM TRASYS Contractor Support, secured 260 old Marine Corps computers that were scheduled to be destroyed and provided them to a single battalion. As the
computers were excess, there were no restrictions on software. This allowed Mr. Nichols
to load a broad range of wargame software that allowed all levels of battalion leaders
to build, tailor, and execute games appropriate to their authority. The games proved so
popular with all ranks that a drop in disciplinary issues was observed. More important37
ly, the battalion was repeatedly recognized for its effectiveness in exercises.
It appears at this writing that Marine Corps wargaming for the training of individual
38
Marines and small units is at something of a crossroads. Some are advocating using
contractors to push the boundaries of technology to create high-end games that can
execute “live, virtual, and constructive” (LVC) at the same time. Others are advocating
simpler wargames that Marines can learn and create scenarios for at schoolhouses and
bring back into the field with them after graduation. The U.S. Army has shown that LVC
wargames at places like the National Training Center can enhance training. The Marines’ own experience with the Deployable Virtual Training Environment (DVTE) and
39
individual game initiatives demonstrates the importance of accessibility. Perhaps the
best answer is to do both. Whatever happens, if past is prologue to future, wargaming
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in the Marine Corps will be characterized by individual initiative, innovation, common
sense, and putting the rifleman first.
From John Schmitt to former commandant Gen. Al Gray, to William “Bill” Simpson
and Dr. William “Bill” Lademan, the U.S. Marine Corps has produced a long line of
wargame advocates and innovators.
The Army. Unified Quest (see chapter 5) remains the Army Chief of Staff’s annual
Title 10 wargame. It is still designed to examine issues critical to current and future
force development. Like all Title 10 games there is much more to Unified Quest than the
wargame itself. The Army refers to the overall effort as a “campaign of learning.” After
a dozen years without dedicated deep-future games, Unified Quest 2013 returned to the
40
2030–40 time frame. UQ13 was held 15–20 September 2013 at the Army’s Center for
Strategic Leadership.
The Army also added a second “futures wargame.” Called the Army Warfighter Assessment this new annual wargame addresses emerging technology-enabled concepts in a joint
41
environment. The first was held in 2016 and involved sister services and six allied nations.
The Army continued to make extensive use of wargames to educate and train. Wargaming is an integral part of the curricula at the Army War College, Command and General
Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies, attached to the Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. While most of the center’s students are junior
officers being instructed in their specialties (armor, communications, etc.), some are
learning to be Red team gamers. The pinnacle of Army training remains the National
Training Center. Through LVC wargaming, the Army trains entire brigades there. Virtual wargaming is also used at Army bases that are home to maneuver units.
From the foundations of U.S. Army wargaming by Major Livermore through the early
faculty at the Command and General Staff College, to Col. Raymond Macedonia, to
the Army’s best-known wargame innovator, Col. Casey Wardynski, the U.S. Army has
produced key players in the evolution of wargaming.
Other Government Wargaming. There is a modest amount of gaming outside the
Department of Defense but inside the government, and it has increased, again modestly,
in the last dozen years. One cause is the attacks of 9/11 and the resulting emphasis on
homeland security. The Department of Homeland Security conducts games to help
anticipate and explore options for reacting to threats. A second cause is the increased
emphasis in DoD on finding interagency strategies to deal with challenges ranging from
counterinsurgency and counterpiracy to the building of partner capacity. There are a
handful of other applications. For example, the CIA uses a wargame to help its civilian
analysts learn about U.S. and non-U.S. military power.
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Commercial. While the American military has largely transitioned from terrain-table
and manual map wargames to computerized constructive, virtual, and live ones (along
with expert panels at the operational and strategic levels), many private gamers continue
to play the miniatures and paper varieties, though the lead of computer wargames continues to grow. As for types, constructive and virtual are rebounding, and there is some
movement toward live games.
Miniatures, the first form of civilian second-generation wargame, continues its slow
but steady growth. Despite predictions that first print, then computer, wargames would
make miniatures obsolete, a small but noticeable number of new people attend miniatures conventions each year. Sales of new products mirror this mini-trend.
Print/paper/board wargames have continued to struggle back from their near-death
experience of the late 1990s. For the first time in decades, new publishers are entering
the market, and stores that had stopped carrying print wargames are doing so again.
However, few of the customers lost to computer and role-playing games have returned,
and the number of young people starting to play paper wargames remains small. The
engine for the recovery continues to be advances in desktop publishing, now augmented
by the new channel of downloadable wargames. Publishers have discovered they can
make a profit on smaller print runs. Selling fewer copies of more titles can increase their
overall sales. The result is more choices for consumers.
Something similar is starting to happen to computer wargames. The “Hollywood effect” that captured the recreational software/video-game industry around the turn of
the century is as strong as ever. As the cost of producing the top-tier games continues
to rise, publishers continue to think like their moviemaker counterparts: they go with
sequels (Grand Theft Auto) and other titles they expect to have the huge sales they need
to recoup their outlays. Nevertheless, the recovery of computer wargames is being aided
by what I call the “iTunes effect.” Just as musicians discovered that making songs easier
and cheaper to buy increases sales, so computer wargame developers are discovering
the benefits of selling online. Lately, some have dropped their prices, expecting to make
up the loss in volume. The incremental cost of a download is negligible. As some games
are starting to be made/adapted for smartphones and tablets, I expect that volume to
increase further. More about this below.
Of course, the number of consumers participating in virtual games—the massive,
multiplayer online games—is huge today. However, most are set in fantasy worlds, not
simulating real armed conflict. However, there seems to be a modest increase in the
number of consumers logging on to virtual spaces with military themes and, say, flying
their B-17s over the heart of the Nazi empire.
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There even seem to be early indications that live wargaming may become popular.
Reenactors have been around for years, but they would concentrate on ensuring that
their uniforms were authentic. Now, Martin van Creveld reports, some are refighting
42
battles. Similarly, paintball and laser tag have been around for years. Most sessions
continue to be free-for-alls, simulating anarchy more than warfare. However, there have
been recent reports of team play that looks a bit like contemporary warfare.
American commercial wargaming has been a major force in the advancement of
wargaming: from Charles Roberts, who introduced second-generation wargaming to
the civilian community; to Jim Dunnigan, who catalyzed an explosion in the numbers
of designers and publishers; to the early computer wargamers Chris Crawford, Gary
Grigsby, and John Tiller; to Joe Miranda, who pioneered wargaming human factors; and
to Mark Herman, an innovator who did more than anyone else to bring together the
commercial and military wings of wargaming.
Academic. One of the first applications of second-generation wargaming was in the
military’s academic institutions. After discussions with military people from roughly
sixty nations, I have yet to learn of a single war or staff college that does not use
43
wargaming as a teaching tool. A few, such as the German war college, as we’ve seen,
actually teach their students how to run games as an integral part of planning after they
graduate.
There continues to be only limited wargaming in American civilian academia. See
appendix C for the few exceptions. Again, most of what does take place is in courses
on military history and defense and diplomatic studies. Seeing the billions of dollars
in annual sales of computer games, a small but growing number of civilian colleges are
beginning to offer courses in how to create computer games, including wargames. In
most cases, these courses teach “bricklayers, not architects”—that is, they instruct in
44
programming to code a game, not design one. There are a few exceptions.
International Wargaming
A significant percentage of American military wargames include international participants. More often than not, Title 10 games invite allies. The most frequently seen
participating nations are the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. However, participation by other countries is not unknown. A fairly recent Global involved the navies
of fifty-one nations. Even the typically classified wargame and exercises conducted in
response to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan sometimes draw representation by regional allies. None are more closely knit than the U.S. / South Korean live and constructive games. Red Flag brags about how many of the world’s air forces have participated in
one or more of its events.
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Multinational Military/Governmental Wargaming. Nor are all international wargames
hosted by the United States. A great many are run by NATO, including games in Sweden
specifically designed for nations belonging to the Partnership for Peace. Other nations
conduct live games similar to Red Flag, and they too invite the air forces of friendly
nations. Two examples: Canada has long held Maple Flag, inviting the U.S. and other
friendly air forces, and the Israelis have recently begun a live air wargame they are calling Blue Flag and have invited the U.S. Air Force to participate. Finally, many nations
(like the United States) invite officers from friendly nations to attend their war and
staff colleges. These students play their host nations’ wargames. Hence, when American
officers attend Germany’s or the United Kingdom’s war college they play that nation’s
games—and vice versa.
Where a nation mostly sends its officers abroad to war and sometimes staff colleges
can be a window into how that nation conducts its own wargames and war planning.
Smaller nations, “developing” or not, often do not have a war college and maybe not a
staff college. Nations that once sent their officers to Soviet war colleges still, in many
cases, game using Soviet methods. Nations that were once part of the British Empire
tend to send all or many of their top officers to British schools, where they learn British
wargaming methods.
Finally, not all international wargaming involves the United States. Since 2005, Russia
45
and China have held an annual live wargame/exercise called Peace Mission. Russia’s
contribution to Peace Mission 2013 was the largest to a wargame since the Soviet era:
46
160,000 troops, five thousand tanks, 130 aircraft, and seventy ships. This was a true
47
wargame, with phases for planning, deployment, and simulated combat. Also, in 2012
two Israeli papers reported on plans for a live wargame/exercise that would include
48
forces from Russia, China, Iran, and Syria.
National Military/Governmental Wargaming. Here is a little of what is known about
49
the wargaming activities of specific nations. Many South American navies participate
in Argentina’s Jupiter naval wargame. The last few years have also been a time of transition for the Australian wargaming community. In 2011 Australia produced a new Simulation Strategy and Roadmap. Change came fast; in December 2012 a proposal was made
to create the Australian Defence Simulation and Training Centre, under a one-star, and,
by merging the Australian Defence Simulation Office and the Joint Combined Training
Capacity, to establish the core simulation capability of a defense synthetic environment.
50
Just a few months later, in March 2013, the government approved this proposal. That
September, the Simulation and Training Centre became operational, consolidating the
51
Simulation Office, Training Capacity, and several other entities.
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Australia has made increasingly sophisticated use of wargames as part of a major effort
to evolve its military capabilities to meet future needs. At the beginning of the century
(see previous chapter) it set out to develop a system to anticipate what would be needed
by the time new systems could be developed and fielded, Concept Development and
Experimentation. A spectrum of wargames was critical for this process, offering insight
52
into concept effectiveness in the face of likely countermeasures.
Other elements of Australian wargaming demonstrate both continuity and change.
In July 2013, for the fifth time, the combined U.S./Australian live wargame Talisman
Sabre was held. It drew roughly the same numbers of military personnel as in previous years (twenty-one thousand American and seven thousand Australian) but saw a
major increase in participation by other government agencies (of both governments)
and nongovernmental organizations. Australia is also continuing to use wargaming to
strengthen cooperative relationships with other militaries around it. For example, the
2012 Pitch Black saw participation by the Indonesian air force for the first time. Australia also continued to participate in many U.S. wargames.
Australia, finally, is one of the few nations with domestic publishers of all types of
commercial games—miniatures, print, and computer. Perhaps in part because of that,
in December 2014 Australia became the third nation to host a Connections wargaming conference, through the initiative of Todd Mason, Mariana Zafeirakopoulos, and
Marcus Carter. This inaugural event attracted thirty-eight participants.
Canada participates extensively in U.S. and NATO wargames. Canada is represented
in American Title 10 games and in games with the other navies of North America—the
U.S. and Mexican. Its Maple Flag live wargames host many friendly nations, including
the United States.
In China, the study of war and the use of wargaming extends back to the dawn of history. The Chinese have used modern wargaming since at least the Korean War. While
China has periodic concerted efforts to learn American wargaming methods (some
mentioned in previous chapters, others in recent years), some elements of Chinese
wargaming are indigenous and unique. The wargaming laboratory at China’s National
53
Defense University has turned out modern game-support software. It has conducted
54
pol-mil wargames extending four to six decades into the future. In recent years it has
repeatedly announced efforts to expand wargaming throughout the armed forces, both
to address the declining combat experience of its military and to catch up with the
55
West.
China has also announced its intention to catch up to the United States in the firstperson shooters and other virtual-environment wargames. Perhaps the first product
of this effort is Glorious Mission, a first-person shooter game described as the Chinese
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answer to America’s Army. While no “bad guy” is named, players fight an enemy who
56
employs American weapons. On the other hand, China appears to have lagged behind
the United States in live wargaming, with respect to both technology and procedures.
American commanders know they will probably lose at the National Training Center; China is not known to have facilities where that might be true. Perhaps because
“losing” a large exercise would be too public a loss of face, China’s live exercises are
choreographed affairs that the good guy (China) always wins. However, recently it has
been learned that the “good guy” does sometimes lose in constructive wargames, where
outcomes are not made public.
Germany’s national wargaming capability is centralized at the Military Academy of the
57
German Armed Forces (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg). Its Wargaming Center is an impressive, state-of-the-art facility. The academy especially trains
and educates staff officers and flag officers. Therefore, the wargaming there mainly
deals with the operational and strategic levels. The officer schools of the armed forces
(Bundeswehr) cover tactical command and control and hence wargame at that level. The
German army also runs a Battle Training and Exercise Center (Gefechtsübungszentrum
Heer), which allows “real” simulations of land-combat units up to brigade size. The live
exercises include soldiers, their arms, vehicles, etc., all applying a specific duel-simulation
system (Ausbildungsgerät Duellsimulator). They make for excellent wargaming—combat elements such as artillery fire, close air support, firefights, etc., are brought to bear
very efficiently and effectively.
Still, wargaming in the Bundeswehr is only nascent. It is limited to the use within
NATO, and “rolling dice in front of German flag officers is still a daring adventure.”
This is for historical and now legal reasons: while Germany has come to dominate the
world family-game market (many board games Americans assume are American were
58
actually designed in Germany), it cannot publish wargames, in any medium.
India, which learned wargaming as part of the staff process from the British, now
conducts a spectrum of games similar in scope to those of the United States. Its navy’s
wargaming is particularly robust. India also makes extensive use of live wargames/
exercises.
Of the world’s thirty-five strongest militaries, Iran’s (at twenty-second) is the only one
59
for which there seems to be no reference to military or governmental wargaming. In
fact, the only mention of wargaming in connection with Iran I know of is the following
curious story. In early 2012, an Iranian court sentenced to death a former U.S. Marine
of Iranian descent on charges of working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. One
of the counts against him was that he worked for a computer-wargame company funded
by the CIA. The purpose of the games, it was charged, was to manipulate domestic and
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world public opinion against the Iranian government by depicting Iran as the enemy.
While the individual did work for a computer-game publisher that did produce three
titles in which the Iranians were the “bad guys,” CIA funding is doubtful. Computer
60
games are far too profitable to need government funding.
Israel has a long history of extensive application of wargaming.61 But other than Israel’s
relatively new live wargame, Blue Flag, little is known of recent developments. There are
several Israeli computer-game development houses.
Japan has, since at least the early 1990s, participated in U.S. naval wargames and has
62
conducted its own gaming of roughly equal sophistication and scope. During this
period of transition the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force staff has begun conducting
wargames similar to the U.S. Title 10 games.
Mexico, in addition to working with the U.S. Naval War College to improve the
wargaming element of its own war college curriculum, participates in games with the
other navies of North America—the U.S. Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy.
Little direct information is available on Russia’s current wargaming methods. History
63
would suggest that it continues to use Soviet-era practices. If so, Russian wargames
make maximum use of historical data and are conducted as single moves, adjudicators
determining the outcome of the full plan for the battle or campaign being gamed. It is
known that wargaming in the Russian navy is very poor, being both procedurally and
technologically primitive. However, Russia has been making increasing (and widely
reported, and quite recent) use of live wargames/exercises. Finally, President Vladimir
Putin has stated that Russia would develop a wargame similar to America’s Army.
Sweden, the second nation to incorporate second-generation wargaming into its planning and military education systems, is currently taking the lead in NATO in the use of
wargames to develop military cooperation with the other Partnership for Peace nations.
Sweden’s wargaming center (Försvarets Krigsspelscentrum—literally, War Case Center)
is situated at the Armed Forces Headquarters in Stockholm. In 2006 the center was
relocated and combined with the Command Combat Center (Ledningsstridsskolan) in
Enköping. The Command Combat Center’s contemporary activities include simulator
support to large, high-level (brigade and above) staff exercises, such as the annual twoweek Combined Joint Staff Exercise organized by the Swedish Defense University and
attended by the Staff Course and Senior Staff Course. Notably, the Command Combat
Center’s role is to provide exercise facilities and simulation support (computers, soft64
ware, and networks), not pedagogical frameworks.
The United Kingdom, like so many nations, saw in the period following the coalition
withdrawal from Iraq both continuity and transition in its wargaming. The emphasis
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placed on wargaming by the United States had an effect on the British. One British
defense official has written,
In my discussions with the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, I was struck by how central and influential wargaming has become to DoD. As such, I am keen to understand how I can reinvigorate
wargaming across UK Defence. To do this, I would like to benchmark the UK’s Defence wargaming
capability against the US’s in order to learn valuable lessons from the US and to understand how we
can further strengthen our collaborative efforts in this area. To that end, your participation in this
survey would be greatly appreciated.65

As one product of this increased emphasis, during August 2017 the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence published Britain’s first wargame doctrine, the Wargaming
Handbook.
The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (see chapter 3) continued developing
66
its PSOM (chapter 5) software. By 2014 it was debugged and documented sufficiently
67
well to be employed with little if any Dstl support. Other British games moved increasingly toward hybrid adjudication, with computers for combat and manual methods for
relevant but “soft” factors that are difficult to quantify: terror, loyalty, confidence, and
68
love.
On 27 October 2016, Sir Gordon Messenger, vice-chief of the Defence Staff, met with
the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, then Robert O. Work, in Washington. General
Messenger produced a “tasker” memo on 4 November 2016 to determine the state of
British defense wargaming and solicit recommendations. In response Dstl and Maj.
Tom Mouat, MBE, British Army, produced a thirty-page report. At a follow-up meeting
on 24 November 2016 in the Ministry of Defence, the vice-chief called for more effort
69
on wargaming.
The British military continues to use wargames for combat training, force planning,
operations planning, staff training, and military education. It also still participates extensively in NATO and U.S. wargames. In each of these areas there has been innovation.
The British army still employs ABACUS (see chapter 4). The original code is over
70
thirty years old, but continuous development has kept it highly capable. Aside from
that economy, the United Kingdom spends, far and away, more money on wargames
and simulations that train leaders and troops than on all other applications combined.
These systems are explicitly designed to permit not only standard procedural training
(simulation) but also two-sided free play (wargaming). This training has a “crawl, walk,
run” pattern, employing in turn constructive, virtual, and live wargames. Of course, the
same systems can be used without a wargame as such—on purpose, when training for
humanitarian missions, and perforce, when corners must be cut and only preparation
71
for combat is exercised.
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Command and Staff Training (CAST) is the “crawl” stage. At its heart is a constructive
wargame; only the command element (typically a battle-group commander and staff) is
trained, the troops, equipment, terrain, and effects all being represented by the computer. Even though it cost seventeen million pounds (roughly U.S.$25 million) to design
and install it at three training locations, this is by far the least expensive of the three
phases. A sixty-person command staff can be trained for a week at a cost of just £25,000
72
($36,500) and the time of a sixty-person support staff.
The Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) is the “walk” stage. CATT is a virtual
wargame/simulation; all members of the command participate, in vehicle-commandpost simulators that move across a virtual battle space. CATT provides great training
for entire organizations but at a high price. The United Kingdom’s two CATT locations
(one in Britain, one in Germany) cost far more than the three CAST facilities. But the
highest cost is incurred during training: one week costs £250,000, which is equivalent
to ten times a week of CAST training. Its hardware and software are very similar to the
American CCTT system, but the two nations use the technology in very different ways.
The U.S. Army built lots of company-sized simulator suites, while the British army has
only two centers, both for full battle groups, with supporting arms. Both British centers
73
provide outstanding training that integrates actions across an entire group.
The “run” element of the British ground-combat training trilogy is the Tactical Engagement Simulator (TES). Like the National Training Center in the United States, TES is a
live wargame, most easily understood as “laser tag on steroids.” Actual troops use their
actual equipment to maneuver on real terrain. Only the effect of their fire is simulated.
While outstanding training, TES’s one location was by far the most expensive of all to
establish, and the recurring cost is likewise. Depending on the unit being trained, one
week at TES may cost from just under two million pounds to well over two and a half
million, roughly ten times the cost of a week’s training with CATT and a hundred times
that of CAST.
At the height of the war in Afghanistan TES cost even more, sometimes much more—as
much as eight million pounds ($11,666,666). It depended on what new equipment was
being tested (there was little opportunity before deployment) and whether live role-play
74
support from Pashto speakers was needed.
The point of all this detail on cost is that CAST, CATT, and TES are so expensive that
access to them is limited; they tend to be used less than once a year. In addition, a requirement that the units and headquarters be assessed means that the facilities are typically used for procedural rather than two-sided, adversarial training (in which trainees
might “lose,” disastrously for their assessments). U.S. CCTT training cannot match the
scope of its British counterpart, but, for example, the average American tanker gets to
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train more often.75 Still, together these systems produce better-trained leaders, soldiers,
and units than any one of them could alone.
Wargames are also a part of Royal Air Force and Royal Navy training. The Royal Air
Force possesses many high-resolution flight simulators. The RAF is gradually linking
them so it will be able to run the equivalent of a Virtual Flag. The Royal Air Force also
collaborates with the U.S. Air Force on both Title 10 games and the games conducted
by the U.S. Air Force Materiel Command. The RN possesses both bridge simulators
for training commanding officers and bridge crews, and ship simulators to train entire
ships’ complements. Again, when these systems are used for training on procedures
(such as emergencies) they are not wargames. When they are used to simulate combat
76
operations against a Red force, they are.
The United Kingdom has replaced both programs it once used to automate, largely, the
adjudication of wargames—the Divisional Wargame and UK Janus—with the Wargame
Infrastructure and Simulation Environment. It has introduced the Close Action Environment to support company-level conventional wargames. Finally, the United Kingdom has applied new software to gaming of unconventional operations, the support
or suppression of insurgent forces. Called the Peace Support Operations Model, it is
designed to facilitate the adjudication of all the “soft” (hearts and minds) and “hard”
77
(combat) elements that affect the success of such efforts.
One distinctive kind of British wargaming, one that goes back at least as far as Field
Marshal Montgomery, is what I call “very free Kriegsspiel.” That is, essentially, military
experts talking through the operation being planned and deciding Blue moves, Red
moves, and outcomes by consensus. Formally referred to as “COA wargaming” today,
even this bedrock of British practice is evolving. British COA wargaming doctrine
was substantially rewritten in the middle to late 1990s and has constantly evolved and
improved since then. It is the form of wargaming most practiced in the British military;
virtually no money is spent on it, because it is 99 percent manual. Every headquarters,
single-service and joint, from battle group through the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
to the Standing Joint Force, conducts one or more COA games every time it develops a
78
plan. At this writing Britain is continuously working to keep COA gaming fast enough
for a rapidly developing crisis, with improved processes and tools that can be learned
79
quickly, are credible, and add significant value.
This pattern of continuity and change is also seen in wargaming at the Royal Military
Academy at Sandhurst (RMAS), one of the United Kingdom’s service academies. Like
other academies, Sandhurst continues to use gaming to reinforce traditional instruction, enabling students to apply what they have learned and to learn through experimentation and debate. (One particularly interesting innovation is that they now follow
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up their staff ride over the Normandy battlefields with a wargame of specific parts of the
D-day invasion.) Unlike other service academies it explicitly considers gaming a way to
gain an edge over adversaries by enhancing the speed and flexibility of decision making,
especially in the face of friction, surprise, and a thinking adversary. The RMAS’s most
recent initiative is to encourage its students to become lifelong wargamers, as many
other academies encourage their students to continue reading military history and
theory after graduation. To do so, it has founded wargame clubs and encouraged student
80
participation after duty hours—though uptake remains disappointingly low.
Many of the above innovations and more were the work of the Defence Science and
Technology Laboratory. During the first Connections UK in 2013 (see below) participants from Dstl realized that it had no plan to advance and sustain Britain’s wargaming
capability. As a result Dstl revised, and briefed at Connections UK 2014, a multiyear
81
plan to get British wargaming “where we want to be.”
Senior ministry and joint and service leaders understand the scope and value of
wargame applications. As we saw, the vice-chief of the Defence Staff requested more
82
effort on wargaming: a cadre of experienced individuals to lead the improvement and
sustainment of wargaming; individuals on every staff trained on when and how to apply
gaming; and tools for wargaming that will help implement the above and make it faster
and easier to learn and execute.
At Connections UK 2014, Colin Marston of Dstl argued the need for the Ministry of Defence to establish a “wargaming hub.” The hub would act as the primary point of contact
for customers within MoD. It would be a “one-stop shop” for collating, understanding,
and developing wargaming requirements. The hub would have the necessary wargaming expertise and networks (e.g., through events like Connections) to provide both
advice on how to meet the requirements and what sources to draw from within MoD,
industry, or academia. It would be a place to develop and maintain a corporate knowledge base and record observations, insights, and lessons. Marston also felt more needed
to be done to sustain and develop a cadre of experienced, professional wargamers within
MoD. By 2016 Colin had become the head of the Dstl Wargaming Team. There he provided continuity, corporate memory, and wargaming expertise in the ministry. Colin
83
and his team continue tirelessly to advocate good gaming practice.
As in other militaries, not all British wargaming initiatives come from the top. At Connections UK 2014, Lt. Col. Ivor Gardiner, commanding officer of the 1st Royal Irish
Regiment, described how he was using the American print wargame Squad Leader to
develop the effectiveness of the leaders within his command. While feedback indicates
his initiative had been very effective, Colonel Gardiner voiced worry that unless gaming
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became an official part of the United Kingdom’s training cycle the initiative would not
84
survive his departure.
Analogously, by 2015 the military of the United Kingdom was benefiting from quite
probably the most-effective wargaming in its history. One the other hand, British gamers had concerns. Unlike in Germany, which trained its general staff officers to conduct
wargames, in Britain military gamers were self-taught, most having started with civilian
games in their youth. Universally, they had volunteered to work in the gaming area.
Like their American counterparts some had begun noticing that they were, as a group,
increasingly “hair pigment challenged,” and these graybeards were worried about who
would lead wargaming in the future. Worse, much British military wargaming was not
directed from above; they, like Colonel Gardiner, worried about the chances of those ini85
tiatives to survive the departure of their originators. It was issues such as these that had
given rise to a British edition of the Connections conference (about which, more below).
In the area of popular wargaming, Britain continues to lead the world in the creation
of rules for miniatures games and in the sale of miniatures games. In 2015 the United
Kingdom’s largest miniatures wargame publisher, Games Workshop, alone, earned
86
$124,000,000 in export sales, primarily to Europe, North America, and Australia. England is still the home of one of the few courses in wargame design, taught by Professor
Sabin at King’s College London. On the civilian side the major new initiative was John
Curry’s History of Wargaming Project. The name of his project is perhaps misleading; rather than telling the history of wargaming he strives to preserve it, by keeping
87
groundbreaking civilian and military wargame publications (rules, manuals) in print.
As for military/civilian cooperation, in late 2011 a British defense official, Andrew
Poulter of Dstl, candidly admitted the need for it. New recruits, having played contemporary commercial wargames, found the military’s games visually primitive. This made
it hard for them to engage fully in the games. The British military, Mr. Poulter said, had
to “catch up” to the commercial state of the art, by adapting a commercial program for
88
defense use.
Perhaps this was one reason for the major development of this period, which came in
2013 when King’s College London hosted the first “Connections UK.” This first Connections conference outside the United States was the vision of Graham Longley-Brown,
an unduly modest and terminally self-effacing ex–British army officer who was already
fully employed running wargames for the British and overseas militaries. He adapted
the format of the original Connections conference to suit British needs and preferences better. Professor Sabin secured a venue (King’s College London); Major Mouat
helped arrange military participation; and Colin Marston obtained Dstl’s support
and participation. Thanks to them, the hard work of many others, and Graham’s own
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organizational skills, Connections UK was an immediate success. The first keynote
speaker was Maj. Gen. Andrew Sharpe, an inspirational advocate of military wargaming
89
throughout his army career. The stature of the leaders of the British wargaming com90
munity who helped launch the country’s first Connections was truly humbling.
The first Connections UK attracted seventy-five people from eight nations, leaders in
the military, academic, and commercial elements of wargaming. Connections UK 2014
increased those numbers to 111 participants from ten nations. The program continues
to grow, with 124 delegates from eleven nations in 2015, 156 from sixteen nations in
91
2016. (This was more than triple the international participation the same years for
Connections US.) Even more important than numbers of participants, the British had
proved that the Connections format can be exported, prompting by 2015 new Connections conferences in Australia and the Netherlands. In this way and others, Britain
remains a leader in the development of new ways of wargaming, doing pioneering work
92
in such areas as matrix games, confrontation analysis, and cyber wargames.
But in British civilian wargaming too, this was also a period of transition. In 2013 the
senior statesman of British commercial gaming, Donald Featherstone, passed away. It
would be difficult to exaggerate the impact he had had on wargaming, not only in the
British civilian world and military, but worldwide. James Dunnigan said, four years
before Featherstone’s death, “Donald Featherstone is one of the dozen or so people who,
in the twentieth century, turned wargaming into both a hobby and a more useful tool
for military professionals.” In his last decades he became a kind of senior ambassador
for wargaming. Respected for his work in military history as well as gaming, he addressed conferences and classes around the world. He left behind over fifty books and
a standard of clear, executable game rules that may never be equaled and will never be
93
surpassed.

So there you have it: a rundown of wargaming from BC to PC. Each service has, and
most nations have, produced wargame innovators and advocates. Overcoming the discipline’s new challenges will not be easy, but the wargamers of the future will be standing
on the shoulders of giants.
Motive, Opportunity, and Next Moves
John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft assert that war, like murder, requires motive and
94
opportunity. Their prescription for anticipating future wars is to look for countries
with motive that are on track to acquire opportunity and for countries with opportu95
nity that seem likely to acquire a motive. This kind of dualism is probably true of all
high-profile inventions: if necessity is the mother of invention, feasibility is the father.
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This is certainly true for wargaming. Second-generation wargaming had motives: it was
developed to produce genius to counter Napoleon, and even more to educate an officer
corps that included many who had not learned their trade at their fathers’ side. It also
resulted in part from the opportunity provided by topographic maps and an increased
understanding of probability and statistics. Similarly, third-generation wargaming was
motivated by the need for a strategy to preserve the independence of an early interwar
Germany too weak to defend itself through military means alone. The opportunity
sprang from the close relationship between the elements of German national power and
the writings of Hans Delbrück. Hence, we should be able to anticipate the future evolution of wargaming by spotting long-standing or emerging motives and matching them
with long-standing or emerging opportunities.

Some motives for the continued evolution of wargaming are enduring, while others are
new. From the dawn of civilization, wargames have been used by decision makers to develop the minds of future decision makers. Four thousand years ago those leaders were
called “kings,” “pharaohs,” or “emperors.” Today they are called “presidents,” “prime
ministers,” or “voters.” Developing the “down-board thinking” of a few rulers in the art
of war is very different from developing the ability in millions of voters.
One motive for reinvigorated wargaming in this country is to help the United States preserve and expand its military edge. The American advantage in conventional military
technology, especially smart bombs, contributed to the coalition’s fast, cheap victory
in the First Gulf War. Now, with that technology, again especially smart bombs (and
wargaming), available to plausible adversaries we need again to widen our edge in gaming and use that edge to catalyze innovation in military technology.
Another motivation for the future evolution of wargaming is the increasing awareness
that national security and international competition extend far beyond purely military
affairs. Empires as diverse in time and substance as the Byzantine and the Soviet fell for
reasons at least as much economic as military. A few wargames—starting in Germany in
the 1920s, Japan in the 1930s, the United States in the 1950s, and China in the 2000s—
have acknowledged the importance of economic and political factors. As globalization
advances and writers like Thomas L. Friedman reach a fairly broad audience, the power
of the motive to include such factors in future wargames, in government, academic, and
96
popular games, will increase.
In no country will this be truer than in the United States. The growing economic, military, and political strength of China presents the United States with an unprecedented
dilemma. During the 1800s the United States had to compete economically with larger,
more developed economies. One of the ways it did so, being secure behind two oceans,

on wargaming  

251

was to allocate relatively smaller resources to its military. Then for almost half a century
the United States faced the very real military threat of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet
economic threat was negligible. Coping with China will require a strategy that includes
all elements of national power. Wargaming will need to evolve to a fourth generation,
depicting all of their impacts, if it is to provide to such comprehensive strategies that it
has always given military ones.

Just as advances in cartography, probability, and statistics enabled the emergence of
second-generation military simulation wargames, so several technical and other current
trends will facilitate the evolution of a fourth generation. For instance, it would be difficult to find a book or article on future technological trends that did not cite Moore’s
law, which predicts that the number of transistors on integrated circuits will double
approximately every two years. This forecast has proved accurate, at times conservative,
over the last fifty years. But the growing power of computers may not be the technical
trend that will most directly enable the evolution of wargaming but their increasing
ubiquity. Why?
As you will recall, in 1811 there was exactly one simulation wargame in the world, and
the users totaled one family, the royal family of Prussia. By 1824, topographic maps and
a relatively elegant design made wargaming accessible to the entire officer corps of one
nation. Still, the games were so cumbersome that most officers had to be ordered to play
them. Substituting the military judgment of umpires for rules increased the frequency
of use, but to an extent limited by the number of trained umpires. Increasing the percentage of trained umpires in the officer corps allowed the proliferation of wargaming
in Germany between the world wars. Extensive gaming played a key role in Germany’s
remarkable military effectiveness in World War II; moreover, no other nation had
invested so much time in training its officers to organize and conduct wargames. The
fast-approaching omnipresence of computers will provide a practical opportunity for
ubiquitous wargaming.
At the time of this writing, an unprecedented percentage of the Earth’s population carries around a camera, typically a video camera, twenty-four hours a day. This is because
smartphones come equipped with such devices. We should really invent a new word
for them, as they are not only phones and cameras but alarm clocks, calculators, photo
albums, music players, atlases, compasses, carpenters’ levels, web portals, barcode scanners—and wargame platforms. As more and more people, even in the developing world,
have such phones, the number who can access wargames increases. These games are
physically accessible (they can simply be downloaded), they are economically accessible
(many today are free or very inexpensive), and they are rapidly executable for people
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with no time or patience to learn complicated rules (the smartphone’s processor handles
the complex adjudication and allows the user to focus on decision making).
As both books and wargames are downloaded onto phones and tablets in increasing
numbers, the integration of books and wargames becomes highly feasible. The integration of a paper wargame with a paper magazine in the early 1970s caused an explosion
in the number of game titles in print and significant growth in the number of individuals using print wargames. What secondary effects might the integration of wargames
and books have?
The centuries-old resistance to wargaming of many nations’ militaries is declining.
This is largely due to a generational shift. Kids who grew up playing computer games,
97
including wargames, are now approaching flag- and general-officer rank. However, it
may also be that even military games are becoming less user hostile—in part owing to
complaints from troops that the multimillion-dollar/pound/euro wargame they were issued was neither as easy to use nor, sometimes, as accurate as the games they had played
before enlisting (a claim that caused a scandal in the United Kingdom).
Finally, I believe there is a particular opportunity for an increase in the number and
quality of wargames, especially commercially published ones. First, game designers,
even in print, tend to be comfortable with computers. This facilitates desktop publishing, selling often “niche” titles over the web and collaborating internationally. Perhaps
the most remarkable example of such international collaboration is a print wargame
publisher located in rural Scotland. He has one full-time employee, two part-time employees, and several unpaid researchers scattered across five nations. Further, in the last
few years several governments have realized that the modeling, simulation, and gaming
industry is an environmentally clean source of well-paying jobs. Nations such as China
and South Korea and states such as Virginia and Florida have announced initiatives to
encourage it. Finally, even without such encouragement many of the best and brightest
of the emerging generation are going to work there. They are lured by the “cool factor”
98
of working on games and the incredible wealth of the top designers.

So, we know where we are, where we want to go, and where we can go. Can we make
some reasonably safe projections about wargaming’s next developments? I think so. If
the evolution of wargaming has been driven by opportunity and motive, we can look
forward and clearly see areas where these factors align.
We’ve seen that the oldest motive for wargaming has been to develop the abilities of
decision makers to make better decisions. The reason that only a small percentage of humans gamed until fairly modern times was because only a small percentage of humans
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made the decisions for their societies and few others had the leisure or resources to
wargame. In more-recent centuries the motive for and feasibility of more-widespread
wargaming changed together. Where in the early 1800s the apparatus of a wargame
would be a very expensive, one-of-a-kind museum piece, by the late 1800s militaries
around the world were using published rules, off-the-shelf topographic maps, and standard kits of counters.
Also, since World War II the percentage of the world’s people living in democratic
states has been increasing, albeit very unsteadily. Even in established democracies,
let alone the new ones, the percentage of civilians playing second-generation simulation wargames has increased each decade as their cost has declined—both in money
(adjusted for inflation) and time needed to learn and play. It seems a safe bet that the
percentage of people living in democracies will continue to grow, however unevenly, and
with it the percentage that are middle class. The new members of the global middle class
will have increased motive and opportunity to learn to think strategically—or just have
fun playing games. The effect will be the same.
With the explosive growth as a percentage of the world’s population in people who own
smartphones and have access to the World Wide Web, within a decade the majority
will be able to download and play the same wargame. What will happen when they do?
Our conclusion will ask, and indirectly answer, a related question: What do we want to
happen?
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to the designers—and few of them. A joke
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popular among print wargame designers goes
something like this: “The surest way to make
a small fortune in print wargaming is to start
with a large one.”

PART TWO
Toward More-Effective Wargaming

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Taxonomy of Wargaming
It has been said the foundations of science are observation and classification. Together
they enable the forming of hypotheses that enable later applications. Having read the
history part of the book, you have completed the observation function. This chapter will
propose the classification aspect.
FIGURE 2

Wargaming: Translating Reality into a Useful Depiction

Created by Col. Uwe Heilmann, German Air Force, for your instructor in 1999

Before we can learn to apply wargaming, we must first define what a wargame is. A
favorite analogy of mine is to think of wargames as “flight simulators for decision makers”—wargames can train the mind to react to changing situations in the same way a
flight simulator can prepare aircrews to respond correctly and quickly to emergencies.
Still, wargaming is much more. We must also understand that the scope of wargaming
has expanded over the last two centuries.
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FIGURE 3

The Hierarchy of Abstraction, Models, Simulations, and Games

Let’s start by describing what wargames are not. Many people in today’s military use the
terms “modeling,” “simulation,” and “wargaming” as if they were interchangeable. They
aren’t. Models are proportional representations of the real world. An impressionistic
painting is not a model, but an architect’s plans are. Models, however, are static. They
may be two-dimensional (such as maps) or three-dimensional (an object, such as a plastic aircraft replica), but they lack a fourth dimension: time. Models are representations
at a fixed moment, like a photograph.
When a model is examined over time, it becomes a simulation. Place an aircraft model
in a wind tunnel and observe how it behaves at different airspeeds at different moments,
and you have a simulation. The military uses simulations to train a wide spectrum of
individuals, from pilots who fly to the mechanics who maintain the aircraft. Several of
the first “hits” in the recreational computer-game market were flight simulators.
When sides compete against each other within a simulation, they’re in a simulation
game. An increasing number of MBA programs use simulation games in the classroom.
In the entertainment-game market, simulations such as Railroad Tycoon, where players
use financial wizardry to build nineteenth-century railroad empires, have sold millions
of copies. When a simulation game involves armed factions in conflict, it is a wargame.
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It is important to remember that wargames are not reality. No wargame ever has or ever
will capture the full scope and complexity of the real world.
Definitions of Wargaming—and Misnomers
Just as in the old story of the blind men describing an elephant, definitions of wargaming tend to reflect who is doing the defining.1 Here are four examples:
Wargame: A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).2

War Game:
1. A simulated battle or campaign to test military concepts or use. Conducted in conference by
officers acting as opposing staffs.
2. A two-sided umpired training maneuver with actual elements of armed forces participating
(Webster’s Dictionary).

Wargame: A warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual
military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made
by the players representing the opposing sides (Dr. Peter P. Perla, The Art of Wargaming).3

Wargame: A simulation game depicting armed conflict (AFMC Wargame Course).

War game: A multisided depiction of conflict in which participant decisions influence future outcomes. (An emerging definition within the wargaming community.)

Not only is there a range of definitions of wargaming, but the word itself appears two
ways in print. “War game” (two words) and “wargame” (one word) are both widely used.
This book uses “wargame,” mostly. This determination was made for two reasons. First,
“wargame” is by far more commonly seen in the press and has been the form most often
used by military figures, like Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work; Adm. Chester
Nimitz, USN; Gen. Al Gray, USMC; Gen. Curtis LeMay, USAF; and Gen. Robert Wallace, USA. It is also the term used by the United Kingdom, NATO, and most (perhaps
all) of our allies. Second, the term “war game” is less precise, as it may mean either of
two things. “War game” refers to the military application of game theory. “War game” is
also used by many in the operations-research community and some members of the U.S.
military to mean “wargame.”
I maintain that wargaming has gone through three generations and is entering a fourth.
Further, each of these generations needs its own definition. A first-generation wargame
is an abstract competition in which outcomes are determined primarily by the decisions

VisComms:02_DesktopPublishing:NWCPress:NewportPapers:NP_43Caffrey:NP_43_OnWargamingFolder:NP_4307Ch7ExpandingScope.inddJanuary25,201910:57AM

264   the

newport papers

of the participants. This generation began before the Christian era and continues today
in wargames like chess and Go. A second-generation wargame is a simulation game
depicting combat. This generation began in the early 1800s and is represented today in
most tactical and operational and many strategic games. A third-generation wargame is
a simulation game of armed conflict depicting all (or most) elements of power. This generation began with the Weimar Republic’s political-military wargames and continues
today in political-military games, the more comprehensive strategic games, and some
insurgency/counterinsurgency games.
The emerging fourth generation can be called “peace games,” as they depict the spectrum of competition between nations or groups in which peace is one plausible path
to victory. It is tough to pick a starting date, though some of the more comprehensive
political-military wargames and the commercial software game Civilization clearly fit
in this generation.
Elements of a Wargame
Some elements are common to all wargames. For instance, Blue is normally thought of
as the friendly side. Still, this may vary. When a Chinese major general and his team
were briefed at the Air Force Wargaming Center in the late 1980s, he was told that the
sides in our games were Blue and Red. He remarked on the coincidence, that the two
sides in China’s wargames were also Blue and Red, “though in our case Red are the good
guys.”
FIGURE 4

Principal Elements of Wargames: Red, White, and Blue
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Red is typically the adversary side. This side is sometimes also called the “opposition
force” (or OPFOR) or the “aggressors.” A thinking adversary is what differentiates a
wargame from a simulation. In fact, when flight simulators are networked into a virtual
battle space to fly against opposing aircraft, they become parts of a wargame.
White varies in composition depending on the size and complexity of the wargame.
For small, simple wargames it may simply be “adjudication.” For medium-to-large
wargames adjudication is just one element of a White team that includes game control,
analysis, and higher headquarters, or “the rest of the world.” In any event, this is the
component of the wargame that determines the net effect of Blue’s and Red’s actions. In
some games White would be represented by the rules and data embedded in documentation or software. Some larger games include additional factions. Red’s allies may be
Orange; Blue’s allies may be Light Blue. Neutrals (civilians or neutral armed forces) are
often called Gray or Green.
Such semantical issues can make researching historical wargaming and keeping up with
its contemporary iterations more difficult. Reporters typically call anything the military
does that does not involve actual combat “wargames.” On the other hand, many military
members find all sorts of words to use for wargames other than “wargames.”
FIGURE 5

When Is an Exercise a Live Wargame?

Exercise

Maneuver

Wargame

The most common term they use is exercise. By the above definitions, an exercise may
or may not be a wargame. If an exercise involves incorporating the net effects of decisions by friendly forces and a thinking opponent, it is a live wargame; if it does not, it is
a live simulation. For example, a simulated enemy integrated-air-defense system makes
the Red Flag an exercise and a wargame, while the lack of thinking adversaries or adjudication of interactions with opponents in virtually all mobility exercises makes them
live simulations.
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Another source of confusion is that wargames are sometimes called “experiments”;
occasionally you will even hear of an “experimental wargame.” Within the classical
scientific method there can be no “experimental wargames,” as a wargame requires both
a thinking, reacting Blue and a thinking, reacting Red. Experiments require all variables to be held constant except the control variable. True, some maintain that advanced
design of experiment techniques can accommodate multiple variables. Still, when a
wargame is referred to as experimental, it is often a new wargame being tested. At other
4
times the term implies a particularly rigorous game. Just because things are not confusing enough as it is, the U.S. Air Force includes many wargames within its experimentation programs. If experimentation is defined broadly as “all efforts to gain insights
before final decisions,” wargaming actually does fit, being one tool for such purposes.
FIGURE 6

Experiments, Wargames, and Experimentation

Experiment

Wargame

Experimentation
FIGURE 7

Wargame Process: Beginning
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The Wargame Process
In addition to having common elements, wargames tend to follow the same process.
Game materials begin with a description of the initial conditions, how game-world
matters stand at the start. Usually called the “scenario,” this element of games typically
includes a “road to war” describing how the situation has developed, orders of battle for
both sides, the objectives of both sides, and information on where the battle/campaign/
war will be fought. Typically, Blue and Red have different understandings of what the
start conditions are—Red, say, may have a weapon Blue is only generally aware of, or
Blue may have more ammunition stockpiled than Red believes.
FIGURE 8

Wargame Process: One-Turn or Vignette Open Wargame

Blue’s actions describe how the Blue side decides to employ its resources to change the
conditions “at start” toward its goal for the “end state.” How that plan is communicated,
briefed to the adjudication team, or typed into a computer varies with the wargame.
Red’s actions are the same for the opposing force, and again, the format or mode of that
input varies from game to game.
Adjudication determines the net effect of Red’s and Blue’s actions, the new “game (or
ground) truth”—that is, what has “actually” happened. Adjudication must establish that
Red’s and Blue’s intentions are physically possible to accomplish. Next, adjudication
determines what effect Blue has on Red and Red on Blue. The last step is to determine
5
what elements of ground truth each side knows. Finally, the end state is the state of the
game world at the end of play, as determined by adjudication.
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FIGURE 9

Wargame Process: One-Turn or Vignette Closed Wargame

This is how “open” wargames work. Such games provide Blue and Red with complete
and accurate knowledge of the situation. During “closed” wargames, sometimes called
“double-blind” wargames, Red and Blue know only what the adjudication determines
they ought to know, to reflect the limitations of both sides’ ability to observe the entire
battlespace, or, sometimes, to serve the games’ goals and objectives. In this case there
are three initial states: game truth, Red perception, and Blue perception. There are also
three end states: game truth and what each of the two teams perceives. Finally, in many
wargames, when adjudication determines that certain Blue or Red planned actions
could not actually be carried out, there are planned moves and actual moves. A graphics
depiction of such games is far less elegant.
In most (if not all) Soviet wargames, this one cycle would be the entire game. In the case
of the United States and most other nations the end state for move 1 becomes the at-start
condition for move 2. The end state of the second move becomes the initial state of the
third, and so on. The end state of the final move is the end state for the game.
Some wargames are played through a series of vignettes—that is, one-move, Soviet-like
games, each set in the same theater with Red and Blue representing the same belligerents. Vignettes are typically used when a sponsor wants to examine different phases
of a campaign in detail but not the entire campaign. The danger is that although each
vignette’s at-start state is independent of previous vignettes’ end states, some may think
the outcome of the final vignette indicates the outcome that would have been produced
by a continuous wargame.
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FIGURE 10

Wargame Process: Multiturn, Closed Wargame

FIGURE 11

Wargame Process: Series of Vignettes, Closed Wargame

2

Types of Wargames
The key to defining the various flavors of “wargame” is how they represent reality.
The oldest form of wargame is the constructive game, in which actual forces are not
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FIGURE 12

Types of Wargames: Constructive, Live, Virtual

maneuvered (as in live wargames) but are represented by some symbol—a chess piece,
a cardboard square, glowing pixels on a monitor. Everything from chess to the latest
wargame used to test our campaign plans for future conflict is considered constructive,
as no actual forces are involved.
Live wargames are the next oldest. Everything from medieval jousts to Red Flag exercises are live wargames because actual forces engage in (simulated) combat, adjudicated
by nonlethal means.
Virtual is the newest form; in it, combatants use electronic simulators. From inside
the simulators (which are physically located feet or thousands of miles apart) they all
look out on the same virtual battle space. They can see other friendly forces—and their
adversaries. Obviously, this type of game was not possible until first simulators, then the
computer networks to connect them, were invented.
Technology has even made it possible for constructive, live, and virtual elements to be
linked in the same exercise. For example, for at least a decade the U.S. Army’s National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, was a live wargame providing exceptionally
realistic training to one battalion at a time. In the late 1990s, the Army decided to train
entire brigades at once. Unfortunately, as big as Fort Irwin is, the ranges of modern
weapons and sensors are such that no more than two maneuver battalions could fit on
the range at once. Brigades have three. The solution was for the third battalion to use
simulators at its home station. The participants look out their viewports into a virtual
battle space that looks like Fort Irwin. In fact, they see elements of the two deployed
battalions as if they themselves were actually there at Fort Irwin. All three battalions
report to the brigade headquarters. Folks who have participated in such a game report it
is difficult for the brigade headquarters to tell which units are live and which are virtual.
Then, to add even more realism, the Army places constructive units (Blue and Red) on
the flanks. This forces the brigade to coordinate with adjacent headquarters.
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FIGURE 13

Media of Constructive Wargames: Terrain Table / Miniatures, Map/Chart/Print,
Computer

Media of Constructive Wargames
Constructive wargames employ three media. Terrain tables (on which the landscape is
modeled) and miniatures were used in the earliest constructive game and are still popular, both in the general public (a type of recreational wargaming called “miniatures” in
the United States, “figures” in the United Kingdom) and in the military (for tactical and
even some higher-level games).
Maps, charts, and print are almost as old as terrain tables; the original map wargames
used topographical maps and naval charts. Typically, but not always, maps are now
overlaid with a hexagonal or other grid for convenience. Most commercial wargames
fall into this category.
Computer wargames use software to perform elements of the game. Many early computer wargames were actually aids to map or terrain-table manual games. The computer
programs adjudicated the engagements, but the locations of units continued to be shown
on a map or terrain table. Today almost all computer wargames display the current situation on the computer screen, eliminating the need for a map or terrain table. Some use
artificial intelligence to make some (subordinate) or all Red or Blue decisions or both.
The Scope of Wargaming
Many assert that form follows function. We see this often in architecture and the design
of common objects, automobiles, planes, and packaging containers. Form follows function in wargaming as well. The wide spectrum of wargame uses has led to a proportionately wide spectrum of wargames. That spectrum can be categorized in three main
ways: application, level of combat, and time period.
Application
The cause of much of the variation in wargaming is the reason a given game is being
conducted. The purposes of most wargames fall between pure decision support and pure
development. In the former group fall wargames designed exclusively to aid decision
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FIGURE 14

Scope of Wargames

makers in making specific decisions. These decisions typically impact human lives and
national resources; accuracy of adjudication is usually the first priority. Still, even these
games need to be user-friendly enough to be completed in time to influence the decisions they are designed to support. These wargames are mostly used by armed forces
and are sometimes created by contractors. The latter, at the other end of the spectrum,
are wargames designed to develop some mode of inquiry or skill. For example, educational games are intended to establish a synthetic decision-making environment to help
students develop their skills as strategists. Another developmental wargame might explore possible future systems to gain a sense of how potential adversaries could attempt
to minimize their effectiveness.
Most wargames conducted by the military function to some degree in both areas.
Decision-support wargames tend to develop the skills of their participants, and developmental games examining potential future systems are likely to influence procurement
decisions.
Level of War
Wargames for all these applications may be tactical, operational, or strategic. Tactical
games focus on battles and firefights. The geography tends to be fairly small, the time
covered short, and the forces on both sides limited. As examples, tactical wargames may
depict combat between a submarine and a destroyer or between two fighter jets, or an
infantry battalion being attacked by an armored brigade.
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Operational games are concerned with conflict at the operational level—that is, large
operations and campaigns. They embrace entire regions, periods of from days to
months, and all forces that are in or can affect the region. As examples, operational
wargames may play campaigns meant to drive an adversary from a specific area, gain
air superiority in a theater, or break the blockade of an ally.
Strategic wargames depicting conflict at the strategic level focus on national wars or the
gaining of national objectives without war. The geography depicted may be the planet,
or at least the entire territories of all the combatants. The time covered will be relatively
long, years to decades, and the forces depicted all those the belligerent nations can bring
to bear. As examples, strategic games may depict World War II or current global defense
challenges.
Time Period
Commercially published wargames depict conflict in times selected from an exceptionally broad spectrum, but even military decision-support games look at a broader range
than you may think. Wargames have been published on conflicts occurring in the
earliest civilizations, in far-future interstellar settings, and everything between. Many
wargames have been published depicting what seems every war in human history. Most
military decision-support games depict the current military situation, or at most the
situation anticipated within the next two years. However, as the lead time to develop and
manufacture new weapon systems grows ever longer, some decision-support wargames
now look out five, ten, or twenty-five years. Educational and training games tend to
depict the same time settings as decision-support games, but many military schools use
wargames to help extract insights from historical conflicts. For example, for many years
the National Defense University curriculum included a game on the Peloponnesian
War.
Other Variables and Nomenclature Matters
Time Available to Produce. Some wargames are thrown together in a few days and
tossed out after a single session. Others can take years to develop and are used year after
year.
Time Needed to Execute. A few wargames can be completed in about an hour, while the
total time needed for other games, preparation through reporting, can extend over two
years.
Geographic Extent. Not surprisingly, tactical wargames tend to focus on a very small
area, while strategic games often encompass all or much of the Earth.
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Classification. While commercial wargames are of course unclassified, it often surprises civilians that many games used by the military too are unclassified, most frequently
(but not only) those that are used for educational purposes. A few wargames are not
6
only very, very highly classified but are tightly “close hold” as well.
Size of User Base. Commercially published wargames are available to the whole world,
and the best-selling titles are played by millions worldwide. Some military games are so
sensitive that their very existence, their insights, even the names of their participants are
known only to a very few individuals, on a strict need-to-know basis.
Source. In recent decades commercial wargames have begun to be designed, developed,
and published in many nations and to be played worldwide. Computer wargames were
a founding element of the huge global computer/video-game industry. On the military
side, all major powers use games. I am unaware of any military service that does not.
Academically, wargames are used not only in military schools worldwide but also in
civilian classrooms, at least in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
Finally, many corporations routinely engage in gaming to understand the implications
of different marketing or financial strategies.
Level of Detail. How a wargame will be used is an important factor in determining
what its level of detail should be. A tactical wargame attempts to include as much of
reality as practical. This level is often a good fit for examining tactical situations or
system-attribute trade-offs. A contrasting approach is distillation, in which rules, maps,
and markers include only selected relevant elements of reality. This level of detail is often used for exploring the operational and strategic levels of war, when too much detail
can obscure the big picture. Or game designers can choose abstraction, dispensing with
most elements of reality and leaving only the essentials of competition. Games with high
abstraction tend either to develop an individual’s strategic thinking ability or to prevent
participants in strategic games from getting “down into the weeds.”
Proof, Prediction, Forecast, or Indication. There is considerable disagreement within
the wargame community on what to call any insights drawn from the end state of a
wargame, though there is a solid consensus among professionals about what not to call
them: “proof.” They believe it is intuitively obvious that wargames do not “prove” anything. Defense professionals cringe when individuals who don’t know better—or worse,
do know better—say this wargame or that proved anything. Often these individuals are
trying to sell a product or a strategy. Many leaders in the field also recommend avoiding the word “predict,” as it conjures up images of crystal balls, implies more confidence
7
than is justified, and is popular with the snake-oil crowd.
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For a few years I advocated using “forecast,” as a way both to get people not to use
“predict” and to emphasize that wargame outcomes are more indications of relative likelihood than predictions. After all, weather forecasts almost never say, “It will
rain”; instead, they give estimates of the likelihood of rain. However, recently I’ve been
8
convinced I was as misguided as Bess Truman. “Forecast” too implies a precision that
wargaming does not possess. Also, the weather is not a thinking adversary consciously
trying to deceive and defeat weather forecasters. The term we will use is “indication.”
Wargame outcomes are at best a plausible indication of what future outcomes may be.
BOGSATs. There is one final element of semantics: while the term “BOGSAT” is used
frequently in defense wargaming, different people mean different things when they say
it. Literally, BOGSAT is an acronym for “bunch of guys sitting around a table.” Some use
BOGSAT as shorthand for any expert-panel method of adjudication. For others it means
folks sitting around discussing a scenario and calling the event, incorrectly, a wargame.
Still others use BOGSAT pejoratively for any adjudication performed by humans. Others yet use the term for any poorly designed wargame. This book has avoided using
“BOGSAT,” because it means so many different things to different people, but if you are
involved in military wargaming for any length of time, you will hear it. When you do, it
would be best to ask the speaker what he or she means.
Cast of Characters. For purposes of this book I define a wargame’s cast as the leader,
who directs wargaming activities without, typically, participating in or creating games
him- or herself; participants (sometimes players), who execute a game; and practitioners,
experts on wargaming who can advise on, design, develop, and conduct games. Some
wargames, often the larger military ones, also include “subject-matter experts” (SMEs).
As the name implies, they are individuals with expertise in areas of relevance to the
wargame. They typically advise the White, Blue, and Red teams, or some of them, on
the likely impacts in their areas. Sometimes they also serve as players.

Notes
1. For those who have not heard the story: one
blind man felt an elephant’s side and pronounced that elephants were much like walls;
another felt the elephant’s leg and asserted
that elephants were much like tree trunks;
and yet a third felt its trunk and declared that
elephants were much like snakes.
2. This definition was dropped sometime around
2015 and as of 10 November 2017 had not
been replaced.

3. This definition has evolved since published in
Perla, Art of Wargaming, p. 164.
4. To make things even more confusing, as mentioned below, the U.S. Air Force now includes
wargaming in its experimentation program.
This approach uses a host of tools to forecast
the likely benefits of changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures of new systems, before
any training or acquisition money is spent.
Wargaming can be a good fit in such work,
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but the wargames are not themselves scientific
experiments.
5. The term “game truth” is also widely used.
Both refer to what game design and adjudication process have established the actual state
of affairs to be.
6. Within the U.S. military and the defense community in general, classified information is
shared with only those who “need to know” it.
“Close hold” information is available only to
an extremely small and predetermined set of
individuals; people not on the access list, even
if they have appropriate security clearances,
will typically not know the information exists.
7. While I usually scrupulously avoid the word
“predict” myself, I’m not above using it to

tweak colleagues who are dismissive of the
ability of wargaming to generate any insights
into plausible future states. To them I point
out that it is literally true that all wargames
predict the future (in that they always produce
an end state), and several times in a century
(as history shows) their predictions turn out
to be correct.
8. The story goes that shortly after Harry Truman assumed the presidency, a number of
reporters approached his wife, Bess. “Ma’am,”
they said, “you have got to get your husband
to stop saying ‘manure’ all the time—he’s
president now.” “Gentlemen,” she replied, “you
have no idea how many years it took me to get
him to say ‘manure.’”
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CHAPTER EIGHT

The Utility of Wargaming
Now, after describing the subset of the history of wargaming that I could both find and
relate in the space available, it is time to continue the “Caffrey Loop” and attempt to
draw theories that are both useful and consistent with that history.
What broad conclusions can we draw? Wargames can save lives. They can also, under
some circumstances, make the difference between victory and defeat. These statements
are supported by both natural experiments and the extrapolation of widely accepted
theories. This chapter will provide that support, but first let’s consider war itself. We
will start by doing what Einstein called a “thought experiment” to generate some hypotheses about winning wars and then use military history to check the validity of those
hypotheses.
How to Gain an Edge in Warfare
Let’s envision a war between two ancient Greek city-states. They have roughly equal
populations, use the same type of weapons, and both employ what is in effect a national
guard of citizen soldiers with the same moderate level of training. Both common sense
and the historical record suggest that a clash between these two city-states would at first
produce a bloody tie, more and more casualties taken and inflicted. Finally, one side
would gain some small advantage, and the fighting would end, the winner almost as
bloodied as the vanquished. If you were the leader of one of these city-states you would
not want either outcome, especially the defeat. Much of generalship, then and today, is
setting up subordinates for success. But with such equal forces, how do you get an edge?
Let’s look at some alternatives (hypotheses) and what the historical record suggests
about their validity.
•

Improve training. This was the strategy Sparta followed; its soldiers trained far harder
and far longer than any others. In anything like an even fight, Sparta won. Still, as
Sparta’s defeat at Thermopylae demonstrated, sufficient numbers (once they could be
brought to bear) could defeat superior training.
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•

Increase numbers. This was the strategy Athens followed; its diplomatic skill and
economic strength typically allowed it to bring the biggest navy and often the biggest
army to the fight. Still, Athens lost the Peloponnesian War.

•

Field better weapons. This has been a principal element of the American way of war
from the long rifles of the American war for independence through the smart bombs
of Operation Enduring Freedom. Still, we were defeated by a far lower-tech enemy
in Southeast Asia, and history includes many other examples as well of the side with
inferior weapons winning.

From the above, two things are clear, one about war and the other about using history
for natural experiments. On war, while it is clear there are several ways to get an “edge”
in warfare, all advantages are relative (relatively better training, better weapons, etc.)
and finite (an edge can be overcome by an enemy with relatively greater advantages
in other areas). On natural experiments, history seldom provides the clear, conclusive
proofs provided by laboratory experiments. I am unaware of a single case where all elements of a fight remained the same except for one single element that could therefore
be said to be the cause of a different outcome. Of course, the sheer number of historical
cases available to examine can increase our confidence some. But as any statistician will
1
tell you, even very large samples can produce misleading results.
Testing Hypotheses on Wargaming
So, history can be used to test hypotheses but will seldom, if ever, provide the proof
positive that is characteristic of a laboratory experiment. With that proviso, I will now
state some hypotheses about wargaming and look to the historical record for (tentative)
confirmation or rejection.
Hypothesis 1: Other factors being equal, the relative quality and quantity of wargaming conducted by a side provide it a finite edge. To assess the accuracy of this statement
historically, we must examine the relative level of wargaming by each side and then try
to correct for any other elements that might have influenced the outcome. Doing so
indicates that gaming does indeed supply a finite edge.
During the wars of German unification, Prussian wargaming appears to have provided
a significant advantage. How else can Prussia’s lopsided victories be explained? Prussian forces were more often than not outnumbered, weapon advantages were mixed,
and training methods were similar, though some think Prussia had an advantage in the
education of staff officers. At this time, though, the Prussian military had a monopoly
on second-generation wargaming and had integrated it into its staff education and its
staff planning methods, especially at the higher levels.
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World War I illustrates the relative advantage wargaming represents. By then all major
combatants were employing wargaming to varying degrees. While the Germans’ greater
sophistication and scope in wargaming appear to have contributed to their greater
effectiveness, allied advantages in manpower, industry, and technology overwhelmed
that modest edge. The German experience in World War II, however, illustrates how
much advantage accrues from significantly higher quality and quantity of wargaming
used. Between World Wars I and II, gaming became much more pervasive at all levels of
Germany’s armed forces than it had been. The benefits appear to have enabled Germany
to be successful in 1940 against Britain and France. However, it is clear even this greater
advantage was of finite utility: ultimately, the combined resources of the United States,
2
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union defeated Germany.
More-recent conflicts also seem to support the hypothesis. Use of wargaming by the
communist side in the Korean War appears to have contributed to its successes, espe3
cially in its first two offensives. The comprehensive use of wargames by the communist
side in Southeast Asia seems to have brought greater advantage than the far less frequent
4
use by the United States of more-sophisticated wargames. In Iraq’s war with Iran, Iraqi
5
wargaming seems to have been a principal element in breaking the stalemate. The
1990–91 Gulf War illustrates that the edge gained through wargaming is based not on
the absolute effectiveness of your wargaming but on its effectiveness relative to your
opponents’. In 1990 and 1991 the Iraqi armed forces gamed at least as effectively as they
had a few years previously, but now they were up against a coalition that made far more
sophisticated and widespread use of wargaming than Iran had (assuming Iran had
wargamed at all).
Hypothesis 2: The advantage provided by wargaming is finite and can be overcome by
advantages in other areas. The examples above are sufficient examples to prove this
point. Several of the sides with clear advantages in wargaming lost their wars.
Hypothesis 3: Wargames do not predict the future—wargames don’t even forecast a
potential future—but they do produce outcomes that may (or may not) suggest plausible
futures. Most wargame professionals can tell you of at least one case, and often several,
when a contractor or, worse, a government official cited a wargame as proof that some
product should be procured or some policy adopted. This is particularly bad when the
individuals involved helped “cook the books” so the wargame would seem to confirm
their preexisting positions. Still, even when conducted with honesty and professionalism
the large majority of games do not correlate to later events.
Many of my friends and colleagues, especially those in the operations-research community, like to say wargames can never accurately predict the future. The problem with this
statement is that, as you know from the earlier chapters, two hundred years of history
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offers several examples of wargames whose outcomes matched future events, occasionally with “eerie” precision.
Still, wargame outcomes are not even like weather forecasts. A typical weather forecast
will tell you that there is an 80 percent chance of rain tomorrow. Game outcomes are
much more tentative: they tell you that if situation A occurs and if Red does B and if
Blue does C, it is more likely than not that D will be the outcome. This sounds a lot less
useful than a weather forecast, but it is actually more useful—you can’t do anything
about the weather, but you normally can do something to prevent a wargame outcome
you do not want. In several cases history turned out the same as had been gamed in part
because the losing side took no action to prevent in the real world a wargame outcome
that would be disastrous.
Given all that, what can be said? First, wargame professionals should avoid the word
“predict,” as it is evocative of crystal balls and suggests a certainty that wargaming does
not deserve. For years I advocated using the word “forecast,” until colleagues convinced
me even this word implied greater confidence than is typically warranted. The mostneutral terms that seem to fit are simply “indicate” and “outcome.” How much confidence any outcome warrants is a separate, and later, discussion.
Hypothesis 4: Wargame outcomes vary from later events because the depicted situation
does not occur (or not as depicted); Red does not act as depicted in the game; Blue does
not act as depicted in the game; the adjudication was wrong; or the game succeeded in
determining the most likely outcome but in the actual event one side was extraordi6
narily lucky or unlucky. History shows that the first reason is far and away the most
frequent reason for mismatches between game outcomes and later real outcomes. During the Cold War the U.S. Army defended the Fulda Gap in West Germany in wargames
played from Fort Leavenworth to, well, the Fulda Gap. Thankfully, the Warsaw Pact
never invaded, and so all those games were at best untested—but in another sense, they
were all wrong. Wargames have also been wrong because the real Red did not do what
the Red player anticipated. Almost no interwar U.S. Navy wargames anticipated the kamikaze or the midwar change in Japanese strategy. Similarly, the Army wargame on the
first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom correctly anticipated Iraqi strategy but neither
the timing nor the nature of Iraq’s shift in strategy.
It is often overlooked in discussions of why wargames produce “wrong” outcomes, but
a major reason is Blue following a different course of action during the actual conflict.
Blue players are typically junior to the individuals who will make the actual decisions.
Even actual decision makers who participate in the wargame, studies have shown, tend
7
to make different decisions when the stakes are real. More importantly, Blue may do
so because the decision makers, not liking how a wargame turned out, have addressed
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the reason, in order to change how the actual event will turn out. The British reacted to
their 1905 wargame by creating the capability to reach the continent sooner; the United
States reacted to negative Gallant Knight outcomes with a host of actions; and General
Wallace reacted to the outcome of his first game on the invasion of Iraq by changing his
line of advance.
Finally, the historical record does support the assertion that incorrect adjudication can
produce wrong wargame outcomes. Still, for the cause that gets most of the attention,
the number of cases is rather modest. The Army’s pre–World War II overstatement of
the effectiveness of tank destroyers and understatement of airpower effects had real consequences in North Africa. Still, not adjudicating at all some aspect of a conflict seems
to have worse impacts than getting the adjudications not very correct. By the time the
Germans began adjudicating logistics in gaming the Schlieffen Plan, it was too late to fix
the identified problems fully. During the First Gulf War, the failure of American games
to adjudicate the prospect of Iraqi units surrendering or disbanding contributed to the
overestimation of friendly casualties. We know these estimates resulted in the stripping
of America’s emergency rooms of reservist medical personnel for no benefit, and they
appear to have contributed to a shortage of POW facilities and to the shipment of far
more supplies than needed. They may have also influenced the American administration’s decision to suspend offensive operations when it did (see chapter 4).
Hypothesis 5: Wargames are a cost-effective way to acquire a military advantage. This
last assertion may be the hardest to support through historical examples. After all, we
have already established that wargaming is just one of several ways in which nations
have acquired military advantages over their opponents. How can the historical record
show that resources spent on gaming might not have produced an even greater advantage had they been committed to other options? Still, I believe the case can be made.
Consider Prussia during the period when it had a monopoly on wargaming. Just a few
years earlier it had been humiliated by Napoleon. What could Prussia do to increase its
military effectiveness? It could not significantly increase the size of its armed forces; it
already had the largest army relative to civilian population in Europe. Prussia tried to
gain a technological advantage, but its economic and scientific bases were only so large.
It took it years to reequip its army with a new rifle, and during that time its potential
adversaries were modernizing their artillery. It could and did redouble its training, but
most training is expensive, and in the opinion of many military observers, Prussia’s
troops had been the best trained in Europe when they were defeated by Napoleon. The
principal change was wargaming, now integrated into its war college and operational
planning. The incremental costs of wargaming were negligible, well within even Prussia’s tight budgets.
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Now let’s consider interwar Germany. It had been so weakened by the Great War that it
feared being conquered by Poland. How could it increase its military effectiveness? The
Treaty of Versailles limited the size of its armed forces. The same treaty forbade tanks,
aircraft, submarines, and other weapons that might have given it a technological edge.
It already had the best-trained army, so further improvement there would provide diminishing effects. It also had the most advanced wargames, but they had been used only
by a small fraction of its force and for a limited number of applications. At a negligible
incremental cost, Germany greatly increased the depth and scope of wargaming in its
armed forces. This had the added benefit that when the armed forces were allowed to
expand, buy new weapons, and activate new units (or did so anyway), they knew from
their wargames what weapons and forces would have the greatest impact. It is difficult
to find an explanation for Germany’s 1940 victories that does not stem from its expanded wargaming. The British and French had more divisions, more troops, much more
heavy artillery, and much greater economic strength. Germany’s edge came from its
wargames and the wise doctrinal and technological choices to which they pointed.
Testing Hypotheses on the Application of Wargaming
The historical record can also be used to test assertions on specific applications of
wargaming. While wargaming can be applied in a range of often overlapping ways, they
can be divided into two broad categories with several subcategories each.
Hypothesis 1: Wargames can be useful as aids in making specific decisions on the
acquisition of military forces and militarily significant infrastructure. The historical
record is particularly strong in this area. From Teddy Roosevelt’s use of wargaming on
the potential value of a Cape Cod canal to the change in German plans for invading the
West to gaming’s impact on both Gulf Wars, the evidence is overwhelming. Admittedly,
most historical evidence is at the strategic and operational levels. But then, historical
records are more likely to be kept at those levels. What little tactical evidence there is
comprises a few reports of the use of wargaming in tactical planning by the Vietnamese
communists and by U.S. forces in the First Gulf War. Yet these support the assertion
that wargaming is useful for planning combat at the tactical level also.
Hypothesis 2: Wargaming can be useful in developing the potential of individuals, technology applications, and ideas. Here it is best to examine the indications in the historical record by type: individuals, technology applications, and ideas.
Hypothesis 2a: Wargaming can be useful in developing the potential of individuals. This
being the oldest application of wargaming, one might assume that its usefulness has the
most historical support. Unfortunately, if history includes an account of a prince with
a record of losing battles taking up chess and then going on to victory, I have yet to find
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it.8 The increase in military effectiveness with the founding of staff and war colleges
might be seen as pertinent. Still, wargaming made up just one part of the individuals’
studies, making the effect of gaming alone difficult to isolate.
The best evidence can be found in the impact of the U.S. Navy’s Top Gun, the Air
Force’s Red Flag, and the Army’s National Training Center. Top Gun is a particularly good case, as there just happened to be a control group: The Navy instituted live
wargaming during the Vietnam War and saw its loss ratio improve dramatically. No
similar improvement in the Air Force loss ratio occurred. True, the turnaround in
performance between Vietnam and the Gulf may be attributable to many causes. Still,
many reports from U.S. forces that participated in the Gulf War credit their effectiveness at least in part to prior participation in live wargames.
Hypothesis 2b: Wargaming can be useful in developing the potential of technology applications. The interwar years offer the most examples of successful wargaming in this
respect. The German army used wargames to help anticipate what properties of tanks
would be most useful once it could possess them. The German navy used games to
identify what should be the attributes of its future submarines. Similarly, the U.S. Navy
used wargaming to help understand what attributes of aircraft carriers had the greatest
impact on their military effectiveness. Finally, the Marine Corps included wargaming in its efforts to anticipate what hardware it would need to achieve an amphibious
capability.
Hypothesis 2c: Wargaming can be useful in developing the potential of ideas. The Marines’ interwar wargaming of their hoped-for amphibious capabilities illustrates that it
is sometimes difficult to untangle the use of wargames to explore ideas from wargaming
exploring the technology needed to implement those ideas. The Marines first envisioned
what would be necessary procedurally, organizationally, and technically to land on a
hostile shore and developed those ideas through constructive and live wargames. The
German navy used wargames to develop the idea of wolf-pack tactics, while the German
army used them to help develop and refine an idea it called “mobile operations.” The
rest of the world would soon call this new type of warfare blitzkrieg.
Admittedly, nothing in the historical record proves any of my assertions with the level
of certainty at which controlled physics experiments have repeatedly proved that F
= ma. Still, I trust that by now you will agree that the preponderance of the evidence
supports the proposition that wargaming can provide a potent military advantage and
that the size of that advantage depends on the effectiveness, breadth, and depth of your
wargaming—relative to that of your adversary.
But why is this so? History can easily tell us what happened, but it doesn’t so clearly tell
us why. While I hope this chapter so far has convinced you that there is ample evidence
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of the impact of wargaming, the record offers few clues about why wargaming’s impact
has been so strong. In 2005 an explanation occurred to me. I can offer no proof that I
am right, but I hope you will find my reasoning compelling and my explanation helpful.
Why Wargames Work
Taken together, three theories, or models, can help explain why wargames work. They
are the OODA Loop, military technical revolutions (MTRs) / revolutions in military
affairs (RMAs), and the Strategy Cycle, also known as the Innovation Cycle and the
Caffrey Loop.
Boyd and His OODA Loop
9

John Boyd was an unlikely theorist. Growing up in a family of limited means in Erie,
Pennsylvania, he enlisted in the Army Air Forces late in World War II. After getting a
degree through the GI Bill he returned to what was now the U.S. Air Force as an officer.
He fought as a fighter pilot during the closing months of the Korean War.
After the armistice a series of events occurred that would lead to his development as a
theoretician and to his formulation of the OODA Loop. He was one of several American
pilots who examined a MiG-15 fighter that had landed behind United Nations lines.
Boyd learned that the MiG was more heavily armed and could fly faster and climb more
quickly than the F-86 Sabre jets he flew. Yet he understood the United States had shot
10
down ten MiGs for every Sabre it had lost. That paradox stuck in his mind and would
not go away.
An outstanding pilot, Boyd was selected to attend the Air Force’s prestigious Fighter
Weapons School. He did so well that he was selected to stay on its faculty. He did so well
on the faculty that he was placed in charge of the school’s core course—on air-to-air
warfare. Finding no true textbook, no unified theory on air-to-air warfare, he developed the principles and wrote the textbook himself. That work led him back to school,
for a master’s in industrial engineering, to acquire the math skills he needed to develop
his theory of energy and maneuverability. His eventual paper on that theory remains a
cornerstone of fighter design and tactics worldwide to this day. It led then to a Pentagon
job defining fighter requirements, and there, more than any other individual, he earned
recognition as the father of the F-16.
Through it all, the paradox of Korean air combat kept coming back to him. How could
a better aircraft suffer more losses? Perhaps it was not better in the ways that really
mattered in air combat. In time, Boyd realized the F-86’s more-experienced pilots,
bubble canopy, and hydraulically boosted controls allowed its pilots to observe, orient,
decide, and act (OODA) faster than their adversaries. That, not top speed, made all the
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difference. In time he realized that staying a move ahead of your adversaries was at least
as important at the operational and strategic levels of war also. This led to the gradual
development of his “Discourse on Winning and Losing” (a presentation available online). This final theoretical work goes as much beyond his “OODA Loop” as Einstein’s
2
general theory of relativity goes beyond E = mc .
A fundamental reason why wargames “work” is that the side that makes more-effective
use of them can (all other things being equal) complete OODA loops more quickly than
an adversary that does not use wargaming as effectively or at all.
Let’s consider two combatants, at any level of warfare. As the fighting continues, Blue
gains combat experience. Each OODA loop gets a little faster. It would be easy to jump
to the conclusion that Blue could win by simply “hanging in” long enough for its increasingly tight OODA loop to become decisive. However, a little more thought makes
the fallacy of such reasoning obvious: Red’s OODA loops are getting a little faster each
time too. As in all warfare, the only advantage that matters is a relative advantage. If
both adversaries tighten their OODA loops equally, neither gains an advantage. The
U.S. military saw something much like this in Iraq, when it would develop a better way
of defeating improvised explosive devices only to see the insurgents develop a counter to
the American counter, which the United States would counter, and so on and on.
But what if you could shrink your OODA loop faster than your adversary can his, or
better yet, what if you could shrink your OODA loop while your adversary’s remains
unchanged? Either would provide a great relative advantage—and of the type that
matters. Wargaming can shrink OODA loops faster and do so without prompting an
improvement in an adversary’s speed. Before I can explain how wargames can shrink
OODA loops faster than war can, I need to explain why Wilbur was wrong.
In 1901 Wilbur and his brother Orville Wright had been trying to invent controlled
human flight for several years. They had made significant progress, but as Wilbur
considered their rate of progress and how far they still needed to go, he concluded that
man would not fly for fifty years. Wilbur should have known better than anyone (except
possibly Orville) how long it would take. How could he have been so wrong?
Wilbur based his estimate on their speed of progress thus far. Until 1901 they had been
traveling to Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, each summer, seeing what worked and what
did not meet expectations, then traveling back to Dayton, Ohio, each fall and working
through the winter on an improved device. Each cycle of improvement took a year. If
they were fifty cycles of improvement away from developing a working aircraft, then it
would take fifty years to produce one. But in 1901, the Wrights started using a wind tunnel. It was not much to look at, a rectangular box that would fit in most dining rooms.
Yet it included delicate instruments, designed by the Wrights, that could measure the
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lift and drag of various wing shapes. Now, instead of a year, wing shapes could be evaluated in seconds. Now, fifty cycles could take much less than fifty years. Just two years
later, man took flight.
Now let’s consider how armies traditionally got better at war. Inexperienced commanders gradually gained experience—if they lived. Green troops gradually turned into
veterans—those who lived. Battles took days to fight, campaigns took seasons, and wars
took years to bring to conclusion. Today live and virtual wargames still take days but
constructive games can be completed much more quickly. A six-month campaign can be
executed in six days, or six hours, or six seconds. The synthetic experience derived from
all types of wargames can create virtual veterans far faster than actual combat creates
real ones—and at a fraction of the cost in lives, time, and treasure.
The reason I said above that wargaming helps shrink friendly OODA loops without
affecting the speed of potential adversaries’ is that the adversary is not gaining the same
experience. This is what happened during the interwar period, when German submarine doctrine became more and more effective while British antisubmarine warfare
doctrine remained unchanged.
Wargaming, MTRs, and RMAs
The theories of military technical revolutions and revolutions in military affairs also help
explain the effectiveness of wargaming. But first we must briefly describe yet another
contribution by Andy Marshall and others from Col. Trevor Dupuy. First, by the late
1980s Colonel Dupuy’s analysis of military history had revealed that the number of
casualties per thousand combatants per hour engaged tended to remain constant. This
is quite counterintuitive, as weapons have obviously become more lethal over time.
Dupuy’s explanation was that soldiers have been getting better at not dying. He also
identified several spikes in history when a new weapon temporarily increased casualties
(per thousand per hour) until defenses caught up. His findings were interesting, but it
11
was not obvious how such knowledge could give your side a military edge.
Then Andy Marshall, as head of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net
Assessment, learned of work done by the Soviet General Staff and had it translated into
English. The Soviets too had reviewed military history and had identified conflicts in
which one side suffered far fewer casualties (per thousand per hour) than the other. The
advantaged side, they had found, was relatively more advanced in an MTR. They were
able to show that maturity in an MTR requires much more than just a new weapon.
Maturity is the sum of advantages in weaponry (or support systems), the employment of
the weapon, and the organization that facilitated the use. A nation could achieve a very
strong edge over its adversaries by fielding new weapons first, developing the best tactics
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for them first, and devising the best way to organize around them first. The sum of the
parts of an MTR was greater than its individual parts—that is, a fully mature MTR had
far more impact than a new weapon alone. Marshall realized here was a way the United
States could acquire a useful edge. The strength of our research efforts would make us
likely to field more effective systems first. If we could also develop effective tactics and
appropriate organizations for them quickly, our advantage would be multiplied.
Later Soviet thinking, also acquired by Mr. Marshall, extended the concept to include
revolutions in military affairs. In this case a new concept of operations comes first, but
as with MTRs, maturity requires new equipment/technology and an organization that
facilitates effective employment.
Strategy Cycle: The Caffrey Loop
In both cases the greatest advantage comes not simply from having more advanced
technology or a more effective doctrine but by maturing all elements of an MTR or
RMA more quickly than your adversary. The Caffrey Loop can be used to illustrate how
wargaming can help make that happen. As originally drawn, the Caffrey Loop describes
how MTRs/RMAs typically mature.
FIGURE 15

The Cycle, a.k.a. Strategy Cycle, Caffrey Loop, Innovation Cycle

History
Theory

Doctrine
Plan
Execution
The British experience during World War I illustrated the normal process. When the
United Kingdom invented the tank, both tank technology and its overall MTR structure were very immature. Still, the British were able to draw on both their experience of
land warfare before and during the present war and their history in employing armored
naval vessels. They formed initial theories of how tanks could best be employed, and
crafted from the most-convincing theories informal doctrine that shaped their initial
plans. They then employed their tanks, in a small way—and found that much of what
they thought they knew was wrong. This new history was added to their body of history,
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and the process was repeated. Gradually the British MTR matured—but then German
countermeasures also matured.
FIGURE 16

The Cycle, with Synthetic History

Wargame
The version of the Caffrey Loop in figure 16 illustrates how wargaming can speed up
maturation while not facilitating the maturation of enemy counters. The German experience during the interwar period illustrates this process. The Germans wanted to adapt
their “lively” way of war to take best advantage of technologies that had emerged during
World War I; in other words, they wanted to initiate and mature a revolution in military
affairs. However, they had two problems. First, the peace treaty forbade them even to
possess tanks or aircraft. Second, as they were at peace, they could not use experience
in battle to feed cycles of improvement. Wargaming solved both these problems. Their
map wargames simply attributed to units known or anticipated capabilities. Their live
wargames used surrogates: motorcyclists as aircraft, torpedo boats as submarines. The
outcomes of these games were used as “artificial history” to fuel revisions in theory and
12
doctrine, as well as the planning for the next wargame. This process not only allowed
Germany to mature its mobile-operations RMA but prevented its future adversaries
from developing counters in advance.
Of course, the German army did not have a monopoly on employing wargaming to create synthetic history and therewith continue the cycle. As you will recall, both the U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps employed much the same cycle during the same period. The
Navy clearly used numerous types of wargames within its cycle, which included relatively low-risk constructive games at its war college that explored new ideas, followed by
much more expensive and rigorous live wargames—the roughly annual fleet maneuvers.
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The maneuvers provided crucibles for strategies and socialized new concepts across the
fleet.
Nor is this just a practice of the interwar years. The Center for Naval Analyses has
advocated a cycle of research in which wargaming feeds and is fed by other analytical
techniques. The Marine Corps continues to describe its wargaming as part of a cycle.
So, we have completed the history and theory elements of our Caffrey Loop. Our final
chapters will provide something of a wargame doctrine. The material is partly derived
from the history and theory presented above, and partly from my almost half-century of
experience with wargaming. The planning and execution phases will be up to you.

Notes
1. For how history can best be used to extract
useful knowledge and why wargame outcomes
can be viewed as artificial history, see Robert
C. Rubel, “The Epistemology of War Gaming,”
Naval War College Review 59, no. 2 (Spring
2006), pp. 108–28, esp. p. 117.
2. Ironically wargame errors may have also
hastened German defeat. Hitler’s decision to
end the pol-mil games denied him a source of
insight into the plausible diplomatic and ultimately military consequences of his actions.
The General Staff ’s failure to allow sufficient
time for Operation Otto, the wargaming of the
invasion of the Soviet Union, in turn, denied
it insight into the impact of the Germans’ first
winter in Russia.
3. An attendee at one of my “history of wargaming” talks later mailed me several pages from
a book on the Chinese intervention in the
Korean War. The brief mention of wargaming
seemed to indicate the Chinese were using
Soviet-style games. For years I couldn’t cite
the book: he did not send its title page. See
chapter 3, note 10, for the rest of the story.
4. While a lieutenant stationed at Pope Air
Force Base in North Carolina, I joined the
Fort Bragg wargame club. Several of the
noncommissioned officers who had served in
Vietnam told me of having frequently come
across, when overrunning base camps, models
of the kind used in Soviet-style wargames.
Conversely, I’ve been able to find only one
account of a wargame conducted by the Army
in Vietnam. It was run by an officer with a
PhD in operations research on a “micro”—a
refrigerator-sized computer.

5. Col. Charles “Westy” Westenhoff, USAF
(Ret.), served as an air attaché in Baghdad
during the Iran-Iraq War. Following Iraq’s
victory at Fish Lake the Iraqi government
took him and many other attachés on a tour of
the battlefield. During that tour he observed
classic Soviet-style wargame terrain models.
The late offensives like Fish Lake followed the
pattern of those planned with Soviet gaming
methods.
6. Dean Rubel makes this case better than I
can: “Or any number of subsidiary things
produced actual outcomes different from the
games. It’s kind of like the butterfly effect—or
Richard III’s ‘for want of a nail the horse lost
its shoe . . .’ The point is that any wargame is a
distillation of reality to one degree or another.
Rules, dice rolls, algorithms, etc. are simplistic
representations of complex phenomena. Some
enlisted man forgetting to flip a switch might
create a cascading series of events that tip the
whole battle, even if all the conditions and decisions of the real event mirror those depicted
in the game.”
7. See Downes-Martin, “Adjudication.”
8. Many successful rulers, such as Elizabeth I of
England, have been serious chess players, but
I am unaware of any attempt to correlate chess
playing with success.
9. As Boyd never wrote a book on his theories,
we do not have a definitive source. Still, a
good overview, integrated into a biography of
Boyd’s professional life, is Grant T. Hammond,
The Mind of War: John Boyd and American
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Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian,
August 2004).
10. Decades later, when we gained access to Chinese and Soviet archives we learned that we
had done very well—but not quite that well.
11. See Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War.

12. Dean Rubel argues that wargame outcomes
can be usefully thought of as artificial history.
See his “Epistemology of War Gaming” for
how intellectual tools used to extract useful
knowledge from history can be applied to
game results.
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CHAPTER NINE

Wargame Participation
We begin our three “doctrine” chapters with what history and practice seem to indicate
is the most effective way to participate in wargames. To paraphrase a former Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Air Force, there is a 0 percent chance that the following is 100 percent
right. The following will also not even apply 100 percent of the time. Still, like actual
doctrine, it will provide a point of departure.
Most folks who participate in a wargame either want to enjoy themselves and hope they
also learn something or want to learn something and hope they will also enjoy themselves. How to get the most out of it does not depend very much on whether an individual is carrying out a military tasking, completing a class assignment, or just having
fun. I have worked to make this advice universally applicable, although the branches of
wargaming call for some variation. There is actually more variation in the preparations
needed for the various roles within a wargame than among wargame applications.
Each side (individual or team) must develop an idea of how it will win. While there are
many types of wargames and an almost infinite number of scenarios, the knowledge
and skills needed to develop a strategy apply to all. It has been my experience playing
commercial wargames for over fifty years that individuals who win games set during World War II generally also win games set in ancient Rome, and in the Cold War,
1
and during the Napoleonic Wars, and between Klingon and Federation fleets. I once
taught someone to play his first wargame and very nearly lost the game to him. My pride
largely recovered when I learned he was a nationally ranked chess player. Being an effective strategist increases your odds of success if you are playing the wargame for military,
academic, or recreational purposes. I suspect the ability to develop strategies can be
applied to business, politics, or any competitive field. But how does someone develop the
ability to develop effective strategies? My “loop” describes one path.
The foundation of it all is history. If you could learn all of military history, what has
worked and failed in the past, you would have a very large quiver of ideas that could
be drawn out to adapt to future situations. However, history is the largest block of the
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Caffrey Loop because there is so much of it. In a lifetime, no one can read all history
books (although some of my colleagues at the Air Command and Staff College made
impressive attempts to do so, and you can find some suggestions on what to read below).
But there is a “CliffsNotes” for history—theory. Theory is created when people who have
read, and typically lived, a great deal of history write down generalizations that they
believe are consistent with all they know. Theory is invaluable, but it has two problems—problems that doctrine addresses. First, different people accept different elements
of theory. If an organization is to fight in a coordinated manner, all its members need to
accept the same ones. (I once suggested to the Air Force Doctrine Center that it change
the definition of doctrine to “those theories we accept as an organization.” The center
said my definition was too short.) Second, theories are general. National doctrine and
service doctrine select or establish theories of warfare that apply to nations’ and services’ specific needs and abilities.
Of course, even doctrine is rather general. That is why plans are developed to cope with
specific contingencies. Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, “Plans are nothing; planning
is everything.” That is, the greatest value of planning may be that the act of planning
develops an individual’s abilities as a strategist, to be able to adjust plans quickly and effectively when the enemy “votes.” Most plans stay “on the shelf,” but a few are executed.
Success and failure in war are the ultimate test of the soundness of all the steps that
produced them. War also becomes one more event in history that can then be studied in
the context of history. And so the cycle begins anew.
That is how I taught the cycle for years, until I noticed that nuclear theory continued to
evolve without nuclear weapons being used and so with no new history to work from. I
also learned that German theory and doctrine had improved greatly between the world
wars with little or no new history. I soon realized both the American nuclear theorists
and the German strategists had been using wargaming to create synthetic history to
keep the cycle going during peace.
You can apply this cycle yourself, to become, perhaps, a more effective participant in
wargames.
Start with military history—not all of it but enough to check your later learning against.
Look for books that do more than recount the events, ones that get into numbers
and analysis. Books by Col. Trevor Dupuy and James Dunnigan tend to be strong on
2
numbers and analysis. Other media for learning history include magazines (Strategy &
Tactics also “does” numbers and analysis), videos (many now available online), visits to
battlefields, and conversation with combat veterans.
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As for theory, by far the best first book to read is Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.3 After more
than two millenniums no one has come close to matching the breadth, clarity, or brevity of this work. Of course, many consider the military theorist to be Clausewitz and
hence the first book to read to be On War. While small parts of his masterwork discuss
elements of nineteenth-century warfare that are no longer relevant, most of his writing, especially on war and politics, will be relevant as long as mankind makes war. Still,
On War is a much harder and longer read than Art of War. It is well worth the effort,
but a more accessible choice for a second book on strategy would be Makers of Modern
4
Strategy; it provides an overview of the ideas of Clausewitz and those of many other of
the most influential strategists. Makers puts Clausewitz into context and may allow you
to get more out of On War later. The most valuable theorist who is missing from Makers is John Boyd, I suspect in part because his work became well-known after the book
went to press and in part because Boyd never wrote a book. (However, you can find his
key briefings on the Air Power Australia website.) There are also theorists who focused
partly or exclusively on one domain: John Warden on airpower (his later works theorize
on competition overall) and Julian Corbett on sea power (though much of what he wrote
can be adapted to airpower).
But there are also “CliffsNotes” on theory, and as someone who taught theory for eleven
years and studied it for the majority of my lifetime, I offer here some of my own. First,
my two fundamental rules of strategy: never, never, never fight an even fight; and always,
always, always remember that you are up against a thinking adversary who is at least as
determined to win as you are.
On joint campaigns, my advice includes the following. First, think like an architect—but
know your bricks. Easily the most common mistake among new strategists is getting
bogged down in detail and not seeing “the full board.” They fail to take in the entire
conflict or to anticipate how the situation is likely to evolve. Future architects are
required to take courses in civil, mechanical, and electrical engineering so they can
determine whether their designs are feasible. (As long as a design is feasible, engineers
can usually work out the details.) Similarly, strategists must understand operations and
logistics well enough to be sure their strategies are feasible. (As long as a strategy is basically feasible, operators and logisticians can usually work out the details.)
Know your enemy and yourself. All enemies have centers of gravity—attributes, locations, capabilities attacking which successfully will do disproportionate harm. Of
course, your side has them also. Understanding both sides’ centers of gravity helps you
understand where to attack and where to make your defense strongest.
Start with your end state and your enemy’s and work backward. While commercial
wargames typically lay down “victory conditions” for both sides, strategists in the real
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world need to work a bit harder to understand just what end state each side is fighting
for. It is worth the effort, as knowing your adversary’s victory conditions will help you
anticipate his actions. Knowing your own helps you focus your efforts.
Develop as many edges as you can. The side with the most combat power does not necessarily win; the side with an edge in combat power at the point of contact tends to. Open
up an information edge. Good intelligence helps only so much if your adversary has
intelligence just as good on you, but seeing your enemy clearly while deceiving or blinding him can be decisive. And of course, open a wargame edge by wargaming more often
and more effectively.
Turn inside your adversary’s OODA loop. What is true for air-to-air dogfights is true
for nations. If your adversary is kept busy getting out of check he cannot check you. In
other words, your organization and application of power should strive to deprive your
opponent continuously of freedom of action to the end that you impose on him your
5
preferred outcome. Wargaming is particularly helpful in anticipating enemy options
and exploring strategies to preclude those options.
Some of my advice is domain specific. On ground power, I can offer three observations
and three rules of thumb.
•

Having the bigger army is not decisive; having significantly more combat power at
the point of contact can be.

•

Combat power is the sum of all your “edges”: numbers, training, tactics, terrain,
morale, leadership, and equipment.

•

Defense is tactically stronger, but offense is needed to win. If an army tries to be
strong everywhere, it can be strong nowhere. Hence some risk must be accepted so
enough power can be focused at the point of decision.

•

Defense is usually successful against up to twice its combat power.

•

Offense usually needs at least a three-to-one advantage in combat power to succeed.

•

Engagements at between two and three to one (in either side’s favor) are unpredictable and should be avoided if possible.

As for naval power, sea power exists so that the sea can be used by friendly commerce
and forces or so that its use can be denied to an adversary. Much less today a separate
domain than it was a century ago, sea power can engage targets deep within continents
and can be engaged by air and missile forces based well inland. As a sunken ship cannot
return fire, getting in the first shot has always been important, sometimes decisive, in
naval warfare. As in all domains, the biggest navy might not win, but the navy with the
most combat power at the point of combat tends to.
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The specific application of sea power is heavily influenced by the combatant’s objectives and capability. While most commentary is focused on command of the sea, in
some cases a combatant may need only to deny its use to the adversary; if your navy is
the weaker, that is all you may be capable of. Navies seldom have the need or means to
exercise command of the sea everywhere at all times. A navy may need absolute command of the sea while protecting an invasion fleet or to deny the enemy the use of the
sea rigorously enough to keep an isolated enemy garrison isolated.
Finally, more people seem to have a better feel for warfare on land than at sea. If you are
such a person, this may help:
•

Think of ships as infantry. Through their ability to remain on station they accomplish the naval equivalent of the infantry holding terrain.

•

Think of aircraft as artillery. They conduct strikes.

•

Think of submarines as cavalry. They conduct raids and collect intelligence.

For its part, airpower is similar to sea power in that it exists so that the air can be used
by friendly commercial or military aviation or denied to an adversary. Today airpower
can involve forces spread over continents. As with other domains, the side with the
larger air force may not win, but the one that can focus the most airpower at the point of
decision usually can. While keeping ships and tanks in working order has a big impact
on sea and land combat power, it does even more with airpower. Smaller air forces have
repeatedly won because they were able to generate many more flights (sorties) than their
opponents.
As sea power focuses on command of the sea, much of the emphasis on airpower is on
command of the air—that is, air superiority. Also similarly, in some cases a combatant may need only to deny the use of the air to an adversary, and an adversary whose
airpower is weaker may be capable of doing only that. Air forces seldom have the means
to exercise command of the air everywhere at all times, nor do they typically need to.
As air forces can be employed almost anywhere but are finite, it is particularly important to think through their employment. Phrases like matching “end state to aim point”
and “strategy to task” emphasize the importance of first deciding what airpower is to
accomplish and then working backward to specific tasking. Sequencing too is very important in airpower. Just as ground forces try to “soften up” an enemy’s defenses before
moving forward, so air forces try to take down an adversary’s radars first and then
dis-integrate its integrated air-defense system before employing nonstealthy aircraft.
Finally, the classic mistake young officers make is concentrating purely on offense.
While the aircraft is an inherently offensive weapon it does need somewhere to land and
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prepare for the next mission. Air strategists need to consider the necessity and means of
defending their airspace and their bases from all threats.
Of course, these few paragraphs alone can no more make you a strategist than an hour
of instruction can qualify you to fly an aircraft. These few words can only serve as
the beginning of your studies, studies that should continue throughout your lifetime.
Yet even reading theory will not be enough; you will need to go back and read enough
history to enable you to ask yourself whether the theories you have read are consistent
with what has actually happened in the real world. Finally, you must make opportunities to apply and develop your skills as a strategist by actively seeking to participate in
wargames of all kinds, including commercial ones. It has always puzzled me that military people are encouraged to read commercially published books on military history
and theory yet are very seldom encouraged to play commercially published wargames—
sometimes from the same authors.
Yet even a lifetime of study and personal development will not fully prepare you for
participation in major wargames. Also, these games are conducted in teams, so “playing
well with others” can have a huge impact on an individual’s effectiveness. Regardless
of what role an individual will play in a wargame, it is important to arrive early, ready
and rested. Military, academic, and commercial wargames require preparation. Military
wargames typically provide “read-aheads,” academic games list required reading, and
commercial games, rules. As the time available to execute wargames is precious and
limited, any preparation that allows play to start sooner and proceed more smoothly is
invaluable. Wargames can begin no sooner than the last key player is ready to start—
thus the importance, to the entire undertaking, of being early.
At the wargame, especially when playing in teams, it is almost as important to learn
about the other players as about the game itself. Players who quickly develop an appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of their teammates can help make the entire
team more effective.
Now that we’ve looked at how you can improve your performance as a wargame participant in general, let’s look at how you can improve your performance in specific functions: on the Blue team, the Red team, and the White team.
Playing Blue
The task unique to Blue participants is devising and “implementing” (that is, submitting
to adjudication in the format needed) a Blue strategy that is close to what the real Blue
would devise and implement. This may seem easy; after all, participants are generally
from the country represented by Blue. However, participants are also generally junior
to those who would be in charge in wartime. Following the Strategy Loop will not allow
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junior players to develop dependably the strategies that would be produced by their
more senior comrades, but it should help them be less wrong and will certainly help
them develop more-effective strategies. In the below I’ll assume Blue is the United States
of America. I do so because as an American I know the USA best and because I suspect
the majority of my readers will be Americans. If you are not, you can still follow this
process, substituting information on your country or for playing Red.
One more issue before we get started on playing Blue: I originally developed the below
for brilliant engineers and scientists. Previously, we had sent them into wargames
without preparation. Without knowing the vocabulary of wargaming or how to play
Blue, they were not able to participate effectively, especially early in the game. (They did
tend to be fast learners.) This section, and to a degree this book, was written to help such
people be effective from the beginning of their first wargame. If you are already experienced in planning U.S. operations and believe you already understand the American
way of war, you can probably skip to the next section, on playing Red.
As always, history is the firm foundation on which all strategic study needs to be built.
If you read only one book on American military history, I would recommend From Lexington to Desert Storm, a good overview of America’s wars at all levels from the national
6
through the operational. In selecting other books on American military history, keep in
mind that books with maps and orders of battle tend to teach the most about warfighting. It is also useful to study all periods in American history, though the more recent,
the more you should read.
Is there an American way of war? Is there an American theory of war? I think so. First,
throughout our history we have demonstrated a preference for forging a win-win peace.
We have not always won, nor when a member of a coalition have we always been able to
implement the type of peace we would have liked, but when we can, Americans prefer
a “soft” peace. We prefer a peace in which the people of our former adversary do not
have a motive to overturn the outcome of the war, because their lives are better than
before the war. I used to tell my students, just slightly in jest, that we have not achieved
the highest level of victory unless our former adversary is now a willing military ally, an
important trading partner, and a popular vacation destination.
There is also a distinctive American approach to casualties. Before 9/11 there was
widespread belief within the United States and around the world that Americans were
“casualty averse.” Even before the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia, many
believed that if terrorists, say, killed a few dozen Americans our people would protest
and the government would order our forces out of that part of the world. It should not
have taken 9/11 to show how wrong that was. During the American Civil War, 620,000
7
Americans lost their lives, yet Lincoln was reelected, and the United States fought on.
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This number is even more amazing than it seems, as we suffered those 620,000 deaths
at a time when our population was thirty-two million. In 2005, by when the American
population exceeded three hundred million, almost seven million, mutatis mutandis,
would have had to die for a voter to have the same chance of losing a son or a father, a
husband or a fiancé. Unlike in dictatorships, our voters are our fighters and our fighters’
parents and families. When “government of the people, by the people, for the people”
is at stake, we will fight on despite horrific losses. When we lose a few soldiers trying to
distribute food in a country whose name most Americans can neither spell nor find on a
map, we will leave.
The above aligns with the theory of the greatest American general most Americans have
never heard of. Gen. Fox Conner served in a variety of senior posts between World Wars
I and II. He never led a great army in combat, but he did mentor an amazing percentage
of the men who would during World War II. He told a young Capt. Dwight Eisenhower
that America should never fight unless it has to, should never fight alone, and should
never fight for long.
A final consistent element of the American theory of war is the conviction that technology and hardware can reduce casualties and speed victory. From the American Revolutionary War to the present, Americans have seen time and time again that this belief is
8
accurate, though often overstated.
The next part of being ready to play Blue is knowing Blue’s doctrine. Much U.S. joint
and service doctrine is available online. Many civilians are surprised to learn how
easy it is to get copies of doctrinal publications (more on this below). This is important
because move planning is an opportunity to ensure that Blue play is close to what the
actual decision makers would do. In the armed forces, actual senior decision makers
more commonly review plans than participate in entire wargames. Following Blue doctrine on military decision making and planning will help all Blue players both improve
the effectiveness of their strategy and bring it more in line with practice.
Our final step is execution. Is this step applicable to all readers? Of course, civilians
don’t “execute” actual forces, but then, neither do military people, very often. However,
all parts of the wargaming community can execute wargames. As most commercial
wargames have historical settings, the entire cycle can be built around them. For example, you could read a book or article about World War II in Western Europe, think
through how the American approach to war could shape our strategy, find and read
some period doctrine, then plan and write down your strategy. After all this you would
execute an appropriate commercial wargame against an opponent who was diligently
working to understand how the Germans fought. A postgame discussion, with appropriate refreshments, would afford additional learning opportunities.
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Playing Red
Rommel, you magnificent bastard—I read your book!
GEORGE C. SCOTT, PLAYING THE TITLE ROLE IN PATTON (1970)

One of the most important elements of decision-support wargames is ensuring that
Red reacts as the real adversary would react. Though perhaps less critically, academic
wargames also benefit from accurate Red play; truer representation of the conflict being
depicted results from Red play consistent with the practices of the real Red. Even recreational wargames can be enhanced by realistic Red play.
Nevertheless, many argue that it is impossible to “get inside the head of” your adversary. I
have argued in my various wargame courses for years that there is good news and bad news
on realistically playing Red. Some steps that can be taken to that end are easy, fast(ish),
and readily available through open sources. Other steps are less easy and less accessible.
Other elements of Red decision making may indeed be unknowable. Still, getting close
will likely produce far better results than not trying. It is probably impossible to get Red
exactly right. Still, by doing all the above and consciously trying to anticipate what Red
would do, the Red team is likely to be less wrong.
The Easy Part
Learn Red’s history. Just as you can infer an American way of war from American
history and a German way of war from German history, so the history of any country
speaks to how it will tend to act in a spectrum of circumstances. Such information is
readily available to anyone, on the Internet, in libraries, and at bookstores.
Learn Red’s culture. Not every society defines war, peace, and victory in the same ways.
Not every culture accepts the same laws of war. An understanding of an adversary’s culture can be invaluable, especially in circumstances without historical precedents. Again,
such information is readily available.
Assess possible foreign influences. This one is not quite as easy. Historically, militaries are
influenced by those from whom they buy or otherwise acquire their equipment. With
equipment comes contact: training classes and maintenance agreements. Nations also
tend to send their officers to the staff colleges of the nations from which they buy most
of their stuff. The Internet and good libraries should hold information on who is getting
equipment from whom. Nations may also continue to be influenced by their former
colonial masters (including Soviet neocolonialists) and current allies. Such information
is in your old history books and on the evening news. The trick is assessing how strong
that influence is. A nation’s history and culture can provide clues.
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The Hard Part
Learn Red’s doctrine. As a guide to how a nation plans to fight, and therefore to how it
will train and equip and organize to fight, doctrine is invaluable. The difficulty of this
method of understanding Red depends on who Red is and who you are. Many nations
realize that to be effective doctrine needs to be widely available and so do not even try
controlling access to (classifying) their doctrine. Even in such cases, it may take a little
digging by any military, academic, or recreational gamers to hunt down copies of Red
doctrine. Unfortunately, some silly countries actually think they can keep their doctrine
secret. This represents a minor inconvenience for Blue military gamers, as documents
that need to be distributed as broadly as doctrine are easy to . . . well . . . acquire. However, academic and recreational gamers will not be able to find copies.
Learn Red’s objectives. If you know where Red wants to go, you have a good start on figuring out how it will try to get there. One problem is that Reds tend to be dictatorships and
do not broadcast competing objectives during election campaigns. Still, one-man dictatorships are rare; even Soviet leaders needed to sell the Politburo on major decisions. Most
dictators are actually leaders of very narrow oligarchies that need to be convinced. This
convincing can sometimes be learned by reporters or intelligence professionals.
Learn Red’s planning methods. How an organization plans influences how it executes.
As stated previously, the Soviets used a very slow, methodical planning process that
tended to produce very effective initial attacks but impeded adjustment to unanticipated
developments. The curriculum of the staff college to which a nation sends its officers
is often the best single source of insight into staff procedures. Reviewing that nation’s
doctrine can also help.
The Hardest Part
Learn how Red organizes, trains, and equips. Knowing how potential adversaries do
these things may not tell you what they will do, but it can tell you what they cannot
do well. Just as an orchestra cannot play a composition for which it does not have all
the instruments or the score, so militaries cannot carry out operations for which they
do not have the needed training, equipment, or organizational structure. Actually, it’s
easy to learn some aspects of how a potential adversary organizes, trains, and equips.
Most parts of military organization are public knowledge, and several online and print
9
sources describe what equipment nations possess. Manufacturers of equipment sold on
the international market often freely issue glossy sales brochures listing all its characteristics. Still, some militaries succeed in keeping some of their organizations secret, and
many classify the specific capabilities of their equipment. It can be even harder to find
information on the topics and standards of adversary training.
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Learn Red’s perception of Blue. Just as our plans are shaped by our perception of the
adversary, so our adversary’s plans are shaped by his perception of us. It does not matter
whether these perceptions are wrong: if they are believed, they will shape how an enemy
10
acts. It is often hard to tell whether what an adversary is saying about us is propaganda,
meant to motivate the adversary’s population, or what Red really believes. There have
also been cases of adversaries coming to believe their own propaganda. Discerning the
real Red’s perception of Blue is hard, but a diligent Red team may be able to find clues in
open or closed sources.
Anticipate the timing and nature of changes in Red’s strategy. Red is at least as determined as Blue to win. If its plan, strategy, or doctrine is not working, Red will change
it. This is clearly the hardest aspect of playing Red. History, culture, and doctrine may
offer some clues about how flexible a particular Red tends to be. It may even be helpful
to study the careers of the Red leader or leaders who would likely direct changes.
Playing White
The White team (for control, adjudication, and analysis) is the brain and the heart of
major wargames. So why am I covering it last? I do so because commercial games almost
never have White teams. There, White-team functions are accomplished by rules or
computer software. (Sometimes even Red is represented by a rule set for manual games
or by artificial intelligence for computer wargames.) Still, if the branch of wargaming
in which you are most interested does not use White teams you should keep reading
anyway, both to see how the other half lives and because some of what is covered may be
relevant to those who are their own White teams.
Control
Every orchestra needs a conductor, every engine a governor, and every large wargame
an element that keeps all the other elements on track. (A computer wargame may not
need a human control element, but the software needs a sophisticated routine to ensure
11
that all actions are executed chronologically.) The game director, the senior mentor
(typically a retired flag or general officer), if mentors are used, and the project officer for
the facility where the game is played typically make up the control element of a major
wargame.
The control cell is in charge of all aspects of the execution of the wargame, but its three
principal duties are making sure the game stays aligned with its goal and objectives,
keeping the game on schedule, and leading the preparation of the postgame outbrief
and “hot wash.” Every Blue and Red team believes it can produce a better product if
it has a few more minutes. Control holds folks to the schedule, determining when, if
ever, the benefit of a schedule slip outweighs the cost. Also, unintended implications
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of the scenario or unexpected moves by a Red or Blue team can easily move the direction of play in such a way that a game objective will not be explored. Control needs to
detect that and then find and implement a way to get game play back on track, without
distorting outcomes (generating false insights) or so disrupting play that players lose
momentum and perhaps heart. Finally, Control needs to collect and package the outbrief for senior decision makers, balancing the value of providing the entire picture with
the need to be respectful of the senior’s time, while also preparing for the much more
freewheeling hot wash.
Adjudication
Clausewitz wrote, “War is very simple, but in war the simplest things become very
12
difficult”; he could well have been talking about adjudication too. After all, adjudication seems simple: determine the net effect of Blue’s and Red’s plans. But in fact, even
before adjudication begins adjudicators typically perform the functions of both the Blue
and Red staffs, answering questions on items not in the game materials but that would
reasonably be known by Red or Blue. When moves are turned in, adjudication has much
to consider. If in the real world a subordinate of either the Blue or Red team would add
detail to Blue’s or Red’s move—or react to unexpected developments—adjudicators need
to “play” as subordinate Blue and Red team members. For example, Blue’s plan may
direct the bombing of a particular target but not specify the type of bomb. Adjudication
determines that in the real world experts at the squadron level determine the best munitions to use. So the adjudication results will be those appropriate for the best munition.
(This is an area in which computerized adjudication tends to be inferior to human.)
Then they must determine whether each part of each plan is even possible to execute.
(Some may not be, either owing to the submitting team’s mistake or because of an action
taken by the opposing team.) If possible, could or would the other team oppose it?
Finally, they need to determine what each side would know of the interaction just adjudicated. To that end, adjudicators need to review beforehand reference materials on the
point they will be adjudicating. They also need to keep these materials at hand during
adjudication. When a first draft of the adjudication is complete they need to work with
Control both to check the quality of their work and to determine what, if any, changes
are needed to keep the wargame aligned with its goal and objectives.
Analysis
One of the most common mistakes in the organization of major wargames is not getting
around to forming an analysis element until just before or even during the game. Since
you cannot analyze data that have not been generated or collected, Analysis needs to be
involved from the beginning: in wargame design, throughout the preparation process,
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and from the first minute of execution. Before the game starts, Analysis needs to have
prepared a collection plan keyed to game objectives. During the wargame it needs to
collect information relevant to both the outbrief and the hot wash. Finally, it needs to
work with Control on the outbrief and later reports.

You now have the general and specific knowledge needed to serve in each major role
within a major wargame. To become truly proficient, you will need actually to participate in wargames. If you do well (and perhaps even if you don’t), after several games
your colleagues will start thinking of you as an expert on gaming. You will start answering questions about it and helping the new guys participate more effectively. Almost
without knowing it, you will be filling the role of a wargame practitioner.

Notes
1. Yes, there are many science-fiction wargames
set in the imagined future. One of the more
popular is Star Fleet Battles, designed by Stephen V. Cole and first published by Task Force
Games in 1979.
2. An excellent example is Phillips Payson
O’Brien, How the War Was Won: Air-Sea
Power and Allied Victory in World War II
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2015).
3. There are many translations of The Art of War,
and it is likely that new editions will continue
to be released. I recommend checking online
for the edition that best fits your tastes.
4. Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy.
5. My thanks to Dr. William “Bill” Lademan,
technical director of the U.S. Marine Corps
Wargaming Division.
6. Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. Drew, From
Lexington to Desert Storm: War and Politics
in the American Experience (Abingdon, U.K.:
Routledge, 1994).
7. Many books on the Civil War estimate
casualties, and many of their totals differ.
The high estimate is over one million total
casualties, the low about 600,000. The mostquoted total seems to be 620,000, given by
James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom:
The Civil War Era (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1988). Even the low estimates

exceed casualties of all other American wars
combined.
8. This belief started early. During the American
War of Independence many believed the
Kentucky/Virginia long rifle would bring us
a swift and cheap victory. This advantage was
real but overstated. After Bunker Hill the British developed tactics that minimized our advantages at range and maximized theirs close
in. By the end of the war we had developed
tactics that partially countered their counter.
9. Jane’s was the first, but today it is just one of
many, from free online sources like Wikipedia
to expensive subscription e-services available
at only a few libraries.
10. For example, during World War II the Japanese knew our submarines were physically
able to reach their merchant shipping lines but
believed Americans were too soft to undertake
such grueling missions. Hence they did not
plan to defend their shipping.
11. See Smith, Military Simulation & Serious
Games.
12. There is much to be said for reading an English translation of On War, but, as mentioned
above, as an alternative, Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 186–216, is a good survey
of Clausewitz’s time, insights, and continued
relevance.
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CHAPTER TEN

Wargame Practitioners
Wargame practitioners are deceptively important. We have already established that
a nation (or a company) that games more effectively than its opponents can gain a
significant edge. The group most responsible for the effectiveness of wargaming is that
comprising its practitioners. Who are wargame practitioners? They are those who work
for the leaders, providing wargames to participants and the insights to strategists. I
deliberately chose the word “practitioner” instead of “professional,” as the latter implies
someone who has completed a formal course of instruction and is working in the field
full-time. Most practitioners meet neither criterion.
Given the importance of wargaming more effectively than our adversaries, it is curious
that most American and other Western wargame practitioners are self-taught, or at best
have been trained on the job. Up through World War II, the Germans taught their war
college graduates how to conduct games. Today Russia and China appear still so to train
all their war/staff-college graduates. The United States does not. Those who are assigned
to do wargaming or would like to be can find in this chapter a start to their educations.
Few of the practitioners work on wargaming full-time. Aside from a relatively small
number of military members and civil servants assigned to wargame organizations, a few
government contractors, and a few exceptionally successful (mostly computer) wargame
designers, most work in the field part-time. Most military wargame practitioners are also
assigned other duties; most contractors also provide operations research, information
technology, or other services; most academic gamers also teach; and most commercial
wargame designers also have day jobs. In fact, the designer of one of the best-selling
print wargames of all time served as an officer in the Central Intelligence Agency until
retirement.
Wargame practitioners are a very broad group: wargame managers, designers, programmers, graphic designers, artists, researchers, analysts, play testers, reviewers, and many
more. They may work for the government/military, academia, or a publisher / development
house. Some practitioners are civilians who in their teens started as play testers and now
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have been designing wargames for forty years. Others are military people who, when
told that their next assignment would be running a wargame branch, asked, “What’s a
wargame?”
Nearly all practitioners, whether paid well, barely paid, or unpaid, military or civilian, full- or part-time, work very hard to do the best they can. This is important, as
the quality of their work can have a huge impact. Why is their work so important? An
analogy may be useful. Your chance of surviving a massive heart attack depends in part
on which hospital your ambulance delivers you to. Survival rates are affected in part by
budgets and technology, but some hospitals have simply developed more-effective ways
of employing their resources. Of course, the medical community, knowing that new lifesaving techniques are always emerging, goes to great lengths to “cross tell” best practices
to make your outcome less dependent on which hospital you arrive at. Still, there is
always some time lag between an initial success somewhere and getting the word out.
A similar situation exists in the wargame community. The confidence given the insights
generated by a wargame and the effectiveness of a wargame in creating virtual veterans
depend greatly on who is running the game. The wargame community knows that it
will never achieve completely reliable indications or complete effectiveness in developing strategists, anticipating military utility of possible future systems, or evolving
more-effective tactics for or against current and future systems. But it also knows that
developing and sharing best practices can increase the community’s effectiveness in all
applications.
This chapter goes beyond simply outlining what wargame practitioners most need to
know; it is also about best practices. It is not about the leaders who set game goals and
allocate resources to achieve them. Nor is it about actually participating in wargames.
This chapter focuses on the wargame practitioners who translate the guidance from
leaders into practical actions. It is focused on those who work to set up wargame participants for success. Even if you are not a wargame practitioner and see no prospect
of becoming one, do read on. The craft of wargame practitioners is an interesting one.
What follows will also offer a glimpse into the current and emerging capabilities and
limitations of wargaming.
One final issue before we get into specifics: so much wargaming is being done in so
many countries that the odds of what follows being really the best practices are very
poor. Even if I somehow managed to capture the best practices today, new and better
ones would start to appear as the book was in production. This chapter will conclude
with a few words on continuing to learn emerging best practices and perhaps contributing some yourself.
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Tasks of a Wargame Practitioner
The first task of a wargame practitioner is to be an authority on wargaming. If you work
directly for someone whose primary responsibility is not wargaming or who is new to
it, you really need to be that person’s expert. If you work for a lead wargamer, you need
to build the depth and breadth of your gaming knowledge as quickly as you can. Given
turnover, you may be advising the boss yourself before you know it.
Your fundamental advice will be when to wargame and when not to. If the boss wants
to conduct procedural training, perhaps a scripted exercise is best. If the boss wants
insights into a particular area, perhaps someone else has already conducted a wargame
that produced them and all you need to do is get a copy of the report. In other cases your
boss’s goal and objectives can be achieved by participating in a wargame being run by
someone else. Your participation influences its outcomes and is probably less work than
developing and conducting a game yourself. But sometimes creating a wargame is the
right answer.
Given the breadth of wargaming’s principal areas of application (defense, education, and
entertainment) and of the functions that practitioners perform in each, few best practices apply equally to all. We will therefore focus on best practices for people assigned to
a defense/military wargame function and mention when advice applies more broadly.
However, we start with a best practice that transcends wargame application and indeed
wargaming itself—be guided by your boss’s values and priorities.
Defining a Wargame
There is an old joke about the ancient Greek hero who navigated a labyrinth, killed a
monster, and survived a shipwreck to bring his queen a golden fleece. When after several years he marched triumphantly into her throne room with her prize she looked up
and exclaimed, “Gold? I distinctly said I wanted a silver fleece! Take it back!” The most
important best practice for wargaming—within the government, the military, academia,
the marketplace, or indeed any endeavor—is to understand fully what your boss is looking for. Bosses do not care how hard you worked, nor do they care much what others
think of your accomplishments. They do care how closely what you achieved matches
what they wanted done. As Col. John Warden, initial architect of the plan that became
Desert Storm, liked to say, “It really does not matter how fast you climb a ladder if it is
leaning against the wrong building.”
Hence, it is highly advantageous to draw from leaders their overall goals, not only their
objectives for wargaming. Practitioners, as their bosses’ experts on gaming, may see
ways in which gaming can help their leaders reach their goals that they have not anticipated. It is equally important that they explain to their bosses when wargaming is a
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bad fit. Even when wargaming is a good fit, it is equally important to educate your boss
on both its capabilities and limitations. For example, if a game is being used to support
decision making, it is imperative that you provide the boss your assessment of the overall confidence that can appropriately be given a particular wargame and also whether
elements of a wargame’s outcome are significantly more or less likely to anticipate actual
outcomes closely than the outcome overall.
Therefore, the most important step in the wargaming process is the initial conversation
between the wargame practitioner and the leader directing the game. “Conversation” is
exactly the right word; regardless of difference in rank, there needs to be a two-way conversation. While the leader knows what he or she wants and has an initial idea of what
resources can be expended to get it, the practitioner almost always has a better grasp
of what is possible and what resources will be needed. So that conversation, about what
can be achieved by when and with what, needs to happen as soon as practical, especially
since the leader’s initial guidance may be unexecutable or better achieved by other
methods. Bad news does not improve with age. When the wargame practitioner believes
an understanding has been reached, it is critical that the understanding be repeated
back to the leader, in writing if time permits, to confirm that a clear understanding has
been achieved.
If such conversations are vital for individual projects, they are even more important
when planning out gaming over a year’s time. It is well worth the extra effort to get clear
guidance on annual objectives, as it is very useful to plan game activities for a whole
year. Doing so can not only decrease the average time to execute games, by anticipating
needs, but also suggest measures that improve the wargaming capabilities of the organization generally, principally with regard to training and resources. Again, it is extremely important to “backbrief” the leader, to ensure the plan is in harmony with the leader’s intent.
Conducting a Literature Search
It is prudent, before delving into the design, planning, and execution of a wargame, to
consider whether all that would be cost-effective. With your boss’s goal and objectives
in mind, as well as a good idea of the resources available, you have the information you
need to evaluate other options. It is important to conduct a literature search at the same
time you are defining your wargame. Learning whether similar wargames have been
conducted before gives you an idea of whether such a wargame is possible. It may also
help you anticipate costs as well as identify elements of the previous wargame that it may
be useful to, ah, incorporate into your own wargame.
Though James F. Dunnigan is best known within the community as the world’s most
prolific wargame designer, he may well also be the most prolific speaker on the design
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and application of wargames.1 His presentations have varied in length from half an
hour to half a week, but their fundamental point has always been the same—plagiarize.
While he is mainly referring to print, commercial wargame design (“so many wargames
have been designed on so many subjects you can always find some game element to steal
for your design”), his advice applies across all types and all stages of wargaming. The
old cliché “Don’t reinvent the wheel” applies on many levels to wargaming. (Though
a revised cliché may be even more appropriate: “Invent no more of the wheel than you
have to.”) Here are some examples.
The best way to minimize the cost of a wargame is not to conduct one at all. When
leaders ask for wargames on particular subjects what they typically really want is the
insights from a wargame on that subject. Practitioners need to check to see whether
planned or completed wargames can provide such insights. Even if existing wargame
reports do not provide everything desired, getting some can still be valuable.
To take an example from the Air Force, that service is required by Title 10 of the U.S.
Code, as we have seen, to organize, train, and equip air, space, and cyber forces. To do
that the Air Force prepares budgets. These budgets affect Air Force capabilities in the
short, middle, and long terms. Hence, the Air Force has used wargames to assess risks
and gain insights at various depths of time in the future. Decades ago the Air Staff realized that the combatant commands were already conducting wargames set in the present and in the near future. As their headquarters were generally located in the parts of
the world in which their games were set, their wargames were likely more accurate than
2
anything the Air Staff could develop. So the Air Staff decided to develop and execute
only wargames set in the mid- and far-term future and for the near term simply acquire
the insights from the combatant-command wargames. The taxpayers save money, and
the Air Staff gets better material than it could have generated itself.
Still, when you are considering using insights generated by someone else’s wargame,
caution needs to be exercised. Wargames are not black boxes that produce answers with
validity across all organizations. They are designed to maximize their utility to their
sponsors. In the Air Force’s case the respective purposes of the two sponsors appear to
be similar enough for the same insights to be useful to both, but in other cases what is
useful to the sponsor can be misleading to others.
Unfortunately, in many cases, wargame practitioners cannot identify a game being
conducted by another organization that provides what is needed. In such cases the
practitioner will need to design, develop, and execute a wargame that does. Even then
it is often possible to gain better results at lower cost, through partnering or reuse (a
euphemism for plagiarism).
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Partnering with another organization with similar needs can save money and perhaps
even create a better wargame. For example in 2012, both the Royal Air Force and the
U.S. Air Force Materiel Command needed to look at possible future systems before
employing them in a major wargame. Neither had the resources to conduct an effective
wargame itself, but together they could. Better still, they were able to spot potential synergies that would have gone unnoticed had each organization played a separate game.
Through “plagiarism” a practitioner can avoid reinventing the entire wheel, by acquiring parts of other wargames. Here are two very different examples. The BritishAmerican wargame just mentioned used the draft scenario of the U.S. Air Force’s
Future Capabilities Title 10 wargame and an off-the-shelf Red order of battle from
the LeMay Center Wargaming Institute. Not only were time and effort saved but the
scenario got a test run before the Title 10 game. On another occasion, the U.S. Air Force
Squadron Officer College needed a new instructional wargame. A review by the school’s
wargame practitioners turned up no government-owned or commercially published
games that exactly met their needs, but one commercial design came close. The Squadron Officer College paid the commercial publisher to modify its game to suit—and for
far less money than it would have spent programming a game from scratch.
Of course, sometimes plagiarism is not helpful. Many individuals who have worked in
government or military wargaming for over a year have stories of an (often expensive)
piece of adjudication software that was plagiarized from another game, where it worked
3
well, only to prove out of scale with the new game. The most common fatal flaw of an
existing adjudication program is more detail than is needed in the new game, making it
slower than needed, hence unable to game the full event in the time available.
Designing, Development, Execution, and Follow-Up
The work to be done in a given wargame function varies between the major applications of wargaming (government/military, academic, and commercial/recreational) and
within each application. (Department of the Navy wargaming is very different from that
done by U.S. European Command, which is very different from that of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense / Office of Net Assessment.) Nevertheless, all forms of wargaming
share certain elements: design, planning/scheduling, and execution. So there is where
we will start.
Design Considerations
The task before a wargame designer is similar in several ways to that of an architect—
both art and science. Both strive to meet the customer’s goal and objectives while
staying within budget and obeying the laws of physics. The success of both depends in
no small part on making wise choices between alternatives. In the case of the architect,
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those choices include building materials and construction techniques. In the case of the
wargame designer, the choices are the options within the various elements of a game.
Only one element of wargame design is universal (that the design must serve the
sponsor’s goal and objectives within resources available). Others vary in each design:
medium (live, virtual, constructive); type, if constructive (3-D models, print, computerized); and application (government/military, academic, commercial). But design in most
wargames follows one of two sequences: designing an “event” wargame is substantially
different from designing a “turnkey,” or item, wargame. We will consider each design
choice in turn.
Perhaps your first design choice is how to balance speed, detail, and scope. Speedy execution is good; it allows more moves and deeper delving into a conflict, and simply demands less of the participants’ time. “Granularity” (close-up detail) is also good; while
it does not necessarily follow that greater detail provides greater accuracy, it may help,
and it does seem to increase the credibility of wargames. “Scope” refers to how many
aspects of the conflict are depicted. For example, will the game address only force-onforce issues, or will it include the impact of logistics too? Broader scope can also increase
accuracy. However, just as folks in procurement point out that there is a relationship
between cost, performance, and schedule (a change in one changes the others), so in
wargaming greater speed comes at a price in detail and scope, and greater detail tends to
slow down execution.
FIGURE 17

Design Trade-Offs: Depth, Detail, Scope-Duration

Depth

Detail

Scope

There is no one right balance. Academic and course-of-action wargames lean toward
speed, as the time available for either is limited. Political-military games prioritize scope
and, secondarily, speed. Wargames that are integral parts of months-long studies tend
to need and to be able to incline the balance toward detail. Designers need to find a balance that fits their goals, objectives, and resources.
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Once that balance is selected, the next step is typically to choose a method of adjudication, deterministic or stochastic. Deterministic adjudication attempts to identify the
most likely outcome of each action and settle on that. However many times a deterministic adjudication is run, the same input will always produce the same output. Stochastic adjudication estimates the range of likely outcomes for each action and assigns a
(typically varying) probability to each possibility within it. A random-number generator
(computer or dice) picks between these outcomes. Deterministic adjudication is often
chosen when a wargame can be conducted only once; some believe the outcome will be
closer to what would actually occur than would one execution of stochastic adjudication. The stochastic method tends to be preferred when it is possible to run the adjudication, or the entire game, several times. Most will produce different results, and after
enough executions an “envelope” of outcomes and their relative likelihoods seems to
emerge. However, if stochastic adjudication is conducted just once, its outcome could be
one of the less likely ones, and the people conducting the wargame would have no way
of knowing that. Stochastic adjudication is also typically used in education wargames,
as it illustrates the uncertainties of war, and by commercial wargames, as it makes them
more exciting.
Again, neither method should be viewed as predicting or even forecasting the future.
4
Among the reasons stated previously, many historical events were improbable. Either
type of adjudication can be performed by judgment, by rule, or by a hybrid of both.
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Neither works best for all objectives:
determining which method is the best fit with your goal and objectives is a matter of art.
Adjudication by judgment is simply allowing the expertise of the adjudicator or team
(an “expert panel”) to determine either the net effect of Blue and Red moves or the relative probabilities of plausible outcomes. Its advantages include the considerations that it
tends to be faster and less resource intensive to set up and that it can deal with interactions that are difficult to reduce to rules (diplomacy, human interactions, the will of
combatants). As disadvantages, it is not entirely repeatable, as judgments evolve; it tends
to be more expensive, an issue if the wargame must be run many times (e.g., educational
games for forty-four seminars or twelve thousand correspondence students); and it
requires adjudicators with the necessary expertise, of whom there is a finite number.
Adjudication by predetermined rules requires that all the types of interactions between
5
Red and Blue be anticipated and the net effects determined in advance. It has some
advantages. It tends to be faster, assuming the adjudicators are familiar with the rules,
and even faster if all those rules are in a computer program. Also, there is no need for
scarce experts to accomplish the adjudication—or even, if computerized, humans at all.
Third, it may be feasible to play enough runs to produce (if the rules contain stochastic
elements) an outcome distribution.
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But adjudication by rule has disadvantages. It tends to take more time and more resources to set up, especially if rules are to be computerized. Also, interactions in warfare
that are only just starting to be understood probably can’t be captured yet in fixed rules
and are likely more suitable for adjudication by expert panel. For instance, training
and morale were once considered too amorphous for rules, though now even commercial wargames have fixed rules for them. Today some feel we do not understand cyber
warfare well enough for rules; probably by the time rigid adjudication of cyber effects
becomes routine, there will be some new element of war needing expert adjudication.
Combinations of these adjudication choices are common, and different types of
wargame tend to use different ones, as can be seen in figures 18 and 19.
FIGURE 18

Spectrum of Adjudication

Pure Monte Carlo

Pure Judgment

Pure Rule Based

Pure Deterministic
Next let’s examine the choice of type and method of wargaming. With respect to the
overall game, there are three types (one with three subtypes) and two methods. The
three types of wargame are live, virtual, and constructive. During live wargames, participants actually do what they would do in war: moving, shooting, and communicating
(minimizing real casualties). On one hand, live wargaming offers the highest levels of
detail and (because most of the game play is real) plausibility, and excellent training. On
the other hand, they are the most costly in time and money, and they may be visible to
real-world hostile intelligence collection (in some cases, foreign observers are required
by treaty). Casualties due to accident are always possible; efforts to minimize them may
create conditions not present in wartime, creating a danger of “dis-training.” Action can
proceed no faster than real time, making it unpractical to explore effects that take time
to develop. Finally, participants might cheat (such as walking across “blown-up” bridges
instead of building tactical replacements).
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FIGURE 19

Applications by Adjudication Choice

Pure Monte Carlo

Pure Rule Based

Pure Judgment

Pol-Mil WGs
Pure Deterministic
During virtual wargames in contrast, the participants experience their wartime actions
without actually performing them. They offer, of these choices, the second-highest level
of detail. They can game actions too dangerous for live wargames, and in areas off-limits
to them, so outcomes may actually be more accurate than live wargames. There is no
danger of fatal accidents or overhead observation, and the training is still excellent. Virtual gaming, however, is also the second most expensive, in time and money. Also, as in
live wargames, the action (for the most part) can proceed no faster than real time, ruling
out exploration of issues that develop slowly.
Finally, players in constructive wargames assume the roles of commanders, directing
the actions of individuals or units. They can depict entire campaigns or even wars. They
can game second-order and delayed effects, so outcomes may be the most accurate.
They are highly educational, the least costly of the three, and typically the fastest to initiate and complete. But they may ignore logistical constraints that are inescapable in live
wargames, and they are almost always less granular than live and virtual wargames.
In constructive wargames, the current state of the wargame situation can be represented
in three ways. The first involves terrain tables and miniatures or figures. Terrain is physically modeled, much like a model-railroad layout. Either soldiers (or ships, or whatever)
are individually modeled or units are represented by shapes that cover area proportional, in the scale being used, to what the actual unit would occupy. While supporters
of this type of display correctly point out it boasts the ultimate in 3-D graphics, it also
tends to be the most expensive constructive option. (In the future, 3-D printing may cut
steeply into the cost and time constraints.)
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The second way is the use of maps, paper, boards, or charts. Here, terrain is depicted on
a two-dimensional surface, often overlaid by a hexagonal (“hex”) or other grid, though
conventional maps or charts are sometimes used. Individuals and units are represented
by markers, typically small cardboard squares. A supporter of this option has noted that
it is far less expensive to create the first copy of such materials than their equivalents on
a computer and that each additional copy is less expensive than miniatures. Games run
this way are also typically faster than miniatures, although slower than computers.
The third, of course, involves computers, tablets, smartphones, or the like. Supporters
assert that computer wargames are the wave of the future. Terrain is displayed on a
screen, as are individuals or units. The initial cost of hardware and software is relatively
high, but the needed hardware is often already owned, and each additional copy of
the software (if you own the rights) is virtually free. Wargames can be set up instantly
and saved at any point, and the map can be “zoomed” in or out to see detail or the big
picture better.
Whatever type of wargame is selected, there are two options for conducting the adjudication, manual and computerized. Manual adjudication simply means that humans
determine the net effects of Blue and Red actions. They may do so on the basis of professional judgment or predetermined rules. In live and constructive wargames, manual
adjudication is provided by “umpires.” During constructive games, umpires may rely
on judgment or predetermined rules—or the Red and Blue players themselves might
use rules to resolve each move themselves. Manual adjudication tends to be slower and
less granular than computerized adjudication, but it can be faster to set up and does not
need the hardware and power sources computerized adjudication does.
The other option, computer adjudication, requires sets of predetermined rules that can
be represented as computer code. In the “extreme case,” virtual games, adjudication
is performed entirely by computer in response to participants’ inputs as they travel
through the virtual space, and the running outcomes are incorporated in what they
experience there.
An element of adjudication in larger wargames is performing the functions of the
“competent subordinate.” That is, individuals in the adjudication cell would play the
collective part of subordinate Blue and Red commanders, adding detail to the moves
submitted by the Red and Blue players. This had always required live adjudicators,
though fairly recent computerized wargames have achieved some success in assessments
that would seem to require human judgment; they did so with sophisticated rule sets
or computer artificial intelligence. Computer adjudication may require the longest lead
time (i.e., if there is no existing program that can be used as is or easily adapted), but
once programmed such wargames are often the fastest.
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Before we leave design choices and computers, we should address one false choice and a
very real one. There are people who think all wargames are computer simulations. Still
others believe that one of the first design choices is between a “computer wargame” and
a “manual wargame.” When many people speak of “computer wargames,” they really are
thinking about games in which the scenario and graphics are on a computer, moves are
entered into the computer, and the new game state (as each side is to perceive it) is adjudicated and provided to each side by the computer. The real design choice, though, is to
what degree, if any, computers should be part of your game. In a given wargame, they
can be used for information: since the 1950s computers have been used to store, create,
and transmit game information—scenarios, maps, moves, and so on. In another game,
they could be used for both information and adjudication.
FIGURE 20
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In yet another, they can be used for information, adjudication, and Red inputs. There
are many important reasons to program computers to play Red. The military saves on
travel funds, since no Red players need to be brought to games; civilians do not need to
find (which may be hard for them) live opponents to play. However, success in creating
6
artificial opponents that replicate Red’s decision making has been mixed. Or, finally,
a wargame might employ computers for information, adjudication, and both Red and
Blue inputs. Success in computerizing the entire wargame process would allow many,
many runs to be accomplished quickly, generating an “envelope” of outcomes with relative probabilities. The challenge is creating artificial intelligence routines that do well
enough.
Before we move on, let’s look at four examples of how differences in objectives and
resources can prompt different design choices.
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Case 1. A service school for midcareer officers decided to add a wargame to its correspondence course. The objective was to give students an opportunity to apply what they
had learned during the conventional part of the course. The staff had a modest budget
and eleven months before the wargame was to start. It selected stochastic adjudication, as it would better introduce students to the uncertainties of war. The school chose
a rule-based system, as it had neither the personnel nor the travel budget to provide
expert adjudicators for each student. Next, as its curriculum focused on the operational
level of war, the school selected a constructive wargame, so that it could be played deep
into the campaign. Next, the staff decided to use a computer to display the situation and
adjudicate each turn; the code needed to play the wargame could simply be downloaded
by each student. This is an example of a “turnkey,” or “item” (entirely self-contained),
wargame.
Case 2. A fighter pilot was assigned to a wing’s headquarters staff a few months before
an operational readiness inspection (ORI). During an exercise conducted to prepare for
the ORI, he observed that the intelligence officers debriefing the fighter pilots simply
took down what the pilots were saying without understanding what they were saying. He
decided that if the intelligence officers could, through a wargame, engage in air-to-air
combat themselves, they would understand well enough to ask more-appropriate questions. With no budget and only a few months to go before the inspection, he acted fast.
He selected stochastic adjudication, to illustrate the uncertainty of air combat. He then
selected the rules-based method, feeling that learning the rules would enhance the intelligence officers’ overall understanding. He then decided on a constructive wargame; he
had neither the budget nor time for a live or virtual game, and he wanted to illustrate
the impact of “packages” of aircraft. How did he produce such a game in time? He
bought one. He picked an off-the-shelf print wargame with manual adjudication: he
could start gaming sooner and allow the participants to see how adjudication was done.
(A postscript: this is based on a real case, and the impact of the wargame was striking:
7
during the ORI the intelligence officers and fighter pilots actually had conversations!)
Case 3. A combat-arms Army officer was assigned as the deputy to a research-anddevelopment division. She soon realized that the civilian workforce had no clue about
ground warfare. How could these folks spot technology to help the warfighter if they
did not understand the challenges faced by the warfighters? The division chief already
permitted two ninety-minute “brown bag” lunch sessions each week; she decided to devote every other one to wargames that might correct this problem. She “went stochastic”
to illustrate the element of chance in war, and rules-based so the game could be played
on days she was not there. She then picked constructive, there being no facilities for live
or virtual and she wanting to show the impact of various weapons and other equipment.
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Finally, she looked for a print wargame to keep the sessions short, and she found one
that was structured to start simply and gradually add more elements of modern warfare.
However, because the games would have to be played over several fairly short segments,
she selected a computerized display. This allowed instantaneous setup at the start of
each “brown bag” and instantaneous wrap-up at the end.
Case 4. U.S. intelligence had finally located six Drug Enforcement Administration officers who were being held deep in the jungle of a South American state. We would have
one chance to rescue them, since once their captors knew the hostages had been located
they could move them or even split them up. The rescue team chose to wargame its plan
several times with stochastic adjudication; it wanted to identify where combinations of
various chance events could derail it. It chose to have those probabilities determined
through judgment, having been promised any subject-matter expert it requested,
including operators recalled from retirement. Next, it selected a constructive wargame,
as a live game might be detected by an adversary and virtual technology was not yet
mature enough. The team members created a terrain model, and on it they manually
adjudicated the mission over and over again, injecting different things that could go
wrong each time. They even “killed” the mission commander to see whether his deputy
could execute the mission, then “killed” the deputy, and so on until half the team had
8
practiced leading the mission.

These outcomes should not be considered “school solutions.” One reviewer came up
with a very different, and perhaps better, solution for Case 4. What I am trying to illustrate with the above is that choices in the design of a wargame should be made on the
basis of each set of goals, objectives, and resources. One size most definitely does not fit
all.
It is also important to point out that sometimes the best way to meet a need is not a
9
single wargame but a series of linked wargames (see figure 21). For example, if the
sponsor’s goal is to identify potential future systems that are likely to provide a significant military advantage, no one game may be capable of meeting it. Many “exploration”
wargames would be needed to sort out the highest-impact concepts. As bad ideas tend to
outnumber good, such wargames would need to be conducted many times; each repetition would need to be cheap in terms of time and cost. Once apparently useful future
systems were identified, “deep-dive” wargames would be needed to pursue the findings
of the earlier, less rigorous ones. Those future concepts that continued to look promising
would then be explored in an “integration” wargame that would look for synergies and
redundancies among all the surviving future systems.
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FIGURE 21
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So after considering your alternatives and concluding that you need to create a
wargame, there remain many decisions on the nature of the game you will employ.
Event-type wargames require the designer to plan the execution of the game as well as
its creation. Turnkey/item wargames must be designed so that they can be executed at
any time and without the assistance of the designer.
Development/Planning
Planning a wargame is largely a matter of scheduling—that is, what element of the effort needs to be completed by when to meet the completion date. As the planning and
scheduling of event and turnkey wargames differ widely, we shall consider the sequence
of each in turn. Both types exist in both the military and commercial worlds, but eventtype wargames are more common in the military, so we’ll cover them first.
Event-game design is as much about designing a process and an event as it is about
designing the wargame itself. Event wargames tend to be conducted once—for example,
Gallant Knight 1987 or Futures Game 2015. While typically used by the military, as
noted, event-type games may also take place at civilian wargame conventions or in the
classroom. Here are the typical steps in their design and execution. Much more detail on
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FIGURE 22

Wargame Cycle, Event

Inspired by graphic from the Naval War College’s War Gamers’ Handbook

conducting an event wargame is available in the U.S. Naval War College’s War Gamers’
10
Handbook.
1. Tasking. This step includes the documentation and confirmation of management’s
goal, objectives, and resource allocation. This is the universal foundation (or should
be) for the design of all types of wargames, for all applications. Whether your direction comes from your commander, your publisher, or your dean, it is vitally important
that there is agreement on the goal and objectives and that sufficient resources will be
available. The most important and the most irreplaceable resource is time. This is when
the wargame practitioner needs to draft a schedule of when each of the below steps will
be completed and when the overall project will be done. Practitioners need to update
management whenever developments impact the expected completion.
2. Literature Search. If nothing else, reviewing previous wargames tells you whether
the goal you are pursuing has ever been in a wargame—and thereby proven possible.
It can also suggest what worked previously and what pitfalls you should look out for.
The search may also turn up wargames from which you can incorporate elements. For
the U.S. military, the first stop in any literature search is the Office of the Secretary of
Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Wargame Repository. Military and
civilian designers who wish to search for commercial wargames should review BoardGameGeek and the StrategyPage, both free online services.
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FIGURE 23
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3. Design. During this step the designer reconciles the sponsor’s objectives with available resources and makes the fundamental decisions concerning the wargame. This
is the point when the decision should be made on the medium of the wargame—constructive, live, virtual, or a mix. If constructive, will the wargame use an expert panel
or rules-based adjudication? What, if any, elements of the wargame will be supported
by computer software? As this is an event wargame, a schedule of pregame events (this
game being the capstone) and a schedule of the game (capstone) itself, as well as any
postcapstone analysis, report writing and coordination, and archiving, must also be
drafted. This is also when the game scale is established. Typically the wargame should
end when the event being wargamed does. If the goal calls for wargaming a battle, the
game could continue until the outcome of the battle was clear. The same applies for
campaigns and wars. Once the length of the capstone and the duration of the conflict
games are established, an experienced designer can estimate the trade-off among detail,
scope, and depth to meet the sponsor’s goal and objectives. For example, a wargame
designer determines that after in-briefings and out-briefings she has thirty-four hours
in which actually to conduct the game. As the part of a campaign to be wargamed is
expected to last forty days, a combination of granularity, depth, and scope must be
selected that can play, on average, more than a day each hour of execution.
4. Alpha Test. During this phase the designer and a few colleagues walk through the
wargame. The purpose is to determine whether the “big rocks” fit and will achieve the
game objectives. If not, the basic design can be adjusted with little if any wasted effort.
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5. Development. Development is about playability. The basic design is a sealed matter;
now it is time to create the “game kit”—the materials that the players and adjudicators
will need to execute the wargame.
6. Beta Test. During the Beta test a small team will attempt actually to execute a part of
the game. If the wargame calls for six moves in three days but the Beta test of one move
takes nine hours, a significant reworking of the game kit, and perhaps of the design, is
needed. This test should reveal any gaps or unclear elements in the game kit. The results
of the Beta test will seldom change the basic design but should result in improvements
to the game kit.
7. Participant “Prep.” The first step in preparing participants is deciding what mix
of skills and backgrounds you will need in your participants. Recruiting for an event
wargame is a little like casting a play. You know what you want, and you get as close
to that as you can. Some deficiencies can be mitigated through pregame training: area
experts can be taught about operations, operators taught about the theater. Then there is
the writing (or selection) and distribution of read-ahead information for all participants.
Read-aheads need to cover everything from dress code to where to park, to readings on
the focus of the wargame.
FIGURE 24
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8. Red Team Definition and Prep. One group of participants requires special consideration and special preparations—the Red team. There are three schools of thought
on Red teams. One holds they should play as close to what the real Red would do as
possible, strictly following Red doctrine and cultural norms. The second school believes
that because the real Red will want to win, the Red team should do anything and everything of which the real Red is physically capable. (This is the view followed by Lt. Gen.
Paul Van Riper during Millennium Challenge 2002.) The final school believes that Red
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FIGURE 25
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is simply a tool of the White team, used to stimulate play bearing on game objectives
regardless of what the real Red might do. Many proponents of each school believe that
they and only they are right.
In actuality, the employment of the Red team should fit game objectives. The Red team
for a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan–prompted wargame should follow the current
doctrine of the Red addressed in the operations plan. The Red of a war-college wargame
should do whatever is feasible to win, to be a challenging sparring partner. The Red for
a command-post exercise should be close to the White team approach—that is, inserting moves designed to meet the sponsor’s goals and objectives. Still, if Red just ticks off
items on a checklist, there is no wargame at all and training suffers. Finally, often the
best approach for Red is a mix of these elements. For example, most Title 10 wargames
are set some amount of time in the future, by when Red doctrine will likely have
evolved; those Red teams tend to play between “stick to doctrine” and “win any way you
can,” with a little bit of “stimulating game objective” thrown in. As almost all Red teams
place some weight on playing as the real Red would act, the study of Red becomes the
most important element during their preparations.
9. Event Prep / Rehearsal. Event preparation is very unsexy—ensuring that everything
from name badges to refreshments is ready. Still, it’s important; for one thing, participants do better work when they are fed. (There can be complications here. For instance,
where supporting foundations exist, they might be requested to pay, with “gift funds,”
for dining-related needs to which appropriated funds cannot be applied. But gift funds
too have restrictions on what they can be spent for. The rules are arcane, yes, but you
can be sure that auditors know all about them.) The rehearsal is all about ensuring that
the execution goes smoothly. This is the final test. It should be conducted where the actual wargame will be played, and it should use all the software and execute all the steps
of the actual game.
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10. Execution. Something will go wrong. Good planning will minimize problems, but
some problems will occur. Preplanned leadership meetings will make coping go more
smoothly. Maintaining a reserve is vital—some extra time in the schedule, a little extra
manpower. Finally, remember an event wargame is an event, and social activities should
be thought of as part of it.
11. Analysis. Analysis falls into two categories: search for insights into wargame objectives and for insights into the game. While many educational wargames do not generate
insights into warfare, all wargames should generate insights into how the next game
can be more effective. Planning for analysis should begin during step 1 and should be
a consideration throughout; you can’t analyze data you did not generate through the
wargame, and you can’t analyze generated data you did not think to collect.
12. Reporting. All the insights generated need to get down on paper. Writing the report
is just half the process. The wargame practitioner needs to help ensure the report gets to
all who would benefit from it.
13. Archiving. Sometimes a wargame’s insights mature with age. The game report needs
to be not only preserved but preserved in a way and place that facilitates access by those
who would likely benefit from reviewing it.
FIGURE 26

Wargame Cycle, Event or Turnkey
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A successful turnkey project is a wargame that is, by virtue of its design and develop11
ment, robust enough to be executed without the intervention of the designer. Turnkey
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wargames are typically intended to be played over and over again. While usually
produced for the recreational wargaming market, turnkey games are sometimes used by
the military—for example, in PME distance-learning courses and for individual professional development.
1. Kickoff. Again, this step includes the documentation and confirmation of management’s goal and objectives and resource allocation, and everything I said in step 1 for an
event game still goes. But also—and unless the objective is to test a particular adjudication program or the publisher only deals in, for example, miniatures games—leadership
should specify objectives, not how those objectives are to be met.
2. Big-Rock Research. Wargame research is best done in stages, as the emerging game
itself makes clear what information is pivotal, given its scenario and nature. Still, “big
rock” (basic) information on the theater and combatants is needed early. Just enough
information needs to be collected to build and conduct a rough expert-panel prototype.
3. Prototype. When old pros like James Dunnigan describe how to design a wargame
they tend to leave out this step, perhaps because after their first few dozen game designs
they could accomplish it subconsciously. In a similar case, for decades Walt Disney
Studios never storyboarded its films, with no ill effect. After Disney’s death the studio’s
new movies stopped flowing so well. In time his successors realized that the earlier
movies had been storyboarded—in Walt’s head. A prototype is the wargame-design
equivalent of a storyboard. The designer, alone, or better with a few core members of
the development team, reviews the game objectives and then walks through the game’s
starting conditions, likely Blue and Red moves, and the likely outcome of the game. For
us mortals, creating an even largely mental prototype does a marvelous job of focusing
research on what is truly needed.
4. Fundamental Design Decisions. As form follows function in architecture, so the
fundamental design decisions of the wargame should be made to achieve the best fit
with the leader’s goal, objectives, and resources. Sometimes, especially in the government or military, it is assumed that a wargame will be adjudicated by computer, because
. . . because, well, aren’t they all? Actually, though not everyone will consider these
“games,” a great deal of wargaming goes on inside the heads of commanders and around
tables in strategy cells. A key early decision will be choosing an adjudication type and
method, game type, and game scale that meet your objectives and yet will be executable
given your constraints of time and money. Decisions on adjudication method and type
of wargame are interrelated and too multifaceted to describe here.
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As for the basic game-scale parameters, you need to establish the following: How much
real time should a single run of the wargame take? What level of command-role will
the players occupy? What would be the length of the real-world decision at that level?
(For some higher-level games this question is replaced by, What is the typical interval
between updates of campaign plans by either side?) How much real-world time will it
take to game to its conclusion, with high probability, the action depicted? Dividing the
total duration of the action by the length of one decision loop will produce how many
decision loops need to be accomplished during the time available. This indicates how
much time is available for each turn and gives a sense of how complicated each turn can
be. (For some higher-level wargames the question is how many campaign-plan updates
are typically made during the duration of the conflict. Dividing this number by the
available time indicates how much time there is for each turn, hence how complex each
turn can be.) This knowledge drives other basic decisions: the size of units depicted and
the map scale.
5. Main Research. Now that the basic parameters of the wargame have at least been
tentatively settled, detailed research can be productive. It is easy to be seduced by archives or intelligence terminals. Research should be limited to what is needed to execute
a game at the scale and in the medium selected. There will be time for more research as
the game demonstrates what information is needed.
6. Manual Prototype. Regardless of the final medium you select, a manual prototype is
invaluable. Some do not see the value of a manual prototype if the final wargame will be
computerized. Consider: all prototypes—be they for an aircraft, a computer wargame,
or a washing machine—are constructed because people have discovered, sometimes at
great cost, that some problems do not become apparent until a prototype is built. In the
case of a computer wargame, you more or less have to build the final version to have
a digital prototype. When such a prototype indicates that a change needs to be made,
the code will have had to be written three times: to create the prototype, to delete the
faulty code, and to write the patch. Such work is not only manpower intensive but also
increases the chances for bugs. If you use a manual wargame to help discern the final
nature of the computerized game, the code need be written only once. The manual game
can also be saved and used as a test bed for contemplated future enhancements.
Manual prototypes for computerized wargames do have their shortcomings; larger
menus of choices and greater granularity of play are possible in a computerized
wargame with little impact on the duration of moves. Such differences need to be kept
in mind during internal testing (the next step). Still, manual prototypes serve as a check
on the depth of the designers’ understanding of the subject matter. Several experienced
designers have told me that if you do not understand the dynamics of a situation well
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enough to create a manual wargame, you will not be able to create a computerized one.
Finally, tweaking a manual game until it is right will reduce the expense of software
changes that would be needed.
7. Internal Testing. Members of the wargame organization need to play-test the prototype to anticipate all the ways real players may try to break it. Are there any elements of
game play that could be exploited to obtain unrealistic outcomes?
8. Development, “Final” Research. Development is what separates functional wargames
from great ones. During development, practitioners work hard to use graphic-design
principles and common sense to build “elegance” into the game. There is a rule of
thumb that the more detail in a game, the slower the play. Design elegance tries to bend
that rule by setting up the users for efficient play. Information that needs to be consulted
frequently might be printed right on the game map; a feature that allows previous moves
to be edited and re-input for the next move instead of retyped from scratch might be
added. Finally, all this work invariably reveals the need for some bit of data that had
been missed during previous research. Folks like to call research at this point “final”
research, and sometimes it even is.
9. Documentation, Programming. While computer and manual wargames seem very
different—and are very different in cost to develop and many other ways—this is the
only step they don’t have in common. Even here, there is significant symmetry. In this
step, instructions on how to execute the wargame are documented. When those instructions are written for people, they are called “rules”; when those instructions are written
for computers, they are called “code” or “programs.” Even many of the principles are the
same; both types of instructions need to cover all possible actions, be free of contradictions, and be executable.
10. Internal > External Testing. No matter how much internal testing is done, it is
extremely important that the wargame be tested by individuals not assigned to or
employed by the organization designing it. Individuals who already know the jargon,
already know something about the game, are likely to fill in mentally gaps in the rules
without even realizing it. Gaps will exist, and they can be found either by outside testers
or by the end users. Perhaps ironically, this is one area where commercial publishers
typically have a big advantage over their military counterparts. Commercial designers
have no trouble finding testers who work for pizza or simply for the glory of seeing their
names in the credits. The military can’t use random teenagers to test classified or even
“official use only” games. So you are likely to encounter more bugs (the software kind,
not the spy kind—one hopes) at high-budget classified games than at weekend wargame conventions.
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11. Refinement, Production. Outside testing always turns up some software bugs to
be squashed, oversights in the rules, or contradictions in the introduction or scenario.
Some coding or editing will be needed. Once that work is confirmed to be complete,
it is finally time for production. For the government or military this typically means
actually conducting a wargame; almost as many man-hours may be expended in administrative, logistical, and protocol arrangements as it took to create the game. For academics, this means producing sufficient handouts and game materials for the number of
students registered. For the commercial folks, this means publishing the game.
12. Feedback. Wargaming is a competitive field. The “best in breed” military, academic, or commercial wargame one year is often eclipsed within a few years or sooner.
A key to pulling away from the pack and staying there is feedback. First and foremost,
you need both frank closed-door and also official written feedback from the leader
who initiated the wargame. Remember, Lee Iacocca had plenty of positive indicators
on his work at Ford, but he was fired—because he did not meet the expectations of his
12
boss. Feedback from game participants is also important. The clearest insights seem to
come from a mix of informal “hallway” conversations and formal or statistical feedback
vehicles. The hallway provides answers to the question that was not asked; the formal
feedback can show trends and tends to be valued by management. Hallway feedback
is easy for military and academic practitioners to collect, but commercial wargame
publishers need to attend conferences where open (pickup) and competitive wargaming takes place to get theirs. Finally, formal feedback may be able to prove that negative
rumored “feedback” is wrong (as I have seen happen, related later in the chapter).
For much more on designing turnkey wargames (and wargame design in general), see
Wargame Design, by the staff of Strategy & Tactics magazine, published in New York by
Simulations Publications in 1977 (and cited in chapter 1).
Execute
The “execute phase” is principally the province of military event-type wargames. Why?
The three main branches of the wargame field vary most after their games are “complete.” When a commercial game publisher ships a product or adds it to online inventory it is not finished—but it is nearly so. Most customers will use their new wargames
without contacting the publisher, except perhaps to send in a feedback card. However,
inevitably, a few have problems executing their games. The quality publishers continue
to support their titles with corrections to their instructions, bug fixes for computerized
wargames, and rules errata for print and miniatures. When academic wargame practitioners complete their “wargame kits” they still need to execute the game in class and
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gauge how much learning has taken place. However, for government/military wargame
practitioners, in most cases only a fraction of their work is complete yet.
This is because military wargame practitioners not only create or adapt wargames
themselves but manage their preparation, execution, and documentation. While some
government/military wargames are held in reaction to developing situations and must
be planned, prepared, executed, and briefed in hours, most are scheduled months, if
13
not years, in advance. Government and military wargame practitioners often need to
hold numerous pre- and postgame meetings, conferences, and workshops aside from the
capstone.
Planning the execution of a wargame is not so different from planning any other event.
The amount and formality depend on the type and size of game. If you are getting
together with friends for some fun or professional development, maybe all the planning
you need is making sure you have a location, the wargame, and sufficient refreshments.
If you are conducting a wargame as a classroom practicum, you should probably inventory your “wargame kit” to make sure you still have enough read-aheads, handouts, and
game components. After making any additional copies needed, you will need to ensure
a room is available, read-aheads are distributed well in advance, and the game components are ready. However, if you are, as we say in the Air Force, the “officer of primary
responsibility” (OPR) for a major military game you may be in for more work than was
expended to create the wargame itself.
In such a case, before the actual planning the OPR needs to do four things. First, review
the goal and objectives; they should influence your planning in both obvious and
subtle ways. Second, learn what you can about the planning and execution of previous
wargames conducted by the organization. Next, compare the objectives with the time
and resources available. The sooner objectives, time, and resources are brought into
balance the less painful the adjustments will be. Next, if the game is a major annual or
biennial (every other year) event there will almost always be notes from the hot wash
(see below) or a section on lessons learned in the game report. For a smaller wargame
there may not be a formal report, but the OPR can still find and talk to the previous
game’s OPR. If a wargame is being executed for the first time, talking to the OPR of a
similar game should be helpful. If the OPR’s organization is conducting a truly unique
wargame and for the first time, the OPR should read this section twice.
The first step of actual planning should be the construction of a “countdown calendar”
like those we’ve discussed above, for what needs to be done by when and on what date
the tasks were actually accomplished. Such calendars can be created with any wordprocessing program, but if you have the software, spreadsheets work better, and projectplanning software works best.
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We already discussed the pivotal importance of a full, clear, and mutual understanding
of objectives. Here are some other specific planning tips. First, when possible, plan a
little more time than is needed at several points during preparations. These interludes
work like planned “holds” during a countdown for a space-vehicle launch: if delays are
encountered, they provide time to make them up. If a facility is needed for the wargame,
reserve it as early as practical. If external participants are needed, deconflict your dates
with other wargames that may draw the participants you want, and get invitations out
early, because the more valuable the participants, the faster their calendars fill up.
Other elements may or may not be needed for your wargame. Here are a few examples:
•

Who has a need to know the insights generated by this wargame? Who has sufficient
need to be invited to the outbrief? Who should receive a copy of the report?

•

Does an analysis plan need to be developed?

•

Do any of your materials need to be reviewed for classification or declassification?

•

Will there be participants sufficiently senior to warrant working with the organization’s protocol office?

•

Is there sufficient chance of interest by the media to warrant working with public
affairs specialists? Do you want media attention?

•

Do you need to hand select any of your participants? Examples might be team leaders
or an adjudicator in a particularly challenging area.

•

Do any of your teams need . . .

•

•

To meet (in person or virtually) before the wargame?

•

To be trained?

•

To receive read-aheads?

Should food be catered, allowing teams to work through lunch (or dinner)? Doing so
creates an additional administrative burden but increases the time available in each
day.

Learning from Your Outcomes and from Others’
At major military games insights tend to be discussed in two different events. Typically,
first there is an outbrief for the sponsor of the game. Its focus is what happened during
the wargame and what real-world insights can be drawn. The second and typically last
event on the agenda is the hot wash. Less formal, with less “rank” in the room, the hot
wash goes over what went right and what went wrong during the wargame. While some
of the discussion invariably touches on the quality of the food and other logistical issues,
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most of it centers on issues that affect the reliability of the game’s insights: the accuracy
of the adjudication, correctness of Blue or Red employment, plausibility of the scenario,
and others.
There are good reasons for this split. Hot-wash participants will talk more freely and
those who ran the wargame will listen less defensively in a more junior group. Also,
many doubt that senior leaders want to listen to how the sausage was made. Still, I’ve
long felt that these two events are kept a bit too separate, because, as just now implied,
some of the comments in the hot wash are relevant to the level of confidence that should
be given to insights arising in the outbrief. Nevertheless, we will address learning from
the game’s insights into warfare first, then the lessons learned on wargaming.
As listed above, before a wargame is ever conducted the practitioners need to determine
who is likely to need the insights it generates, and how badly. An individual or organization with great interest may want to be involved in the planning and execution.
Those with a lesser but still substantial need may want to attend the outbrief, while still
others may simply want a copy of the report. Finally, there are those who need to know
but don’t realize it yet. For them, some form of outreach, targeted or blanket, is often
needed.
It is also important to package insights in a way that meets different types of need. Wargame outcomes are typically treated as news, something to be reported but not referred
to later. However, many individuals will need to refer back to them later, so it is important to establish an easy-to-use depository. Finally, wargame insights are sometimes
most valuable when combined with insights from other games. Just as the outcome of an
experiment is given more credibility when repeated independently, so a wargame insight
also produced by other independent wargames should be and is taken more seriously. A
trend across several wargames may be a more valuable insight than the insight from any
one wargame.
Still, this can be dangerous ground. Multiple wargames all using the same faulty assumptions can produce the same misleading insights. Even a set of truly independent
wargames may include ones that were conducted poorly or were driven by incompatible
14
objectives. Multiple wargames may also have used the same deterministic adjudication method; no value will have been added through repetition. My favorite Benjamin
Franklin quote (Otto von Bismarck said something similar) is “A smart man learns from
his mistakes, a wise man learns from the mistakes of others.” When it comes to improving your abilities as a wargame practitioner it is best to be smart and wise.
As with an analysis plan to produce wargame insights, you can most effectively compile
lessons learned by planning for it before the game starts. First, determine what information you will need from what individuals. Next think how best to collect that
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information. Except for very small, informal wargames, it is almost always wise to
construct a feedback form beforehand; it can be printed or made available online. The
form works best when it seeks a mixture of quantitative inputs and narrative comments.
Quantitative inputs are best for showing trends, like improvement from one game to the
next, while narrative comments may actually contain quotable compliments or ideas
on how to improve. A block for comments on the hot-wash agenda and simply asking
“How’re we doing?” over doughnuts can also provide useful feedback.
Such surveys also serve a defensive purpose. It is a sad fact of human nature that dissatisfied individuals are more likely to make the time to talk to your boss than satisfied
ones. A boss once told me to cut a section out of my wargame course as one of the students had told her that all the students hated that block and found it useless. Fortunately, I had my survey results showing that the block in question had received the highest
overall score and had been marked “below average” by only one student.
There are basically two ways to learn from others about conducting more effective
wargames: participating in other organizations’ wargames and attending gatherings of
practitioners. Participation in others’ games also increases the odds that the host will
participate in your next one. Actually, how you learn in another’s wargame is not terribly different from how you learn during yours. Try to get the report of the survey, if the
host conducts one and is willing to share the results. Attend and take notes during the
hot wash. Finally, solicit the views of other participants throughout the game.
There are several venues in which wargame practitioners get together and exchange best
practices. In the United States, Connections has been attracting military, commercial,
and academic wargamers from throughout the country and around the world since
1993. Connections’ mission is to advance and sustain the art, science, and practice of
wargaming. A tutorial offered the day before brings those new to the field sufficiently
up to speed to benefit from the rest of the event. The keynote speakers are leaders in the
field. The agendas also include speaker panels, working groups, “demos,” and a “game
lab.” Finally, Connections maintains a website (Connections-Wargaming.com) that
provides a forum for and a reference source for wargaming 24/7/365.
Also in the United States, the Military Operations Research Society’s annual symposium includes a wargaming working group and typically between one and three other
wargame-related events. In the past the requirement for at least a U.S.-recognized secret
clearance has blocked almost all commercial and academic attendance and complicated
international participation. However, it also allows the discussion of classified processes
and outcomes that cannot be covered at Connections.
Finally, since 2013 there has been a British/European edition of Connections. International participation in Connections had always been modest because of the high cost of
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air travel, but the first Connections UK attracted seventy-five participants from eight
nations. By 2017 participation in Connections UK had grown to almost two hundred
participants from nineteen nations.
While all of these events are great venues to learn best practices, they also provide opportunities to “give back” to the field. Volunteering to share your successes is both the
right thing and the smart thing to do. Franklin also spoke of “doing well while doing
good”—that is, sometimes when you help others you may also be benefiting yourself.
Building a talk for any of these gatherings will clarify the subject of your briefing in
your own mind. The question-and-answer period following your talk, not to mention
“sidebar” discussions, can sharpen your understanding further. Finally, becoming better
known in the community can provide benefits difficult to anticipate.

In this chapter we covered how wargame practitioners can best identify what work
they have before them, plan and conduct that work, and learn how to improve their
performance continually. I have tried to make my guidance as general as I could, but of
necessity it is most relevant within a military or defense environment. Our next chapter
will address how leaders can gain the greatest value from their practitioners and from
gaming in general. Again, much of that will apply to all forms of wargaming, though
we will deal with the military side in the most detail. In the chapter following that I will
specifically address how a wide range of people can ideally benefit from wargaming.

Notes
1. Starting with Jutland in 1966, James Dunnigan designed well over a hundred wargames
before going into semiretirement (from
wargame design) in the 1980s. His record for
total designs was not surpassed (by Joseph
Miranda) until well after the turn of the
century.
2. CENTCOM is the exception in terms of
headquarters. While its area of responsibility
is roughly the Middle East, its headquarters is
located in Tampa, Florida.
3. This generally happens when adjudication
software that works well for one use is applied
to a very different purpose. The most frequent
examples are attempts to use for wargames
depicting theater campaigns software with a
proven track record for only a few analytical
studies, or even just one. If it can be made to

work at all, it is likely to take a week to adjudicate something like three hours of a six-month
campaign.
4. Erik Durschmied has written several books on
the impact of the unlikely on history, including The Weather Factor: How Nature Has
Changed History (New York: Arcade, 2001),
and How Chance and Stupidity Have Changed
History: The Hinge Factor (New York: Arcade,
1999).
5. Frank McHugh calls this “rigid assessment”
(Fundamentals of War Gaming).
6. During Connections UK 2014, one of the
senior leaders of Dstl told me it had had good
results with computer routines replicating decisions of doctrinaire Soviet commanders but
not much success automating the decisionmaking processes of terrorist groups.
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7. This story was told to me by “Mo” Morgan,
then a captain, at Nellis AFB in the mid1980s. He had done as the story describes,
except that he did not buy a constructive
paper wargame but designed and developed
one himself. The wargame would later evolve
into Check Six!, the first wargame funded by
the Air Force’s Project Warrior.
8. Of course, all this is very time-consuming.
Simple sensitivity analysis can identify many
of the same potential problems much more
quickly.
9. Figure 21 is based on a slide in a presentation
by Maj. Eric Frahm of the Air University LeMay Center War Gaming Institute. He originally called it the “Caffrey Triangle,” having
based it on a conversation we had had. I told
him the name was already taken (variables
to Red play) and suggested he use Caffrey
“Pyramid” or “Equip Pyramid” instead.
10. Shawn Burns, ed., War Gamers’ Handbook: A
Guide for Professional War Gamers (Newport, RI: Naval War College, War Gaming

		

Department, n.d. [2015?]), www.usnwc.edu/
getattachment/Research---Gaming/War
-Gaming/WGD-HB---Complete-2.pdf.aspx.

11. These steps are based partly on the ten steps
of print wargame design in Dunnigan, Complete Wargames Handbook. Jim advised me to
“plagiarize” the list, and I could only obey.
12. For readers born after roughly 1970, Lee
Iacocca is best known for spearheading the
development of the Ford Mustang, while at
the Ford Motor Company in the 1960s, and
for reviving the Chrysler Corporation as its
chief executive officer during the 1980s.
13. For example, when I checked the schedule
for the Air Force’s Future Capabilities Game
2015 in the summer of 2013, a Title 10 game
scheduled for spring 2015 had already been
available for three months.
14. For a number of years students played against
a Red order of battle that had been doubled,
to pose a greater challenge. The wargames
met their educational goals but any insights
they generated would have been worthless for
anyone trying to anticipate how fighting in the
depicted theater might actually develop.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Leaders and Wargaming
Wargames can help leaders gain an edge on their competitors—if they use games more
extensively or more effectively than competitors do. This chapter will address how leaders—especially of defense-related organizations, leaders from the platoon to national
level—can maximize the odds that their organizations will in fact wargame more effectively than their adversaries.
Does this mean that someone who is not a leader within the defense establishment
should skip this chapter? Not necessarily. Leaders in the defense-contractor community
may find some of the below useful in understanding and communicating with their clients. Citizens may be better able to understand defense work conducted on their behalf.
Leaders in the economic or political realm may find some of it adaptable to getting an
edge on the competition. Finally, folks who are not yet leaders may find this useful, both
to help them anticipate what their leaders need and to prepare for when they become
leaders themselves.
Anticipating Wargaming’s Biggest Payoffs
Just as we needed to describe what we mean by “gaining an edge” in war and what its
value is before describing how wargaming can help do that, so now we must discuss
what leaders do before we can describe how wargaming can help them do those things
better. But before doing even that, we need to acknowledge that leaders do not actually
achieve things themselves. Leaders do not take hills, bring the iPhone to market, or
turn around failing schools. It is their followers who actually do those things. Successful leaders set up their followers for success. Their followers are the ones who throw the
dice, but leaders can affect the odds of success. Leaders do that in four ways: developing
and communicating goals and objectives, securing resources, anticipating the likely
outcome of actions in a competitive environment, and developing their followers. Let’s
look at each in turn.

336   the

newport papers

Leaders sometimes establish goals and objectives themselves, though more often they
tailor and elaborate those set by leaders above them, either in a military chain of command or a civilian organizational structure. This tailoring typically involves focusing
on the leader’s part of a larger effort. The edge that wargaming can provide in setting goals more effectively may not be immediately obvious, but actually wargaming
can help in several ways. Higher-level goals may have been developed in part through
gaming; knowing about those games can help leaders better understand the goal. For
example, U.S. naval wargames in the late 1920s and 1930s indicated that if war came
with Japan, the capability to capture Japanese-held islands would be of strategic importance. Developing such a capability became a goal of the Marine Corps. Wargaming can
also be used to refine and develop goals at the leader’s level. It can help anticipate their
feasibility and clarify their contribution (or lack of it) to higher goals.
Leaders also work to provide their followers the resources needed to obtain their goals.
From the strategic level (justifying placing an item on an “Integrated Priority List”) to
the tactical level (perceiving the need for reserve “lift” should a helicopter in a raid have
to turn back), wargames are very useful. They help identify gaps and opportunities, and
they communicate the likely impact of resource decisions.
For example, prior to retiring from the Air Force Reserve, I had to keep my weight within the limit stated for my height. To help, I often used a cheap, noisy exercise machine.
One evening I turned on C-SPAN and began watching a U.S. Air Force major general
testify to Congress. I caught words like “megajoules” and “gigawatts,” but I could not
make out, over my exercise machine, all that the general was saying. So I stopped exercising, but I still could not understand what he was talking about. Then an Army major
general testified. He began by saying something very much like this: “Thank you for the
opportunity to talk to you about an American tragedy, all-too-unfriendly friendly-fire
incidents, where Americans are accidentally killing other Americans. The Army is seeking funding to equip one division with what we are calling Blue Force Tracker, a system
that will let our soldiers know where they are, where their buddies are, and where all
known enemies are. To gain insights into possible impacts of this system we wargamed
a brigade ‘meeting engagement’ with and without this system. Without Blue Force
Tracker we suffered fourteen friendly-fire fatalities; with it we suffered none.” The committee members were not only supportive of Army procurement plans but even explored
the feasibilities of speeding up the procurement. One asked, “Why don’t we just take the
money away from the Air Force? They want to spend it on gigajoules.” The committee
members probably did not understand the science behind Blue Force Tracker any better
than they understood gigajoules, but they did understand fourteen lives.
Leaders can use wargames to help them arrive at more-effective strategies. This help
may come in several ways. Over the long term, games can help leaders develop their
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own ability to envision effective strategies. Conversely, wargames may well make their
most important contribution by identifying strategies that are unlikely to succeed. They
offer enough insight into outcomes to allow alternative strategies to be compared and
the most effective to be selected. Finally, they can point out dangers and opportunities
before operations begin, so that measures can be taken to avoid the one and exploit the
other. Of course, exactly how wargames are used will vary.
In the case of preparing for a specific endeavor, the type and scope of wargaming will
be determined by the level and size of the leader’s organization and the time remaining until the earliest time of execution. The level and size of a leader’s organization or
unit will determine what resources (principally people) can be dedicated to planning
and wargaming. As for time, a balance must be struck: the more time taken to prepare
instructions, the more time the leader will have for concurrent wargaming and improving his or her instructions in a host of other ways as well. However, the less time a leader
takes to provide guidance the more time subordinates will have to prepare. It is generally a good rule of thumb that a leader should take no more than one-third of the time
remaining to develop instructions to subordinates. The importance of giving subordinates time to prepare applies at all levels, from the commander in chief to the platoon
leader.
The payoff of such wargaming is an increase not only in the chances of developing the
most effective plan but also in your organization’s understanding of the plan, which
should increase the speed and accuracy of execution. Wargames can also promote faster,
more effective execution of operations when conducted long before an operation is conceived of. They can help leaders develop themselves and their people, help develop an
understanding of an adversary and the projected operational environment, help develop
tactics, and finally, help identify the best use and overall utility of new and proposed
equipment.
Wargames can also help you answer the “So what?” question concerning intelligence
information. Intelligence, from open and closed sources, typically does a good job of
informing defense organizations on the evolution of adversary capacity and capabilities.
It is less consistent in making clear why it matters. “Intel” may tell us that an adversary’s new surface-to-air missile can hit targets a thousand feet higher than his current
missile. But would this new capability be devastating or inconsequential? The leader’s
wargame professionals can help identify the most cost-effective game alternative to gain
such insight.
Wargames can also help develop new tactics to reduce the impact of current adversary capabilities or to respond to emerging ones. Bad ideas outnumber good ideas,
and many good ideas become good only as they are refined. Casualties tend to be high
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(per thousand per hour) early in wars as both sides sort out the good ideas from the
bad. Wargames provide a bloodless, if somewhat less than foolproof, way to sort the
ideas into “good,” “great,” and “seemed like a good idea at the time.” Again, a leader’s
wargame practitioners can turn up the most cost-effective wargame for the purpose.
Similarly, wargames can help clarify both the utility and best application of new or
proposed equipment. Lower-level leaders tend simply to receive new equipment that was
selected at a higher level. But they can still use games to find and communicate its best
use more quickly. If you are a leader at a higher level, you can use wargames to help
assess the relative military utility of various hardware proposals. With most defense
budgets falling and all budgets finite, it is important to pick out those items that will
most increase military effectiveness. Here, perhaps more than in any other form of
wargaming, it is critical that leaders work closely with their wargame practitioners.
Another way leaders can use wargaming to help set up their subordinates for success is
to educate and train them. As stated earlier, wargames can help create virtual veterans,
by providing synthetic experience—even on systems that do not yet exist in the real
world. When the time comes actually to execute a mission, be it combat or disaster
relief, followers who have “done it before” during games will have a tremendous edge.
As you know by now, the development of the strategic abilities of leaders is the most
ancient of wargaming’s application. Chapter 12 provides detailed advice on wargaming
as part of a broad program of self-development. For now it is enough to say that leaders
should lead by example and use games as an important avenue for personal development
and encourage their subordinates to do the same. Leaders should also work with their
wargame practitioners to explore the cost-effectiveness of holding unit wargames.
Leaders can also use wargaming to develop their own and their organizations’ understanding of current and potential adversaries. Even junior leaders can arrange for an
intelligence briefing, but even the best briefings do little to develop an intuitive feel for
how Red fights. But fall for a Red deception plan just once, in a wargame, and a leader
will be much more wary in a real encounter. Done right, wargames can help leaders start
developing counters to Red systems even before they enter Red’s inventory.
It is a truism of modern warfare that the first tactics used, developed before or during a
conflict, are never the ones considered most effective by the conflict’s end. Wargames
can help leaders identify ineffective tactics before such information must be purchased
with lives. Places like the U.S. Army’s National Training Center and the Air Force’s Red
Flag have a history of developing tactics that later proved effective in actual combat.
Most people outside a nation’s defense establishment, and many within, seem to assume
that decisions about what new systems to research or procure are made at the highest
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levels. While this may be formally true, over the years a surprisingly large number of
surprisingly junior individuals have had major impacts on such decisions. Wargames
can help leaders at any level influence such decisions by demonstrating the likely
impacts of such systems. As we’ve seen, leaders can also use wargames to anticipate the
best employment for new hardware before it is delivered.
Wargames can also familiarize players with environments in which they will operate.
Historians often note the military advantage enjoyed by the side with superior knowledge of the ground. How can the members of our increasingly expeditionary military
gain an understanding of ground to which they have not deployed? Fighting over terrain
in a wargame does a remarkable (and all too seldom acknowledged) job of imprint1
ing that terrain on the participants’ brains. Even where there is no opponent, a “ROC
drill” (see note 3 below) can reveal relationships among factors that would otherwise be
obscured. Sometimes “Nature” can be Red. Umpires playing Nature can toss at the Blue
players “wild cards” that force them to adapt, replan, etc. The Naval War College’s War
Gaming Department used this method to good advantage in the Strategic Foundations
2
Game that underpinned the development of the 2007 CS21 game.
Finally, the leader should never automatically assume that a wargame is the answer for
any given objective. If your challenge does not involve a thinking adversary, perhaps a
simulation or some other OR technique will be a better fit. If your goal is to train your
subordinates for just that type of challenge, perhaps a scripted exercise is your best option. At other times the best answer may be a series of wargames or a game embedded in
a larger process. While wargaming can help you and your organization in many ways,
just how much it actually does help will be largely a function of how effectively your
wargame practitioners are employed.
Making Effective Use of Wargame Practitioners
Before they can make effective use of wargame practitioners, leaders need to determine
with which practitioners they will work. Your basic options as a leader are to use an external wargame organization, use subordinates, or accomplish the wargame yourself. A
leader’s choice will be influenced by need, time, and resources available. Sometimes all
that is needed is a quick idea of how a likely adversary would affect the success of a decision being contemplated. Sometimes a decision is needed quickly; on other occasions
there is plenty of time. Finally, different leaders have access to different levels of support,
but all can conduct wargames themselves.
Regardless of how big or how small the wargame will be, the critical first step is always
the same: a leader needs to state clearly the wargame goal and objectives and the
resources (time, money, personnel, and facilities) available. Such wargame taskings,
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again, work better when the wargame professionals are told what leaders want, not how
to achieve it. For example, leaders should generally not specify a particular adjudication
method or wargame tool but allow their professionals to recommend the best fit with
their goals and objectives. It is even better if the leader and the wargame practitioners
enter into a dialogue, even before a goal and objectives can be defined: the nature of the
problem should be clarified so as to determine whether a game is actually needed. If a
wargame is indicated, the game’s goal must be identified, and only then can its objectives and resource needs be established. Finally, a leader is prudent to have the wargame
professionals “repeat back” the guidance to ensure that it was interpreted accurately.
External Organization
Often the best option, when time, resources, and organizational level allow, is to give the
job to an external wargaming organization. Most militaries have wargaming organizations whose mission includes wargame support. For example, in the United States
the Naval War College’s War Gaming Department and the Air Force’s LeMay Center
Wargaming Institute dedicate half their capacity to supporting professional military
education (PME) and half to supporting leaders throughout their respective services.
Whether or not your service has such organizations, your best choice (or your only
choice) may be a contractor. In such cases, if you have sufficient funds, your best option
may be contracting with a commercial wargame provider. The cost of such contracts as
well as their success has varied widely. Multimillion-dollar projects have been terminated without producing value, while other contracts (typically modifications of existing
commercial games) have provided significant value at very low cost.
Between the service and the contractor options is working with a “federally funded
research and development corporation” (FFRDC), such as RAND or the Center for
Naval Analyses. Sometimes an FFRDC does a set amount of support work each year, so
if your effort can get on the list the work may cost your budget nothing. If you must pay,
and you probably will, the FFRDC’s support is still typically faster to secure than that of
a commercial entity.
To get the best results from any type of external wargame organization, it is especially
important to describe clearly at the outset your goal, objectives, and resources to be
allocated. With contractors it is important to establish exactly what will be government
property at the termination of the contract. It is always important also to conduct periodic reviews of progress.
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Internal Practitioners
Who are a leader’s wargame practitioners? Wargame practitioners are typically present at every level within defense organizations, but trained, long-serving specialists
are more likely to be found at higher headquarters, while self-taught, self-identifying,
additional-duty volunteers are the norm at the lower levels. The wargame abilities of
people assigned to your unit but not in wargaming positions will vary greatly, from a
former staff-college faculty member who ran wargaming for three years to recreational
gamers who have been waiting their entire careers to work on wargames during duty
hours. Just how far down the organizational chart trained wargame practitioners are
assigned fluctuates over time and between armed forces. The interwar German armed
forces probably still hold the record for sending trained practitioners deepest into their
organization, while the U.S. military of the late 1950s and 1960s is a contender for the
shallowest.
Oneself
While flag and general officers may choose to play mental wargames to help themselves
crystallize their initial guidance, for junior leaders running such a wargame themselves
may be the only option. In almost any military, leaders who command small units, such
as platoons, typically have no staff and typically little notice of operations. If this is your
case, the next chapter constitutes important reading. But here is some advice on the two
principal game applications: decision support and education/training.
In the case of decision-support wargames, no matter how little time leaders have or
how small their staffs, they should always make time to wargame the situation in their
own heads. The leader starts by thinking through a course of action (COA) that the
adversary is most likely to adopt and what the adversary is capable of. Next, because the
adversary can wargame too, a leader needs to think of an adversary course of action that
would be more dangerous, though still feasible. Finally, the leader should try to think of
an enemy COA that is less dangerous, one the leader’s organization might realistically
induce the adversary to choose.
The leader would then consider his or her own options. Each option must be suitable
and feasible. That is, to be suitable it must actually fulfill the mission if successfully
executed. To be feasible, the training, logistics, infrastructure, and technology necessary
to accomplish it must be at hand. Each COA must be acceptable—that is, in accordance
with international law and consistent with your nation’s values and those of any allies or
coalition partners or both. All options must also be effective, as determined by at least
a mental wargame. Typically, leaders quickly think of one option—probably the most
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likely option and one likely to occur to the adversary also. Leaders need to keep thinking until they come up with at least two more suitable and feasible COAs.
Finally, the leader needs to think through the most likely outcome of a collision of each
friendly (Blue) course of action with each adversary (Red) course of action. Now he or
she thinks through the likely casualty rates, time, and other costs of each set of Blue and
Red options. In particular, he or she tries to anticipate which would be the most risky and
which the least. Finally, the leader decides which option is most advantageous overall.
When time and resources are tight this mental wargaming may be all that is possible
and the leader will make a decision based in part on it. When there is some additional
time and staff, the same mental work can help the leader provide initial guidance to a
small planning team. In these cases the leader needs to identify who will be developing
the plan and fix how much time they will have to develop and recommend a course of
action. The leader needs to keep the team small. That’s easy at the lower levels, where
there is little staff, but even at the highest levels, where more staff is available, a small
team seems to work better—and faster.
When they are available, the leader would include at least one wargame practitioner, a
Blue strategist/planner, a logistician, and someone capable of anticipating Red choices.
Next the leader provides the guidance the unit has received, any additional information
that has been developed, and the insights gained through the leader’s mental wargame.
Leaders should never tell their teams the specific option they should pick, as this would
bias their subsequent thinking. Now the team members follow essentially the same steps
the leader did. They develop feasible adversary options: most likely, most dangerous,
and most advantageous. They then develop friendly options. The greatest difference
from the leader’s earlier work will be in their wargaming of the collisions of adversary
and friendly options. Depending on time and resources available, they would game each
set of options at some higher level of rigor than the leader could have. Even when time
and resources are tight, the group may form small (often one-person) Red, Blue, and
White teams, which will then game each major phase of each collision of Red and Blue
COAs. At the time designated, the team will come back to the leader with the courses of
action it developed and its recommended one. It is the leader’s decision whether to pick
the recommended COA, take one of the others, modify one of them, or tell the team to
try again (if there is time). The option picked will be forwarded to subordinates and for
more detailed planning at their levels.
If time permits, the leader may run one more wargame/rehearsal, toward the end of
planning, when the detailed plan is almost complete, involving the entire staff. The staff
members would walk through what they will need to do when, much like a rehearsal for
responding to natural disasters with no adversary. However, in the defense community
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a Red team is formed (even if it’s a team of one) and provides inputs; a White cell then
determines the net effect of Blue and Red actions. This outcome typically reveals unan3
ticipated needs and vulnerabilities, prompting modifications to the plan.
The other wargame application a leader may need to implement directly is a wargame
for educational or training purposes. The actual experience of a friend and colleague
of the author may illustrate both the why and the how of such games. At the time, my
friend was a young lieutenant commanding a platoon in America’s single ranger regiment. He and his men had been on an exercise (one-sided drill) all week. Now they were
waiting for trucks to take them back to base to clean and stow their gear and begin their
weekends. And they waited and waited for the trucks. My friend’s rangers were becoming restless. He realized he needed to do something to maintain his standing with his
men, so he stood on a tree stump and called them together. He told them they were
going to be in another exercise (this time a two-sided live wargame) the next week. The
platoon would wargame its mission now, which should improve its performance next
week and perhaps speed up the exercise. Sections two and three would play Blue, section
one would play Red, and he and his platoon sergeant would serve as White. He briefed
Blue and Red separately and gave them a fixed amount of time to tell him what they
would do. After assessing the net effect of the Blue and Red moves (trucks still not having arrived), he backbriefed each team separately and gave them a fixed amount of time
to brief him on their new plans. When the trucks finally arrived, four hours late, the
men looked up and got right back into the game. After a few minutes one of the drivers
blew his horn. One of the men looked up and called, “We waited for you four hours! You
4
can wait until we’re done.”
Did this wargame meet its objective? Yes: instead of wasting time, his rangers participated in an engaging, useful activity. Was it a credible wargame? Yes: each team was well
qualified for its tasks. I like to tell this story for another reason: How much money did
this wargame cost the American taxpayers?
While a self-created educational wargame can be very effective, leaders can, working
with their wargame professionals, develop plans to maximize the ability of wargaming to create virtual veterans while minimizing any negative effects on their organizations’ day-to-day missions. Options include encouraging the individual play of relevant
commercial wargames, encouraging formal professional development (that includes
wargaming), piggybacking on wargames conducted for other reasons (and often by
other organizations), and conducting internal wargames with subject matter, type, and
timing selected to maximize benefit and minimize negatives.
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Assessing Confidence in Wargame Outcomes
Leaders are responsible for making decisions. They must make them when those decisions are needed. All leaders sometimes need to make decisions when the information
available is incomplete, uncertain, and possibly misleading, but this situation is particularly common in the defense area. Sir Winston Churchill liked to say, “In war the truth
is so precious it must always be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies.” In war, cold war,
and what are called times of peace, adversaries try to deny information and deliberately
mislead—and yet decisions have to be made.
George Edward Pelham Box once observed that “all models are wrong, though some
5
are useful.” The two-dimensional models we call maps illustrate this point. The most
accurate and detailed topographical map does not show all that is present on the ground
it depicts, yet we all use maps, because they are detailed enough, accurate enough, for
our purposes. They are useful. It can reasonably be said, on the basis of the history of
wargames, that all are at least a little wrong, in that the end states of wargames never
exactly match later events. Even the “eerily accurate” U.S. Marine Corps wargame (mentioned earlier) was off by a few casualties, and history offers many examples of wargames
being very wrong. Yet it also indicates that wargames have often been very useful, sometimes providing key edges over opponents. How can a tool that is always wrong, and
wrong to varying and unpredictable degrees, be useful to decision makers?
So if a game’s outcome may or may not match the future reality, should wargames be
ignored by decision makers? No. In war, in all matters defense, decisions must always be
made under conditions of less than certainty. Actually, all of us make decisions based on
information that is less than certain. No one believes weather forecasts are infallible, yet
most of us grab an umbrella when we hear there is an 80 percent chance of rain.
Actually the defense establishment has long adopted a methodology for coping with
uncertain information. The intelligence community routinely includes confidence assessments with the products it provides to decision makers. Analysts may say, “We have
high confidence in this report, as it is based on multiple highly trusted sources,” or, “We
have low confidence in this report, as it is based on a single fairly new source.”
At the time of this writing, it is still unusual for reports on wargames to include explicit
statements of their assessed levels of confidence. Even if such statements become as
common for wargame reports as they are today for intelligence reports, it is important
that leaders make up their own minds about how much credence they should give to any
wargame. To do so, a leader needs to consider the two principal factors: the difficulty of
what is being gamed and the quality of game execution. On one hand, wargaming even
the easiest subjects can never prove, predict, or even forecast, and on the other, gaming even the most challenging areas can produce useful insights; so confidence in the
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relative accuracy of outcomes can and should vary. Here are some categories of variables
with the greatest impact on confidence. Let’s look at each.
FIGURE 27

Situational Influences on Confidence

Tactical
Physics
Kinetics
Red Similar Culture
Short Duration (Battle)
Many “Runs”
Attrition

Strategic
Human Factors
Nonkinetics
Red Dissimilar Culture
Long Duration (War)
Single or Few “Runs”
Eﬀect

•

All other things being equal, it is appropriate to have relatively more confidence in the
outcomes of wargames at the tactical level than those at the strategic. Wargamers typically have much more data on which to base their adjudication at the tactical level. It is
typically appropriate to have relatively less confidence in strategic games, as they tend
to be on the low end in terms of confidence in many of the areas covered below.

•

While political science, economics, sociology, and other “soft” sciences have made
important contributions to human understanding, none have produced equations with
the precision of F = ma. Wargames that deal principally with ballistics, such as aircraftversus-missile duels, produce outcomes that engender greater confidence than games
dealing with a hearts-and-minds campaign in unconventional warfare or a counterinsurgency campaign. That is to say not that wargaming insurgencies is not important (it
is) but that outcomes of those wargames should inspire relatively less confidence.

•

In a similar vein, wargames that deal with kinetic effects (breaking things) tend to
produce findings that inspire greater confidence than those dealing with nonkinetic effects (morale, training, second-order-and-higher effects). Again, this is not
to say that nonkinetic effects should therefore be ignored. Some games in the First
Gulf War did not attempt to adjudicate when Iraqi units would stop offering effective resistance and so depicted all Iraqi units fighting to the last man. Leaving out
nonkinetic effects that will be present in the actual conflict because they are hard to
wargame will just make outcomes less accurate and generate lower confidence.

•

If our adversary’s culture is similar to ours, it is relatively easier to “think Red” accurately than if his culture is substantially different. Hence, wargames with Reds of
similar culture, all other things being equal, tend to elicit higher confidence.
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•

The less time covered by the wargame, the higher the confidence. Simply, there are
fewer opportunities for the game to go off in the wrong direction.

•

When a wargame is executed once, there is no way of knowing whether the outcome
is the most likely or one of the outliers. When a wargame is executed (equally well)
a number of times, a sense of which outcomes are relatively more and less likely
emerges. Of course, when and if the gamed operation takes place, a “black swan” may
occur—a freak weather event or any number of unlikely developments—which may
produce a real outcome on the edge or even outside the spectrum of those produced
6
by the multiple runs of the wargame.

•

While the very first American wargame adjusted its attrition tables to reflect actual
battlefield rates of attrition, our experience adjudicating effects is much more recent.
Therefore, wargames that principally explore attrition elicit more confidence than
those that focus on effects.

It should now be clear why strategic wargames are so hard and accordingly inspire less
confidence than others. Strategic-level conflicts are of long duration, human factors can
be decisive in them, and effects can be critical. Many of the categories that are difficult
to adjudicate individually are present together in strategic wargames.
Finally, factors that help assess relative confidence in a wargame overall can also be
considered for relative confidence in outcomes within a single game. For example, an
indication in a wargame that a theater has too little ramp space for all planned Blue
aircraft should be viewed with more confidence than an indication from the same game
7
about how and when Red would modify its tactics.
The other major factor influencing confidence levels is the quality of game execution. Much of the previous two chapters deals with ways to improve the execution
of wargames. But here are some of the things that can go wrong in major aspects of
wargames. One is the starting condition. Most wargames that produce outcomes that
differ from future events do so because their “scenarios,” the situations at the start of the
game, did not match reality or never actually happened. Here are examples of each case.
The German wargames prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union relied on Soviet maps.
These maps tended to exaggerate the quality of the roads. When the invasion took place,
German forces were often unable to move as fast as the wargames indicated they would.
Or the scenario may never “come to pass.” For decades the U.S. Army, and to a lesser extent NATO, forces conducted wargames depicting a Warsaw Pact attack through an area
of central Germany called the Fulda Gap. They were all “wrong,” inasmuch as Soviet-led
forces never attacked. These cases result from several causes. Sometimes a situation that
is viewed as unlikely is wargamed anyway, because Blue suspects there is potential for
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great harm should it occur; because the event poses an interesting problem; or because
the situation is representative of a type of problem that is believed likely to occur in
some part of the world. Some assert that unlikely situations are selected deliberately
to make a particular service or proposed weapon system look good. Finally, a starting
situation of a game may not occur because the conflict depicted in the wargame looked
so dangerous that leaders decided that the best way to win it would be to ensure it never
took place. Some of the wargames depicting global strategic nuclear war with the Soviet
Union may fall into this category.
When considering potential causes of wargame outcomes differing from later events,
Blue play typically comes to mind last, if at all. After all, we are Blue—how could the
decisions we make in the game differ from those we would make in a war? There are
several reasons. Often, as we’ve seen, though not always, Blue players are making decisions one, two, or more grades above their own. Actual presidents and flag officers are
very busy people. Also, the participants know that no casualties will actually occur, no
campaign will be lost, and so tend to be more aggressive than actual decision makers in
8
the real world. Even when conditions may seem favorable for authentic Blue play, differ9
ences are common.
Often overlooked is that it is not uncommon for Blue to take concrete steps to make sure
the indicated outcome of a wargame will be wrong. As Microsoft is often alleged to say,
“This is not a bug; it is a feature.” The ability to avoid a future that might have been is
possibly the most valuable “feature” of wargaming. Wargaming can only indicate possibilities. If outcomes prompt subsequent decisions and actions, leaders can increase their
odds of achieving or avoiding certain eventualities.
The second-most-often-cited reason for game outcomes that do not match future
outcomes is Red play: failure of the Red team to make the same choices as the real
Red decision makers turn out to make. Therefore it is curious that efforts to play Red
realistically have been very uneven. While it is probably impossible to re-create exactly
an adversary’s decision-making processes, preparation can help Red players get closer
to thinking like Red than if they do not prepare at all. How this can be achieved was
described in an earlier chapter and will arise again in the next. As for assessing how
much confidence should be placed in a wargame’s outcome, how hard it is to play Red
accurately and whether an explicit effort is made to do so should be important factors.
It is not surprising that there are several ways White play can contribute to misleading
results: White, after all, has three functions—control, adjudication, and analysis. White
as control—this is almost never discussed yet is sometimes disastrous—may not ensure
the wargame runs for the full duration of the conflict being examined. (Why will be
discussed below.) From the German wargame on the invasion of the Soviet Union to the
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coalition invasion of Iraq, wargames have missed elements of a conflict that later turned
10
out to be important simply because they had not gotten that far yet.
As adjudication, White may contribute to misleading results by failing to consider
factors that in the actual conflict turn out to be important or even decisive. The clearest case is the 1990–91 Gulf War, when several U.S. wargames adjudicated coalition
casualties on the assumption that every Iraqi unit would fight to the end. Uncertain at
what casualty level Iraqi units would become combat ineffective, they ignored the issue.
Clearly, it is not practical for wargames to consider every element in every conflict,
which is why pregame analysis, to identify which elements will likely be most important, is so critical.
White can also contribute to misleading results by getting specific values wrong. This is
far and away the area that gets the most attention. Certainly, the importance of getting
right such values as the probability of one platform killing another seems self-evident,
but I have been able to find only one case where such an error produced misleading
results. It is one mentioned before: the pre–World War II U.S. Army wargames that
overstated the effectiveness of tank destroyers and so led to the development of tactics
that proved disastrous a few months later in North Africa. Prior to combat it was probably not possible for the Army to get these values exactly right. Still, there were things it
could have done to be less wrong. Just a few years earlier the U.S. Navy had gone to great
11
lengths to anticipate the likely future effectiveness of air attacks on naval vessels. Data
from World War II were to show it did not get the values exactly right, but it was close
enough to avoid grossly misleading outcomes.
There is also a widespread implicit belief that if accurate values are good, more-precise
values are better. So instead of using a probability of kill (pk) of 0.9, great effort is expended to derive a value of 0.88 and even greater effort to derive a value of 0.881. I have
not found a single case where misleading results were produced because the wargame
adjudication used pk of 0.88 but the actual value turned out to be 0.881. Worse, devotion
of effort to increasing precision is likely to mean that values as or more important are
ignored and wargames are not played through to the conclusion.
Finally, White may not make sufficiently clear what the input (scenario) is and what the
12
output is (adjudicated outcomes). This has resulted in some reports citing as insights
from the games conditions that were actually starting assumptions.

After reading all the ways in which wargame results can be thrown off, you may be
thinking that it is a minor miracle that wargames produce outcomes that match future
reality even a few times a century. The good news is a wargame does not have to indicate
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the future with complete accuracy to be useful. Consider the Gallant Knight wargames
conducted in the decade preceding the Gulf War. These games got the enemy wrong and
enemy’s objective wrong yet still accurately pointed up the military utility of increasing ramp space and prepositioning in the Gulf region, which proved to matter a lot. To
paraphrase Professor Box, all wargames are at least a little wrong but can still be useful.
If you are a leader, your staff may recommend a confidence level to you. The above
should give you a basis on which to decide ultimately for yourself.
Finally, how effectively leaders can use wargaming depends in great measure on the
effectiveness of their subordinate game practitioners. Whether your gamers comprise a
single additional-duty volunteer or a wargame department, here are two things leaders
can do to help them provide the most effective assistance practical.
First, the importance of providing clear guidance to your wargame practitioners cannot
be stressed often enough. In many cases wargames that are viewed as unsuccessful had
objectives that were unstated, unclear, or changing. The best thing you can do to ensure
success is to state clearly your goal, objectives, and the resources (especially time) your
practitioners will have. If military necessity requires your goal or some of your objectives to change, the resources allocated (especially time) need to change as well.
Second, leaders need to encourage and support the professional development of their
wargamers. Just as ace fighter pilots get much more out of their jets, wargamers who
really know wargaming will help their leaders get more out of wargaming. Encouraging
and supporting their efforts to increase their individual knowledge and to support the
advancement in the field of wargaming will pay rich dividends over time. If you think
you do not need to develop your wargame practitioners because you plan to use contractors, think again. Yes, contractors have produced some of the biggest breakthroughs in
wargaming and some of the most influential insights. But others have taken millions of
dollars and produced nothing of value. Sharp internal practitioners can help you spot
the snake-oil salesmen and help the excellent contractors surpass themselves.

Notes
1. My evidence of effect is all anecdotal but, I
believe, convincing. As one example, a college
history course I once took gave a map quiz to
see whether students could locate geographic
features mentioned in our readings. I had
never visited any of the locations covered in
the quiz but had fought several commercial
wargames over the terrain. I answered correctly twenty questions out of twenty. The
second-highest score was seven.

2. Rubel, comments. “CS21” was the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” a
new U.S. Navy maritime strategy introduced
that year.
3. According to Dean Rubel: “The Army calls
such a walk-through a ‘rock drill’ because they
used to use rocks to represent units. At other
times it is called a ROC drill, for ‘required
operational capabilities.’ This last seems to be
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too stilted and not really an accurate title for
what is going on.”
4. The story was told to me by Bill Gibbs,
cofounder of Omega Games, a small print
wargame development and publishing
company.
5. George Edward Pelham Box, 18 October
1919–28 March 2013, a British mathematician
and professor of statistics at the University
of Wisconsin, was a pioneer in the areas of
quality control, time-series analysis, design
of experiments, and Bayesian inference.
See Wikipedia, s.v. “George E. P. Box,”
en.wikipedia.org/.
6. For examples of the huge effect of the improbable on military outcomes, see Durschmied,
How Chance and Stupidity Have Changed History, and, of course, Nassim Nicholas Taleb,
The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House,
2010).
7. The idea that insights from the same wargame
should sometimes be treated with different
levels of confidence is not mine but Robert

Rubel’s (in his comments on the manuscript):
“If—in advance of a war—you were forced to
bet on certain things, would you feel better
placing money on the utility of ramp space or
the prospect of Iraqi unit integrity? I would
go with the ramp space bet as I would be far
more confident in that—almost a sure thing—
than I would be in Iraqi unit integrity either
way.”
8. See Rubel, “Epistemology of War Gaming.”
9. Downes-Martin, “Adjudication.”
10. Often this is not really the fault of White but
can be traced to a sponsor who did not ask for
a game of sufficient duration or to a designer
whose structure set up White for failure.
11. See Nofi, To Train the Fleet for War.
12. Anyone who has wargamed for a substantial
amount of time will have heard at least one
person say that a game “proved” something
that was either part of the original scenario or
was added during the wargame to address a
game objective better.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Wargaming and Your Personal Objectives
Up to now this book has focused principally on military applications of wargaming,
with occasional asides on other types of users and other types of applications. This
chapter addresses how almost anyone can apply wargaming to help meet goals. Specifically, it will address how different groups of people can best use wargaming.
For Parents: A Tool for Active Learning That Kids Will Want to Use
Most of us are or someday will be parents. Many of those who never will be parents are,
or someday will be, aunts and uncles. All of us have a stake in the development of the
next generation. All of us need to understand how wargames and related simulation
games can help our children compete more effectively in an increasingly competitive
world.
Of course, some see games, especially computer-based games, as a threat. When mass
shootings take place in the United States some advocate controlling access to video
games. It is easy to forget that one generation tends to blame all that is perceived as
negative in a younger generation on what is popular with that generation. At one time or
another the perceived decay in the morals of the then-younger generation was blamed
on ragtime music, horseless carriages, jazz, comic books, rock and roll, Dungeons &
Dragons, rap, and now computer-based games of all types.
Still, like a broken clock that is right twice a day, each generation of critics has occasionally been right. It probably was unwise for a fourteen-year-old girl to go for a ride with
an older boy in a horseless, or horse-drawn, carriage. Some rap lyrics are inappropriate
for early teenagers. (Some are inappropriate for senior citizens.) It may be prudent to
conduct additional studies to see whether the type of video game called “first-person
shooter” has any statistically significant impact on reducing a player’s inhibitions
against shooting real people in the real world. As of this writing, studies seem to suggest
1
the opposite.
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It is clear that many wargames and other simulation games can have enormous positive
effects on the development of young people. Here is one bit of anecdotal evidence that illustrates several of the ways they are helpful. In the first grade, my son Matthew started
playing the computer game Civilization. Designed for adults, Civilization was, and is,
a simulation game that depicts all areas of a civilization’s development: war, diplomacy,
2
invention, exploration, expansion, and trade. At first I played it with him, but he very
quickly began playing it on his own, though he would sometimes come and get me, usually if there was a word he did not yet know. One evening, close to the end of the school
year, I realized he had been standing next to me. I said, “I’m sorry, Matt, I didn’t see you,
is there a word you need help with?” “No,” he answered. I asked, “Do you want advice on
what to invent next?” Again he said, “No.”
Finally I said, “Well, then, what is it?” Matt said, “Dad, do you remember a while ago I
invented railroads?” “Yes.” “Well,” he replied, “a lot changes when you invent railroads.”
“Yes,” I said, “tell me about the changes you’ve seen.” “Well,” he said, “my cities seem to
be growing a bit faster and I think I’m building stuff faster, but that’s not what I want to
talk to you about. You’ve always told me to keep two military units in each of my cities
on the border with another civilization and one unit in each city next to those cities,
so they can move up quickly if needed. You also told me to always connect all my cities
by railroad. Well, I’m almost done, and, well, I can now get my units very far very fast.
Do I still need to keep as many units one city back from the border?” I looked at my son
with pride and wonder. “You are not yet six years old and you have grasped the effect
increased mobility has on the size of a reserve you need to maintain?”
I tell this story for several reasons. I will not deny it, a father’s pride is one reason. But
this story also illustrates some of the key strengths of gaming. Is there another medium
that would have caused a first grader to care about the impact of railroads in human
development, let alone discern impacts for himself?
War and other simulation games promote personal development in several ways:
•

Motivation of learning. All kids want to win; when kids see that learning about
railroads, or profit and loss, or strategy helps them win, they are motivated to learn
about those things.

•

Provision of context. As a kid I had trouble learning free-floating facts—the names
of national capitals, the spelling of words. Wargames can provide or create synthetic
context and artificial relevance. Facts become part of the player’s virtual, but also
personal, experience.
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•

Facilitation of application. It has been said the best way to learn something is to do it.
Few of us have the time or money (OK, mainly money) to travel the world or set up a
business. Games make both feasible in simulation.

•

Immersion. This is a feature bragged about by many of the newest, highest-resolution,
first-person computer games, but it is not limited to the latest graphics or even computers. Decades ago I read a review of a text-based computer wargame on the 1973 fighting
on the Golan front. The reviewer had played the part of one of the two Israeli brigade
commanders on the front at the time the fighting started. The computer wargame came
with a paper map, but the screen was simply a black screen with a prompt for writing
text. The viewer would type in orders to units of his or her brigade and receive text messages back from them, as well as from higher headquarters. Far into the night, all was
not going well for the reviewer’s units. Several times reinforcements arrived only just
in time to save units from being overrun. Finally, he received a message from one of
his battalion command posts: “There is an enemy tank driving up onto my bunker,
tell Ruth I love h——.” The reviewer reported he had broken into a cold sweat: “How
can I tell Ruth?” Then he realized: there was no Ruth, no command post was being
overrun, and it was now 4:20 am. Presenting someone with the decisions, the dilemmas faced by George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, or a platoon leader on D-day is
more immersive than the best book or movie, regardless of the wargame medium.

•

“Down-board” thinking. We live in a world where life choices can close before we
know they were ever open. Wargames, since before the invention of chess, have
trained the mind to anticipate the likely impacts of actions several moves later.

So war and other simulation games can be good for your kids. Do you just let them play?
Well, you could do worse—but you can also do better. When I was in second grade, I fell
behind in my reading speed. My father bought me comic books. He knew I liked them,
so I would read them, and my reading speed would go up. It worked. Still, the time I
spent reading comic books was not spent reading history, science, or great literature.
Almost any game your child plays will have some positive effect, but just as all books are
not equally beneficial, not all games will develop your children’s abilities equally well. In
fact, a mix of developmental activities, game and nongame, may be the most beneficial
of all.
First, before you can use wargames, or other simulation games, to help your child get a
personal edge in this highly competitive world, you will need to get smart on wargaming yourself. Reading this book is a great start, but it’s not sufficient. A walk through a
print or computer game store would be helpful, if you have either or both in your area.
Pick up a few titles. Publishers put a lot of information on the box, to help sales. This
will also give you a feel for what is being sold. If there are no stores in your area you are
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at only a small disadvantage. The Internet provides a far larger selection of wargames—
computer, print, and miniatures—than the largest game store. Even better, many sites
post reviews. The websites milgames.com, BoardGameGeek and StrategyPage are all
good places to start.
Once you have a feel for what is available, your next step is to talk to your child. It is
easier to get children to play a game on a subject they are already interested in. It may
also be useful to find out (if you don’t already know) whether there are subjects they are
struggling with. It may be possible to find a game that helps correct a specific weakness.
A weakness in geography may be reversed somewhat by a strategic-level wargame set in
the geography that needs to be learned. If history is a problem, a game set in the period
being studied should help. Finally, your child is probably already playing some games
already; ask about them. Especially ask how he or she decides which games to play.
Next, pick one more game for your child. It is important that you play it yourself and
become proficient at it before introducing it to your child. Your help will make it easier
for your child to start playing it, hence more likely. It will also earn you some credibility
that will help in your next steps. That is: once you have taught your child how to play,
you should shift to teaching how to win. Your head start on the wargame should help,
but you will likely need to supplement your experience with online strategy articles.
As children work to beat you or their previous best scores, you should start to lead them
beyond needing your advice, to finding out more about the situation being depicted in
the game. This should be easy, as the game will likely have sparked their interest in the
3
subject. Still, start easy, perhaps with a documentary or even a movie. Point out that
knowledge of the situation should improve their strategies and so their chances of winning. Chances are, though, that the film will be enjoyable but will lack the detail your
child really needs. Soon he or she should turn to books.
There are two final steps. First, look for opportunities to enrich your child’s gamerelated learning through additional avenues: say, a visit to a battlefield depicted in one
of his or her wargames, or a lecture (podcast or live) by an expert on a related subject.
Second, as your child looks for new games, continue to be part of both the search for the
game and your child’s search for his or her own path to strategy advice and then on to
learning about the subject being depicted.
There are also an increasing number of simulation games on the market (SimCity, Zoo
Tycoon, etc.) that will allow children to continue to learn down-board thinking and
will expand their learning into more-peaceful pursuits. A successful adult will need to
have developed many skills. While playing games can help develop many of those skills,
learning how to learn (initially to get better at a game) may well be the most valuable of
all.
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For Educators: A Catalyst and Tool for Learning
Many of the reasons wargames are effective tools for parents trying to help their kids
develop are also reasons wargames are effective in education. However, the classroom
is a very different environment from the home, so there are also many differences. My
own experiences illustrate some of the potentials and problems with using wargames in
a classroom.
The Air Command and Staff College told me it had a problem with its block on the
Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Most
students (midcareer officers) found the material exceptionally boring. Worse, PPBS was
the last block of the course, so most students already knew what their next duty assignments would be; their heads were in their household moves and their next jobs. ACSC
wanted me to make PPBS exciting. I have seldom felt such an overwhelming feeling of
doom—make PPBS exciting? But as I thought about it, I realized the boring part was
trying to memorize all the names of the system’s elements. The actual process was high
strategy: What weapons will we buy, and what forces will we maintain?
I realized the key to making this block interesting was to make the material relevant.
The key to doing that was to require the students actually to build DoD budgets and
then employ the forces they built to cope with contingencies. I then guessed that eight
years was about the minimum time needed to change the U.S. force structure significantly. To game that far, one move for each year, in the class time allowed, I needed to
minimize the time needed to play each move. I rounded all “costs” to the closest hundred million. I gave students only a limited number of budget choices: a dozen research,
development, and acquisition programs to be pursued or not; brigades, wings, and battle
groups to be kept active or placed in reserve; and “expendables” (fuel, spare parts, and
munitions) to be purchased. Maj. Dan “Dano” Novak (now lieutenant colonel, retired)
and I created identical files for every seminar, each with eight linked Excel spreadsheet
tabs, on which to explore alternatives and document each move, rapidly.
In execution, our success can most charitably be described as mixed. Excel had just
been released; in most seminars no one, faculty or student, knew how to use it. Frustration was high, many seminars spending much more time fighting the software than
learning. But in seminars where at least one individual was, or became, comfortable
with Excel, the outcomes exceeded my most optimistic expectations. Students not only
stayed engaged but became passionate, doing outside research to support their positions,
4
continuing to debate their decisions long after class was dismissed.
As I said it would, this story demonstrates both the potential and the pitfalls of using
wargames and other simulation games in the classroom. On the potential side, a good
wargame can hold, or increase, student interest when no other teaching method can.
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High school seniors who have already been accepted to college, fourth graders the week
before Christmas, and eighth graders the week before graduation can all become passionate learners, determined to win. Wargames can also help students see beyond the
facts to the underlying principles; in addition to hearing about Washington’s crossing
of the Delaware, they can see the impact it had. All simulation games can also motivate
students to learn more by conventional means. They also serve as application exercises
for information taught more conventionally. On the negative side: any simulation game
can fail far more spectacularly than any lecture; the time that goes into learning the
game is not available for learning the subject. Computer games with glitches and print
wargames with ambiguous rules or missing components can cause frustration to soar
and learning to plummet.
So, how can a curriculum developer or teacher reap the benefits of games in the classroom without suffering any of the pitfalls? First, it is important to understand that there
is no “best” wargame or any other type of simulation game for the purpose, any more
than there is one best book. There are only games and books that fit your learning objectives and your class well, and those that don’t. Don’t assume the wargame raved about
by a fellow teacher will work for your own school or class.
Just as military wargame practitioners do, you need to start with your objectives and the
resources you are willing and able to provide to achieve them. Like the military, you will
need to explore whether your best option is to purchase an existing wargame to use as is,
purchase and then modify a game to make it a better fit, or design a game from scratch.
Do not overlook low-tech options; for some applications you can simply divide your
students into factions and adjudicate their moves by your own judgment.
Finally, keep in mind the best use of wargaming may be to get your students not to play
them but to create them. Professor Philip Sabin of King’s College London has had great
success teaching military history in part through assigning his students the task of creating wargames. Delving into a situation deeply enough to create a simulation game that
can reproduce historical outcomes seems to produce a depth of understanding achiev5
able by few other means.
For Military Members: The Role of Wargaming in Personal Development
For our readers who are or will be members of their nation’s profession of arms, remember that we never know when or whether we will stand at a hinge of history, when the
decision we make will determine the outcome. Not all of us ever will. Some of us serve
our entire careers during peacetime. Still, even someone so fortunate may be called on
to make a decision that many years later results in peace being preserved or his or her
nation going to war at a disadvantage. Nor do we know when in a career such events
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may happen. Majors George Washington and Moody Suter had huge impacts while they
6
were still fairly junior. When and if you find yourself standing at a hinge of history, will
you be ready?
Of course, each nation’s and each service’s formal military education systems work to
prepare their military people to choose wisely at such times of testing. That is the point:
every nation does that, and so both sides in a conflict will be led by people with such
education and training. For you to gain an edge, if your nation is to gain an edge, you
need to do more than attend service schools.
This is not a new truth. George S. Patton Jr. read as many books each year of his life,
from sixteen on, as a student attending the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff
7
College would. Many of the famous Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces
generals belonged as young captains to a military history book discussion group while
8
stationed in the Philippines between the world wars. What is new is that it is now easier
than ever to add wargaming to the mix of tools in your self-development.
Indeed, to gain the greatest benefit, spectra of subjects need to be explored, using a
mix of tools. My personal modification of Col. John Warden’s admonition holds true:
9
“Think like an architect, but know your bricks.” While warfare today is more than
ever the collective province of joint (multiservice), combined (allied/coalition), wholeof-government (intelligence, development agencies), and even nongovernmental (from
the United Nations to Doctors without Borders) organizations, it is still important for
military members to have deep understandings of their own branches. You cannot contribute to the orchestra if you do not know your own instrument.
Hence, soldiers should focus first on learning land combat; sailors, maritime warfare;
and airmen, war in the air. In each case a mix of media works best. For example, an
airman might read Air Warfare in the Missile Age to gain an initial appreciation for
modern air warfare, then play some of the described operations using Modern Air
10
Power. Documentaries, articles, and websites should also be in the mix. Each source of
information should be critically compared with the others. Does a documentary claim
that a different decision would have led to a radically different outcome? A wargame
can help you explore the feasibility and likely impact of such an alternative. Similarly,
an article may describe a factor in a conflict that the wargame apparently completely
overlooked. For experienced wargamers, it may be possible to modify the game to add
the omitted factor.
However, still fairly early in their careers, military members need to expand their horizons to an understanding of joint operations. One good place to start is the Pacific theater during World War II. The same tools should be used: good books like Eagle against
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the Sun and General Kenney Reports;11 good wargames like Victory in the Pacific, Flat
12
Top, and Uncommon Valor; and a mix of documentaries, articles, and websites.
Once they begin to feel comfortable with joint operations, it is time for them to press on
to exploring war at the strategic level. Now, it is important to open their perspective in
both scope and time. As strategic principles are relatively timeless and tend to become
clearest over time, the study of long periods of history, even of earlier eras, can be helpful. However, the value of a mix of media holds at this level also. For example, reading
Battle Cry of Freedom and then playing For the People will yield insights into the U.S.
13
Civil War era available through neither one alone. As always, also include in your mix
14
documentaries, articles, and websites.
World War II is also a good source of insights, given its scope and the amount published
on it, both book and wargame. I will not attempt to single out any one book on that
war, but there are three commercially available wargames that provide a good range of
15
ways to explore it. Axis & Allies is an easy-to-learn, easy-to-play print game. While
the game’s mechanics are literally simple enough for a twelve-year-old, it does a great
job of depicting the “big rock” factors in the war, precisely because so many of the
details are stripped away. At the opposite extreme, the print wargame Third Reich and
its companion game for the Pacific theater, taken together, provide an in-depth view
16
of the military, logistical, and industrial aspects of the conflict. However, be warned,
17
the rule book for each is longer than some compact histories of the war. Finally, the
computer wargame Hearts of Iron covers all theaters of the war and allows play to
begin sufficiently before the war so that the impact of various options for research and
18
development can be explored. Using both Third Reich and Hearts of Iron will also
vividly clarify the trade-off between paper and computer games: paper games are more
transparent, computerized faster to learn and use.
Again, you may never be tested by war. But if you are, the work of your lifetime may well
help you help your nation to win its war faster, with less loss of life and at a lower cost
in national treasure—not a bad investment of your time. It will also help you become a
more discerning voter.
For Voters and Citizens: Understanding Military Dynamics
In the United States, every four years, voters hire a new, or extend the contract of the
current, commander in chief of the armed forces—the president of the United States.
Between elections the president is sensitive to the views of the folks who hired him.
His choices may also be constrained by members of Congress, most of whom will be
running for reelection soon. So the voters have a strong voice in determining military
policy, but with less than 0.5 percent of the American people serving in uniform, how
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do they know what to say, how can they be sure they are speaking wisely?19 This is an
important question. As Hans Delbrück realized over a century ago, because sovereignty
rests with the people of democracies, it is vitally important that the people of democra20
cies understand war.
It was not always such a problem. In 1945 most of the 16.1 million Americans returning
from World War II understood war. So did our World War I veterans, many of whom
were by then only in their forties. Today the “Great War” generation is gone, and there
are fewer World War II veterans each year. How can the voters form insightful positions
on military matters when fewer and fewer voters understand war firsthand? Congress
has more military experience, but there percentages are declining also, from 70 percent
with military experience in 1975 to 20 percent in 2013. What can be done?
Months after the end of the First Gulf War, I was speaking at the Origins gaming convention on the history of wargaming. After my talk several members of the audience
came up and asked questions. After a while I asked them a question. After the Vietnam
War, I said, when the military was so unpopular, many of us were criticized for playing
wargames. Did they feel, I asked, that the time since Vietnam and our success in the
Gulf had diminished the criticism for playing wargames? The answer I received was a
resounding “Yes!” I will never forget what one of them said: roughly, “Far from being
criticized, I’ve received calls from other dentists from all across southern Indiana asking
for my views on the conflict.” It was clear from their comments that friends, family, and
colleagues viewed these folks—civilians all—as having greater than normal insight into
military affairs.
It is easy to see why. Wargaming provides artificial experience in war. When Tom
Clancy wanted a better appreciation of what all the statistics on submarine warfare
21
meant, he turned to Larry Bond and his Harpoon wargame. After reading The Hunt
for Red October many U.S. Navy submariners had trouble believing Clancy had never
served in their branch.
Granted, the artificial experience of wargaming cannot come close to matching actually
being on the ground. Still, artificial experience gained through gaming has some advantages over the real kind. It is not possible to be shot. You will never have to consume
a meal-ready-to-eat. Also, while truly addictive (or just long) wargames may delay your
sleep, you will sleep each night in your own bed. Most importantly, service members
have limited control over the types of experience they gain in war. One individual may
serve on the Allied staff planning the D-day invasion while another may shovel out
stables in Louisiana. With wargames you get to pick the type of artificial experience you
receive.
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What types of wargames are most relevant for voters? In brief, games depicting conflict
at the strategic level are most relevant. Voters hire and pay for the training of military
folks to handle the tactical elements of war. Voters have their greatest influence, hence
should focus most, on the big questions such as defense spending and when to commit
military forces. Also, as stated previously, wargames are most effective as part of a set of
media. The single best book I know of for a voter to read is the second edition of From
22
Lexington to Desert Storm and Beyond; it is a great overview of American military history from the strategic and high operational levels. While any book on military history
and theory may be helpful, those on entire wars, and better yet the preparation for and
23
execution of wars, should be the best fits. As for wargaming, the computer wargame
Civilization is a great introduction to both wargaming and national strategy. At the intermediate level of difficulty and relevance, the computer game Victoria (from Paradox
Interactive) provides a look at national strategy during the 1800s. Finally, Hearts of Iron
III (2009) is probably the most relevant but also among the most difficult.
Wargames can also help you develop a sense of what you need to learn through moreconventional sources. They can help you develop your views on national and defense
policy. You still may be wrong, or your voice may still be drowned out by others. Still, if
nothing else, as crucial decision points approach you may get calls from colleagues all
over your state.
For Historians (Professional and Armchair)
There is a range of ways in which wargaming can help historians: checking the plausibility of purported facts, identifying gaps in information, providing substance to what is
now speculation, and enriching the development and communication of insights.
Though it is not well-known, most historians already owe a debt to one application of
wargaming. Hans Delbrück, considered the father of modern military history and to a
lesser extent of modern systematic history, adapted his techniques (techniques still used
today) from planning and wargaming techniques he learned as a Prussian staff officer.
In brief, he used norms developed to plan future operations to check the credibility of
previous historical accounts. To a limited degree he also worked backward, to fill in
gaps in the record—we know b happened, but b is only possible if a happened first. Historians today can use wargames as an edit check of the facts they have, uncovering gaps
and errors not obvious through conventional methods.
Since the introduction of double-entry bookkeeping in the closing years of the Middle
Ages, one field after another has developed ways to check its work. The Wright brothers’
wind tunnel allowed them to check the effectiveness of their ideas far more quickly than
by annual trips to Kitty Hawk. Today, modeling and simulation help companies identify
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errors that could previously be detected only through building and testing prototypes, a
process always more time-consuming, usually far more expensive, and in the case of the
1950s for test pilots, sometimes deadly.
How can wargames provide an edit check for historians? They have already done so.
Speaking years ago, James Dunnigan, then editor of Strategy & Tactics magazine and
the world’s most prolific wargame designer, told of his attempts to create a game on one
of the World War II battles of Kharkov. As a check on his work, his colleagues attempted
to follow the strategies of both sides, expecting to arrive at the actual outcome. After
repeated attempts they had not come close. After checking their orders of battle on both
sides and much of their other data, they finally discovered that the map used in all the
American histories of the battle was significantly wrong. When they substituted the
true map and repeated their tests, the historical outcomes were achieved. By creating
(or using an existing) wargame in parallel with your research and writing, it would be
possible to conduct similar edit checks. Such a process would also help to make more
readily apparent (and before you publish) any gaps in your data.
Of course, good history goes beyond simply reporting the facts. Even before the popularity of “what-if” books and alternative histories, good historians have attempted to
look down roads not taken. These attempts sometimes result from comments made
by participants during or after the conflict and sometimes from the historian spotting
what appears to be an option not realized, or at least not taken, at the time. At best,
historians have had to limit themselves to checking logistical feasibility. In a recent book
John Prados clearly describes how he adapted a previously published print wargame to
24
check the likely accuracy of claims made by participants in the campaign in question.
Similar techniques can be used to explore the likelihood of one force or the other taking Cemetery Hill late on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg or many other such
questions.
Finally, scratch-built, adapted, or “off-the-shelf” wargames on the subjects of historians’ work can enrich the perceptions of both historians and readers. Imagine having
a wargame you can use, as you research and write your book, for sensitivity analyses,
to determine what factors truly were decisive. Now imagine your readers following the
progress of that war, campaign, or battle trying for themselves various options described
in the book.
Of course the application of simulation gaming need not be limited to the study of
military history. Imagine how much more immersive (and popular) a book on the history of Shakespeare’s London would be if the reader could walk the streets of the city as
a person of the time and interact with other inhabitants. With the rate of progress being

362   the

newport papers

made on hardware and software, the book and all of London Town may soon be able to
fit on your phone. Such a book/game/environment would be, well, historic in itself.
For Businesspeople: Indirect and Direct Application
Given the well-deserved outpouring of praise for Steve Jobs following his untimely
death, many have forgotten that he was once fired by Apple’s board of directors. The
mind boggles when trying to imagine the state of personal computing today (and the
25
value of Apple stock) if it had not done so. Then there was the case of New Coke, when
a company took one of the most popular products on the planet off the market and
replaced it with something truly dreadful. These are only a few of the most famous cases
of truly bad business decisions. Given that 25 percent of small businesses fail during
26
their first year, it is clear bad decisions are quite common. Can the study of military
strategy provide an edge in business competition? Many seem to believe so. Several
27
books have been written advocating the application of military strategy to business.
Today it seems more businessmen read Sun Tzu than military officers.
I believe a very strong case can be made for the use of abstract wargames like chess for
developing a business leader’s ability to think down-board, see the entire board, and
generally think like a strategist. On the other hand, simulation wargames, though they
can produce similar benefits, would typically take more time to learn and execute than
abstract games. Typically they would also provide insights into specific business environments and choices; businesspeople should decide for themselves whether this added
benefit provides a good incremental return on an incremental increase in time invested.
Wargaming can provide the greatest benefit to business leaders not by the direct use of
actual combat games but as suggesting the types of benefits that would likely be available through the adaptation of wargaming to the bloodless (well, almost) combat of
business. While war and business are very different, they also have much in common.
Like war, business is a competition between two or more thinking competitors. Like
war, the success of a business strategy depends largely on what strategies are implemented by competitors. These similarities make it conceptually quite easy to adapt wargame
procedures to business, and many such adaptations have already been accomplished.
Still, it takes a touch of genius and usually a lot of hard work to develop businesscompetition simulation games to the effectiveness level of current military decisionsupport games.
Nevertheless, in some cases a relatively easy, relatively low-resource wargame can
provide valuable insight. In part to make adaptation of wargame techniques to business
easier to understand, let’s start with a notional description of such a business game.
Most individuals with business experience who have read to this point should be able to
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conduct the equivalent of a “tree-stump” business wargame. Here is one way it could be
accomplished. Take as our scenario that a hardware-store chain is exploring the profitability of opening a store in a new area. Three of the managers involved could conduct
a wargame equivalent in an afternoon. As they are actively considering an expansion,
they already have on hand all the competitor, cost, and demographic information they
will need to plan and adjudicate their moves. The most junior executive, who would
actually execute the expansion, is assigned to play Blue. A slightly more senior manager,
one who survived the launching of one new store, is assigned to play Red. The most
senior executive assigns him- or herself to play White.
Blue and Red first plan their actions before the new store opens, and each briefs White
separately. White estimates the net outcomes of Blue’s and Red’s plans and tells Blue and
Red only what each would know. Blue and Red then plan actions for the opening week
of the new store. Red recalls how competitors actually reacted when he opened a new
store and plays variations on their actions and some of his own ideas. Blue inputs more
or less the actions she is actually planning for her first week. Again White estimates the
net effect of both Blue’s and Red’s actions and briefs them only what they each would
know. The business game continues for three more turns, covering, respectively, the
first month, the next three months, and the first anniversary of the store’s opening. Following the assessment of the final moves, White, Blue, and Red discuss what they have
learned. Blue will be more aware of how her competitors are likely to react to the new
kid on the block and will have an idea of which choices are likely to be more effective.
As with the military application of wargaming, there is potentially a broad range of
business-game applications as well as a spectrum of methods and tools for them. Also
as with military wargames, it is unlikely any one tool or procedure will fit all applications. Other potential business applications of wargaming and wargame-like techniques
include:
•

Professional development: provide new and relatively new leaders with the experience (virtually) of veteran leaders.

•

Anticipating future environments: simulate conducting business under likely future
market conditions, such as after you and competitors have introduced new products.

•

Decision support: try out several business strategies against thinking, reacting
adversaries.

•

Execution development: try out selected strategies against thinking, reacting adversaries to refine your plan further.
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Tools could include a cadre of semiretired leaders who can play Red or serve as Whiteteam members, consultants with experience in adapting wargaming to business applications, and software specifically designed to replicate your industry.
Perhaps war and business are most similar in that in both, you need an edge. You do
not want to compete with a product of quality, functionality, and cost equal to that of
your competitors. Even less do you want to compete with leaders and managers who
have taken the same business courses that your competitors’ have. You do not want your
competitors and yourself to be equally effective. Wargames have been providing an edge
to monarchs and emperors, to generals and admirals, for centuries. With several books
on the subject and many contractors willing to provide as much or as little assistance as
you believe you need to get started, now is a great time to use wargaming to find an edge
for your business.
And All the Others . . .
The above groups are just a few of those who can benefit from wargaming, especially if
we adapt gaming techniques. Other groups could benefit too.
First Responders. Exercises for first responders are conducted today, but they often fail
to uncover flaws in plans, and they do not always prepare their participants for the chaos of real disasters. All too often such exercises simply follow a script, which is adjusted
little, or not at all, in response to the decisions the participants make. By designing into
their exercises elements of wargaming, such as a Red team to look for what could go
wrong and a White team to estimate ground truth and what part of ground truth the
participants would know, both plans and participants would be more effective when a
real disaster occurs.
Politicians. Politics already uses a lot of military vocabulary, such as “political campaigns,” and military strategists are assigned reading at many political science departments. It is easy to see why. If, to modify what Clausewitz said, war is the continuation
28
of politics by violent means, then it could be said that politics is war by peaceful means.
In both, success depends in very great part on the actions of your adversary. Wargaming
political campaigns before they get under way could refine a candidate’s strategy and
provide synthetic experience for the participants.
Government Officials. Elected, appointed, and civil-service employees all have parts
to play in governing. Techniques similar to those developed in adaptations to national
disasters and elections games can be developed that could help participants anticipate
likely outcomes of policy options. Again, plans and people could benefit from virtual
experience.
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Promoters of Tourism. Your first reaction might be—what! How can tools originally
developed for war be adapted to promote tourism? Today, tourism is marketed by trifold
pamphlets and thirty-second TV spots. In the fairly recent past, travelogues on TV, and,
earlier, between features in movie houses, were popular, but comparatively few watch
them today. What people are doing, especially what young people are doing, is playing
games. They play on their smartphones, on their computer tablets, on their computers, and on their game consoles. Imagine using the technology that makes first-person
shooters so immersive applied to making the user feel as if he or she is at some vacation
destination. How many, after an enjoyable, immersive experience, would want to go
back to that destination—this time for real? True, this is not really a wargame, but it
would use technology developed for wargaming.
I strongly suspect that the most lucrative, the most beneficial application of wargame
technology has yet to be imagined, yet to be realized. Given what you know now, you
may be the person who comes up with that application.

Notes
1. A “first-person shooter” (FPS) is one of a
very popular type of close-combat, tactical
computerized wargames that depict the player
as actually acting within the game environment. This is different from most wargames,
in which the player decides what actions
will be taken by subordinate units. Multiple
studies indicate that users of FPSs, who can
work off their anger against pixels, tend to be
calmer and less frustrated than other gamers.
(Literature search by colleague Dave Ross.)
2. As of this writing Civilization is in its sixth
edition. Graphics and interfaces have improved with each edition, but the basic game
play remains unchanged, and Civilization is
still an extremely popular game.
3. My son and I watched the movie A Bridge
Too Far (1977) together and then played the
print wargame Market Garden. We had a great
discussion on how events in the game both
differed from and paralleled the movie.
4. One naval officer actually stood on one of the
seminar tables and delivered an eloquent case
for the seminar not shifting a carrier battle
group into reserve.
5. See Sabin, Simulating War.
6. The 1754 report of Major Washington fed
British interest in the Ohio country, and

Major Suter’s briefing to the commander of
Tactical Air Command secured funding for
Red Flag.
7. See Roger H. Nye, The Patton Mind (New
York: Avery, 1993). For those of you who saw
the movie Patton, the real Patton really did
read Rommel’s book.
8. How I was told about this informal group is a
story itself. Captains (that is, O-3s, as opposed
to Navy captains, O-6s) are not normally summoned to their nations’ military headquarters
to brief, but I received such a call while serving at Nellis Air Force Base, in Nevada. The
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, then Gen. Lew
Allen Jr., had decided that his service had become too “stovepiped”—that is, while in their
hearts all Marines are infantrymen, Marines
first and their specialties second, we in the
Air Force, General Allen believed, thought of
ourselves as F-15 pilots, missileers, or logisticians first. To remind all Air Force members
that they were part of a common mission, he
had decided to institute “Project Warrior.” I
and several others had been invited to brief
on how various options, from base libraries to
military bands, could help. I briefed on how
wargaming could contribute. During our initial meeting to plan the launch of Project Warrior, General Allen had planned to speak to us
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but at the last minute he was preempted and
sent Brig. Gen. (later a general and commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command)
John T. Chain to pass on his remarks. General
Chain related a story General Allen had told
him about a reading group in the Philippines
between the world wars. The group lasted
only a few years; it never had more than nine
members, and over its life its participants totaled about thirty-five—but their names read
like a who’s who of World War II’s leading
American generals. General Allen wanted to
convey that though one might think informal
meetings of a handful of officers could not
have much impact, in fact, these officers
gained a grasp of strategy that paid dividends
during World War II. Hence, even if Project
Warrior convinced only 1 percent of Air Force
members to study war, its impact on future
wars could be disproportionate.
9. Colonel Warden liked to tell his ACSC
students, “Think like an architect, not like a
bricklayer.” He felt many Air Force officers
“had trouble getting out of the cockpit,” that
they continued to think tactically when they
were in positions that required strategic
thought. I did and do agree with him, but I
went to an engineering school with an architecture school, and all the future architects
were required to take enough engineering
to ensure their beautiful designs would not
fall down. So I added “Know your bricks” to
Colonel Warden’s dictum.
10. Lon O. Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile
Age (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2010); Modern Air Power (the Over
the Mideast and Over Vietnam editions),
designed by John Tiller, HPS Simulations,
2004.
11. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports:
A Personal History of the Pacific War, 2nd ed.,
USAF Warrior Studies (Washington, DC:
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Office of Air
Force History, 1987); Spector, Eagle against the
Sun.
12. Uncommon Valor, Matrix Games and 2 By 3
Games, 2002; Flat Top, designed by S. Craig
Taylor, Battleline and Avalon Hill, 1977;
Victory in the Pacific, designed by Richard
Hamblen, Avalon Hill, 1977.
13. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom; For the
People, designed by Mark Herman, GMT
Games, 2000.

14. Of course, the documentary The Civil War, by
Ken Burns, 1990, is a must-see for students of
the American Civil War, or war generally.
15. Axis & Allies, designed by Larry Harris, Nova
Game Designs, 1981. (Since 1984 it has been
published by the Milton Bradley Company.)
16. Rise and Decline of the Third Reich, designed
by John Prados, Avalon Hill, 1989; Empire
of the Rising Sun, designed by John Prados,
Avalon Hill, 1995.
17. An alternative to Third Reich with a less-thick
rule book is World in Flames (especially the
third edition) by Harry Rowland of the Australian Design Group, published in the early
1990s. This physically big wargame covers the
entire world fairly simply, and, with its add-on
Days of Decision, runs from 1936 to 1946.
18. Hearts of Iron is a grand-strategy wargame set
in 1936–48, designed in the Paradox Development Studio and published by Strategy First.
A player can control any one nation as World
War II unfolds. It was first released in 2002
for Microsoft Windows–compatible personal
computers. Since then Paradox has issued significantly enhanced editions every four or five
years. Mac versions have also been released.
19. Karl W. Eikenberry and David M. Kennedy,
“Americans and Their Military: Drifting
Apart,” New York Times, 26 May 2013.
20. For Delbrück, see Paret, Makers of Modern
Strategy, pp. 326–53.
21. I’ve heard a few moderately differing versions
of the story from Larry and mutual friends but
have seen in print only Michael Peck, “The
Name Is Bond, Larry Bond,” Foreign Policy
(October 2013).
22. Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. Drew, From
Lexington to Desert Storm and Beyond: War
and Politics in the American Experience, 2nd
ed. (London: Routledge, 2000).
23. For example, for the American Civil War,
McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom is written
at the appropriate level—it is simply an excellent, readable book.
24. John Prados, Normandy Crucible: The Decisive
Battle That Shaped World War II in Europe
(New York: NAL Caliber, 2011).
25. Still, there is a school of thought that views
that firing as a formative moment, critical
to his growth, which got Jobs to reevaluate
himself and his life.
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26. Only 1 percent of those that fail do so
because of natural disasters, crime, or other
factors beyond their control. Most failures
are attributed to various flavors of lack of
experience that manifests in bad decisions.
For more details go to “Startup Business
Failure Rate by Industry,” Statistic Brain
Research Institute, www.statisticbrain.com/
startup-failure-by-industry/.
27. The earliest I’ve found is Barrie G. James,
Business War Games (Boston: Abacus,
1984); the most insightful, John A. Warden
III and Leland A. Russell, Winning in Fast
Time: Harness the Competitive Advantage of
Prometheus in Business and Life (Montgomery,
AL: Venturist, 2002); the most recent, James
D. Murphy, Flawless Execution: Use the Techniques and Systems of America’s Fighter Pilots
to Perform at Your Peak and Win the Battles of
the Business World (New York: ReganBooks,
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2005); best for the scope of possible adaptation of wargame procedures to business, Mark
Herman, Mark Frost, and Robert Kurz, War
Gaming for Leaders: Strategic Decision Making
from the Battlefield to the Boardroom (New
York: McGraw-Hill for Booz Allen Hamilton,
2009); best for describing how to make those
adaptations, Benjamin Gilad, Business War
Games: How Large, Small, and New Companies
Can Vastly Improve Their Strategies and Outmaneuver the Competition (Wayne, NJ: Career,
2008). The last two, read together, do a fair
job of covering the spectrum of approaches to
business wargaming.
28. The quote varies with translation. Some give
“the continuation of policy,” not politics. “By
violent means” is more frequently translated
as “by other means.”

Conclusions: Toward Peace Gaming
We have come a long way since that first wargame in that first city. In the over four
millenniums since then we have developed democracy, free markets, and flush toilets.
We are now in a time, as President Kennedy said during his inaugural address, in which
“man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all
forms of human life.” Can wargaming play a part in making the first alternative more
likely and the latter less?
Where Have We Been?
As we look back on the broad sweep of the history of wargaming, some constants and
some trends become evident. One constant is the utility of wargaming. From Ramses
through Queen Elizabeth I to Ronald Reagan, heads of state with many other demands
on their attention have found wargaming worth their time. It is also clear that the
benefit gained from gaming varies with both the scope and the sophistication of our
wargame use relative to those of our adversaries’. So the Prussians’ simulation wargames
gave them an edge on Europeans using abstract games, while the increased sophistication and breadth of the Germans’ wargaming before World War II gave them an edge
over their early adversaries, whose gaming had not changed significantly since 1900.
The dominant trend of this book is the expanding use of wargames. True, for millenniums wargaming was the province of royalty and military elites, but when their use
began to expand, the expansion just kept on going. So when Franklin encouraged “the
people” to play chess, not every backwoodsman bought a chess set, but chess playing did
grow. When Lieutenant von Reisswitz figured out how his father’s wargame could be
produced cheaply enough that each regiment could be equipped with one, the explosion
in its use was such that even his tragic death could not put the genie back in the bottle.
When after World War I Germany kept a disproportionate number of officers trained in
conducting wargames, there was yet another explosion, this time in the applications and
hence types of games.
Just look at the United States since the 1950s. The growth of wargaming in the armed
forces has been dwarfed by the increase among civilians. In the 1950s few consumers had the money for miniatures wargames, and fewer still had heard of the single
print wargame then existing, Tactics. By the 1960s an increasing standard of living,
less expensive miniatures, and more print wargames more widely available increased
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civilian gaming by more than an order of magnitude. That rate of growth continued
into the 1970s, fueled by more choice and lower costs, thanks largely to magazines with
print wargames enclosed. By the 1980s, computers and role-playing games had expanded participation yet more. The late 1990s saw an explosion of computer games. By
the early years of the following decade, computer gaming had surpassed Hollywood in
revenues. Since then we have seen the Internet and small computing devices bring the
cost of wargames down and the spectrum of platforms on which they can run broaden.
Meanwhile the spread of democracy and free markets has enabled the growth of a global
middle class. We seem to be approaching a point where the majority of the human race
will have the time and technology to play sophisticated simulation wargames.
Where Do We Want to Go?
The best way to predict the future is to decide what you want the future to
be and make it so.
COL. JOHN WARDEN III, USAF (RET.)

So, what do we want the future to be? At the conclusion of the history section of
this book I reported my views on the most likely direction of the future evolution of
wargaming. Now I will suggest what direction would be in our best interest. I will conclude with two fictional vignettes illustrating how better wargaming can help produce a
better world for our children and their children.
First, Win
I will argue below that there is a distinctive American way of peace, and that it is the
best way of peace for all sides. To implement such a peace, the good guys first have to
win the war. We have established that wargaming is one way to gain an edge to help
win wars. Having looked at what has worked and not worked so well across the world’s
militaries, across the centuries, I offer here my views on the six steps needed to allow
wargaming to provide its maximal edge:
1. Train all military leaders on how to conduct wargames. Top Gun enabled the U.S.
Navy to turn around its air-to-air loss rate using the same aircraft, sensors, and
weapons it had used previously. Germany led the world in wargaming for a century because all its war college graduates were expected to conduct wargames upon
graduation. Only if military leaders have hands-on experience conducting games
can all the useful applications of wargaming be spotted and realized.
2. Use wargaming at all levels. The PhDs at RAND created some amazing wargames
that may well have been the most sophisticated in the world at the time. These
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games did little good for the infantryman in Vietnam, who faced an adversary who
used far-less-capable wargames but used them to plan even attacks of modest size.
During the interwar period, Germany widened its edge in wargaming; most officers
knew how to conduct games and did so at every level and for purposes previously
undreamed of. Ubiquitous wargaming will catalyze innovation and help the most
militarily effective innovations bubble up.
3. Wargame to the conclusion. From the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union to the
American combat involvement in Vietnam, wargames have misled when not played
to the conclusion of the event being gamed. Battles need to be played until one side
wins or a stalemate develops. Campaigns need to be played to their conclusion, wars
to their end. This will require design discipline, as many believe that if granularity
is good, more granularity is better. But when granularity comes at the price of not
wargaming the full event, the cost outweighs the benefit.
4. Adapt the intelligence community’s practice of assessing confidence. I used to tell
my students that the two biggest problems in wargaming were outcomes being taken
too seriously and outcomes not being taken seriously enough. Consciously assessing
confidence merited by game outcomes will help solve both problems. It will also help
identify ways to make wargames just a bit more worthy of confidence.
5. Use wargaming as a key element in the continuous professional development of
military leaders. Fortunately, most military members spend more of their careers in
time of peace than in active combat. Hence, folks who are best at managing peacetime operations tend to get promoted. Many think of war for only a year or two
out of their careers, if they get to go to a staff college or a war college. Even at these
schools, much of the curriculum is in becoming a better manager, writer, and briefer.
Wargaming can allow leaders to become virtual combat veterans at every stage of
their careers. Wargaming can put war back into the war colleges. If wargaming is
at the core of the curriculum, all other instruction can be designed to make the students more effective at gaming during school and more effective at war after graduation. Sets of books should accompany wargames, so that between schools leaders
can continue their development as virtual veterans. These texts can be created by the
military, purchased from commercial sources, or adapted from a commercial source.
Finally, militaries should hold wargame competitions. While the whole person
should continue to be the criterion for promotion, such competitions would allow a
leader’s effectiveness at winning wars to be one of the factors.
6. As platforms become cheaper and more powerful and code becomes more portable,
the defense community should be vigilant in spotting applications that just a few
years earlier were impossible or cost prohibitive. We may be in a time when new
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applications are constrained more by the limits of our imaginations than those of
technology. Even today, millions of Americans could be playing the same wargame,
at the same time, at a negligible cost to the government.
It is probably impossible to anticipate all the potential uses of such widespread wargaming. You can imagine several applications. Here is one I imagined: “The First Peace
Fighter.”
The dust of the access road quickly covered the dark-blue government car. Aside from the
dirt road, the trailer park did not look too bad. Most trailers were well maintained and nicely
landscaped. The entire park was among pines; there was even a small pond in the back with
a boat dock, but no boats. The colonel wondered, absentmindedly, “Would this be considered
working poor, or working class, or just toward the bottom of the middle class . . . ?”
Soon they arrived at number 61, one of the nicer trailers, down by the pond. As the two
men got out of the car they were instantly grateful for the shade of the trees. It was much
too warm to be wearing a “Class A” uniform or a suit and tie. Dr. Archer had commented
earlier that morning at the Lexington airport, “I didn’t think Kentucky got this hot.”
They were greeted at the door of the trailer by Mrs. McCoy and her daughter, Mary Ann.
Both looked younger than their ages. “Please come in,” said Mrs. McCoy. “You came a long
way to just hear me say no in person.” Both men entered, Colonel Kenney removing his
hat. Dr. Archer spoke first. “Ma’am, we understand your position . . .” “Do you?” interrupted Mrs. McCoy. “So you also lost your husband in Afghanistan, who died without ever
seeing your daughter?” Dr. Archer replied, “As I tried to tell you, we are not trying to recruit Mary Ann into the military.” For the first time, Mary Ann spoke. “Mama, these men
came a long way, and they are guests in our home. Don’t you think we should be courteous
enough to let them have their say?” Mrs. McCoy looked at her daughter with a curious
sadness and simply nodded her head.
After everyone had sat down Dr. Archer began. “Two years ago the U.S. government decided to form a twelve-person interagency strategy cell. The cell’s mission is to develop ‘all
of government’ strategies to enhance both our military security and economic prosperity. I
convinced the planners that the best way to pick folks to develop strategies was to see how
good they were at developing strategies. We built the 22nd-Century America computer
game as a test for candidates. Participants would play the game by setting American
policy through the end of this century. The twelve candidates with the highest composite
score for peace and prosperity would be offered positions. Halfway through development
we realized that we had a pretty addictive game on our hands, so we made it available as
a free download online. Your daughter was one of sixteen million Americans who played
the game.”
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Mrs. McCoy turned to Mary Ann. “You never told me you were taking a government test.”
Dr. Archer jumped in. “She never told you because she never knew; we did not want anyone to be intimidated by the purpose of the game and not play.” Dr. Archer continued, “We
are very glad that we opened up the game to whoever wanted to play. As things turned out,
only five of our twelve were already working for the government. Only two were serving
military. Colonel Kenney here makes three military, but he had retired by this time last
year, so we arranged to have him brought back on active duty. Five of our top twelve scorers are in their twenties. Your daughter is the youngest, but not by much.”
Mary Ann beamed when she learned how well she had done. She had known her score
was way higher than any of her friends’, but one of the top twelve . . . Mrs. McCoy looked
a little proud but mainly still troubled. “But she can’t just go off and do this,” Mrs. McCoy
said. “She won a full scholarship to our local community college; she starts in the fall. She
needs to get a degree first. I never did get my degree, and I still regret it.” Colonel Kenney
leaned forward: “Ma’am, your daughter will get her degree. As part of her compensation
package we will be paying one hundred percent of her college costs. I’ve already spoken to a
few DC-area colleges about her starting as a night student next fall.”
As Mrs. McCoy’s opposition softened, her look of sadness grew more intense. She was a
widow with an only child; Dr. Archer finally realized Mary Ann’s departure would leave
her alone. “Well, this is all very good, but Mary Ann is still so young, you could hire
whoever came in thirteenth instead,” said Mrs. McCoy; “Mary Ann will go to college here.”
It was a long time before anyone spoke. Finally Colonel Kenney reached out to put his
hand on Mrs. McCoy’s hand. “The loss of your husband left a void that has not, cannot,
ever be filled. I’ve never lost a spouse, but I have lost men and a woman while they were
under my command. The letters I had to write to their spouses were the hardest things I’ve
done in my entire career. I came back from retirement because if this cell works as well as I
hope and believe it will, then we will find ways to achieve our national objectives with far
fewer husbands and mothers, sons and daughters getting killed.” Looking intently at Mrs.
McCoy, Dr. Archer said, “I need Mary Ann. You do not yet fully understand: She did not
have the twelfth-highest score, doing little better than the thirteenth. Mary Ann had the
highest.”
Next, Make a Better Peace
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
SUN TZU

For many years I have argued that the American way of peace is to make our defeated
enemies willing military allies, important trading partners, and popular vacation
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destinations. This is not purely or even principally due to altruism; a defeated population that is better off than ever before is unlikely to start another war a generation later.
To make such a peace more likely America attempts to fight its wars while minimizing
the cost in time, lives, and treasure (on all sides).
Again, this is not purely or even principally due to altruism. The shorter the war, the less
time there is for something to go wrong (like bombing the Chinese embassy), the less
time for our adversary to develop a new weapon or gain a new ally. The fewer casualties
among our troops, the less opposition there is to the war; the fewer enemy civilians and
even enemy fighters killed, the easier the transition to peace. The less treasure lost by
our adversary, the easier the transition to peace and the sooner that nation will be an
important trading partner. The less treasure lost by the United States, the stronger we
will be for our next challenge. If you take U.S. objectives to their extreme, the highest kind of military victory is one with zero time spent at war, zero casualties, and no
loss of treasure. Hence, the highest form of victory is peace, a peace where our former
adversary becomes a willing military ally, an important trading partner, and a popular
vacation destination without any war at all.
From Win-Lose to Win-Win
Another constant in wargaming over the past several millenniums is that wargames
have universally been exercises in “win-lose.” One side is checkmated; the other wins.
One side gains a beachhead on the continent of Europe; the other loses. In sports, for every thrill of victory there is the agony of defeat. Win-lose is so pervasive we do not even
think about it. Yet as every sports fan knows, there is always next year, and in enough
“next years” even the Chicago Cubs can win again—that is one of the most enjoyable aspects of sports. Yet in war, the determination to win next time leads to more war, more
death, and more destruction. Perhaps the time has come for us to evolve wargames into
peace games: playing for peace.
This book started with a story of a real wargame; it was retold to the best of my memory,
based on the words of a general who asked to be quoted. This book will conclude with
a short work of fiction. If it, or something like it, is to become nonfiction, then many
readers of this book must decide to envision a future they want—and work to make it so.
After all these years, videos of cats doing funny things can be counted on to go viral on the
Internet. Some of the other things that go viral are harder to anticipate. Who would have
thought a game on the current Taiwan crisis would go viral? Sure, it was a free download,
but there are so many free apps online that there are apps to sort through them all. Then
again, given the global concern that this crisis might end the long peace, perhaps it was not
so surprising.
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Even in today’s plugged-in world, few spotted the beginning of the crisis. Owing to quiet
campaign contributions from the mainland, ethnic Chinese candidates did very well in
several Taiwanese national elections. Before the next election, a host of laws were passed,
each justified for a different reason but all having the effect of suppressing the ethnic
Taiwanese vote. With each succeeding election voter-suppression measures became more
naked and more effective. Soon the Taiwan government, now ethnically Chinese, began
moving to “reunify with the rest of China.”
Early Taiwanese resistance actions were within local laws, nonviolent, and largely unreported by the Taiwanese and the international media. The story was picked up early on
social media, but even there it was one thread among many. As protests started to become
more violent, first social then traditional media started paying more attention.
As both peaceful civil disobedience measures and violent clashes increased, attitudes on
both sides hardened. Ethnic Taiwanese saw the struggle as their last best hope to avoid cultural if not physical genocide. The ethnic Chinese on Taiwan increasingly came to believe
they would quickly become a persecuted minority if they compromised. More ominously,
attitudes were also hardening in China and the United States. China had long sought “reunification” with Taiwan. Reports and especially videos smuggled out of Taiwan struck a
chord with the American public; commentators drew parallels to the civil rights movement
and even the American Revolution. As tensions grew, many historians worldwide likened
the current situation to the summer of 1914—none of the leaders wanted war, but no one
seemed to know how to avoid it.
Then the Taiwan Crisis app began going viral. The app allowed users to play any side
in the crisis. Opponents could be played by the app’s artificial-intelligence routine or by
online opponents. The app took off among the Taiwanese first. After many replays they
found a strategy that usually brought victory but would take decades and destroy much
that they hoped to preserve. Almost at the same moment, the app became an obsession
with the ethnic Chinese on Taiwan. It took most of these players much longer to find a
winning strategy, and it seemed that any winning strategy required the genocide or near
genocide of the Taiwanese people. Would they, could they, really kill all the Taiwanese and
still consider themselves civilized? The story was similar for Chinese and American players. Made curious by the reports coming out of Taiwan, many millions downloaded the
app. Some never found a strategy that would bring their nation victory; most eventually
did but at a price that made the word “victory” ring hollow. Similar results were obtained
in nation after nation, increasing international concern over the crisis still further.
Then, also starting on Taiwan, a different type of outcome started to be reported. A
website listing top scorers started to be dominated by players who had not achieved total
victory but had scored highest overall because their costs were far lower. The ethnic
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Taiwanese players discovered that if they allowed the ethnic Chinese to retain political
power disproportionate to their numbers the ethnic Chinese would not fight as hard. Ethnic Chinese started playing a strategy that allowed the ethnic Taiwanese to regain much
of their political power while retaining for the Chinese enough to have in effect a veto over
any initiatives that threatened their position. Again, similar insights emerged in China
and the United States.
Almost as suddenly as it had burst on the world’s consciousness, the Taiwan Crisis, real
and digital, had dropped from the headlines. There were still stories of flare-ups and small
acts of reconciliation on Taiwan, but there was no longer the feeling that the long peace
would soon end. Commentators who had not moved on to the next hot story expressed
amazement at the impact a single app seemed to have had.
His Holiness was relieved but not surprised. When he had been a boy growing up in Mumbai, radicals had tried to convince him and his fellow youths that Americans were triggerhappy fiends who cared nothing about the lives of others. Some of his friends contradicted
the radicals; they had played America’s Army, a game created by the Americans for
Americans. In the game, shooting innocents landed your character in the brig. Certainly
Americans would not be trained to be cautious if that was not how they were supposed to
be. At that young age the future pope learned how powerful, how credible, lessons learned
from games could be. When the Taiwan crisis first started to look as if it might spiral out
of control the pontiff became concerned. Had so much of the world’s population gone
so long without war that the horrors of war were no longer real? If they were reminded,
would they not work hard enough to avoid such a war? He decided the world needed a way
to make the costs of war seem real before they became real.
His Holiness smiled when he remembered that Stalin had asked dismissively how many
divisions the pope had. Without any divisions he had helped stop what could have become
a world war before it started. There was just one thing that truly surprised him. Although
the app had been given away for free, the sites that distributed it had been supported by
advertisers and had paid a very small royalty for each download. With just over two billion downloads the royalties had exceeded the costs of producing the app. The Vatican had
made a profit.

Appendix A: Contemporary and Historical Wargames
Contemporary
Advanced Concepts Event (ACE). This virtual wargame/demonstration uses mostly
Virtual Flag infrastructure to explore the impact of proposed platforms, munitions,
and other systems.
Air Force Future Capabilities Wargame, a.k.a. Futures Game (FG). This expert panel–
adjudicated constructive wargame is the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff’s far-term Title
10 wargame. It is held on odd-numbered years at the LeMay Center Wargaming
Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Blue Flag. This computer-adjudicated constructive wargame trains the staffs of air operations centers in the planning and execution of joint/combined air campaigns and
the air elements of theater campaigns.
Expeditionary Warrior (EW). The Marine Corps’s Title 10 wargame series is conducted
annually by the Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
to examine issues relating to the future of the force. Representatives from every U.S.
service, combatant commands, and multinational partners participate.
Global Engagement. This expert panel–adjudicated constructive wargame is the U.S. Air
Force Chief of Staff’s midterm Title 10 wargame. It is held on even-numbered years,
rotating between Europe and the Pacific. From 1997 to 2014 the wargame was known
as Unified Engagement.
Global Game, a.k.a. Navy Global. The first U.S. Title 10 wargame. Global has been held
since 1979, at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
Maple Flag. Established in 1978, Maple Flag is the Canadian air force’s live wargame/
exercise. Maple Flag is conducted twice a year at Cold Lake Canadian Forces Base,
Alberta, Canada. Maple Flag has hosted the air forces of over a dozen nations.
National Training Center. The U.S. Army’s center for training entire brigades through
live, virtual, and constructive wargaming. It is located at Fort Irwin, California.
Red Flag. Called the “ultimate wargame,” this live wargame/exercise is based at Nellis
Air Force Base and held several times a year in the skies of southern Nevada.
Unified Engagement (UE). This expert panel–adjudicated constructive wargame
is the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff’s midterm Title 10 wargame. It is held on
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even-numbered years, rotating between Europe and the Pacific. It was known before
1997, and has been since 2014, as Global Engagement.
Unified Quest (UQ). The U.S. Army’s Title 10 wargame, held at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania.
Historical
Big Stick. U.S. Air Force, 1961. Computer-assisted wargame of nuclear warfare between
the Soviet Union and the United States. Used in Air Command and Staff College’s
curriculum for decades.
Charge! Brigadier Peter Young, Col. J. P. Lawford. Influential miniatures wargame rules.
Dungeons & Dragons. E. Gary Gygax and David L. Arneson. This game started the roleplaying wing of wargaming.
Little Stick. U.S. Air Force, 1960s. Computer-assisted wargame of conventional warfare
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Used in Air Command and Staff
College’s curriculum for decades.
Little Wars. H. G. Wells, 1913, London, United Kingdom. First published second-generation
land wargame intended for a civilian audience. First published land miniatures
wargame for a civilian audience.
Panzer Blitz. Jim Dunnigan, 1970, Avalon Hill, Baltimore, Maryland. The first true
board-based, tactical-level wargame to be published and one of the best-selling of all
time.
Space War. MIT, 1962. First computer wargame.
STAGE (Simulation of Total Atomic Global Exchange). U.S. Department of Defense,
1960–63. Wargame of total war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It
required three years to develop and six months to execute one run.
TACSPIEL. U.S. Army, 1960s. Wargame for the division level and below. Computer assisted, but thirty minutes of game time took eight hours to play.
Tactics / Tactics II. Charles Roberts, 1954/1958, Baltimore, Maryland. First unambiguously second-generation board wargame for a civilian audience.
THEATERSPIEL. U.S. Army, 1960s. Theater-level, computer-assisted wargame.
War Games. Donald Featherstone, 1962, United Kingdom. First unambiguously secondgeneration miniatures wargame rules for a civilian audience.

Appendix B: Chronology
2000 bc

Date of an Egyptian mural that depicts two men apparently playing an
abstract wargame. Later evidence indicates the game was called T’au.

600 bc

Likely date of oldest surviving complete abstract wargame. Found in ruins of
Ur, an important Sumerian city-state, located in modern-day Iraq.

400s bc

Greek citizens begin playing Petteia, an abstract wargame.

300 bc

Earliest known Chinese abstract wargame, Weiqi, now called Go in the West.

168 bc

With the conquest of Greece, Rome acquires Petteia, renames it Latrunculi. The game spreads throughout the empire, as evidenced by a set 		
found in Britain.

400s

Weiqi spreads to Korea, where it is called Baduk.

500s

Earliest Indian abstract wargame. Called Chaturang, it is the earliest known
ancestor of chess.

600s

Weiqi spreads to Japan, where it is called Igo.
Chaturang spreads to Persia.

644

Following the Muslim conquest of Persia, Chaturang spreads throughout 		
Muslim territory.

800s

Earliest known use of Chaturang in Europe.

925

Earliest written mention of the Viking wargame Hnefatafl; oral tradition
suggests it is much older, plausibly an evolution of the Roman game Latrunculi. The Vikings go on to spread Hnefatafl to lands they settle.

1000

Chaturang is played throughout Europe.

1400s

Chaturang evolves into chess. Earliest known chess sets.

1664

Christopher Weikhmann, a German, introduces a variant of chess he calls
“the Kings Game.”

1780

Helwig, master of pages at the court of Brunswick, introduces a game with a
playing board of 1,666 squares, the color of a square representing the type
of terrain.
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1798

Neues Kriegsspiel is developed by Georg Vinturinus. The board depicts the
border region of France/Belgium, and the sixty pages of rules include 		
logistics.

1809

Schnorr von Carolsfeld develops military chess for the Saxon court.

1811

Herr von Reisswitz, the Prussian war councilor at Breslau, invents the first
“modern” wargame—that is, simulation game of combat, not abstract.

1816–17

Herr von Reisswitz’s wargame is played by Prussian and Russian princes.

1824

Lieutenant von Reisswitz adapts his father’s wargame so it can be played on
topographical maps, making the wider use of wargames practical.
Lieutenant von Reisswitz demonstrates his wargame to the Chief of Staff of
the Prussian army. Result: each regiment is ordered to procure a copy of the
wargame. Reisswitz is promoted to captain.

1827

Captain von Reisswitz takes his own life.

1828

First known occasion of Lt. Helmuth von Moltke advocating the use of 		
wargames.

1835

Captain von Moltke teaches German staff procedures, including wargaming,
to the Ottoman army.

1837

Moltke, now a general, becomes the Chief of Staff of the Prussian army
and orders increased use of wargaming.

1846

First wargame handbook is published in Prussia.

1866

Wargaming adopted by the Austro-Hungarian military.

1871

Prussian victory in Franco-Prussian War leads to international imitation of
the Prussian military, including wargaming.

1872

Captain Baring publishes a simplified version of German Kriegsspiel for use
by the British army. Its rules are likely the first rules used by the British army.

1873

Rigid wargaming is adopted by the Italian military.
First publication in Germany arguing for the adoption of “free Kriegsspiel,”
the use of professional judgment to speed adjudication.

1874

First known advocacy of wargaming in France.

1875

Tsar of Russia approves use of wargaming for instruction.

1877

Captain Naumann of Saxony publishes rules for what are now called “break
points,” at which units cease to attack or defend despite orders.
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1878

Capt. Philip Colomb, Royal Navy, patents earliest known naval wargame.

1883

Maj. W. R. Livermore, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, publishes first set of
wargame rules within the United States. The Army does not adopt his rule
set.
First formal decision by the British army to adopt wargaming. Members of
the “volunteer movement” (reservists) have already used the German game
for some time for informal training.

1884

U.S. Naval War College is founded.

1886

First lecture on wargaming at the U.S. Naval War College.

1887

Major Livermore and Captain McCarty Little conduct the first joint (Army/
Navy) wargame. They are told by their superiors never to do so again.

1888

The Royal United Services Institute plays the tactical-warfare board game
Polemos in its London headquarters—a learned academic society playing a
wargame to learn.

1889

Adoption of wargaming by the French military.
First wargame becomes part of the U.S. Naval War College curriculum.

1894

U.S. Navy first uses wargaming to evaluate tactical impacts of design options.
First known international participation in a U.S. naval wargame: two
Chinese observers.
U.S. Navy wargame is played assuming hostilities between the United States
and the United Kingdom.
Wargaming begins uninterrupted presence in the U.S. Naval War College
curriculum, extending to the present.

1895

Wargaming helps persuade the U.S. Congress to fund the Cape Cod Canal.
F. W. Kitchener publishes wargaming rules in the United Kingdom.

1896

U.S. Navy orders fleet experiments to confirm wargame indications of
benefits from converting ships from coal to oil.

1898

Second edition of Livermore’s American Kriegsspiel appears.

1900

U.S. Army War College is founded, incorporating wargaming in its
curriculum from the start.
In France the use of wargaming for staff planning down to the regimental
level becomes standard practice.
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1902

Decrease in wargaming by the British military. One explanation: contemporary wargames had not addressed factors that proved critical to the outcome
of the Boer War.

1903

U.S. Navy wargame indicates merit in keeping fleet concentrated.
Earliest reported use by Russia of wargames for operational planning.

1905

Schlieffen conducts his final staff-ride wargame, which ends in a German
victory over France before Britain can intervene. Schlieffen begins advocating this strategy should Germany go to war.
Unofficial wargame played in England ending in a German victory over
France before Britain can intervene apparently influences decision to
enhance British readiness.

1906

First U.S. use of wargaming in development of a battle plan, sent to fleet for
“examination and testing.” (Was this a live wargame?)
Moltke the Younger becomes the chief of the German general staff, improves
wargaming.

1908

Capt. Farrand Sayre, U.S. Army, writes Map Maneuvers and Tactical Rides,
to be published in 1911.

1911

U.S. Navy wargame conducted examining ships versus coastal defenses.

1912

Article by McCarty Little on wargaming published in the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. It is still one of the best papers on the subject.

1914

(April) Russian general staff conducts a wargame of its planned invasion of
East Prussia. Adjudication indicates that the Russian army would be
destroyed, approximately where it actually would be four months later, but
plan is not changed.

1916

Frederick Lanchester devises differential equations modeling power relationships between opposing forces. Lanchester’s equations are at the heart of 		
many computerized wargames today.

1922

U.S. Navy upgrades its tactical wargaming with actual weapons data.

1927

Under leadership of Lt. Cdr. Sokichi Takagi, the Japanese navy wargames an
attack on a U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. It goes badly for Japan.

1929

First Link Trainer built.
First wargame of the type later called “political-military,” or “pol-mil,” played
in Germany.
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1933

Wargame at the U.S. Naval War College indicates that war with Japan will
require four to five years, principally owing to logistical restraints.

1938

In an effort to persuade Hitler not to invade Czechoslovakia, German army
chief wargames the plan. Outcome points to a Pyrrhic victory that would 		
leave Germany vulnerable to attack.

1939

German army given so little notice that it cannot wargame the invasion of
Poland, its only major operation in World War II not gamed.

1940

Germany conducts four months of wargames to refine plans for attack-		
ing the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. The games lead to significant 		
changes.
German wargame of Operation Sealion, the planned invasion of Britain, 		
identifies many difficulties and contributes to the decision to cancel.
Germany wargames the imminent invasion of the Soviet Union. The game,
Operation Otto, is unprecedented in length and, probably, depth. Led by
Lt. Gen. Friedrich Paulus, the game plays the first six months of the war on
the Eastern Front. The game situation for November 1941 seems to indicate
near victory but also that the Wehrmacht has neither strength nor logistical
support to conquer Russia in one short campaign.

1942

Allies use wargames in planning the Torch landings in French North Africa.

1942–45 Capt. Gilbert Roberts, Royal Navy, uses wargaming for anti-U-boat training
and operational analysis in the Western Approaches Tactical School.
1944

Allied and German wargames of the invasion of Normandy project Allied
success. Germany orders reinforcements; two of three units arrive by D-day.
German wargame of the defense of the Ardennes interrupted by actual U.S.
offensive but wargame continues using actual development as inputs.

1945

Combined U.S., British, and Soviet wargame in Moscow indicates feasibility
and likely success of a Russian attack on Japan.

1946

Stanford Research Institute is founded.

1948

RAND is founded.

1954

Charles Roberts publishes Tactics, considered by many the first secondgeneration board wargame for a civilian audience.

1958

First computerized wargame, Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS),
becomes operational; it costs $7 million and takes up three floors.
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Charles Roberts publishes Tactics II, the first unambiguously secondgeneration board wargame for a civilian audience. He also founds Avalon
Hill, which will be for over a decade the leading publisher of secondgeneration print wargames for the civilian market.
1962

First civilian computerized wargame, Spacewar, programmed by students at
MIT.
In Britain, Donald Featherstone writes his classic War Games, inspiring a
generation of hobbyists and professional wargamers. Its impact is greatest in
the United Kingdom but is significant in the Commonwealth nations and the
United States. At least some copies will be sold in most nations.

1964

Sigma II, a pol-mil wargame of the Vietnam conflict, is played in the Pentagon
basement and indicates a likely initial stalemate.

1969

The U.S. Navy establishes its Fighter Weapons School, better known as “Top
Gun,” with live wargaming at its core. The school will be credited with improving the Navy’s air-to-air loss ratio in the closing years of the Vietnam
War, during which the Air Force’s loss ratio remains nearly unchanged.

1977

Dunn/Kempf wargame sets with 1 : 300–scale models are widely issued in
the American army as training tools.

1981

U.S. Army activates at Fort Irwin, California, the National Training Center,
which will push the envelope of live wargaming.

1982

The Warrior Preparation Center opens, as a U.S. Air Force–only wargaming
facility.

1983

The movie War Games opens.

1984

U.S. Army joins the Warrior Preparation Center, making it the first joint Air
Force / Army wargame facility in Europe.
Tactical Training Group activated at Hurlburt Field, Florida, Air Operations
Center Wargames.
Air Force Wargaming Center opens at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Center for Applied Strategic Learning founded, consolidating all National
Defense University wargame branches.

1986

Joint Warfare Center opens at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

1990

USCENTCOM wargames the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
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1993

First “Connections” wargaming conference held at Maxwell AFB, brings 		
together all wings of U.S. wargaming community; international participation
follows shortly.

1995

U.S. Marine Corps modifies the commercial computer wargame Doom to
serve as a virtual game for a four-Marine fire team.

1996

U.S. Navy joins Warrior Preparation Center.

1999

USCENTCOM conducts the Desert Crossing wargame, which identifies 		
problems of a post-Saddam Iraq, as well as solutions—findings that will be
ignored by U.S. leadership when planning Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Wargame Center opens at the German War College.

2003

(March) The Army component of USCENTCOM wargames the invasion 		
of Iraq. Game results that suggest high casualties in Iraqi cities prompt 		
changes in the Army’s plan.

2004

British army adopts a commercial personal computer–based game, VBS2, as
a key infantry training tool.

2008

Pentagon begins developing a $130 million simulated Internet for live cyber
wargames.

2012

The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff initiates Strategic Seminar 		
Series, conducted as a very free Kriegsspiel.

2013

First Connections UK wargame conference, high international participation.

2014

USSTRATCOM Wargame Center opens at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.
First Connections Australia conference.

2015

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work calls for the reversal of the 		
atrophy of wargaming in the U.S. military.
First Connections Netherlands conference.

2017

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence publishes its first wargame
doctrinal publication, the Wargaming Handbook.

Appendix C: Wargaming Organizations
Military
United States
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Office of Net Assessment (NA), Pentagon. Wargaming is just one of the tools it
uses.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Pentagon.
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Pentagon. Uses wargaming
		
as one tool to understand trade-offs between cost and impact.
Joint Staff
J-7 Joint Wargaming Division, Suffolk, Va.
J-8 Studies, Analysis and Gaming Division (SAGD), Pentagon.
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
Warrior Preparation Center, Einsiedlerhof, Germany. Founded in 1982 by Col.
		
“Moody” Suter; the U.S. Army joined in 1984, the Navy in 1996.
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
Pacific Warfighting Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Korean Air Simulation Center, Korea.
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
USSOCOM Wargame Center, Tampa, Fla. Principal wargame is Shadow 		
		Warrior.
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
USSTRATCOM Wargame Center, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: opened 5 June 2014.
National Defense University
Center for Applied Strategic Learning (CASL), Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
		
Since 1984 CASL has been responsible for providing wargame services to
		
all the university’s colleges and schools except for the geographically
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separated Joint Forces Staff College, which was served by its own
wargame branch. During a 2013 reorganization that function became
part of CASL (per Tim Wilkie of CASL).

U.S. Air Force
Air Staff (HQ USAF).
		
HQ USAF/A5SW, Pentagon. Runs the Air Force Title 10 wargaming 		
			 enterprise.
		

HQ USAF/A10, Pentagon.

		

Air Combat Command (ACC).

			

HQ ACC/A9LW Wargame Branch, Langley Air Force Base, Va.

			
414th Combat Training Squadron (Red Flag), Nellis Air Force 		
				
Base, Nev.
			

505th Combat Training Squadron (Blue Flag), Hurlburt Field, Fla.

			
705th Combat Training Squadron (Blue Flag), Kirtland Air Force
				
Base, N.Mex.
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Integrated with USPACOM wargaming.
U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). USAFE’s wargame operation evolved into
		
the USEUCOM capability.
USAF Special Operations Command.
		

War Gaming Office, AFSOC/A8XC, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Air Education and Training Command.
		
LeMay Center Wargaming Institute (LCWI), Maxwell Air Force Base,
			
Ala. LCWI supports Air University and the entire U.S. Air Force.
		
Blue Horizons, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Focuses on science and
			
technology (S&T) gaming.
Air Mobility Command (AMC).
		

AMC Wargaming, AMC/A8XC, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).
		
Wargaming and Strategic Studies, AFGSC/A8XC, Barksdale Air Force
			
Base, La.
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).
		

Wargame Branch, AFMC/A8OW, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
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USAF Research Laboratory (AFRL).
		
Strategic Planning and Transformation Division, AFRL/XPT, Wright-		
			
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. S&T support for the USAF 		
			
wargaming enterprise.
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
		

Wargame Office, AFSPC/A3TG, Peterson Field, Colo.

U.S. Army
Army Staff.
		
Strategy & Tactics Analysis Group (STAG), Pentagon. Analytical wargam			
ing and decision support.
Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
		
Conducts Army Title 10 wargames.
Center for Army Analysis, Fort Belvoir, Va. Provides high-level wargaming and
		
analysis in support of the Army Staff.
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
		
TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). Conducts analytical wargaming
			
in conjunction with studies, primarily at four of its centers: Fort
			
Leavenworth, Kans. (Wargaming and Simulation Directorate,
			
Scenarios and Data Directorate); White Sands Missile Range, N.Mex.
			
(Models and Simulation Directorate); Fort Lee, Va. (wargaming and
			
similar support to the Army’s Combined Arms Support
			
Command and the Sustainment Battle Lab); Naval Postgraduate
			
School, Monterey, Calif.
Centers of Excellence. All, though heaviest users are the Battle Lab Centers.
National Simulation Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Advocates, develops,
		
and provides live, virtual, and constructive wargames and one-sided 		
		simulations.
Educational wargaming:
		
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Wargames conducted 		
			
throughout the curriculum.
			

Department of War Gaming.

			

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

			

Digital Leader Development Center, Simulations Division.
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U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.

			

Warfighting Simulation Center.

			
Department of Military Instruction. Curriculum employs 		
				
wargames and simulations throughout.
		

Unit-training wargaming (live, virtual, and constructive):

			

National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.

			

Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La.

			

Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

			
Most major Army installations for decision support, education,
				
and training (constructive gaming) and unit training
				
(virtual gaming).
U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations.
		

Assistant for War Gaming Matters, Pentagon.

Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College (NWC), Newport, R.I.
		
War Gaming Department. High-quality research, analysis, gaming, and
			
educational support to the NWC mission, 1887–present. Forty
			
employees in purpose-built 110,000-square-foot facility, McCarty 		
			
Little Hall, conduct approximately fifty educational and decision			
support games annually. Executive agent for the Navy’s Title 10
			
wargame, Global. www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/War
			 -Gaming.aspx.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. Teaches wargaming and conducts
		
wargame-related research and development.
U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Wargaming Division, Quantico Marine Corps Base, Va.
Marine Corps University
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International
Australia. The center of Australian wargaming is the Australian Defence Simulation
		
and Training Centre. The Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre 		
		
(ADFWC), at RAAF Williamtown in New South Wales, is another 		
		
important center of wargaming, playing joint games for both training
		
and experimentation. Australia also has wargame centers near Darwin,
		
Brisbane, and Townsville, collocated with major ground units. Wargam		
ing is used as a teaching aid at staff and war colleges. Finally, Australia
		
conducts several annual live games, at least in part on instrumented 		
		ranges.
China. Wargames are developed at a Wargame Laboratory located at China’s National
		
Defense University. They are then used at headquarters and military 		
		
schools across the country.
Germany. Educational wargaming is conducted at the Führungsakademie der 		
		
Bundeswehr, also known as the General Staff College or the Senior		
		
Military Academy, near Hamburg. It has had a wargaming center 		
		
since 1999.
India. India’s Joint Staff includes an operations-research organization that conducts 		
		
some wargames but no office specifically dedicated to them.
Indian Army
		

HQ Army Training Command

		

Wargame Development Centre, DGIS Enclave, New Delhi

Indian Air Force
		

War Gaming Centre, to begin operations in 2014

Indian Navy (unknown)
New Zealand. Wargaming is conducted at Army Simulation Centres at Linton,
		
Waiouru, and Burnham.
Sweden. There are two wargaming organizations, one in the general staff to conduct
		
games, one in the war college to support both educational wargaming for
		
the war college and the NATO Partnership for Peace.
United Kingdom. This outline is based primarily on a 4 May 2015 e-mail from Maj. Tom
		
Mouat, British Army.
Ministry of Defence (MoD)
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Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Located at the Defence 		
			
Academy at Shrivenham, it performs high-level, decision-		
			
support wargaming and doctrinal development for gaming.
		
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl). Conducts most MoD
			
analytical wargaming to ensure that innovative science and
			
technology contribute to security.
		

Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Surrey.

		

Air Warfare Centre, Royal Air Force Waddington, Lincolnshire.

		

Maritime Warfare School, HMS Collingwood, near Portsmouth.

		
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom (formerly the Royal Military
			
College of Science), near Swindon, Wiltshire.
		
Principal garrisons (e.g., Warminster, Wiltshire; Catterick, North
			
Yorkshire; Paderborn, Germany) have facilities for constructive,
			
virtual, and live wargaming.
Defense Contractors
(All the below are or have been actively supporting defense efforts through wargaming.)
Abt Associates.
BAE Systems.
Bendix Corporation.
Boeing Company.
Booz Allen Hamilton.
BreakAway Games. A computer-wargame development and publishing company since
		
1998, pursues a strategy of bridging the defense, serious games, and
		
popular wargaming markets. See www.breakawayltd.com.
Center for Naval Analyses. Prolific producer of innovative wargames.
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. RAND-like organization, works 		
		
closely with OSD’s Office of Net Assessment.
Decisive-Point. One of the oldest and most prolific developers of serious games for the
		
military. Since the development of its first serious game, a tank-identification
		
game in 1990, it has sold more than ten game titles to the U.S. Army for
		
professional military education and training. Allied armies (e.g., those
		
of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Ukraine) have purchased 		
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Decisive-Point games. Decisive-Point has developed games for military
research and development. It produces critically acclaimed commercial
wargames through HPS Simulations.

Dupuy Institute.
IBM.
John Tiller Software.
Lockheed Martin.
Mäk Technologies. Parent company of the National Center for Simulation. With
		
Lockheed Martin hosts a wargame seminar for STEM (science,
		
technology, engineering, and mathematics) teachers. See mak.com.
RAND Corporation. Nonprofit organization “dedicated to furthering and promoting
		
scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for the public welfare and
		
security of the United States.” Name is portmanteau of “research and 		
		
development.” See www.rand.org.
Raytheon.
Research Analysis Corp (RAC).
Riverview Artificial Intelligence LLC.
Science Applications International Corporation.
Sonalysts. Begun in 1973 as a consulting firm for sonar-related analysis, now provides
		
support in engineering, planning, analysis, software, and training. It has
		
produced several commercial wargame titles; one, Dark Waters, is the 		
		
only commercial wargame of which I am aware that is used without 		
		
modification by one of the U.S. armed services.
Stanford Research Institute.
Technical Operations. Designers of STAGE, an air-defense command-and-control
		
system that in the 1960s included an embedded computer wargame.
Publishers and Developers
Most American consumer wargame publishers receive their product from in-house
design/development departments or freelance designers—often both. However, many
wargames, especially computer games, are created by development companies. Some of the
below organizations are no longer in business but are included for historical purposes. As
wargame publishers and, especially, development houses can be quite small I’m sure there
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are active companies that I missed. Also, companies come and go. I will attempt to keep
the list up to date at Connections-Wargaming.com.
1A Games. American print and miniatures wargame and book publishing, since 2013.
		
Titles include America Divided, Gettysburg, and Rebel Rail. See 		
		1AGames.com.
Activision Blizzard. American computer-game developer and publisher founded in 		
		
2008, now second largest by sales volume. In 2012 it had revenue of $5 		
		
billion and seven thousand employees. A few titles fit the definition of
		
wargames—for example, Call of Duty: Ghosts. See www.activisionblizzard
		.com.
Advanced Gaming Systems. American computer-game developer, 1990 to the present.
		
Developed the contemporary naval wargame Harpoon, sold by Matrix
		
Games. See www.advancedgaming.biz.
Against the Odds. American developer and publisher of a magazine with a print 		
		
wargame in each issue. Its titles cover all time periods, as well as all
		
warfare domains: air, sea, and land. As of early 2014 it had published 		
		
forty-two wargames and issues of the magazine. See ATOMagazine.com.
Avalanche Press. American developer and publisher of print wargames, founded in 1994,
		
in Irondale, Alabama. Most of its seventy (as of early 2014) depict aspects
		
of World War I or World War II land or sea warfare, though a few are set
		
in the American Civil War, the early gunpowder era, or the Roman era.
		
See AvalanchePress.com.
Avalon Hill (AH). American print-wargame developer and publisher and the first print		
wargame maker, it was founded in 1954 as the Avalon Game Company,
		
in Avalon, Maryland, producing Tactics. In 1958 the firm changed its
		
name to Avalon Hill. It is now a subsidiary of Wizards of the Coast, itself
		
a subsidiary of the toy and game maker Hasbro. In the 1960s the only
		
publisher of second-generation print wargames, AH continued to
		
dominate the field in the 1970s and ’80s. Many of its innovations became
		
standard industry practice, and many of its designs (such as Panzer Blitz and
		
Squad Leader) set records for sales. AH founded the first magazine on 		
		
print wargaming, The General (1964–98), which spread information on
		
wargame design and built the self-awareness of the wargaming commu		
nity. See www.avalonhill.wizards.com.
Battlefront.com. An American developer and publisher of computer wargames for 		
		
“Macs” and PCs, principally set in World War II. See battlefront.com.
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Bayonet Games. American print-wargame publisher, mostly on contemporary
		
conflicts. Markets to the troops. Only print wargame of which I know that
		
depicts the U.S. Army’s live wargames at the National Training Center.
		
Website performs many of the functions of a company magazine:
		bayonetgames.com.
Blue Sky Enterprises. Publisher of World War I and World War II miniatures rules.
Breakaway Games. Computer wargame-development company, since 1998. Attempts to
bridge the defense, serious, and popular wargaming markets. See www
		.breakawayltd.com.
Clash of Arms Games. American developer and publisher of print and miniatures 		
		
wargames and family games. Titles cover all periods of history, as well as
		
air, sea, and land warfare. See www.clashofarms.com.
Collins Epic Wargames. Publisher of historical and science-fiction wargames in paper,
		
card, and miniatures media. As of early 2014 it had only eight titles but
		
had distributors for not only the United States but Canada, Germany, the
		
United Kingdom, and Spain. See www.collinsepicwargames.com.
Columbia Games. Wargame developer and publisher since 1972. Its system, which uses
		
paper for maps and wooden blocks for counters, allows, without a
		
computer, limitation of intelligence input and incremental loss of unit 		
		
strength. As of early 2014 it offered about thirty titles and roughly a 		
		
dozen alternative maps; the website offers almost fifty videos, mostly
		
tutorials, and also “Ten Best Wargames for a Beginner.” See
		columbiagames.com.
Compass Games. Publisher of print wargames since 2004, with twenty-six titles covering
		
all eras. Over eighty issues have appeared of its magazine, Paper Wars,
		
with a wargame in each. See www.compassgames.com.
Consim Press. Publisher of print “consim” (conflict simulation) games, a division of 		
		
ConsimWorld LLC. In 2017 it had no titles immediately available but five
		
listed for preorder, as well as two out of stock. See www.consimpress.com.
Decision Games. Print and computer wargame publisher since 1988, has issued
		
numerous updates of SPI classics. Many are “monster” games; for 		
		
instance, Atlantic Wall has a forty-two-square-foot map of Normandy,
		
at two miles per inch, and over four thousand playing pieces representing
		
all battalions and companies. Most popular recent title is D-day at 		
		
Omaha Beach, by John Butterfield. It produces each year two or three 		
		
boxed games and eight to sixteen “folio” (simplified, standardized rules
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and formats) and “mini” games (small, easy to learn, quick to play). See
		shop.decisiongames.com.
Diffraction Entertainment. A British publisher of print wargames, in “The Second 		
		
World War” and “Foxhole” series. See www.tsww-online.com.
Eidos Interactive. See Square Enix Europe.
Electronic Arts. Large developer and publisher of computer games, founded in 1982, 		
		
headquarters in California. In 2017 it reported net revenue of $4.8 billion.
		
A pioneer in all types of home computer games, Electronic Arts has major
		
development studios in the United States and Canada. See www.ea.com.
FASA Games. Founded in 1980 in the United States, it is now part, with Ral Partha Europe,
		
of the FASA Corporation. FASA Games is focused on pen-and-paper role		
playing and tabletop-miniatures games. See fasagames.com.
Flying Buffalo. Founded in 1970, develops a wide spectrum of innovative print games.
		
They include a unique “Ace of Aces” series of close, tactical World War I
		
air-to-air wargames. See www.flyingbuffalo.com.
Forgotten Fronts. Early American computer-game developer and publisher. Its titles ran
		
in DOS; two are available from archive.org, one set on the eastern front of
World War I, the other a “what-if”depicting Czechoslovakia fighting the
		
German occupation in 1938.
Fresno Gaming Association. A small (nine titles) print-wargame developer and
		
publisher, operated 1991–92. Known for perhaps the best graphics and
		
worst rules editing in the industry.
Game Designers Workshop. A prolific developer and publisher (on average one
		
every twenty-two days) of print wargames from 1973 to 1996. It also 		
		
produced several miniatures rules systems and well-received role-playing
		
games. At its demise it was probably the third-largest print-wargame 		
		publisher.
Games Workshop. Founded in 1975, it is the largest publisher of miniatures wargaming
		
materials in the United Kingdom, probably in the world. See www
		.games-workshop.com.
Gathering of Developers. American computer-game developer, 1998–2004.
GMT Games. Founded in 1990, it is now one of the largest print-wargame developers
		
and publishers. It prospered in the 1990s when so many wargame
		
publishers failed, thanks in part to its pioneering preordering program,
		
“Project 500.” Titles include all eras across a spectrum of size and
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complexity, as well as several science-fiction and family games.
See gmtgames.com.

Hexagon Interactive. “Designing and developing software tools for the US Military.”
		
See umahexagon.com.
High Flying Dice Games. American print-wargame publisher, games set in World Wars
		
I and II (Europe and Pacific), American Civil War, pre-1800, Cold War,
		
and contemporary conflicts. See www.hfdgames.com.
HPS Simulations. Computer wargame publisher, founded in 1990 by Scott Hamilton.
		
Over ninety titles, of which one, Point of Attack 2, was adapted for U.S.
		
Air Force use. See hpssims.com.
John Tiller Software. Small group of computer-wargame developers founded by Dr. 		
		
John Tiller in 1995. Over ninety commercial titles (some for HPS
		
Simulations and other houses) and twenty wargames developed under
		
contract for the U.S. Air Force and Navy. See johntillersoftware.com.
Judges Guild. Founded in 1976, it flourished until 1983, producing, especially, “play 		
		
aids” for Dungeons & Dragons. It closed in 1983 but reopened for business
		
in 1999 and since has published many role-playing titles. See judgesguild
		.org.
Kuma Reality Games. American publisher of computer wargames founded in 2003. 		
		
Its titles are mostly first-person shooters (World War II, science fiction,
		
tank, aircraft, ship); all are available for download free. See kumagames
		.com.
Legion Wargames. Print wargame publisher founded in 2009. Twenty-six titles are in
		
print, several dealing with events in the military histories of the United
		
Kingdom, Canada, or Australia. See www.legionwargames.com.
Lock ’n Load Publishing. Developer and publisher of board and computer games,
		
especially strategy and wargames, as well as of Line of Fire magazine. See
		store.lnlpublishing.com.
Lost Battalion Games. Publisher of miniatures wargames on paper maps, subjects from
		
ancient history to the twentieth century and science fiction. See www
		.lostbattaliongames.com.
Matrix Games. Prolific computer-wargame publisher, now owned by Slytherin UK.
		
See matrixgames.com.
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Mayfair Games. American designer, publisher, and distributor of print games, founded
		
in 1981. Of over a hundred, about a dozen deal with war or national
		
strategy. See www.mayfairgames.com.
MicroProse. An American video-game publisher and developer that operated from 1982
		
to 2001. It was founded by pioneer computer wargame and flight		
simulator designer “Wild Bill” Stealey, who in 1993 hired Sid Meier,
		
designer of Civilization. See Wikipedia, s.v. “MicroProse,” en.wikipedia.org/.
Modern Conflict Studies Group. Modern Conflict Studies Group, founded in 2007, is a
		
small print wargame publisher, marketing to both the general public and
		
serious gamers. Titles include Battle for Baghdad. See MCSGroup.org.
NovaLogic. American computer-game developer and publisher founded in 1985. Its 		
		
many wargames include first-person shooters, flight/fight (i.e., combat
		
flight) simulators, and titles that combine both. See www.novalogic.com.
Omega Games. Small publisher of print wargames on modern subjects and the
		
wargame review magazine Paper Wars, as well as U.S. distributor for 		
		
Simulations Canada. See OmegaGames.com.
Phalanx Games. A publisher of print wargames founded in 2009, with a London address
		
but a website with a Polish domain extension. Formerly cooperated with a
		
Dutch house of similar name. See www.phalanxgames.pl.
Quarterdeck Games. Small publisher of detailed yet playable naval and World War II
		
wargames. Founded by Jack Green, it operated until 1989. Several titles
		
were also published in Japan.
Schwerpunkt. American computer-wargame developer and publisher, founded in 1995
		
by two people—still the only employees, working part-time. Its four titles
		
depict the World War II Eastern and Western Fronts and conflict in the
		
Middle East, 1948–2010. See schwerpunktgames.com.
Sierra Entertainment. Founded in 1979 as On-Line Systems, its name changed to Sierra
		
On-Line and then to Sierra Entertainment before it was transferred to
		
Activision in 2008 and ceased operation. It was a pioneer in computer 		
		
gaming, including some wargame titles. Activision revived the name
		
in 2014 for marketing, among others, legacy Sierra titles. See Wikipedia,
		
s.v. “Sierra Entertainment,” en.wikipedia.org/.
Simulations Publications Inc. SPI was an American print-wargame pioneer, developer, and
		
publisher operated from 1969 to 1982. It was first to include a wargame
		
in each issue of its magazine, Strategy & Tactics. Founder James
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Dunnigan innovated many methods that are now standard and for
		
decades held the record for the most wargames designed. Art director 		
		
Redmond Simonsen developed many now-standard graphic conventions.
		
SPI titles included all historical eras, ranging from national-strategic to
		
close-tactical and from small “introductory” wargames to the first of the
		
“monster” games. See Wikipedia, s.v. “Simulations Publications, Inc.,”
		en.wikipedia.org/.
Sonalysts. See listing under Defense Contractors.
Square Enix Europe. British computer-game developer and publisher, with titles that
		
include the first-person shooter Commando. Originally Square Enix, its
		
name changed when in 2009 it merged with Eidos Interactive. Developers
		
and studios in California, Denmark, Canada, London, and China. See
		eu.square-enix.com.
Steve Jackson Games. An American designer and publisher of print games—war, family,
role-playing, card—founded in 1980. Many of its titles are small games,
		
and many are satirical. It also publishes the magazine Pyramid. See www
		.sjgames.com.
Strategic Simulations Inc. An American computer-wargame developer/publisher, 		
		
arguably the first one; its Computer Bismarck is considered the first 		
		
computer wargame produced for the consumer market. Founded by Joel
		
Billings in 1979, by 1985 it had a dozen titles and sixty employees and by
the end of 1987, eighty-seven titles and annual sales of $5 million. When
		
it closed in 2001 it had published about 180 titles, mostly wargames, but also
the officially sanctioned computer version of Dungeons & Dragons. See
		
Wikipedia, s.v. “Strategic Simulations,” en.wikipedia.org/.
Strategic Studies Group (SSG). SSG is an Australian computer-wargame developer and
		
publisher, founded in 1982. Long a world leader in artificial intelligence,
		
it also publishes Run 5 magazine. Its products are distributed in the 		
		
United States by Matrix Games. See www.ssg.com.au.
Strategy & Tactics Press. Publisher of board wargames and military-history magazines;
		
the oldest, Strategy & Tactics, was the first to include a game in every
		
issue. Founded in 1991, it now produces, under publisher Dr. Christopher
		
Cummins, two additional magazines, also enclosing games: World at 		
		War, with a focus on World War II, and Modern War, on the Cold War
and modern and future conflict. Modern War recently featured “Target:
Iran,” by Joseph Miranda, looking at possible military intervention in
Iran. These three magazines (with print runs of fifteen to twenty
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thousand) appear bimonthly, meaning eighteen magazine games per year.
		
See strategyandtacticspress.com; contact Christopher Cummins, at
		doccummins@strategyandtacticspress.com.
Take 2 Interactive. An American developer and publisher of computer games founded in
1993, it produces war, national-strategy, and sports games, as well as
		
educational games for young children. It is best known for Civilization
		
and Grand Theft Auto. See www.take2games.com.
TalonSoft. An American computer-wargame developer and publisher that operated
1995–2005, it produced roughly forty titles, from the Napoleonic era to
		
contemporary conflicts. Most focused at the battle or campaign level. See
		
Wikipedia, s.v. “TalonSoft,” en.wikipedia.org/.
Task Force Games. From 1978 to 1996 an American publisher of print wargames, it 		
		
is best remembered for the popular tactical space science-fiction wargame
		
Star Fleet Battles. But many of its titles had naval themes, and many were
		
small. See Wikipedia, s.v. “Task Force Games,” en.wikipedia.org/.
TSR. Founded as Tactical Studies Rules and now best known as the original publisher
		
of Dungeons & Dragons, TSR also published twenty-three wargames and
		
even more fantasy, science-fiction, and economics titles. Operated 		
		
1973–97. See Wikipedia, s.v. “TSR (company),” en.wikipedia.org/.
Turning Point Simulations. An American publisher of print wargames, founded in 2012.
		
Its intention is to publish a wargame on each of the “twenty decisive 		
		
battles of all time.” As of 2017 fifteen seem to have been in print. 		
		
See turningpointsimulations.com.
UbiSoft. A French computer-game developer and publisher founded in 1986, it now has
		
9,200 employees in twenty-nine design studios in nineteen nations and an
		
annual revenue of €1.25 billion. See www.ubisoft.com.
Victory Games. A division of Avalon Hill, it existed 1982–83. Founded in New York, 		
		
it developed print wargames and family games. Probably best known for
		
Gulf Strike, a contemporary campaign-level wargame, which was quickly
		
but extensively modified on the day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and
		
was used to analyze the actual military situation. See boardgamegeek
		.com.
Victory Point Games. An American print wargame developer and distributor founded
		
by Allen Emrich in 2007. In early 2014 it had forty titles in print; in 		
		
mid-2017 it listed ninety-nine best sellers alone. Most are on military
		
themes, some science-fiction, and one a simulation game of a campaign
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for the presidency of the United States. Its front office is converted entirely
to telework (“Virtual VPG”), all manufacturing and shipping to be
contracted out. See www.victorypointgames.com.

West End Games. An American developer and publisher of print games, 1974–2008.
		
Its best-known wargame was Tank Leader. It also published several role		
playing games, each set in a different era or environment. Its best-known
		
non-wargame title was Paranoia, a spoof on science fiction and role		
playing. See Wikipedia, s.v. “West End Games,” en.wikipedia.org/.
Worthington Publishing. A print wargame developer and publisher founded in 2009. In
		
2017 its site lists twenty-three games for sale. See worthingtonpublishing
		.com.
Yaquinto Publications. An American developer and publisher of print wargames and
		
family games, operated 1979–83. Yaquinto was probably best known for
		
its innovative packaging and the wargame Ironclads. See Wikipedia,
		
s.v. “Yaquinto Publications,” en.wikipedia.org/.
Academic
(All these institutions and individuals use wargames to teach, teach how to create
wargames, or have advanced the state of the art of wargaming.)
Air University, U.S. Air Force
LeMay Center Wargaming Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base
Squadron Officer School, Squadron Officer College, Air University
Army Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Art Institute of California, Orange County
Emrich, Allen (Teaches the art and business of wargaming.)
German War College, Germany
Harvard, Cambridge, Mass. (A pioneer in game theory.)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. (Leader in the development of
		
political-military wargames.)
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec (Especially the work of Professor Rex Brynen, 		
		
Department of Political Science. He used war/peace operation gaming in
my POLI450 [Peacebuilding] course since 1998, with approximately
		
a hundred students per year. The simulation is fully described in PS: 		
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Political Science & Politics [January 2010]. He won the International
Studies Association’s Deborah Gerner Innovative Teaching Award in 2011
for that and his work with PAXsims.)

Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. (Uses computer games for the study of
		
international relations.)
Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. (A pioneer in game theory.)

Appendix D: Key Contributors
Contemporary
(The below are brief bios of selected current key contributors to the field of wargaming.
For a periodically updated list with fuller biographical information, when available, see
Connections-Wargaming.com.)
Larry Bond, wargame designer, author, analyst, coauthor of Red Storm Rising
Rex Brynen, originator of the PAXsims website, pioneer in adapting WG to peace
building and political analysis
Matthew Caffrey, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), founder of Connections, designer, author, 		
teacher, advocate
Jon Compton, political scientist, wargaming of violent nonstate actors, lead of CAPE
wargame function
John Curry, publisher, founder of the History of WG Project, documenting the history
and developments in WG
Stephen Downes-Martin, former professor at NWC, wargame innovator, theorist, 		
advocate
James F. Dunnigan, prolific wargame designer, editor, publisher, author, now 		
semiretired
Michael W. Garrambone, past president of MORS, SME in OR and WG, analyst, 		
educator
Peter Garretson, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, chief of ACSC wargaming, wargame
advocate, innovator
Uwe L. Heilmann, Colonel, German air force, advocate and innovator in the application
of WG
Mark Herman, past partner in BAH, WG designer, publisher, innovator of military,
recreational, and business wargaming, now semiretired
Graham Longley-Brown, father of Connections UK, wargame SME, advocate
Jim Lunsford, Lieutenant Colonel, USA (Ret.), wargame designer, educator
Michael R. Macedonia, vice president and chief scientist for SAIC
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Colin Marston, head of the Defence Science and Technology Lab Wargaming 		
Team, UK
Rudy “Silver Fox” Martinez, founder of the Air Force Research Lab’s Advanced
Concepts Event, centered on a virtual wargame
Joseph Miranda, the most prolific print wargame designer, editor, writer
Tom Mouat, Major, British Army, wargame SME, advocate, innovator
Dr. Al Nofi, wargame researcher, designer, author
Michael Peck, journalist, most prolific writer on wargames and all computer gaming
Dr. Peter P. Perla III, wargame theorist, designer, author, manager, advocate
David O. Ross, wargame SME, advocate, innovator
Robert “Barney” Rubel, Captain, USN (Ret.), former dean at NWC, wargame advocate
and innovator
Philip Sabin, professor, educator of and with wargaming, cofounder of Connections UK
William “Bill” Simpson, principal wargame designer for USMC Wargame Division, 		
pioneer of open adjudication
John Tiller, designer and publisher of computerized wargames, commercial and military
Brian Train, Canadian wargame designer, writer, veteran
Eric Walters, Colonel, USMC (Ret.), principal wargame advocate in USMC
John Warden, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), originator of Connections, author, strategist
Casey Wardynski, Colonel, USA, originator of America’s Army wargame
Christopher Weuve, wargame designer and analyst, naval analyst
Tim Wilkie, NDU, wargame SME, cochair of Connections
Dr. Yuna Huh Wong, leader in advancing the MS&G of irregular warfare
Robert O. Work, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, American who has arguably done
most to advance wargaming in the DoD, wargame practitioner while at CSBA
Historical
(The list includes contemporary individuals who have fully retired. For updates and unabridged biographies see Connections-Wargaming.com.)
David Lance “Dave” Arneson, codesigner of first published role-playing game,
Dungeons & Dragons
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Lincoln Bloomfield, MIT professor jointly responsible for bringing pol-mil wargaming
to United States
Philip Howard Colomb, Captain, Royal Navy, inventor of modern naval WG
Trevor Dupuy, Colonel, USA, historian, champion of historical data in wargaming
Donald Featherstone, father of miniatures and British second-generation WG, prolific
wargame designer, editor, publisher, author
Benjamin Franklin, proponent of chess playing by the public, among many, many other
things
Herbert Goldhamer, RAND, codeveloper in 1950s of American pol-mil WG
Charles Grant, wargame designer and author, helped popularize miniatures wargaming
Gary Gygax, codesigner of first published role-playing game, Dungeons & Dragons
Sterling Hart, first director of NDU’s War Gaming and Simulation Center
Orville E. “Bud” Hay, chief of wargaming, Naval War College, 1985–99, a father of 		
Global
John Hill, designer of the best-selling print wargame Squad Leader and many others
Fred Jane, wrote first clearly second-generation naval combat wargame rule set for
civilian audience
William Jones, Colonel, USAF, founder of U.S. Joint Staff wargaming
F. W. Kitchener, author of 1895 British rule set on wargaming
Charles C. Krulak, General, USMC, directed commercial WG use for professional 		
development
Frederick William Lanchester, creator of Lanchester’s equations
Harris Laning, Admiral, USN, live and constructive wargame innovator, president of
NWC 1930–33
J. P. Lawford, Colonel, coauthor of Charge!, an influential miniatures wargame rule set
Edwin Link, first volume designer and builder of flight and other simulators
W. R. Livermore, Major, USA, first in United States to advocate, improve wargaming
Raymond Macedonia, Colonel, USA, founder and chairman of the Army War College
Wargame Department
William McCarty Little, father of American wargaming, 1846–1915
Francis McHugh, wargame designer, cofounder of Global, the first Title 10 wargame
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Helmuth von Moltke, Field Marshal, Prussian Army, adapted wargaming for planning
Gary “Mo” Morgan, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, wargame designer, USAF and 		
commercial
Joseph Morschauser, early miniatures wargame designer and innovator
Captain Naumann, first to publish rules on what are today called “break points”
Constantine “Dean” Pappas, Colonel, USAF, father of USAF Wargaming Center
Fletcher Pratt, designer of first U.S. naval wargame intended for civilian audiences
Georg H. R. J. von Reisswitz, Lieutenant, created first widely used modern wargame
Leopold von Reisswitz, Prussian war councilor, invented first modern wargame
Charles S. Roberts, founding father of commercially available print wargames
Ed Rotberg, in 1980 designed Battlezone and later Army Battlezone, the first FPS
Steve Russell, originator of Spacewar, programmed in 1962, first civilian computer 		
wargame
Farrand Sayre, Captain, USA, author of Map Maneuvers and Tactical Rides, 1908
Alfred von Schlieffen, General, German army, conceived Schlieffen Plan, advocate of
wargaming
Redmond Simonsen, pioneer in the art of intuitive graphics conventions
Richard “Moody” Suter, Colonel, USAF, father of Red Flag, Warrior Prep Center
Jack Thorpe, father of virtual wargaming, convinced DARPA to network simulators
Charles Totten, Lieutenant, USA, author of Strategos, early series of U.S. wargames
Adolf von Trotha, Prussian officer who asserted wargaming contributed to Prussian
success
Gary Ware, Colonel, USAF, Director of Wargaming for CENTCOM during Gulf War
H. G. Wells, author, wrote early ground-combat wargame rule set for civilian audience
Spenser Wilkinson, British volunteer officer, advocate of staff system and wargaming,
early advocate of the British adoption of wargaming, father of 1905
wargame that showed British inability to intervene against a fast German 		
offensive
Peter Young, Brigadier, coauthor of Charge!, an influential miniatures wargame rule set
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Abbreviations
ACSC		

Air Command and Staff College

BAH		

Booz Allen Hamilton

CAPE		

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

CENTCOM Central Command
CSBA 		

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DoD		

Department of Defense

FPS 		

first-person shooter

MIT 		

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MORS 		

Military Operations Research Society

MS&G 		

modeling, simulation, and gaming

NDU		

National Defense University

NWC		

Naval War College

OR		

operations research

pol-mil		

political-military

Ret. 		

retired

SAIC		

Science Applications International Corporation

SME		

subject-matter expert

UK		

United Kingdom

USA		

U.S. Army

USAF 		

U.S. Air Force

USMC 		

U.S. Marine Corps

USN 		

U.S. Navy

WG 		

wargame, wargaming
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